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The tokenizer appends one 40-byte Token per code point to a WTF::Vector. A Vector holds at most INT32_MAX bytes, so a component near 52 million characters made Vector::expandCapacity CRASH() the process. Append with tryAppend, stop tokenizing on failure, and return a TypeError, as WebKit 302131@main does. The bound also follows Bun__stringSyntheticAllocationLimit through Bun::maxVectorSize<Token>() so the test reaches it with a 64 KiB pattern.
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Reproduced on stock release bun (1.4.3, With this branch, both builds throw CI: the URLPattern tests pass on every lane in builds 113898 and 113903. The two red jobs are |
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Included review availability: Your plan provides up to 10 included reviews per hour; 1 remains after this review. WalkthroughChangesURLPattern tokenization now bounds token-vector growth using the synthetic allocation limit. Failed token appends stop tokenization and produce a URLPattern allocation handling
Merge Risk: ⚪ Minimal · up to URLPattern construction now reports an expected TypeError instead of aborting when token storage cannot grow. The covered boundary and regression cases pass, so the change is mergeable. 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4✅ Passed checks (4 passed)
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In `@test/js/web/urlpattern/urlpattern.test.ts`:
- Around line 219-222: Refactor the URLPattern allocation-limit test to use
beforeEach() for setSyntheticAllocationLimitForTesting setup and afterEach() to
restore originalLimit. Replace the manual component loop with describe.each()
over username, password, hostname, pathname, search, and hash so each component
runs as an independent test case.
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📒 Files selected for processing (4)
src/jsc/bindings/VectorSizeLimit.hsrc/jsc/bindings/webcore/URLPatternTokenizer.cppsrc/jsc/bindings/webcore/URLPatternTokenizer.htest/js/web/urlpattern/urlpattern.test.ts
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Updated 11:15 AM PT - Sep 10th, 2026
❌ @robobun, your commit dbfe20c has 2 failures in
🧪 To try this PR locally: bunx bun-pr 42220That installs a local version of the PR into your bun-42220 --bun |
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LGTM — focused port of WebKit 302131@ main that turns a reachable Vector::expandCapacity CRASH into a catchable TypeError.
What was reviewed:
addTokenfailure path:m_indexis not advanced on failure, but everyaddTokencall site intokenize()is followed bycontinue/loop-end, and the loop condition now checks!m_tokenAppendFailure, so no infinite loop or stale-index read.- End-token ordering: the
m_tokenAppendFailurecheck runs after the End append, so a list that fills exactly at the bound throws instead of returning withoutEnd(whichURLPatternParserandgetSafeTokenboth depend on). maxVectorSize<T>(): thestatic_assertpair pins the byte cap toisValidCapacityForVector's actual boundary;minwith the synthetic limit widens correctly (bothsize_t).- Tests: scoped
beforeAll/afterAllrestore of the synthetic limit,Buffer.allocover.repeat, boundary bisection covers both sides, all six tokenized components plus constructor-string and baseURL paths.
Extended reasoning...
Overview
This PR fixes a process abort in URLPattern when a pattern string produces more tokens than a WTF::Vector<Token> can hold. It adds a small header (VectorSizeLimit.h) computing the max element count for WTF::Vector<T> (lowered by the synthetic allocation limit for testability), changes Tokenizer::addToken to bound-check and use tryAppend instead of append, adds a bool m_tokenAppendFailure that short-circuits the tokenize loop, and returns a TypeError after the End-token append. Tests are added to the existing urlpattern.test.ts, lowering the synthetic limit to 1 MiB so the bound is reachable at 64 KiB instead of ~52M characters / ~5.8 GB.
Security risks
The change is a security improvement: it converts a user-reachable CRASH() (process abort, DoS) into a catchable TypeError, matching the WHATWG spec's error class and upstream WebKit's fix. No new attack surface is introduced — the only behavioral change is that oversized inputs now throw instead of aborting. The maxVectorSize computation uses size_t throughout with std::min before division, so there is no overflow risk.
Level of scrutiny
Moderate. This is a small (~30 LOC production change), focused fix that ports a specific upstream WebKit commit. I traced every addToken call site in tokenize() to confirm that a failed append (which leaves m_index unadvanced) cannot cause an infinite loop or be observed mid-iteration — every site is immediately followed by continue or is the last statement, and the loop condition now includes !m_tokenAppendFailure. I also verified the PR's stated deviation from upstream (checking the flag after the End-token append) is correct: without it, an input filling the list exactly would return a token list missing End, which URLPatternParser::performParse needs to flush pending text and URLPatternConstructorStringParser::getSafeToken asserts on.
Other factors
Test coverage is thorough for the change: six init components, the constructor-string form, baseURL inheritance, a below-bound pattern that still matches, and a binary-searched exact boundary asserting both sides (round-trips whole at N, throws at N+1). The tests follow repo conventions (Buffer.alloc over .repeat, bun:internal-for-testing to lower the limit, restored in afterAll, added to the existing test file). The bug hunt exited on dry_streak with no findings. No CODEOWNERS cover these paths. The one earlier CodeRabbit thread was resolved by a non-author and a follow-up commit landed.
…ot grow (#42649) ### Problem - Eight containers in the C++ web streams grow with script input and call `CRASH()` when full: `panic(main thread): abort() called`, exit 134. Every release since #33193 aborts, and Bun 1.3.14 does not. Fuzzing found them, with no user report. - Four are cheap: `StreamQueue::enqueueValueWithSize` (`StreamQueue.h:138`, the 67,108,864th `enqueue()`, 1.1 GB), `BunTextAccumulator::pieces` (the 262,343,954th binary `write()` under `.text()`, 2.1 GB), `streamingUTF8Decode` (`WebStreamsMisc.cpp:101`) and `concatenateChunks` (`BunStreamConsumers.cpp:402`), each with one 2^31-byte input. - Four need 8 GB or more: the read request, read-into and pull-into `Deque`s and the byte queue (from #42659, merged into this branch). ### Fix - Each site throws `RangeError: Out of memory`, as #37237 does. `Deque` has no fallible append, so those sites check `Bun::maxDequeSize<T>()` before the cell lock. The `Vector` sites call `tryAppend`, `tryGrow` or `tryReserve*`. - A failed `enqueue()` errors the stream. A refused `read()` rejects and the stream stays readable. `writer.write()` never throws: the stream errors and the pending writes reject. A full `tee()` branch errors both branches and cancels the source. - In `concatenateChunks` this PR only stops the abort. #37239 (open) makes totals up to 4 GiB resolve again. - Verified: 14 new tests in `streams.test.js`, 2 in `streams-string-limit.test.ts`. All 16 fail on the `main` sources. Self-reviewed: 14 concerns raised, 12 addressed. The other 2 ask for a source lint (#42648). ### Background - `WTF::Vector<T>` holds `INT32_MAX / sizeof(T)` elements. `append` calls `CRASH()` past that, and `tryAppend` returns false. `WTF::Deque` has a power-of-two capacity and keeps one slot empty. - `Bun::maxVectorSize<T>()` and `Bun::maxDequeSize<T>()` are those bounds, lowered by `Bun__stringSyntheticAllocationLimit`. The tests set it to 64 KiB in a child process. - `cellLock()` guards GC references against the concurrent marker. A throw allocates from the GC heap, so it happens outside the lock. <details><summary>Notes</summary> **Repros, on a release build of `main` (f04caca) and on Bun 1.3.14** ```js // 1. main: exit 134 after 2.6 s at 1.11 GB. 1.3.14: finishes, 4.7 GB. let c; new ReadableStream({ start(ctrl) { c = ctrl; } }, { highWaterMark: Infinity }); for (let i = 0; i < 67108864; i++) c.enqueue(1); // 2. main: exit 134 after 10 s at 2.13 GB. 1.3.14: resolves, 4.4 GB. const chunk = new Uint8Array(1); await new ReadableStream({ type: "direct", pull(c) { for (let i = 0; i < 262343954; i++) c.write(chunk); c.end(); }, }).text(); // 3. main: exit 134 at once, 29 MB. 1.3.14: exits 0. const w = new TextDecoderStream().writable.getWriter(); w.write(new Uint8Array([0xe2])); w.write(new Uint8Array(2 ** 31)); // 4. main: exit 134 at once, 32 MB. 1.3.14: resolves with 2,200,000,001 bytes. const big = new Uint8Array(1100000000); await Bun.readableStreamToArrayBuffer(new ReadableStream({ start(c) { c.enqueue("a"); c.enqueue(big); c.enqueue(big); c.close(); }, })); ``` **Provenance** - Sites 1 to 3 come from one fuzzing census of `main`. Site 4 is the abort #37239 reported on 2026-08-09. A review of this diff found that it was still open in a file this PR edits. - The four expensive `Deque`s come from the same census. This PR first left them out and listed them in #42648. #42659 then fixed them on top of this branch, and it was merged into it. - All eight containers first appear in #33193, the C++ rewrite of the streams. Before it the queues were JS arrays, which throw `RangeError: Out of memory`. - This is hygiene under the `REVIEW.md` rule that a failure user input can reach is a catchable error. It is not urgent. **With this PR, on a release build, at the real limits** (measured before #42659 was merged in) - Repro 1: `enqueue()` throws at 67,108,862 values. Exit 0, 2.9 s, 1.08 GB. - Repro 2: `write()` throws at 262,343,953 pieces, then `text()` resolves with that many characters. Exit 0, 12.1 s, 2.67 GB peak. - Repro 3: the second `write()` rejects. Exit 0, 0.1 s, 20 MB. - A `WritableStream` whose queue holds exactly 67,108,862 writes closes and drains (5.7 GB). One more write errors the stream: `writer.closed` and all 67,108,863 write promises reject with the `RangeError`, and no chunk reaches the sink (3.75 GB). - That last run gave the write promises no reactions. With a reaction on each, `writableStreamFinishErroring` queues 67 million jobs in one loop, and JSC's microtask queue aborts at the 33,554,432nd pending job. A plain `Promise.resolve().then()` loop does the same on `main` and on 1.3.14. #42648 tracks it. - The four expensive `Deque`s were not run at their real limits (8.5 GB to 42 GB). The synthetic limit covers them. **Where each number comes from** - A value queue entry is 16 bytes, so the largest legal `Deque` capacity is 2^26. A ring of capacity C holds C - 1 entries: 67,108,863. After this change that is 67,108,862 values plus the slot for the `WritableStream` close sentinel. A queue takes one sentinel at most, because `close()` rejects when a close is already queued. - A piece is 8 bytes. `Vector::append` grows by a quarter, and the step from 262,343,953 passes the largest capacity (268,435,455). `tryAppend` refuses at the same point. `maxVectorSize` binds only when a test lowers the limit. - `concatenateChunks` also keeps a 16-byte entry per chunk. It now reserves them in one fallible step. - A read request, a read-into request and a pull-into descriptor each take an 8-byte slot: 134,217,727 entries. A byte queue entry is 24 bytes: 67,108,863 entries. **What each refused operation leaves behind** - The byte controller checks the pull-into `Deque` before it transfers the caller's buffer, and it adds the request before the descriptor. A refused `read(view)` keeps its view and leaves no descriptor. - `readableByteStreamControllerEnqueueChunkToQueue` errors the stream when the byte queue is full. The buffer of the chunk is already transferred at that point, so the chunk cannot be handed back. The same function does this for a failed clone. - A direct stream refuses the read before `pull()` runs, so a `close()` that `pull()` defers is not lost. - `teeAbortWithError` is the clone-failure path of the byte tee, moved into one function. The default tee and the byte tee now use it when a branch enqueue throws. **Sites left as on `main`** - The write request `Deque` (`WritableStreamOperations.cpp:264`). The value queue of the same stream fills first, and `enqueueValueWithSize` bounds that. - JSC's microtask queue (#42648). - `StreamQueue::prepend` has no caller. **`VectorSizeLimit.h`** - It started as the file #42214, #40577 and #42220 add, byte for byte. #42659 added `maxDequeSize` and `#include <bit>` to it. Whichever of those PRs lands after this one takes this copy, which is a superset. **The tests** - Fourteen tests run children with the 64 KiB limit, the knob `scrypt.test.ts`, `argon2.test.ts` and #42214 use. On the `main` sources every loop runs to its end and reports no error, or a refused read never rejects. So the fail-before is an assertion diff, not an abort, and no test runs into its timeout. - The `TextDecoderStream` test and the `arrayBuffer()` byte-total test need the real sizes: a later check in the same function has the same threshold as the synthetic limit. Each child reserves its big chunk and never touches it. On the `main` sources each child exits 134. - The `WritableStream` test also closes a writer whose queue is exactly full, to cover the sentinel slot. - `streams-leak.test.ts` fails one RSS threshold on a debug ASAN build in this container, with and without this diff (761 MB against a 700 MB bound on the `main` sources). </details> <!-- robobun:evidence:begin --> --- **no test proof** · iteration 0 · platform-specific test(s) that do not run on this machine, deferring to CI, which covers all platforms: test/js/web/streams/streams.test.js <!-- robobun:evidence:end --> --------- Co-authored-by: robobun <robobun@bun.sh> Co-authored-by: Jarred Sumner <jarred@jarredsumner.com>
…ot grow (oven-sh#42649) ### Problem - Eight containers in the C++ web streams grow with script input and call `CRASH()` when full: `panic(main thread): abort() called`, exit 134. Every release since oven-sh#33193 aborts, and Bun 1.3.14 does not. Fuzzing found them, with no user report. - Four are cheap: `StreamQueue::enqueueValueWithSize` (`StreamQueue.h:138`, the 67,108,864th `enqueue()`, 1.1 GB), `BunTextAccumulator::pieces` (the 262,343,954th binary `write()` under `.text()`, 2.1 GB), `streamingUTF8Decode` (`WebStreamsMisc.cpp:101`) and `concatenateChunks` (`BunStreamConsumers.cpp:402`), each with one 2^31-byte input. - Four need 8 GB or more: the read request, read-into and pull-into `Deque`s and the byte queue (from oven-sh#42659, merged into this branch). ### Fix - Each site throws `RangeError: Out of memory`, as oven-sh#37237 does. `Deque` has no fallible append, so those sites check `Bun::maxDequeSize<T>()` before the cell lock. The `Vector` sites call `tryAppend`, `tryGrow` or `tryReserve*`. - A failed `enqueue()` errors the stream. A refused `read()` rejects and the stream stays readable. `writer.write()` never throws: the stream errors and the pending writes reject. A full `tee()` branch errors both branches and cancels the source. - In `concatenateChunks` this PR only stops the abort. oven-sh#37239 (open) makes totals up to 4 GiB resolve again. - Verified: 14 new tests in `streams.test.js`, 2 in `streams-string-limit.test.ts`. All 16 fail on the `main` sources. Self-reviewed: 14 concerns raised, 12 addressed. The other 2 ask for a source lint (oven-sh#42648). ### Background - `WTF::Vector<T>` holds `INT32_MAX / sizeof(T)` elements. `append` calls `CRASH()` past that, and `tryAppend` returns false. `WTF::Deque` has a power-of-two capacity and keeps one slot empty. - `Bun::maxVectorSize<T>()` and `Bun::maxDequeSize<T>()` are those bounds, lowered by `Bun__stringSyntheticAllocationLimit`. The tests set it to 64 KiB in a child process. - `cellLock()` guards GC references against the concurrent marker. A throw allocates from the GC heap, so it happens outside the lock. <details><summary>Notes</summary> **Repros, on a release build of `main` (f04caca) and on Bun 1.3.14** ```js // 1. main: exit 134 after 2.6 s at 1.11 GB. 1.3.14: finishes, 4.7 GB. let c; new ReadableStream({ start(ctrl) { c = ctrl; } }, { highWaterMark: Infinity }); for (let i = 0; i < 67108864; i++) c.enqueue(1); // 2. main: exit 134 after 10 s at 2.13 GB. 1.3.14: resolves, 4.4 GB. const chunk = new Uint8Array(1); await new ReadableStream({ type: "direct", pull(c) { for (let i = 0; i < 262343954; i++) c.write(chunk); c.end(); }, }).text(); // 3. main: exit 134 at once, 29 MB. 1.3.14: exits 0. const w = new TextDecoderStream().writable.getWriter(); w.write(new Uint8Array([0xe2])); w.write(new Uint8Array(2 ** 31)); // 4. main: exit 134 at once, 32 MB. 1.3.14: resolves with 2,200,000,001 bytes. const big = new Uint8Array(1100000000); await Bun.readableStreamToArrayBuffer(new ReadableStream({ start(c) { c.enqueue("a"); c.enqueue(big); c.enqueue(big); c.close(); }, })); ``` **Provenance** - Sites 1 to 3 come from one fuzzing census of `main`. Site 4 is the abort oven-sh#37239 reported on 2026-08-09. A review of this diff found that it was still open in a file this PR edits. - The four expensive `Deque`s come from the same census. This PR first left them out and listed them in oven-sh#42648. oven-sh#42659 then fixed them on top of this branch, and it was merged into it. - All eight containers first appear in oven-sh#33193, the C++ rewrite of the streams. Before it the queues were JS arrays, which throw `RangeError: Out of memory`. - This is hygiene under the `REVIEW.md` rule that a failure user input can reach is a catchable error. It is not urgent. **With this PR, on a release build, at the real limits** (measured before oven-sh#42659 was merged in) - Repro 1: `enqueue()` throws at 67,108,862 values. Exit 0, 2.9 s, 1.08 GB. - Repro 2: `write()` throws at 262,343,953 pieces, then `text()` resolves with that many characters. Exit 0, 12.1 s, 2.67 GB peak. - Repro 3: the second `write()` rejects. Exit 0, 0.1 s, 20 MB. - A `WritableStream` whose queue holds exactly 67,108,862 writes closes and drains (5.7 GB). One more write errors the stream: `writer.closed` and all 67,108,863 write promises reject with the `RangeError`, and no chunk reaches the sink (3.75 GB). - That last run gave the write promises no reactions. With a reaction on each, `writableStreamFinishErroring` queues 67 million jobs in one loop, and JSC's microtask queue aborts at the 33,554,432nd pending job. A plain `Promise.resolve().then()` loop does the same on `main` and on 1.3.14. oven-sh#42648 tracks it. - The four expensive `Deque`s were not run at their real limits (8.5 GB to 42 GB). The synthetic limit covers them. **Where each number comes from** - A value queue entry is 16 bytes, so the largest legal `Deque` capacity is 2^26. A ring of capacity C holds C - 1 entries: 67,108,863. After this change that is 67,108,862 values plus the slot for the `WritableStream` close sentinel. A queue takes one sentinel at most, because `close()` rejects when a close is already queued. - A piece is 8 bytes. `Vector::append` grows by a quarter, and the step from 262,343,953 passes the largest capacity (268,435,455). `tryAppend` refuses at the same point. `maxVectorSize` binds only when a test lowers the limit. - `concatenateChunks` also keeps a 16-byte entry per chunk. It now reserves them in one fallible step. - A read request, a read-into request and a pull-into descriptor each take an 8-byte slot: 134,217,727 entries. A byte queue entry is 24 bytes: 67,108,863 entries. **What each refused operation leaves behind** - The byte controller checks the pull-into `Deque` before it transfers the caller's buffer, and it adds the request before the descriptor. A refused `read(view)` keeps its view and leaves no descriptor. - `readableByteStreamControllerEnqueueChunkToQueue` errors the stream when the byte queue is full. The buffer of the chunk is already transferred at that point, so the chunk cannot be handed back. The same function does this for a failed clone. - A direct stream refuses the read before `pull()` runs, so a `close()` that `pull()` defers is not lost. - `teeAbortWithError` is the clone-failure path of the byte tee, moved into one function. The default tee and the byte tee now use it when a branch enqueue throws. **Sites left as on `main`** - The write request `Deque` (`WritableStreamOperations.cpp:264`). The value queue of the same stream fills first, and `enqueueValueWithSize` bounds that. - JSC's microtask queue (oven-sh#42648). - `StreamQueue::prepend` has no caller. **`VectorSizeLimit.h`** - It started as the file oven-sh#42214, oven-sh#40577 and oven-sh#42220 add, byte for byte. oven-sh#42659 added `maxDequeSize` and `#include <bit>` to it. Whichever of those PRs lands after this one takes this copy, which is a superset. **The tests** - Fourteen tests run children with the 64 KiB limit, the knob `scrypt.test.ts`, `argon2.test.ts` and oven-sh#42214 use. On the `main` sources every loop runs to its end and reports no error, or a refused read never rejects. So the fail-before is an assertion diff, not an abort, and no test runs into its timeout. - The `TextDecoderStream` test and the `arrayBuffer()` byte-total test need the real sizes: a later check in the same function has the same threshold as the synthetic limit. Each child reserves its big chunk and never touches it. On the `main` sources each child exits 134. - The `WritableStream` test also closes a writer whose queue is exactly full, to cover the sentinel slot. - `streams-leak.test.ts` fails one RSS threshold on a debug ASAN build in this container, with and without this diff (761 MB against a 700 MB bound on the `main` sources). </details> <!-- robobun:evidence:begin --> --- **no test proof** · iteration 0 · platform-specific test(s) that do not run on this machine, deferring to CI, which covers all platforms: test/js/web/streams/streams.test.js <!-- robobun:evidence:end --> --------- Co-authored-by: robobun <robobun@bun.sh> Co-authored-by: Jarred Sumner <jarred@jarredsumner.com>
Problem
new URLPattern({ pathname: ".".repeat(53_000_000) })aborts the process:panic(main thread): abort() called, exit 134. Any component and the string form reach it.Tokenizer::addToken(src/jsc/bindings/webcore/URLPatternTokenizer.cpp:71) appends one 40-byteTokenper code point to aWTF::Vector<Token>. AVectorholds at mostINT32_MAXbytes, andVector::expandCapacitycallsCRASH()when a growth step passes that.Fix
tryAppend, stop the loop on failure, and returnTypeError: URLPattern constructor: Failed to create URLPattern (from input string). The check runs after theEndtoken is appended (upstream checks before it), so a list that fills exactly at the bound throws too instead of losingEnd.Bun::maxVectorSize<Token>()(VectorSizeLimit.h, byte-identical to the header url: throw a RangeError instead of aborting when URLSearchParams or FormData outgrows its Vector #40577 adds). With the default limit it equals theVectorcap. The test reaches it with 64 KiB instead of 5.8 GB.test/js/web/urlpattern/urlpattern.test.ts(nine new tests, stock bun fails each: "Received function did not throw"). The real 53M input throws on debug ASAN and release builds. Also node'stest-urlpattern.js.Background
src/jsc/bindings/webcore/URLPattern*.cppis a copy of WebKit'sModules/url-pattern/, compiled into Bun. The tokenizer makes one token per code point of plain text, plus anEndtoken that both parsers rely on.WTF::Vector<T>::appendgrows by 1.5x and crashes when the new capacity failsisValidCapacityForVector<T>.tryAppendreturns false.setSyntheticAllocationLimitForTesting(bun:internal-for-testing) lowersBun__stringSyntheticAllocationLimit, down to 1 MiB.maxVectorSize<T>()ismin(INT32_MAX, limit) / sizeof(T).Notes
TypeError URLPattern constructor: Failed to create URLPattern (from input string)for{ pathname: ".".repeat(53_000_000) }, fornew URLPattern("https://example.com/" + "\0".repeat(60_000_000)), and for{ hash: "x".repeat(51_821_100) }(release, 5.5 s for all three).Endtoken: with the check before it, an input whose tokens fill the list exactly passes the check, theEndappend fails unseen, and the list is returned withoutEnd.URLPatternParser::performParseflushes pending fixed text only when it consumesEnd, so such a pattern would compile to an empty part list (a pathname pattern of"") instead of throwing.URLPatternConstructorStringParser::getSafeTokenassertslast().type == End. The last test finds the longest pathname that parses under the 1 MiB limit and checks that it comes back whole.sizeof(Token)is 40 in release and 48 in debug (StringViewcarries a lifetime-check pointer there), so the tests do not hardcode the bound. It bisects between 8 Ki (parses) and 64 Ki (throws): the longest pathname that parses is 26213 code points in release and 21844 in debug, plus theEndtoken.BUN_JSC_validateExceptionChecks=1is clean on the new tests. The real limit is not in the test suite: it needs more than 5 GB and about 35 s per run under ASAN. The tests cover six init components, the constructor string, a pathname inherited frombaseURL, a pattern below the bound that still matches, and both sides of the exact bound.protocolandportare left out because a 64 KiB value already fails their canonicalize step.Vector<Part>inURLPatternParserhas the same cap in theory (48-byte parts). Reaching it needs more than 112 million tokens, or tens of millions of unique group names through the linearisDuplicateNamescan, so the token bound covers it.String::MaxLengthwhen escaping or joining the base URL) and does not touch the tokenizer. It throwsRangeError: Out of memory, which is what Bun throws elsewhere for a string above the length limit. This PR keeps upstream'sTypeError, which is also what every other failure inURLPattern*.cppthrows. url: throw a RangeError instead of aborting when URLSearchParams or FormData outgrows its Vector #40577 adds the identicalVectorSizeLimit.h; whichever lands second merges cleanly.[human-review] gate passed · iteration 1 · 4 files touched
fails on main (without fix)
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