Replace T::max_value() with MAX (#156)

src/hazardous/aead/streaming.rs

@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@
 //!
 //! # Panics:
 //! A panic will occur if:
-//! - 64 + (`ciphertext.len()` - [`ABYTES`]) overflows `u64::max_value()` when decrypting.
+//! - 64 + (`ciphertext.len()` - [`ABYTES`]) overflows `u64::MAX` when decrypting.
 //!
 //! # Security:
 //! - It is critical for security that a given nonce is not re-used with a given key.
@@ -1300,7 +1300,7 @@ mod private {
         ];
 
         let mut ctx = StreamXChaCha20Poly1305::new(&SecretKey::from(KEY), &Nonce::from(NONCE));
-        ctx.counter = u32::max_value();
+        ctx.counter = u32::MAX;
         assert_eq!(ctx.key, before_internal_key.as_ref());
         assert_eq!(ctx.get_nonce(), before_internal_nonce.as_ref());
         assert_eq!(ctx.counter, u32::from_le_bytes(before_internal_counter));
@@ -1345,7 +1345,7 @@ mod private {
         ];
 
         let mut ctx = StreamXChaCha20Poly1305::new(&SecretKey::from(KEY), &Nonce::from(NONCE));
-        ctx.counter = u32::max_value();
+        ctx.counter = u32::MAX;
         assert_eq!(ctx.key.unprotected_as_bytes(), before_internal_key.as_ref());
         assert_eq!(ctx.get_nonce(), before_internal_nonce.as_ref());
         assert_eq!(ctx.counter, u32::from_le_bytes(before_internal_counter));
@@ -1390,7 +1390,7 @@ mod private {
         ];
 
         let mut ctx = StreamXChaCha20Poly1305::new(&SecretKey::from(KEY), &Nonce::from(NONCE));
-        ctx.counter = u32::max_value();
+        ctx.counter = u32::MAX;
         assert_eq!(ctx.key, before_internal_key.as_ref());
         assert_eq!(ctx.get_nonce(), before_internal_nonce.as_ref());
         assert_eq!(ctx.counter, u32::from_le_bytes(before_internal_counter));
@@ -1435,7 +1435,7 @@ mod private {
         ];
 
         let mut ctx = StreamXChaCha20Poly1305::new(&SecretKey::from(KEY), &Nonce::from(NONCE));
-        ctx.counter = u32::max_value();
+        ctx.counter = u32::MAX;
         assert_eq!(ctx.key, before_internal_key.as_ref());
         assert_eq!(ctx.get_nonce(), before_internal_nonce.as_ref());
         assert_eq!(ctx.counter, u32::from_le_bytes(before_internal_counter));

src/hazardous/hash/blake2b.rs

@@ -968,7 +968,7 @@ mod private {
             context.increment_offset(12);
             assert!(context.t == [30u64, 0u64]);
             // Overflow
-            context.increment_offset(u64::max_value());
+            context.increment_offset(u64::MAX);
             assert!(context.t == [29u64, 1u64]);
         }
 
@@ -980,14 +980,14 @@ mod private {
                 internal_state: IV,
                 buffer: [0u8; BLAKE2B_BLOCKSIZE],
                 leftover: 0,
-                t: [1u64, u64::max_value()],
+                t: [1u64, u64::MAX],
                 f: [0u64; 2],
                 is_finalized: false,
                 is_keyed: false,
                 size: 1,
             };
 
-            context.increment_offset(u64::max_value());
+            context.increment_offset(u64::MAX);
         }
     }
 }

src/hazardous/hash/sha512.rs

@@ -263,10 +263,10 @@ impl Sha512 {
     /// Increment the message length during processing of data.
     fn increment_mlen(&mut self, length: u64) {
         // The checked shift checks that the right-hand side is a legal shift.
-        // The result can still overflow if length > u64::max_value() / 8.
+        // The result can still overflow if length > u64::MAX / 8.
         // Should be impossible for a user to trigger, because update() processes
         // in SHA512_BLOCKSIZE chunks.
-        debug_assert!(length <= u64::max_value() / 8);
+        debug_assert!(length <= u64::MAX / 8);
 
         // left-shift to get bit-sized representation of length
         // using .unwrap() because it should not panic in practice
@@ -528,7 +528,7 @@ mod private {
             context.increment_mlen(12);
             assert!(context.message_len == [0u64, 240u64]);
             // Overflow
-            context.increment_mlen(u64::max_value() / 8);
+            context.increment_mlen(u64::MAX / 8);
             assert!(context.message_len == [1u64, 232u64]);
         }
 
@@ -539,10 +539,10 @@ mod private {
                 working_state: H0,
                 buffer: [0u8; SHA512_BLOCKSIZE],
                 leftover: 0,
-                message_len: [u64::max_value(), u64::max_value() - 7],
+                message_len: [u64::MAX, u64::MAX - 7],
                 is_finalized: false,
             };
-            // u64::max_value() - 7, to leave so that the length represented
+            // u64::MAX - 7, to leave so that the length represented
             // in bites should overflow by exactly one.
             context.increment_mlen(1);
         }

src/hazardous/kdf/argon2i.rs

@@ -39,11 +39,11 @@
 //!
 //! # Errors:
 //! An error will be returned if:
-//! - The length of the `password` is greater than `u32::max_value()`.
-//! - The length of the `salt` is greater than `u32::max_value()` or less than `8`.
-//! - The length of the `secret` is greater than `u32::max_value()`.
-//! - The length of the `ad` is greater than `u32::max_value()`.
-//! - The length of `dst_out` is greater than `u32::max_value()` or less than `4`.
+//! - The length of the `password` is greater than `u32::MAX`.
+//! - The length of the `salt` is greater than `u32::MAX` or less than `8`.
+//! - The length of the `secret` is greater than `u32::MAX`.
+//! - The length of the `ad` is greater than `u32::MAX`.
+//! - The length of `dst_out` is greater than `u32::MAX` or less than `4`.
 //! - `iterations` is less than `1`.
 //! - `memory` is less than `8`.
 //! - The hashed password does not match the expected when verifying.

src/hazardous/stream/chacha20.rs

@@ -967,7 +967,7 @@ mod private {
 
             chacha_state_hchacha.keystream_block(0, &mut hchacha_keystream_block_zero);
             chacha_state_hchacha
-                .keystream_block(u32::max_value(), &mut hchacha_keystream_block_max);
+                .keystream_block(u32::MAX, &mut hchacha_keystream_block_max);
 
             assert_eq!(hchacha_keystream_block_zero, hchacha_keystream_block_max);
         }
@@ -1010,7 +1010,7 @@ mod private {
                     U32x4(0, 0, 0, 0),
                     U32x4(0, 0, 0, 0),
                 ],
-                internal_counter: (u32::max_value() - 128),
+                internal_counter: (u32::MAX - 128),
                 is_ietf: true,
             };
 
@@ -1031,7 +1031,7 @@ mod private {
                     U32x4(0, 0, 0, 0),
                     U32x4(0, 0, 0, 0),
                 ],
-                internal_counter: (u32::max_value() - 128),
+                internal_counter: (u32::MAX - 128),
                 is_ietf: false,
             };
 

src/high_level/auth.rs

@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ mod public {
             /// in `authenticate/authenticate_verify`.
             fn prop_authenticate_key_size(input: Vec<u8>) -> bool {
                 let sec_key_res = SecretKey::from_slice(&input);
-                if input.len() == 0 || input.len() >= u32::max_value() as usize {
+                if input.len() == 0 || input.len() >= u32::MAX as usize {
                     return sec_key_res.is_err();
                 }
                 let sec_key = sec_key_res.unwrap();

src/high_level/hltypes.rs

@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ construct_secret_key_variable_size! {
     /// An error will be returned if:
     /// - `slice` is empty.
     /// - `length` is 0.
-    /// - `length` is not less than `u32::max_value()`.
+    /// - `length` is not less than `u32::MAX`.
     ///
     /// # Panics:
     /// A panic will occur if:
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ construct_salt_variable_size! {
     /// An error will be returned if:
     /// - `slice` is empty.
     /// - `length` is 0.
-    /// - `length` is not less than `u32::max_value()`.
+    /// - `length` is not less than `u32::MAX`.
     ///
     /// # Panics:
     /// A panic will occur if:
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ construct_secret_key_variable_size! {
     /// An error will be returned if:
     /// - `slice` is empty.
     /// - `length` is 0.
-    /// - `length` is not less than `u32::max_value()`.
+    /// - `length` is not less than `u32::MAX`.
     ///
     /// # Panics:
     /// A panic will occur if:

src/high_level/kdf.rs

@@ -48,8 +48,8 @@
 //! - `iterations` is less than 3.
 //! - `length` is less than 4.
 //! - `memory` is less than 8.
-//! - The length of the `password` or `expected` is greater than `u32::max_value()`.
-//! - The length of the `salt` is greater than `u32::max_value()` or less than `8`.
+//! - The length of the `password` or `expected` is greater than `u32::MAX`.
+//! - The length of the `salt` is greater than `u32::MAX` or less than `8`.
 //! - The `expected` does not match the derived key.
 //!
 //! # Security:

src/high_level/pwhash.rs

@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@
 //! An error will be returned if:
 //! - `memory` is less than 8.
 //! - `iterations` is less than 3.
-//! - The length of the `password` is greater than `u32::max_value()`.
+//! - The length of the `password` is greater than `u32::MAX`.
 //! - The password hash does not match `expected`.
 //!
 //! # Panics:
@@ -604,7 +604,7 @@ mod public {
             let exact_min = "$argon2i$v=19$m=8,t=3,p=1$cHBwcHBwcHBwcHBwcHBwcA$MDAwMDAwMDAwMDAwMDAwMDAwMDAwMDAwMDAwMDAwMDA";
             let less = "$argon2i$v=19$m=7,t=3,p=1$cHBwcHBwcHBwcHBwcHBwcA$MDAwMDAwMDAwMDAwMDAwMDAwMDAwMDAwMDAwMDAwMDA";
             // Throws error during parsing as u32
-            let u32_overflow = format!("$argon2i$v=19$m={},t=3,p=1$cHBwcHBwcHBwcHBwcHBwcA$MDAwMDAwMDAwMDAwMDAwMDAwMDAwMDAwMDAwMDAwMDA", u64::max_value());
+            let u32_overflow = format!("$argon2i$v=19$m={},t=3,p=1$cHBwcHBwcHBwcHBwcHBwcA$MDAwMDAwMDAwMDAwMDAwMDAwMDAwMDAwMDAwMDAwMDA", u64::MAX);
 
             assert!(PasswordHash::from_encoded(exact_min).is_ok());
             assert!(PasswordHash::from_encoded(less).is_err());
@@ -616,7 +616,7 @@ mod public {
             let exact_min = "$argon2i$v=19$m=65536,t=3,p=1$cHBwcHBwcHBwcHBwcHBwcA$MDAwMDAwMDAwMDAwMDAwMDAwMDAwMDAwMDAwMDAwMDA";
             let less = "$argon2i$v=19$m=65536,t=2,p=1$cHBwcHBwcHBwcHBwcHBwcA$MDAwMDAwMDAwMDAwMDAwMDAwMDAwMDAwMDAwMDAwMDA";
             // Throws error during parsing as u32
-            let u32_overflow = format!("$argon2i$v=19$m=65536,t={},p=1$cHBwcHBwcHBwcHBwcHBwcA$MDAwMDAwMDAwMDAwMDAwMDAwMDAwMDAwMDAwMDAwMDA", u64::max_value());
+            let u32_overflow = format!("$argon2i$v=19$m=65536,t={},p=1$cHBwcHBwcHBwcHBwcHBwcA$MDAwMDAwMDAwMDAwMDAwMDAwMDAwMDAwMDAwMDAwMDA", u64::MAX);
 
             assert!(PasswordHash::from_encoded(exact_min).is_ok());
             assert!(PasswordHash::from_encoded(less).is_err());

src/test_framework/streamcipher_interface.rs

@@ -212,15 +212,15 @@ fn initial_counter_overflow_err<Encryptor, Decryptor, Key, Nonce>(
     assert!(encryptor(
         key,
         nonce,
-        u32::max_value(),
+        u32::MAX,
         &[0u8; 65], //  CHACHA_BLOCKSIZE + 1 one to trigger internal block counter addition.
         &mut dst_out
     )
     .is_err());
     assert!(decryptor(
         key,
         nonce,
-        u32::max_value(),
+        u32::MAX,
         &[0u8; 65], //  CHACHA_BLOCKSIZE + 1 one to trigger internal block counter addition.
         &mut dst_out
     )
@@ -242,15 +242,15 @@ fn initial_counter_max_ok<Encryptor, Decryptor, Key, Nonce>(
     assert!(encryptor(
         key,
         nonce,
-        u32::max_value(),
+        u32::MAX,
         &[0u8; 64], // Only needs to process one keystream
         &mut dst_out
     )
     .is_ok());
     assert!(decryptor(
         key,
         nonce,
-        u32::max_value(),
+        u32::MAX,
         &[0u8; 64], // Only needs to process one keystream
         &mut dst_out
     )

src/typedefs.rs

@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ macro_rules! func_generate_variable_size (($name:ident) => (
     #[cfg(feature = "safe_api")]
     /// Randomly generate using a CSPRNG. Not available in `no_std` context.
     pub fn generate(length: usize) -> Result<$name, UnknownCryptoError> {
-        if length < 1 || length >= (u32::max_value() as usize) {
+        if length < 1 || length >= (u32::MAX as usize) {
             return Err(UnknownCryptoError);
         }
 
@@ -362,7 +362,7 @@ macro_rules! test_generate_variable (($name:ident) => (
     #[cfg(feature = "safe_api")]
     fn test_generate_variable() {
         assert!($name::generate(0).is_err());
-        assert!($name::generate(usize::max_value()).is_err());
+        assert!($name::generate(usize::MAX).is_err());
         assert!($name::generate(1).is_ok());
         assert!($name::generate(64).is_ok());