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Restrict high-risk Claude tools to reduce prompt-injection blast radius.
Allowing both
BashandWebFetchfor an agent processing PR review content creates a direct exfiltration path if prompt-injected (the step also exposesGH_TOKEN). Please tighten--allowedToolsto the minimum set required for/utils:address-reviews(avoid network/shell unless strictly necessary).Suggested hardening
As per coding guidelines, "Agentic CI actions: audit for prompt injection via issue/PR title/body flowing into LLM prompts" and "Least privilege: minimize GITHUB_TOKEN permissions".
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents