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[Backport 3.7] Onboard new backport-pr re-usable github workflow (OpenSearch) - #22321

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[Backport 3.7] Onboard new backport-pr re-usable github workflow (OpenSearch)#22321
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Backport a6387ac from #22310.

…earch-project#22310)

- Replace old backport workflow (VachaShah/backport + GitHub App) with reusable workflow
- Remove delete_backport_branch.yml (now handled by reusable workflow)

Signed-off-by: Peter Zhu <zhujiaxi@amazon.com>
(cherry picked from commit a6387ac)
Signed-off-by: opensearch-ci-bot <opensearch-infra@amazon.com>
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opensearch-ci-bot requested review from a team, jed326 and peternied as code owners June 25, 2026 17:17
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PR Code Analyzer ❗

AI-powered 'Code-Diff-Analyzer' found issues on commit 1251412.

PathLineSeverityDescription
.github/workflows/backport.yml11highExternal reusable workflow dependency added: opensearch-project/opensearch-build@58f2e51. Per mandatory rule, all external workflow/dependency references must be flagged regardless of apparent legitimacy. The commit pin is good practice but authenticity of that commit in the external repo cannot be verified here.
.github/workflows/backport.yml9mediumThe original workflow explicitly guarded against pull_request_target abuse with a comment citing GitHub security docs: it only ran on *merged* PRs. That guard (github.event.pull_request.merged check) has been removed. pull_request_target runs with target-repo secrets even for fork PRs, so if the reusable workflow does not re-implement this check, unmerged fork PRs labeled 'backport' could trigger the workflow with secret access.
.github/workflows/backport.yml13mediumSecret OPENSEARCH_CI_BOT_TOKEN is forwarded unconditionally to the external reusable workflow. The previous workflow used a short-lived GitHub App token scoped per installation; a bot token is typically longer-lived and broader in scope. Passing it to an external workflow increases the blast radius if that workflow's commit is ever replaced with a malicious one.

The table above displays the top 10 most important findings.

Total: 3 | Critical: 0 | High: 1 | Medium: 2 | Low: 0


Pull Requests Author(s): Please update your Pull Request according to the report above.

Repository Maintainer(s): You can bypass diff analyzer by adding label skip-diff-analyzer after reviewing the changes carefully, then re-run failed actions. To re-enable the analyzer, remove the label, then re-run all actions.


⚠️ Note: The Code-Diff-Analyzer helps protect against potentially harmful code patterns. Please ensure you have thoroughly reviewed the changes beforehand.

Thanks.

@peterzhuamazon

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Test completed, closing.

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