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moxa_timer reload issue #107
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Another one approach – do not disable TIMER1 and just update MATCH1 based on current COUNT register (with a little waste of timer's tick). It works too. |
shenki
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May 12, 2021
commit ccd48ec upstream. * rqst[1,2,3] is allocated in vars * each rqst->rq_iov is also allocated in vars or using pooled memory SMB2_open_free, SMB2_ioctl_free, SMB2_query_info_free are iterating on each rqst after vars has been freed (use-after-free), and they are freeing the kvec a second time (double-free). How to trigger: * compile with KASAN * mount a share $ smbinfo quota /mnt/foo Segmentation fault $ dmesg ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in SMB2_open_free+0x1c/0xa0 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888007b10c00 by task python3/1200 CPU: 2 PID: 1200 Comm: python3 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc6+ #107 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x93/0xc2 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x18/0x130 ? SMB2_open_free+0x1c/0xa0 ? SMB2_open_free+0x1c/0xa0 kasan_report.cold+0x7f/0x111 ? smb2_ioctl_query_info+0x240/0x990 ? SMB2_open_free+0x1c/0xa0 SMB2_open_free+0x1c/0xa0 smb2_ioctl_query_info+0x2bf/0x990 ? smb2_query_reparse_tag+0x600/0x600 ? cifs_mapchar+0x250/0x250 ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x70 ? cifs_strndup_to_utf16+0x12c/0x1c0 ? rwlock_bug.part.0+0x60/0x60 ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x70 ? cifs_convert_path_to_utf16+0xf8/0x140 ? smb2_check_message+0x6f0/0x6f0 cifs_ioctl+0xf18/0x16b0 ? smb2_query_reparse_tag+0x600/0x600 ? cifs_readdir+0x1800/0x1800 ? selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec+0x4d0/0x4d0 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x30b/0x950 ? __x64_sys_openat+0xce/0x140 __x64_sys_ioctl+0xb9/0xf0 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7fdcf1f4ba87 Code: b3 66 90 48 8b 05 11 14 2c 00 64 c7 00 26 00 00 00 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d e1 13 2c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffef1ce7748 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000c018cf07 RCX: 00007fdcf1f4ba87 RDX: 0000564c467c5590 RSI: 00000000c018cf07 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007ffef1ce7770 R08: 00007ffef1ce7420 R09: 00007fdcf0e0562b R10: 0000000000000100 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000004018 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000003 R15: 0000564c467c5590 Allocated by task 1200: kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40 __kasan_kmalloc+0x7a/0x90 smb2_ioctl_query_info+0x10e/0x990 cifs_ioctl+0xf18/0x16b0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0xb9/0xf0 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae Freed by task 1200: kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40 kasan_set_track+0x1c/0x30 kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x30 __kasan_slab_free+0xe5/0x110 slab_free_freelist_hook+0x53/0x130 kfree+0xcc/0x320 smb2_ioctl_query_info+0x2ad/0x990 cifs_ioctl+0xf18/0x16b0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0xb9/0xf0 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888007b10c00 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512 The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of 512-byte region [ffff888007b10c00, ffff888007b10e00) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:0000000044e14b75 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x7b10 head:0000000044e14b75 order:2 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0 flags: 0x100000000010200(slab|head) raw: 0100000000010200 ffffea000015f500 0000000400000004 ffff888001042c80 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888007b10b00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff888007b10b80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc >ffff888007b10c00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff888007b10c80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff888007b10d00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ================================================================== Signed-off-by: Aurelien Aptel <[email protected]> CC: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Steve French <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
shenki
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Feb 17, 2022
commit 341adee upstream. When we replace TCP with SMC and a fallback occurs, there may be some socket waitqueue entries remaining in smc socket->wq, such as eppoll_entries inserted by userspace applications. After the fallback, data flows over TCP/IP and only clcsocket->wq will be woken up. Applications can't be notified by the entries which were inserted in smc socket->wq before fallback. So we need a mechanism to wake up smc socket->wq at the same time if some entries remaining in it. The current workaround is to transfer the entries from smc socket->wq to clcsock->wq during the fallback. But this may cause a crash like this: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdead000000000100: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E 5.16.0+ #107 RIP: 0010:__wake_up_common+0x65/0x170 Call Trace: <IRQ> __wake_up_common_lock+0x7a/0xc0 sock_def_readable+0x3c/0x70 tcp_data_queue+0x4a7/0xc40 tcp_rcv_established+0x32f/0x660 ? sk_filter_trim_cap+0xcb/0x2e0 tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x10b/0x260 tcp_v4_rcv+0xd2a/0xde0 ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x3b/0x1d0 ip_local_deliver_finish+0x54/0x60 ip_local_deliver+0x6a/0x110 ? tcp_v4_early_demux+0xa2/0x140 ? tcp_v4_early_demux+0x10d/0x140 ip_sublist_rcv_finish+0x49/0x60 ip_sublist_rcv+0x19d/0x230 ip_list_rcv+0x13e/0x170 __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x1c2/0x240 netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x1e6/0x320 napi_complete_done+0x11d/0x190 mlx5e_napi_poll+0x163/0x6b0 [mlx5_core] __napi_poll+0x3c/0x1b0 net_rx_action+0x27c/0x300 __do_softirq+0x114/0x2d2 irq_exit_rcu+0xb4/0xe0 common_interrupt+0xba/0xe0 </IRQ> <TASK> The crash is caused by privately transferring waitqueue entries from smc socket->wq to clcsock->wq. The owners of these entries, such as epoll, have no idea that the entries have been transferred to a different socket wait queue and still use original waitqueue spinlock (smc socket->wq.wait.lock) to make the entries operation exclusive, but it doesn't work. The operations to the entries, such as removing from the waitqueue (now is clcsock->wq after fallback), may cause a crash when clcsock waitqueue is being iterated over at the moment. This patch tries to fix this by no longer transferring wait queue entries privately, but introducing own implementations of clcsock's callback functions in fallback situation. The callback functions will forward the wakeup to smc socket->wq if clcsock->wq is actually woken up and smc socket->wq has remaining entries. Fixes: 2153bd1 ("net/smc: Transfer remaining wait queue entries during fallback") Suggested-by: Karsten Graul <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Wen Gu <[email protected]> Acked-by: Karsten Graul <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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I observe an issue in the moxart_clkevt_next_event. Right after the timer has been disabled, the new value for MATCH1 register calculated based up on the current COUNT register. Regarding to the datasheet, after the timer disabled then it's counter's register have to be reloaded with a RELOAD register value. But it seems it is not. Seems like SoC need some cycles to reload. We read current value near the same as MATCH1 (we stops counting a little later). So, each round of clockevent gets a lesser value of MATCH1 (interval grows dramatically). For example, if we did a double read from a COUNT register, everything seems ok. If we disable then enable and disable TIMER1 again it's make a trick too.
I suggest just set negated "cycles" value to the MATCH1 register. It is already known that the RELOAD value is all "ones" right after the one shot round.
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