doc: add web-team IRP

INCIDENT_RESPONSE_PLAN.md

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+# Incident Response Plan (IRP)
+
+## Scope
+
+This IRP covers incidents affecting Node.js web properties and supporting services operated by the **@nodejs/web** team.
+
+For a list of covered services and repositories, refer to [PERMISSIONS.md](./PERMISSIONS.md).
+
+## IC & Escalation
+
+* **Incident Commander (IC):** Any `@nodejs/web` member who first takes charge.
+
+**Escalation:**
+ IC → `@nodejs/web-infra` → `@nodejs/web-admins` → `@nodejs/build` (Cloudflare account/zone-critical) and/or `@nodejs/security-wg` (security incidents) -> `@nodejs/tsc`.
+
+## Severity Levels & SLAs
+
+* **P0 – Critical user impact** (global outage/defacement/security breach):
+
+  * Acknowledge: TBD
+
+* **P1 – Major degradation** (partial outage, broken downloads/docs on a locale/route):
+
+  * Acknowledge: TBD
+
+* **P2 – Minor** (noncritical errors, single integration down):
+
+  * Acknowledge: TBD
+
+When in doubt, start at higher severity and downgrade later.
+
+## Canonical Response Workflow
+
+1. **Declare** severity; assign IC and Comms Lead.
+
+2. **Stabilize users first:**
+   * Roll back to last good deploy
+   * If needed, enable Cloudflare “Under Attack/WAF rules” and emergency caching on critical paths.
+
+3. **Communicate:** post an initial status summary and known impact; repeat per SLA. (Use blog/announcements or org channel as appropriate; precedent: public [post-mortem for March 17 incident](https://nodejs.org/en/blog/announcements/node-js-march-17-incident).
+
+4. **Contain & eradicate:** revoke keys/tokens, disable compromised deploy hooks, patch, and purge caches safely.
+
+5. **Recover:** redeploy clean artifact, validate, then progressively relax mitigations.
+
+6. **Review:** draft a blameless post-mortem, impact, root cause, and follow-up engineering actions \+ process fixes
+
+## Common Incidents — What Happens & What They Cause
+
+| Incident                            | Likely Cause                                | What users see                                                | Immediate actions                                                                                | Primary owner                |
+| ----------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ---------------------------- |
+| **Token/secret leak**               | Accidental commit or exposed CI logs.       | Subsequent unauthorized changes/deploys.                      | Invalidate in provider; rotate in 1Password; hunt for usage in audit logs; force redeploy clean. | Service owner + Web-Admins.  |
+| **Expired TLS/SSL certificate**     | Missed renewal or misconfigured auto-renew. | Browser warnings (“Connection not secure”), failed API calls. | Renew/redeploy certificate; validate chain; confirm monitoring alerts.                           | Infra + Build.               |
+| **Outage due to misconfigured DNS** | Incorrect DNS update or provider outage.    | Users can’t reach service; domain not resolving.              | Roll back DNS change; verify propagation; coordinate with DNS provider.                          | Infra + Build.               |
+| **Compromised admin account**       | Phishing or weak MFA.                       | Unauthorized changes in systems.                              | Disable account; rotate credentials; audit changes; notify security.                             | Security WG + Account owner. |
+
+## Communications
+
+**Internal (private):** `@nodejs/web` or `@nodejs/web-infra` channel/thread; if Cloudflare account action is required, loop in `@nodejs/build`. 
+
+**Public (as needed):** short status updates; if user impact was material, publish a brief blog post or addendum to an incident page (example precedent exists).
+
+### Notes on authority & ownership
+
+* Cloudflare account-level actions (e.g., role changes) are coordinated with **@nodejs/build**; Web-Infra holds write/admin depending on team (`web-infra` vs `web-admins`). Keep this in mind when planning mitigations that require account scope.