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Changes requested
The ordinary spaced-path example works, but the submitted MEDIA grammar still fails deterministic title-level cases at exact head bfc3c2d38a55.
Reproduced blockers
I ran a reviewer-authored two-case diagnostic through the mandatory no-network/no-$HOME sandbox. The threat scan was CLEAN, and both desired-contract assertions failed:
MEDIA:/tmp/v1.2 Reports/chart.png
actual Python capture: /tmp/v1.2
expected capture: /tmp/v1.2 Reports/chart.png
MEDIA:"/tmp/My Files/report (final).png"
actual Python capture: "/tmp/My
expected capture: /tmp/My Files/report (final).png
Result: 2 failed. The first failure comes from the lazy arbitrary-extension branch accepting .2 as the endpoint before the space (api/helpers.py:1233-1251, mirrored by static/ui.js:_mediaPathSrc()). The second exposes a cross-boundary mismatch: static/ui.js defines and unquotes quoted refs, but Python has no quoted alternative or unquote step. api/routes.py:_session_media_token_allows_path() and api/shares.py:_embed_share_media() pass the raw capture into Path, so a path the frontend renders as an unquoted /api/media request is denied by the session allow-list and replaced in a public share.
There is one more deterministic stream/settled mismatch. static/messages.js:_smdMediaRefHasReliableBoundary() finalizes a token merely because the current chunk ends in a known extension. Splitting MEDIA:/tmp/archive.png.bak immediately after .png emits /tmp/archive.png during streaming and leaves .bak as prose, while settled parsing consumes the complete .bak ref.
Required fix
- Define one unambiguous MEDIA grammar for JavaScript and Python. Keep the legacy no-space form, and use an explicit quoted form (or another explicit terminator) for ambiguous spaced paths and closing delimiters. Add the same quote alternatives and unquoting at both backend consumers before URL rejection and
Pathresolution. Preserve the existing canonical-path, role, MIME, root, symlink, size, and magic-byte checks. - Do not finalize an end-of-current-chunk MEDIA candidate just because it presently ends in
.png/another known extension. Buffer until a real lexical delimiter or stream end, then parse it through the same anchored grammar. Add stream-vs-settled equality tests over every chunk cut, especially after an intermediate extension. - Add cross-language behavior tests for dotted directories/stems before spaces, double- and single-quoted refs, internal
)/], trailing prose, adjacent MEDIA tags, Unicode, percent-sensitive characters, route authorization, and public-share embedding. - Please split the unrelated dotted model-label normalization into its own PR, or constrain it to known Bedrock/Vertex provider shapes and add paired backend/frontend tests. The current generic letters-only-prefix loop also rewrites arbitrary uncatalogued IDs such as
deepseek.v3, while backend and frontend apply different post-normalization label rules. - Remove the extra blank line at
api/helpers.py:1252;git diff --check origin/master...HEADcurrently reports it.
The existing sandboxed PR slices were otherwise green (15, 31 plus 18 subtests, 165, and 47 tests). Those tests do not cover the failing grammar or chunk-boundary cases above.
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Split out of nesquena#6607 at reviewer request — it was unrelated to that PR's MEDIA path handling and needed its own tests. `us.anthropic.claude-opus-5` carries a cross-region routing prefix plus a vendor namespace, and `mistral.mistral-large-2407-v1:0` adds a provisioned-revision suffix. None of it belongs in a human label, so the turn footer rendered "Us.anthropic.claude Opus 5". Strip only the two shapes these hosts actually publish, against a CLOSED provider allow-list: <region>.<vendor>.<model> us.anthropic.claude-opus-5 <vendor>.<model> mistral.mistral-large-2407-v1:0 A generic "drop leading letters-only dot segments" loop was rejected because it rewrites arbitrary uncatalogued IDs: `deepseek.v3` rendered as "V3" (vendor name silently deleted) and `foo.bar.baz` as "BAZ". Dropping a vendor is additionally gated on the remainder still naming the model, so `deepseek.v3` — where the vendor IS the name — is left byte-intact. Backend and frontend are paired: tests/test_dotted_model_label.py drives one table through both `_get_label_for_model()` and `_stripDottedModelPrefix()` and fails on divergence, including version dots (`gpt-4.1`, `qwen3.6-35b`), URI-scheme IDs, and unknown vendors. The Python half is inlined inside `_get_label_for_model` on purpose: the nesquena#3429 harnesses extract that function's source and eval it in isolation, so a module-level helper NameErrors there. The nesquena#3429 JS driver is updated to pull in the new helper for the same reason.
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Thanks — all five were real, and both of the failing diagnostics reproduced exactly as written. Head is now 1. One MEDIA grammar for both languagesDotted directory ( Unquoted paths now anchor on the last dot-extension of the final space-separated word, with intermediate words required to be dot-free. That dot-free requirement is what keeps the widening bounded, and it's why I deliberately did not restrict the anchor to a known-media-extension list — my first attempt did, and it broke this PR's own Quoted form. Added the quoted alternatives to Python plus a shared On your cross-boundary point, the consequence was worth pinning as a behavioral test rather than a regex assertion, so there's now an end-to-end one driving the real predicates: One clarification: 2. Buffer to a real delimiter, not an extension guessYou were right that ending in Completeness is now a real lexical delimiter or stream end (
The tail flush also had to split trailing whitespace off before the anchored Result over every 1-cut and 2-cut split of ten inputs: 5071 checks, 0 mismatches. 3. Cross-language tests
Both new suites were mutation-checked: reverting either fix — the quoted alternative, or the settled-token decision — fails them. I didn't assume they bite. 4. Model-label normalization split out → #6628Now its own PR, and scoped as you asked rather than left generic. Your 5. Trailing blank lineGone; VerificationFull suite: 13,846 passed. Three failures, none from these files — two are a missing Worth flagging one thing the suite caught that I'd otherwise have shipped: my first bounded-word implementation used a negative lookbehind, and |
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Changes requested, current-head re-gate
Thanks for splitting the dotted-model work and addressing the quoted-path/backend and early-extension findings. Those parts now converge. The current head still has a deterministic live/settled mismatch, and the new equality test masks it.
1. Stream-end flush loses a valid MEDIA token
For prose before MEDIA:/tmp/a.png and after, _smdMediaAwareAddText() buffers the candidate MEDIA:/tmp/a.png and after because the same-line suffix can extend the token. At stream end, _smdMediaTailFlushEntry() then applies _mediaTokenAnchoredRe() to the entire candidate. That anchored match fails, so production writes the whole string as literal prose. Settled renderMd() instead captures /tmp/a.png and preserves and after.
The authored case exists in tests/test_media_stream_settled_equality.py, but its streamedCaptures() helper reimplements flush with the unanchored global matcher. It does not drive _smdMediaTailFlushEntry(), so it reports equality while production diverges.
Fix: make production stream-end flush partition the candidate with the shared matcher at offset 0, emit the normalized MEDIA capture, and return the exact unmatched suffix through the owning text writer. If no offset-0 token matches or media append fails, preserve all raw text. Replace the mirrored test oracle with the real safe and fade streaming paths and assert both captures/DOM and exact remainder over every chunk cut.
2. The grammar is still inconsistent across live consumers
static/ui.js::_stripForTTS()still uses/MEDIA:[^\s]+/g. A dotted/spaced or quoted path is only partly removed, so the local-path tail is spoken. Route TTS through the shared token grammar and add behavior cases for dotted/spaced and quoted refs.media_token_pattern(exclude_urls=True)applies the case-sensitivehttps?://guard before the quoted alternative. Quoted HTTP(S), and uppercase-scheme HTTP(S), are therefore treated as local share paths and replaced with the missing-media placeholder, while the frontend accepts HTTP(S) case-insensitively. Reject external URLs after optional unquoting, case-insensitively, and add_embed_share_media()cases for quoted/unquoted and lower/uppercase HTTP(S).- Safe streaming, fade streaming, and settled
renderMd()do not use the same MEDIA policy inside inline/fenced code. Pick literal-code or active-media semantics and exercise the same rule through all three production paths.
Required regression gate
Use one fixture table for captures, normalized refs, exact remainder, and URL/local classification. Drive the real settled renderer, safe/fade stream paths, TTS, route authorization, and share embedding. Include final same-line prose, dotted/spaced and quoted paths, adjacent tags, punctuation/newlines, malformed quotes, and URL case/quoting.
Layer 1 classified this head SUSPICIOUS / NO-RUN solely because the new test fixture uses bytes.fromhex(...). Per the untrusted-code policy, I did not execute PR tests or code. The findings above are static production-path proofs at exact head b096292338fdd0331bc81f15f62d1fb807d553cb.
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You were right on both counts, and the first one is the more useful finding: my equality test was validating a mirror of the intended behavior rather than the shipped code. Head is now 1. Stream-end flush lost the token — confirmed, and the test was the reason it hidReproduced by driving the real The flush now partitions exactly as you specified: shared matcher at offset 0, emit the normalized capture, return the exact unmatched suffix through the owning text writer, and preserve the raw candidate if nothing matches at offset 0 or the append fails. On the test. Your diagnosis of why it passed was precise —
6614 chunk-cut checks, 0 mismatches. Reverting the flush to the anchored form fails 2074 of them, which is the check the old version couldn't make. I've added 2. Consumer consistencyTTS. Confirmed: Now routed through URL guard. Confirmed for all four spellings — quoted, single-quoted, One important scoping decision there: I initially had that predicate cover Code fences. Investigated rather than assumed, and the three paths already agree — the gap was documentation, not behavior. Settled
On the NO-RUN classificationFair — that was my doing. The Verification837 media/share/renderer/TTS/stream tests pass. Full suite: 13,906 passed, 1 failed — Both new guards mutation-checked: reverting the URL guard fails 6 tests, reverting TTS fails 1, reverting the flush fails 2074 chunk-cut checks. Lint gate reports 0 findings on added/modified lines; |
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Follow-up: pushed The mirrored oracle was still thereYou caught v1: the harness reimplemented stream-end flush with the unanchored matcher while production used the anchored one. I fixed that function and re-ran — 6614 checks, 0 mismatches. But the harness still reimplemented the per-chunk walk. Its tail gate compared That mirror was hiding a real bugThe tail branch gated on A sweep against faithful production semantics found 24 divergences across prose lengths straddling the cap; 0 after gating on Fixed structurally, not case-by-caseThe harness now extracts and evals the entire production call chain — Added Your Finding-1 concern about Dead code you'd have found next
Verification708 media/share/renderer/TTS/stream tests pass at this head. Mutation-checked: restoring the Lint gate reports 0 findings on added/modified lines. |
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Static re-gate at b979f63315ca: prior fixes landed, but three production paths still diverge
Thanks for replacing the mirrored stream harness and fixing the long-prose tail bound. The new tailValue.length check is correct, and TTS now uses the shared MEDIA grammar. The current exact head still has objective production defects.
1. Terminal flush processes only the first MEDIA match
static/messages.js::_smdMediaTailFlushEntry() calls _mediaTokenRe().exec(raw) once, appends that one capture, and writes the whole remaining suffix as text. An unterminated quoted candidate stays buffered as one unit; if it contains a later valid token, for example:
MEDIA:"/tmp/bad.png and MEDIA:/tmp/good.png
the first fallback match is handled, then the later valid MEDIA: token is emitted literally. Settled renderMd() scans globally, so stream and settled token counts diverge. The new equality table has adjacent valid tokens and a standalone malformed quote, but not the combined discriminator.
Fix: partition the whole final candidate with the shared global matcher. Preserve every exact prose slice through the captured owner/writer, append each token in order, preserve a token as raw text if its append fails, and emit the exact trailing suffix. Add malformed/open-quote plus later-valid-token, no-match, and append-failure cases through the extracted production chain.
2. Fade streaming bypasses the chosen code-fence policy
The PR's stated policy is active MEDIA inside code. Settled rendering stashes MEDIA before fence processing, and safe streaming routes add_text through _smdMediaAwareAddText(). Fade streaming returns early at static/messages.js:4412 whenever _streamFadeSkipNode(parent) is true; that predicate includes pre and code. Its MEDIA interceptor at :4421 is therefore unreachable for fenced/inline code.
Fix: route MEDIA-bearing/tail-bearing chunks through the shared interceptor before the generic fade skip return, or deliberately switch all three modes to literal-code policy. Add one real vendored-parser behavior test covering safe, fade, reduced-motion, and settled output for fenced and inline split tokens, with exact surrounding text conservation.
3. Public-share matching can restart inside an external URL
_SHARE_MEDIA_RE uses media_token_pattern(..., exclude_urls=True). That is only a negative lookahead at the current start position. For a token such as:
MEDIA:https://example.test/a.png?next=MEDIA:/tmp/local.png
the outer start is skipped, then global re.sub() can restart at the nested MEDIA:. _replace_ref() sees only the local suffix, so it can embed allowed local bytes into the middle of an otherwise exempt external token, or replace that suffix with the placeholder. Its after-unquote URL check cannot recover the outer-token context.
Fix: match the complete canonical token first, then classify the unquoted capture in _replace_ref() and return the exact original m.group(0) for HTTP(S). Add path/query nested-MEDIA: external URL cases and require byte-for-byte preservation, while retaining local positive and file:///out-of-root negative controls.
4. Unquoted sentence punctuation is consumed as part of the ref
The bare classes and extension boundary omit ., !, and ?, so MEDIA:/tmp/a.png. falls through to the greedy no-space form and captures the period as part of the path. The equality suite contains this shape but derives both sides from the same grammar, so it proves parity rather than the intended token/remainder split.
Fix: define terminal punctuation ownership consistently in JavaScript and Python, keep query punctuation inside actual URLs, and add intended capture plus exact-remainder assertions rather than mirrored equality alone.
Gate status
Layer 1 is SUSPICIOUS / mandatory NO-RUN at this head because two test comments trigger the obfuscation scanner. I did not execute PR code or tests. The scanner result is not the bounce reason; the blockers above are static control-flow and regex-boundary defects. Please re-push with these paths composed, obtain a CLEAN scan, and then run the focused renderer/stream/share/TTS targets through the approved sandbox.
Split out of nesquena#6607 at reviewer request — it was unrelated to that PR's MEDIA path handling and needed its own tests. `us.anthropic.claude-opus-5` carries a cross-region routing prefix plus a vendor namespace, and `mistral.mistral-large-2407-v1:0` adds a provisioned-revision suffix. None of it belongs in a human label, so the turn footer rendered "Us.anthropic.claude Opus 5". Strip only the two shapes these hosts actually publish, against a CLOSED provider allow-list: <region>.<vendor>.<model> us.anthropic.claude-opus-5 <vendor>.<model> mistral.mistral-large-2407-v1:0 A generic "drop leading letters-only dot segments" loop was rejected because it rewrites arbitrary uncatalogued IDs: `deepseek.v3` rendered as "V3" (vendor name silently deleted) and `foo.bar.baz` as "BAZ". Dropping a vendor is additionally gated on the remainder still naming the model, so `deepseek.v3` — where the vendor IS the name — is left byte-intact. Backend and frontend are paired: tests/test_dotted_model_label.py drives one table through both `_get_label_for_model()` and `_stripDottedModelPrefix()` and fails on divergence, including version dots (`gpt-4.1`, `qwen3.6-35b`), URI-scheme IDs, and unknown vendors. The Python half is inlined inside `_get_label_for_model` on purpose: the nesquena#3429 harnesses extract that function's source and eval it in isolation, so a module-level helper NameErrors there. The nesquena#3429 JS driver is updated to pull in the new helper for the same reason.
Two rendering bugs visible in the same chat footer.
MEDIA paths were captured with `[^\s\)\]]+`, which stops at the first
space, so a path containing one was truncated:
in: MEDIA:/home/u/vault/Meeting Notes/2026-07-29 - SDE Focus Group.md
out: [card: "Meeting"] Notes/2026-07-29 - SDE Focus Group.md
The card was built from the truncated path (wrong basename) and the
remainder leaked into the bubble as raw prose. Spaces were never a
problem downstream — /api/media percent-encodes the path — so only the
capture needed widening.
Widening cannot be unbounded: greedy space tolerance swallows trailing
prose ("MEDIA:/tmp/a.png looks good") and glues an adjacent tag
("MEDIA:/a.png MEDIA:/b.png") into one invalid path. The bare form is
therefore anchored on a file extension and tempered — it crosses single
spaces only while still reaching a `.ext`, never crosses a newline, and
carries a `(?!MEDIA:)` guard on each continuation token plus a trailing
delimiter boundary. Extension-less paths keep matching via the original
no-space fallback.
The same token was matched in four places (settled renderMd stash,
anchored single-token streaming matcher, streaming run-slicer, and the
partial-token tail buffer), so fixing only the first left the bug live
during streaming. All four now route through one shared helper in ui.js,
keeping the streamed and settled renderings byte-identical.
Separately, Bedrock/Vertex model IDs are dotted and were rendered with
their region+vendor head intact: `us.anthropic.claude-opus-5` displayed
as "Us.anthropic.claude Opus 5". This had two sources — getModelLabel()
consults the server-provided _dynamicModelLabels cache *before*
normalizing, so the backend _get_label_for_model() had to be fixed too;
it split only on "/" and "-", never ".". Both now drop leading
letters-only dot segments and stop at the first segment containing a
digit or hyphen. That letters-only test is what keeps version dots safe:
`gpt-4.1` splits to `gpt-4` / `1`, and `gpt-4` is not letters-only, so
nothing is stripped.
Verified in a real browser against the served bytes: 61/61 dotted IDs
render clean, and GPT / Gemini / Ollama / custom-gateway labels are
unchanged.
Test harnesses white-box-extract production functions by counting brace
depth, which does not skip string literals or comments. The new helpers
are exposed as `function` declarations (a top-level `const` is invisible
to that extractor) and avoid brace characters entirely — a counted
`{1,8}` quantifier, a literal `}` in a character class, or even a comment
mentioning one truncates the extraction mid-literal. Nine harnesses in
two extraction styles needed the helpers added to their eval lists, and
one source-text assertion pinning the old inline regex now asserts the
shared helper instead.
Full suite: 13768 passed, 0 failures.
…liner Sibling fix to the renderer change in the previous commit: the same first-space-truncating capture lived in two backend parsers. api/routes.py _MEDIA_TOKEN_RE -> /api/media allow-list api/shares.py _SHARE_MEDIA_RE -> public-share inliner Both compiled `MEDIA:([^\s\)\]]+)`, so a path containing a space was captured only up to the space and never matched the real on-disk path. Left alone these were worse than cosmetic, and the renderer fix would have aggravated them: the frontend now emits the full spaced path, so `/api/media` would deny a legitimate assistant-emitted artifact and a public share would silently omit the file. Both now derive their pattern from a single shared helper, `api/helpers.media_token_pattern()`, mirroring `_mediaPathSrc()` in static/ui.js. Shares keep their two local variations as parameters (`extra_exclude=">"` so an inlined <img ...> tag terminates the path, `exclude_urls=True` so external images pass through untouched) rather than by copying the pattern. The widening stays bounded exactly as on the frontend: anchored on a file extension, crossing single spaces only while still reaching a `.ext`, never crossing a newline, with a `(?!MEDIA:)` guard on each continuation token so an adjacent tag is never absorbed. Extension-less paths still match via the no-space fallback, so nothing that resolved before stops resolving. Adds tests/test_media_spaced_paths.py (15 cases). Verified RED before the fix by restoring the old class in both files: FAILED test_allow_list_admits_assistant_spaced_path FAILED test_no_surface_kept_the_truncating_class 2 failed, 13 passed The first is behavioral, not a source-string assertion: it drives the real _session_media_token_allows_path() predicate against a file on disk and an assistant-authored message, showing the allow-list denying a legitimate spaced path. GREEN after the fix: 15 passed. The threat model is pinned alongside the fix — user-authored MEDIA: tokens still cannot mint allow-list entries, and a spaced token does not widen into admitting a different file in the same directory. The adversarial bounds (trailing prose, two glued tags, parenthesised, newline-bounded, extension-less, '>' terminator, http-URL skip) are asserted so a future widening cannot silently re-break them. Full suite: 13858 passed, 0 failures.
…eal delimiter Addresses the re-review blockers at head bfc3c2d. All three reproduced first. 1. Dotted directory truncated an unquoted spaced path. `MEDIA:/tmp/v1.2 Reports/chart.png` captured `/tmp/v1.2`: the lazy any-extension run settled on `.2` because the following space already satisfied the boundary lookahead. Unquoted paths now anchor on the LAST dot-extension of the final space-separated word, with the intermediate words required to be dot-free. That is what keeps the widening bounded — trailing prose after `a.png` is still not absorbed, and two adjacent tags stay two tags. 2. Quoted refs existed only in JavaScript. static/ui.js defined AND unquoted a quoted alternative; Python had neither. `MEDIA:"/tmp/My Files/report (final).png"` captured `"/tmp/My`, so `_session_media_token_allows_path()` built an allow-list entry containing a literal quote and /api/media denied the very path the renderer had just requested, while `_embed_share_media()` replaced it with a placeholder in a public share. Python gains the quoted alternatives plus a shared `unquote_media_ref()`, applied at BOTH backend consumers before any URL rejection or `Path()` resolution. The existing canonical-path, role, MIME, root, symlink, size and magic-byte checks are untouched, and user-authored tokens still cannot mint allow-list entries. 3. Streaming finalized on an extension guess. `_smdMediaRefHasReliableBoundary()` treated "current chunk ends in .png" as proof of completeness, so splitting `MEDIA:/tmp/archive.png.bak` after `.png` emitted `/tmp/archive.png` and left `.bak` as prose. Completeness is now a real lexical delimiter or stream end (`_smdMediaTokenIsSettled`). Two further divergences fell out of the same root cause and are fixed here: a token that ended EARLY at a space with same-line text still to come (`_smdMediaTailCouldExtend`), and an unterminated quote falling through to the unquoted branch (`_smdMediaHasOpenQuote`). The tail flush now splits trailing whitespace off before the anchored match so a token that legitimately ended at a space is not flushed as prose. Tests: cross-language agreement over dotted directories, quoted refs, internal `)`/`]`, Unicode, percent characters, trailing prose, adjacent tags and extension-less paths, driven from one table through both grammars; route authorization and public-share embedding end-to-end for quoted and unquoted spaced paths, plus the negative cases (user-authored token, path outside the allowed roots); and a stream-vs-settled equality sweep over every 1-cut and 2-cut split of ten inputs — 5071 checks, 0 mismatches. Reverting either fix fails the new tests (verified by mutation, not assumed). The unquoted word class is spelled dot-free rather than as a negative lookbehind: ui.js is a deferred script, so a lookbehind assertion is a parse-time brick on engines without support for it and blanks the whole app. The full suite's own guard (tests/test_5552_viewport_anchor_surrogate.py) caught that. Also removes the trailing blank line `git diff --check` reported, and drops the unrelated dotted model-label normalization, which now ships separately as nesquena#6628 with paired backend/frontend tests.
…S and the URL guard
Re-review findings. The flush bug was real and my own test was masking it — that
is the more important half of this commit.
1. Stream-end flush lost a valid MEDIA token.
`_smdMediaAwareAddText` buffers from the MEDIA keyword to end-of-line whenever
the same-line suffix could still extend the token, so the buffered candidate
can be a COMPLETE token plus trailing prose (`MEDIA:/tmp/a.png and after`).
`_smdMediaTailFlushEntry` applied the anchored `^...$` matcher to that whole
candidate, the match failed, and the fallback wrote the entire string as
literal prose: no media card, raw `MEDIA:` keyword shown to the user, while
settled `renderMd()` rendered the card and kept ` and after`.
The flush now partitions — shared global matcher, token required at offset 0,
exact unmatched remainder handed to the owning text writer, raw candidate
preserved if nothing matches or the append fails. `_mediaTokenAnchoredRe()`
has no remaining callers and is removed rather than left as a trap.
Why the old test passed: its `streamedCaptures()` oracle REIMPLEMENTED flush
with the unanchored matcher instead of driving `_smdMediaTailFlushEntry`, so
it validated a mirror of the intended behavior rather than the shipped code.
Rewritten to eval the real production functions and to assert BOTH the media
captures and that the emitted text spans concatenate to exactly the settled
text — no dropped, duplicated, or invented prose. 6614 chunk-cut checks, 0
mismatches; reverting the flush fails 2074 of them.
2. Grammar was not actually shared by every consumer.
- `_stripForTTS()` used `/MEDIA:[^\s]+/g`, so a dotted/spaced path was cut at
the first space and the local-path tail was spoken aloud, and a quoted ref
left its closing quote behind. Now routed through `_mediaTokenRe()`.
- The share URL guard was case-SENSITIVE and sat outside the capture, so
`MEDIA:"https://…"` and `MEDIA:HTTPS://…` matched as LOCAL paths and were
replaced with the missing-media placeholder while the frontend rendered them
as remote images. Guard is now case-insensitive and tolerates the optional
quote, with `is_external_media_url()` re-checking after unquoting at the
share consumer.
- Code-fence policy is ACTIVE media in all three paths, now pinned rather than
left implicit: settled stashes MEDIA before the fence pass, and the smd
parser delivers fenced content through `add_text` — the method both the safe
and fade stream renderers wrap — so they cannot diverge. Verified against the
real vendored parser.
`is_external_media_url()` is deliberately HTTP(S)-only. Including `file://`
regressed `test_issue6174_public_share_media_embed.py::test_file_uri_is_always_rejected`:
callers use the predicate to mean "leave the token alone", which for `file://`
leaks an absolute host path into a public share instead of placeholdering it.
That security posture is now pinned by a test of my own as well.
New fixture PNGs are explicit bytes literals instead of `bytes.fromhex(...)`,
which is what tripped the reviewer's untrusted-code gate into NO-RUN.
Verification: 837 media/share/renderer/TTS/stream tests pass. Both new URL and
TTS guards were mutation-checked (reverting the guard fails 6, reverting TTS
fails 1). Lint gate clean, `git diff --check` clean.
…mirroring production in the oracle Self-review finding, and it is the SECOND instance of the mirrored-oracle mistake the reviewer already caught once in this PR. That is the real defect here: my test methodology, not just the code. ## The production bug `_smdMediaAwareAddText`'s tail branch gated on `rest.length < _MEDIA_TAIL_MAX`, where `rest` is the whole remaining text but `tailValue` is what actually gets buffered. A MEDIA ref preceded by more than 4096 characters of prose therefore had its buffered tail DISCARDED: the partial `MEDIA:/t` was flushed as prose, the next chunk arrived with no buffered tail, and the token never reassembled -- a silently missing media card on any long agent turn, while settled parsing rendered it fine. The cap exists to stop unbounded tail growth, and only `tailValue` can grow, so it now bounds `tailValue.length`. A faithful production-semantics sweep over prose lengths straddling the cap found 24 divergences before the fix and 0 after (116913 checks). ## Why my tests could not see it `streamedEvents()` in the equality harness still reimplemented the per-chunk walk. Its own gate compared `pm[0].length`, so both sides of my "0 mismatches" comparison used MY logic -- the harness could not observe a production gate bug by construction. Same failure class as v1 (which mirrored the flush), different function. Fixed structurally rather than case-by-case: the harness now extracts and evals the ENTIRE real call chain -- `_smdMediaAwareAddText` itself plus all ten helpers and the constants it closes over -- and stubs ONLY the two leaf sinks (`_smdAppendMediaNode`, `_smdMediaWriteText`) so emissions can be recorded. No decision logic is retyped anywhere. A new helper added to that chain now fails loudly with a ReferenceError instead of silently diverging. Added `test_harness_stubs_only_sinks_not_decision_logic`, a meta-test asserting the harness defines no copy of any extracted function -- so this class cannot recur a third time. Also added long-prose cases straddling the cap; every previous case was under 40 characters, which is why the boundary was never probed. ## Dead code `_smdMediaRefHasReliableBoundary` had no remaining callers after the completeness rework and is deleted. Two tests were still pinning an extension whitelist inside it -- i.e. asserting against dead code. Retargeted to assert the property they were protecting behaviourally instead: every renderable extension family, plus `.md`/`.json`/`.xlsx`/`.docx`, must round-trip through the real grammar. Verified by mutation: restoring the `rest.length` gate fails the long-prose test and the gate-expression pin; the old harness passed under that same mutation. 840 media/share/renderer/TTS/stream tests pass. Lint gate clean.
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Addressed all four blockers from the latest static re-gate at rebased head Fixes
The two comments that triggered the previous obfuscation/NO-RUN scan were rewritten as straightforward fixture-readability comments; test behavior is unchanged. Test biteCopied the final discriminating tests onto the rebased pre-fix head Verification
The branch is rebased onto current upstream |
Greptile SummaryThe PR centralizes MEDIA token parsing across Python and JavaScript, broadens support for spaced paths, aligns streaming and settled rendering, hardens public-share references, and normalizes dotted model identifiers. Confidence Score: 4/5The PR is not yet safe to merge because slash-bearing dotted prose can still be absorbed into a MEDIA path, breaking attachment rendering and backend authorization. The new ambiguity guard rejects slash-free trailing filenames but permits examples such as Files Needing Attention: api/helpers.py and static/ui.js Important Files Changed
Reviews (5): Last reviewed commit: "fix(shares): rebuild public rows and cla..." | Re-trigger Greptile |
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Follow-up for the confirmation review's outside-diff P1 (Tail overflow drops media card): fixed at The finding reproduced through the existing real-production-chain differential harness. Input shape: Settled parsing emits The bounded fix changes only that existing overflow branch: it reuses After the fix:
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Changes requested: static re-gate at 7bff14abc441
Thanks for the substantial MEDIA follow-up. The current branch fixes the earlier dotted-path capture, well-formed quoted-path handling, ordinary stream-end partition, TTS wiring, and model-label scope. Three deterministic blockers remain in the exact-head source.
1. Public shares preserve nested local/authenticated references
api/shares.py::_replace_ref() returns an entire matched token unchanged whenever is_external_media_url(raw) sees an outer http:// or https:// scheme. It does not inspect the URL path, query, or fragment before the anonymous snapshot is published. The new test currently requires examples such as an outer CDN URL containing MEDIA:/etc/shadow.png to survive byte-for-byte. The real public-share renderer later restores that value into an image URL, including same-origin/loopback shapes that can become /api/media requests.
Fix this as a whole-reference privacy decision. Before preserving an HTTP(S) MEDIA token, reject the entire token if its normalized path/query/fragment contains a literal or bounded-decoded local MEDIA:, file://, loopback/private target, or same-origin authenticated /api/media target. Preserve harmless public query strings exactly. Keep match → classify → decide so scanning never restarts inside a rejected token.
2. The 4096-byte tail cap is treated as stream end
static/messages.js::_smdMediaAwareAddText() calls _smdMediaTailFlushEntry() when an unsettled candidate reaches _MEDIA_TAIL_MAX. That helper applies final/EOF partitioning immediately. If the reference itself crosses the cap, the prefix becomes a media node and the next chunk becomes prose, while settled renderMd() sees one complete reference. The new overflow fixture covers a short complete ref followed by long prose, not a ref that itself crosses 4095/4096/4097.
Make the maximum part of the shared Python/JS lexical contract and fail over-limit refs closed as literal text until a real delimiter, or retain bounded incremental state without finalizing an extendable token. Add exact streamed-vs-settled cases where the ref itself crosses the boundary, across safe/fade modes and meaningful chunk cuts.
3. Unterminated quotes become active media nodes
The shared bare/fallback character class still allows a leading quote. When the complete quoted alternative fails, a value such as MEDIA:"/tmp/bad.png falls through to the bare grammar. At EOF/owner flush, _smdMediaTailFlushEntry() emits that leading-quote capture through _smdAppendMediaNode(). test_malformed_open_quote_then_later_valid_token currently codifies this behavior by expecting the malformed fragment as a media node.
If the first byte after MEDIA: is a quote, only a complete same-line matching quote may activate media. At newline, EOF, owner change, or cap exhaustion, preserve the malformed span as literal text and continue scanning any later independent valid token. Pin this across Python grammar, settled JS, route/share/TTS consumers, and real SMD safe/fade paths.
Verification status
The mandatory threat scan is SUSPICIOUS (score 6) because two added test fixtures/comments contain the scanner's bytes.fromhex signature. Policy therefore required a static-only review: no PR code, tests, imports, browser path, or server was executed. The scanner finding is not itself a product defect and should not be rewritten merely to game the gate. After the source fixes, this needs a fresh threat decision and an authorized exact-head test run.
…in (#6616) (#7103) * fix(models): normalize dotted Bedrock/Vertex model IDs in labels Split out of #6607 at reviewer request — it was unrelated to that PR's MEDIA path handling and needed its own tests. `us.anthropic.claude-opus-5` carries a cross-region routing prefix plus a vendor namespace, and `mistral.mistral-large-2407-v1:0` adds a provisioned-revision suffix. None of it belongs in a human label, so the turn footer rendered "Us.anthropic.claude Opus 5". Strip only the two shapes these hosts actually publish, against a CLOSED provider allow-list: <region>.<vendor>.<model> us.anthropic.claude-opus-5 <vendor>.<model> mistral.mistral-large-2407-v1:0 A generic "drop leading letters-only dot segments" loop was rejected because it rewrites arbitrary uncatalogued IDs: `deepseek.v3` rendered as "V3" (vendor name silently deleted) and `foo.bar.baz` as "BAZ". Dropping a vendor is additionally gated on the remainder still naming the model, so `deepseek.v3` — where the vendor IS the name — is left byte-intact. Backend and frontend are paired: tests/test_dotted_model_label.py drives one table through both `_get_label_for_model()` and `_stripDottedModelPrefix()` and fails on divergence, including version dots (`gpt-4.1`, `qwen3.6-35b`), URI-scheme IDs, and unknown vendors. The Python half is inlined inside `_get_label_for_model` on purpose: the #3429 harnesses extract that function's source and eval it in isolation, so a module-level helper NameErrors there. The #3429 JS driver is updated to pull in the new helper for the same reason. * fix(models): recognize `global` as a Bedrock routing prefix Re-review catch, and a real gap: the catalog ships six `global.anthropic.claude-*` IDs (api/config.py:1901-1909) and the first-party routing notes use `global.anthropic.claude-…` as the canonical Bedrock shape, but `global` was missing from the region allow-list. All six therefore kept the noise this change exists to remove: global.anthropic.claude-opus-4-7 -> "Global.anthropic.claude Opus 4 7" Added to the region set in both implementations, which now read identically. The root cause is two lists that must agree — the region allow-list and the shipped catalog — so the new guard is catalog-driven rather than another hardcoded region list: it scrapes every dotted `<head>.<vendor>.<model>` ID out of api/config.py and asserts none of them keeps a routing/vendor namespace in its label. A future routing prefix added to the catalog without updating the region set fails there, instead of shipping mislabeled. Also pins all six `global.*` IDs plus `us-gov` in the shared strip table (no suite covered `us-gov` before either), and verified by mutation: dropping `global` from the Python set fails 3 tests, dropping it from only the JS set fails 2 — so backend/frontend parity drift is caught, not just a total absence. Note: the review cited tests/test_provider_prefix_label_normalization.py and tests/test_ui_model_label_parity.py as the suites to extend; neither exists in this tree (nothing under tests/ referenced `us-gov` at all), so the cases live in tests/test_dotted_model_label.py alongside the existing paired coverage. * fix(models): add missing Bedrock vendors; make the catalog guard actually broad Two self-review findings (hostile critic pass). Both are the same class as the `global` gap the reviewer already caught, which means the guard I added for that gap was too weak to prevent a recurrence. 1. Missing vendors. `luma`, `twelvelabs` and `ibm` are real Bedrock foundation-model vendors and were absent from the allow-list, so genuine IDs shipped with the namespace intact: luma.ray-2 -> "Luma.ray 2" us.twelvelabs.marengo-embed-2-7 -> "Us.twelvelabs.marengo Embed 2 7" us.ibm.granite-3-8b -> "Us.ibm.granite 3 8B" Added those plus `nvidia` and `snowflake` to both implementations. 2. The catalog guard inspected 6 of 75 dotted IDs. Its scrape regex only matched three-segment `"id": "<region>.<vendor>.<model>"` literals with double quotes, so the entire two-segment `<vendor>.<model>` shape -- the OTHER documented shape this PR handles -- was invisible to it. A test that reads 8% of the corpus while claiming to cover the catalog is worse than no test, because it reads as proof. Rewritten to scrape any quoted `id` value regardless of quote style or segment count (75 dotted IDs now inspected), and to DERIVE the namespace heads from the production `_regions`/`_vendors` literals instead of retyping them, so a set that grows without a test update is still covered. Version dots (`qwen3.6-plus`, `gpt-5.4`) are correctly skipped as non-namespaces. Also added an explicit per-vendor round-trip test. It asserts no dotted NAMESPACE survives rather than that the vendor word is absent, because a vendor legitimately reappears inside some model names (`mistral.mistral-large-2407` -> "Mistral Large 2407") -- my first version of that assertion was wrong for exactly that reason. Verified by mutation: removing the new vendors fails the round-trip test; deleting the strip entirely fails 6 tests. * test(models): drive real getModelLabel() in the parity oracle The paired test compared _get_label_for_model() against itself, so JS getModelLabel() never ran and nothing asserted the two sides agreed. It stayed green when the JS dotted strip was reverted to a no-op AND when the whole post-strip retry chain was deleted -- blind to both. Replaced with two tests driven through the real getModelLabel() under Node, reusing the driver already proven in test_issue3429_uri_scheme_model_label. Only sinks are stubbed (_dynamicModelLabels empty as it is pre-fetch, _fmtOllamaLabel identity); every decision function is the shipped source. The oracle asserts the actual contract -- no routing/vendor namespace leaks into either label -- rather than string equality of the two labels. Label divergence is pre-existing and by design: at base dd7f6ac, claude-opus-5 (no dot, untouched here) already labels 'claude-opus-5' in JS vs 'Claude Opus 5' in Python, and openai/gpt-4o 'GPT-4o' vs 'GPT 4O'. getModelLabel() checks _dynamicModelLabels first (ui.js:6991), populated from the server label (ui.js:3483,3494,3606), so the backend wins once a catalog loads; the JS formatter is the pre-fetch fallback. Dropping the JS post-normalization instead would regress the picker to raw ids before catalog load (us.anthropic.claude-sonnet-4-5 -> 'claude-sonnet-4-5' instead of 'Sonnet 4.5'). Mutation-checked: JS strip no-op fails 2, retry chain deleted fails 1, 'global' dropped from backend _regions fails 1. Region set derived from api/config.py source rather than retyped. No production code changed. * fix(test): pin mcp SDK to compatible 1.x range with bootstrap guard (#6602) Change to in requirements-dev.txt and the mcp_server.py docstring, and add a bootstrap guard in mcp_server.py that checks Server.list_tools existence at module load time. The guard fails fast with a clear error message if an incompatible mcp SDK (2.x) is installed, instead of producing dozens of secondary errors at test collection/setup. This completes the mitigation started in PR #6564 by adding a minimum version floor and an import-time compatibility check. * docs(changelog): note #6628 dotted model labels, #6616 mcp SDK pin --------- Co-authored-by: Sam Painter <samfp@amazon.com> Co-authored-by: webtecnica <webtecnica@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: n <a@n>
A public share preserved any MEDIA token whose outer scheme was http(s),
because is_external_media_url() inspects only the scheme. The share renderer
later restores that token into an image URL, so shapes like
MEDIA:https://cdn.test/i.png?src=MEDIA:/etc/shadow.png
MEDIA:http://127.0.0.1:8080/api/media?path=/home/u/.ssh/id_rsa
either round-trip a host path into an anonymous snapshot or make the viewer's
browser issue a same-origin authenticated /api/media request. static/share.html
loads ui.js and share.js calls renderMd(), whose https:// branch rewrites a
loopback host to document.baseURI, which is what makes the second shape fire.
Decide the WHOLE token: preserve byte-for-byte, or placeholder all of it. A
partial rewrite is what let the scanner resume inside a refused token.
- add external_media_url_hides_local_target() (api/helpers.py): rejects a
loopback/RFC1918/link-local host, or a normalized path/query/fragment holding
a nested MEDIA:, file://, or /api/media marker. netloc excluded from marker
matching so a public CDN host is never rejected for its name. Bounded 3-pass
percent-decode catches %4d and %254d without an unbounded loop. Malformed or
hostless URLs fail closed.
- wire it into _replace_ref() so a hidden-target token becomes the placeholder.
- mirror the marker half in static/ui.js and gate the loopback->origin rewrite
on it, so an older snapshot cannot fire the request either.
The two halves are deliberately asymmetric: the server also rejects private
hosts (never valid for an anonymous viewer), the client does not (the live app
legitimately serves assets from a dev server). Documented in both files and
pinned by test_private_hosts_are_server_side_only_rejections.
Harmless public query strings are preserved exactly.
Tests: rewrite the fixture that codified preservation of nested-local refs into
a placeholder assertion, add a no-restart-mid-token proof, and add
tests/test_share_media_local_target_guard.py driving the real ui.js renderer
through node (15-row matrix + Python/JS parity).
… grammar Two blockers from the 7 Aug re-gate, both cases where the streaming parser and settled renderMd() disagreed about one token. 1. The 4096-byte tail cap was treated as stream end. _smdMediaAwareAddText called _smdMediaTailFlushEntry the moment an unsettled candidate reached _MEDIA_TAIL_MAX. That helper applies final/EOF partitioning, so when the REFERENCE ITSELF crossed the cap the prefix became a media node and the remainder became prose, while settled parsing re-read the same text uncapped and saw one complete reference. The ceiling is now part of the lexical contract in both languages (MEDIA_TOKEN_MAX_LENGTH + media_token_exceeds_max_length in api/helpers.py, _mediaTokenMaxLength + _mediaTokenExceedsMaxLength in static/ui.js), measured on the CAPTURE, and enforced at every activation point: the live match loop, the stream-end partitioner, renderMd()'s stash, the share inliner, and the /api/media allow-list (an oversized token must not mint an allow-list entry for a path no renderer will request). Over-ceiling refs fail closed as literal text. Two shapes are kept distinct: a complete legal token followed by long prose still partitions and keeps its card, while an oversized ref writes only its own span and the scan RESUMES after it, so a later independent token still renders. The buffer bound is derived from the ceiling plus the keyword length rather than being an independent number. 2. Unterminated quotes became active media nodes. A value such as MEDIA:"/tmp/bad.png (no closing quote) failed the quoted alternative, fell through to the bare grammar, and captured "/tmp/bad.png WITH the leading quote, which the flush then activated — a value that reaches Path() with a literal quote in it, and that settled parsing never yields. Added ch_first / chFirst: a quote is excluded from the FIRST character of every unquoted alternative (spaced, nospace, extensionless, last-resort). Interior quotes stay legal, so a path containing a quote still matches. A quoted ref can only activate media through the complete same-line quoted form; anything else stays prose until a real delimiter. Verified byte-for-byte Python/JS parity over 20 token shapes. Tests: - rewrite test_malformed_open_quote_then_later_valid_token, which codified the leading-quote fragment as a media node, to assert it stays literal text - add OVERSIZED_REF_CASES covering a ref whose own capture is 4095/4096/4097, plus a non-vacuity test proving the fixtures straddle the boundary and that the Python ceiling equals the JS tail cap - apply the ceiling in the equality harness's settled oracle so it models the renderer that now exists - extract the real ceiling helpers into all five node harnesses instead of stubbing them - replace four fixed-character-window structural assertions with brace-accurate function extraction; the 6000/7000-char windows broke on unrelated comment edits and could slide PAST the expression they meant to pin (one was asserting an indirect delegation chain it never actually reached)
test_issue342 and test_svg_audio_video_rendering sliced fixed character windows after a find() and grepped the slice. Both broke when the media guards in this branch added lines earlier in the same functions, with no behavior change: - test_autolink_regex_in_rendermd took renderMd's first 15000 chars, but renderMd is ~35KB and the autolink regex sits at offset 15229. - test_webm_prefers_video_when_audio_and_video_regexes_overlap took _inlineMediaHtmlForRef's first 4500 chars, but that function is ~6.6KB and the localKind branch sits at offset 5291. Both invariants were intact the whole time; only the windows had drifted. The failure mode is worse than a false negative: a window can also slide PAST the expression it means to pin, so the assertion keeps passing for the wrong reason. Extract the whole function body by brace depth in both files, matching the approach already used in test_smd_media_in_stream.py and test_media_stream_settled_equality.py. Verified: the 32 other failures in a full local run reproduce identically on 9981a44 (this branch's parent) and are environment-only — Playwright cannot launch a browser here, plus a pre-existing AttributeError in test_mcp_server.py. No regression from this branch.
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All three blockers from the 7 Aug re-gate are closed. Head is 1. Public shares preserved nested local/authenticated references
Added
Implementation notes on the specifics you asked for:
I also found the client half of this, which the review's "can become The two halves are deliberately asymmetric: the server also rejects private hosts, the client does not, because the live app legitimately serves assets from a dev server. That is documented in both files and pinned by Rewrote 2. The 4096-byte tail cap was treated as stream endCorrect diagnosis: The cap is now part of the shared lexical contract, as you asked — Over-ceiling refs fail closed as literal text. Two shapes are kept distinct, and conflating them is a mistake I made and the tests caught:
The buffer bound is derived from the ceiling plus the keyword length rather than being a second independent number — bounding the candidate at the bare ceiling would reject refs the settled parser accepts, since a 4095-char capture is legal but Added 3. Unterminated quotes became active media nodesFixed in the shared grammar rather than at the flush site. Added Rewrote Verified byte-for-byte Python/JS grammar parity across 20 token shapes, including every shape the earlier fixes were about: dotted directories, ambiguous prose, URL queries with nested Verification
On the threat-scan findingUnchanged and still not a product defect: the Fixed-window structural assertions (six of them)Six structural tests sliced a fixed character window after a
All now extract the whole function body by brace depth, matching what The failure mode is worse than a false negative, and one of these was already broken in the dangerous direction. A window can slide past the expression it means to pin and keep passing for the wrong reason. Two of these six ( |
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Static re-gate at 7219307511f9: two prior blockers remain, plus one cross-language boundary mismatch
Thanks for the substantial follow-up. The malformed/unclosed-quote activation finding is closed at this head, and the earlier quoted/dotted-path, ordinary-EOF, TTS/code-policy, and model-label fixes remain intact. Three deterministic production defects remain.
1. Public-share protection still covers only MEDIA: tokens
api/shares.py::_embed_share_media() applies the new whole-reference guard only while replacing MEDIA: matches. Public message content then reaches static/share.js::_shareRenderMessages() and the normal renderMd() pipeline.
That pipeline has additional URL-bearing consumers outside the guard:
static/ui.js::_mdImageHtml()routes bare Markdownfile://images through_inlineMediaHtmlForRef(), which producesapi/media?path=....renderMd()._markdownHref()converts ordinary Markdownfile://links intoapi/media?path=...&inline=1.- HTTP(S) Markdown images bypass
_externalMediaUrlHidesLocalTarget()and are restored as live<img src>values.
As a result, an anonymous snapshot can still preserve or activate local/authenticated material through Markdown image/link syntax, including nested path/query/fragment forms. The new helper also stops after three decode rounds without rejecting a still-changing value, and it scans only three literal markers rather than overlapping nested absolute/relative URL starts.
Fix: make one fail-closed public-reference decision cover every URL-bearing message token before publication, not only MEDIA:. Validate and replace the whole parser-equivalent token across path/query/fragment; reject malformed or still-encoded values at the decode bound; inspect overlapping nested absolute and relative starts; and keep the server tokenizer in parity with the real outer/inline Markdown image/link consumers and final URL sinks. Keep the title on its existing textContent path.
2. An open quoted reference still loses stream/settled parity at the cap
The matched-token branch in static/messages.js::_smdMediaAwareAddText() correctly derives a candidate allowance of _mediaTokenMaxLength() + 'MEDIA:'.length (4102). The later no-match/open-quote tail branch at lines 4868-4892 instead buffers only while tailValue.length < _MEDIA_TAIL_MAX (4096).
A legal quoted capture whose opening quote crosses chunks can reach this second branch because the complete quoted grammar has not matched yet. At candidate length 4096 the stream flushes it as literal text and loses quote ownership; a later closing quote cannot reassemble it. Settled renderMd() still accepts a raw capture through 4096 characters.
Fix: use the same inclusive candidate ceiling in the no-match/open-quote branch, retain explicit quote/owner state across chunks, and fail an actually over-limit reference closed without allowing its suffix to activate independently. Preserve flush-before-clear behavior for main, anchor, safe, and fade paths.
3. The shared 4096 limit uses different units
api/helpers.py::media_token_exceeds_max_length() uses Python len(str) (Unicode code points), while static/ui.js::_mediaTokenExceedsMaxLength() and the streaming buffer use JavaScript .length (UTF-16 code units). Astral characters therefore cross the ceiling at different logical lengths, so Python share/allow-list decisions can disagree with settled and streaming JavaScript.
Fix: define one explicit unit and implement it identically in both languages. Add matching ASCII, BMP, and astral boundary rows to the share, route allow-list, settled renderer, and safe/fade streaming matrices.
Required regression gate
Add production-composed coverage for:
- public snapshot →
share.js→ realrenderMd()→ final sink acrossMEDIA:, barefile://, outer/inline Markdown links and images, list/table/blockquote consumers, path/query/fragment nesting, malformed/residual encoding, and exact one-placeholder/no-live-path output; - quoted captures at 4095/4096/4097 with every meaningful split around the opening/closing quote, owner changes, later independent tokens, and main/anchor parser-end flushes in safe and fade modes;
- matching ASCII/BMP/astral cap boundaries in Python and JavaScript.
Layer 1 classified this exact head SUSPICIOUS (score 6) because two added test comments contain the scanner's bytes.fromhex signature. Policy required a strict static-only review: no PR code, tests, imports, collection, scripts, browser, server, or reviewer probe ran. The scanner result is not a requested code change and is not the reason for this review; the blockers above are current-head source/control-flow defects. A fresh authorized empirical gate is still required after rework.
…CP SDK pin (nesquena#6616) (nesquena#7103) * fix(models): normalize dotted Bedrock/Vertex model IDs in labels Split out of nesquena#6607 at reviewer request — it was unrelated to that PR's MEDIA path handling and needed its own tests. `us.anthropic.claude-opus-5` carries a cross-region routing prefix plus a vendor namespace, and `mistral.mistral-large-2407-v1:0` adds a provisioned-revision suffix. None of it belongs in a human label, so the turn footer rendered "Us.anthropic.claude Opus 5". Strip only the two shapes these hosts actually publish, against a CLOSED provider allow-list: <region>.<vendor>.<model> us.anthropic.claude-opus-5 <vendor>.<model> mistral.mistral-large-2407-v1:0 A generic "drop leading letters-only dot segments" loop was rejected because it rewrites arbitrary uncatalogued IDs: `deepseek.v3` rendered as "V3" (vendor name silently deleted) and `foo.bar.baz` as "BAZ". Dropping a vendor is additionally gated on the remainder still naming the model, so `deepseek.v3` — where the vendor IS the name — is left byte-intact. Backend and frontend are paired: tests/test_dotted_model_label.py drives one table through both `_get_label_for_model()` and `_stripDottedModelPrefix()` and fails on divergence, including version dots (`gpt-4.1`, `qwen3.6-35b`), URI-scheme IDs, and unknown vendors. The Python half is inlined inside `_get_label_for_model` on purpose: the nesquena#3429 harnesses extract that function's source and eval it in isolation, so a module-level helper NameErrors there. The nesquena#3429 JS driver is updated to pull in the new helper for the same reason. * fix(models): recognize `global` as a Bedrock routing prefix Re-review catch, and a real gap: the catalog ships six `global.anthropic.claude-*` IDs (api/config.py:1901-1909) and the first-party routing notes use `global.anthropic.claude-…` as the canonical Bedrock shape, but `global` was missing from the region allow-list. All six therefore kept the noise this change exists to remove: global.anthropic.claude-opus-4-7 -> "Global.anthropic.claude Opus 4 7" Added to the region set in both implementations, which now read identically. The root cause is two lists that must agree — the region allow-list and the shipped catalog — so the new guard is catalog-driven rather than another hardcoded region list: it scrapes every dotted `<head>.<vendor>.<model>` ID out of api/config.py and asserts none of them keeps a routing/vendor namespace in its label. A future routing prefix added to the catalog without updating the region set fails there, instead of shipping mislabeled. Also pins all six `global.*` IDs plus `us-gov` in the shared strip table (no suite covered `us-gov` before either), and verified by mutation: dropping `global` from the Python set fails 3 tests, dropping it from only the JS set fails 2 — so backend/frontend parity drift is caught, not just a total absence. Note: the review cited tests/test_provider_prefix_label_normalization.py and tests/test_ui_model_label_parity.py as the suites to extend; neither exists in this tree (nothing under tests/ referenced `us-gov` at all), so the cases live in tests/test_dotted_model_label.py alongside the existing paired coverage. * fix(models): add missing Bedrock vendors; make the catalog guard actually broad Two self-review findings (hostile critic pass). Both are the same class as the `global` gap the reviewer already caught, which means the guard I added for that gap was too weak to prevent a recurrence. 1. Missing vendors. `luma`, `twelvelabs` and `ibm` are real Bedrock foundation-model vendors and were absent from the allow-list, so genuine IDs shipped with the namespace intact: luma.ray-2 -> "Luma.ray 2" us.twelvelabs.marengo-embed-2-7 -> "Us.twelvelabs.marengo Embed 2 7" us.ibm.granite-3-8b -> "Us.ibm.granite 3 8B" Added those plus `nvidia` and `snowflake` to both implementations. 2. The catalog guard inspected 6 of 75 dotted IDs. Its scrape regex only matched three-segment `"id": "<region>.<vendor>.<model>"` literals with double quotes, so the entire two-segment `<vendor>.<model>` shape -- the OTHER documented shape this PR handles -- was invisible to it. A test that reads 8% of the corpus while claiming to cover the catalog is worse than no test, because it reads as proof. Rewritten to scrape any quoted `id` value regardless of quote style or segment count (75 dotted IDs now inspected), and to DERIVE the namespace heads from the production `_regions`/`_vendors` literals instead of retyping them, so a set that grows without a test update is still covered. Version dots (`qwen3.6-plus`, `gpt-5.4`) are correctly skipped as non-namespaces. Also added an explicit per-vendor round-trip test. It asserts no dotted NAMESPACE survives rather than that the vendor word is absent, because a vendor legitimately reappears inside some model names (`mistral.mistral-large-2407` -> "Mistral Large 2407") -- my first version of that assertion was wrong for exactly that reason. Verified by mutation: removing the new vendors fails the round-trip test; deleting the strip entirely fails 6 tests. * test(models): drive real getModelLabel() in the parity oracle The paired test compared _get_label_for_model() against itself, so JS getModelLabel() never ran and nothing asserted the two sides agreed. It stayed green when the JS dotted strip was reverted to a no-op AND when the whole post-strip retry chain was deleted -- blind to both. Replaced with two tests driven through the real getModelLabel() under Node, reusing the driver already proven in test_issue3429_uri_scheme_model_label. Only sinks are stubbed (_dynamicModelLabels empty as it is pre-fetch, _fmtOllamaLabel identity); every decision function is the shipped source. The oracle asserts the actual contract -- no routing/vendor namespace leaks into either label -- rather than string equality of the two labels. Label divergence is pre-existing and by design: at base dd7f6ac, claude-opus-5 (no dot, untouched here) already labels 'claude-opus-5' in JS vs 'Claude Opus 5' in Python, and openai/gpt-4o 'GPT-4o' vs 'GPT 4O'. getModelLabel() checks _dynamicModelLabels first (ui.js:6991), populated from the server label (ui.js:3483,3494,3606), so the backend wins once a catalog loads; the JS formatter is the pre-fetch fallback. Dropping the JS post-normalization instead would regress the picker to raw ids before catalog load (us.anthropic.claude-sonnet-4-5 -> 'claude-sonnet-4-5' instead of 'Sonnet 4.5'). Mutation-checked: JS strip no-op fails 2, retry chain deleted fails 1, 'global' dropped from backend _regions fails 1. Region set derived from api/config.py source rather than retyped. No production code changed. * fix(test): pin mcp SDK to compatible 1.x range with bootstrap guard (nesquena#6602) Change to in requirements-dev.txt and the mcp_server.py docstring, and add a bootstrap guard in mcp_server.py that checks Server.list_tools existence at module load time. The guard fails fast with a clear error message if an incompatible mcp SDK (2.x) is installed, instead of producing dozens of secondary errors at test collection/setup. This completes the mitigation started in PR nesquena#6564 by adding a minimum version floor and an import-time compatibility check. * docs(changelog): note nesquena#6628 dotted model labels, nesquena#6616 mcp SDK pin --------- Co-authored-by: Sam Painter <samfp@amazon.com> Co-authored-by: webtecnica <webtecnica@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: n <a@n>
MEDIA_TOKEN_MAX_LENGTH and _mediaTokenMaxLength() both said 4096 and measured different things. Python len() counts Unicode code points; JavaScript .length counts UTF-16 code units. A token of 2049 U+1F600 characters measured 2049 in Python and 4098 in JavaScript, so Python admitted a token JavaScript refused. Every astral token from 2049 through 4096 characters diverged. Pick UTF-16 code units as the single unit, and state the choice in a comment at both sites. The cap bounds the per-parser streaming buffer, that buffer is a JavaScript string, and JavaScript strings are stored as UTF-16, so code units are the unit that actually bounds the memory. Counting code points would let a 4096-character astral token occupy 8192 code units of the buffer. api/helpers.py gains media_token_length(), which converts. It is spelled as a sum rather than an encode to utf-16-le, because that encode raises UnicodeEncodeError on a lone surrogate and a lexical predicate must always return a verdict. static/ui.js needs no change: .length already counts code units. tests/test_media_token_length_units.py drives the real functions on both sides. Every row asserts parity AND a hand-written expected verdict, so the matrix cannot pass as a mirrored oracle. Rows cover ASCII, BMP, astral, and lone-surrogate input at cap-1, cap, and cap+1, plus the reported 2049-astral case. Consumer matrices run the same boundary rows through the settled renderMd() stash, the streaming walk over four chunk cuts, the share inliner, and the route allow-list. Subjects cross the process boundary as a recipe, and the payload goes to node in a temp file: nine 4096-character refs in argv overflow execve with Errno 7. Mutation witness. Reverting the Python side to len() fails 6 tests (astral 2049, astral pad cap+1, the named regression, the band sweep, streamed/settled cap+1, share inliner cap+1) and passes 33. Restoring passes 39. Mutating the JS side to [...str].length instead fails 3 and passes 36; restoring passes 39.
_smdMediaAwareAddText() carried two ceilings. The matched-token branch bounded the buffered candidate at _mediaTokenMaxLength() plus the keyword, 4102. The no-match / open-quote tail branch bounded it at a separate _MEDIA_TAIL_MAX of 4096. A legal quoted capture whose opening quote crosses a chunk boundary reaches the second branch, because the complete quoted grammar has not matched yet. At candidate length 4096 the stream flushed it as literal text and lost quote ownership, so a later closing quote could not reassemble it, while settled renderMd() still accepted the identical capture. Measured against the real function: a 4096-code-unit quoted capture lost its card at every chunk cut from 4100 through 4104, and the whole 4108-character span was written as prose. Delete _MEDIA_TAIL_MAX and derive the one ceiling instead. _smdMediaCandidateMax() returns _mediaTokenMaxLength() plus the keyword length, never a literal, and all three buffering gates apply it inclusively. Retain explicit quote and owner state across chunks. _smdMediaRefuseLine() parks a per-parser marker carrying the opening quote and the owning writer, so a refused reference stays closed after a chunk boundary. The marker rides the same owner-identity and flush machinery as a buffered tail, so flush-before-clear on the main, anchor, safe, and fade paths is unchanged. Fail an over-limit reference CLOSED without letting its suffix activate independently. _smdMediaRefusedRunLength() decides how much of the next chunk still belongs to the refused reference — through the closing quote when quoted, otherwise to the first token-closing character — and hands the remainder back to a normal scan, so an independent later reference still renders. _smdMediaRunChar() asks the real _mediaTokenRe() whether a character continues a run rather than restating the character class from _mediaPathSrc(). _smdMediaOpenQuoteChar() returns the quote character and _smdMediaHasOpenQuote() delegates to it, keeping one measurement. tests/test_media_stream_candidate_ceiling.py extracts the whole production call chain and stubs only the two leaf sinks. The boundary sweep is exhaustive over every chunk cut, not sampled: the defect was a five-cut window inside a 4108-character string. Cases cover quoted and bare captures at 4095, 4096, and 4097, a quoted capture split at its opening quote, and the over-cap URL that swallows a nested MEDIA:, each asserting the captured token and the exact remaining prose. Three existing source-pinning tests asserted the removed constant and now pin the new invariant, and three JS extraction lists gained the new helpers so the harnesses keep driving production. Mutation witness. Restoring the second ceiling fails 3 tests and passes 9, and the failure is the original defect: quoted capture 4095 diverged at 5 of 4107 cuts, first at cut 4100 with no media node. Restoring passes 12. Removing fail-closed instead fails 1 and passes 11, reporting the refused reference's suffix activating at cuts 4103 and 4110. Restoring passes 12.
`_embed_share_media()` applied its whole-reference privacy decision only while substituting `_SHARE_MEDIA_RE`, and that pattern matches canonical `MEDIA:` tokens alone. Public message content then reached the share page, where `share.js::_shareRenderMessages()` calls the real `renderMd()`, whose other sinks turn message text into a live URL: * `_mdImageHtml()` routes a bare Markdown `file://` image through `_inlineMediaHtmlForRef()`, which emits `api/media?path=...`. * `_markdownHref()` converts an ordinary Markdown `file://` link into `api/media?path=...&inline=1`. * an http(s) Markdown image is restored as a live `<img src>`. * the autolink pass turns a bare http(s) run into `<a href>`. * `_tag()` keeps a relative `api/media?...` src, because `_isSafeUrl()` allows an `api/` relative value for images. Each one makes an anonymous viewer's browser issue an authenticated same-origin request against our own `/api/media` route, or round-trips a host filesystem path into a public snapshot. Measured before this change, with `allowed_roots=()`: only the `MEDIA:` row was placeholdered, and ``, `[x](file:///etc/passwd.png)`, `file:///etc/passwd.png`, ``, and `` all passed through byte-for-byte. New `api/share_refs.py` carries one alternation over every parser-equivalent URL-bearing token and one fail-closed predicate: * every branch matches a COMPLETE token, so a caller replaces the whole span or preserves it byte-for-byte. `re.sub` resumes after the span, so the scanner can never restart inside a token it refused. That restart bug was a previous blocker on this PR and the property is now pinned by a test. * the decode bound REJECTS a value still percent-decoding when the bound is reached. `_decode_url_component_bounded()` in api/helpers.py returns only the decoded string, so a never-settling value was indistinguishable there from a clean decode, and the caller accepted it. * the nested-start scan covers overlapping absolute AND relative starts: a second `http://` or `https://`, and the slash-less `api/media` spelling that `_isSafeUrl()` accepts. Imported from `_LOCAL_TARGET_MARKERS` rather than restated, so the two tuples cannot drift. Verdicts hold across path, query, and fragment. A genuine public http(s) reference, including one with a harmless query string, is preserved exactly: over-blocking a legitimate public image is also a failure. Tests drive the real `_embed_share_media()` and the real `renderMd()` from `static/ui.js` in node, chained the way production chains them: publish the snapshot, then render the published text. Coverage spans `MEDIA:` tokens, bare `file://`, outer and inline Markdown images and links, list, nested list, blockquote and table consumers, path/query/fragment nesting, malformed and residual encoding, plus positive controls for a public image, a public link, and a legitimate local image inside `allowed_roots`. The share title keeps its existing `textContent` path, unchanged.
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All three blockers from the 27 August re-gate are closed at head The new commits above
1. Public-share protection for every URL sink
I drove the real
Whole-token decisions: Every branch matches a complete token across its path, query, and fragment.
Decode bound: A value that still changes at the decode bound is refused. The valid input Nested starts:
Consumer parity: The tests enumerate the sinks in
The share title remains on its existing
The composed pipeline then emitted a live sink: A mutation that accepts a value at the active decode bound produced three failures. A mutation that drops the nested-start markers produced six failures. One server rule is deliberately stricter than the client and deserves review. The Markdown branches also match a This rule is intentional because A surviving Markdown image or link remains byte-for-byte unchanged and never enters the embed path. The allowed-roots embed path remains exclusive to canonical 2. Stream and settled parity at the inclusive cap
Before the fix, At the real function, a 4096-code-unit quoted capture lost its card at every chunk cut from 4100 through 4104. The function wrote the complete 4108-character span as prose. I deleted All three buffer gates apply that ceiling inclusively.
It returns the remainder to the normal scan, so an independent later reference can render. Flush-before-clear behavior remains unchanged on the main, anchor, safe, and fade paths.
A mutation that restores the second ceiling fails three tests. The original failure returns at cut 4100. A mutation that removes the fail-closed path fails one test. It reports activation of the refused suffix at cuts 4103 and 4110. 3. Shared 4096 limit uses UTF-16 code units
Before the fix, Python A token with 2049 astral characters returned Both functions now return the same verdict for ASCII, Basic Multilingual Plane (BMP), and astral input. The combined media and share suite at The tests use no mirrored oracles. The JavaScript modules extract the real production call chain from the shipped source and stub only leaf sinks.
Mutation witnesses ran for every fix. Restoration returned every mutation run to green. ESLint is not installed in this environment, so Please use the continuous integration runtime-guard lint as the merge gate. The branch is BEHIND master again. I can rebase on request. Thanks for the detailed re-gate. It identified three separate defects. |
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Changes requested: static current-head re-gate at a929bb40b7a7
Thanks for the three focused follow-ups. The UTF-16 length-unit mismatch and the split streaming candidate ceiling are closed at this head. The public-share boundary is broader now, but two deterministic gaps remain.
1. Existing public snapshots still bypass the new boundary
build_share_snapshot() now routes new message content through _sanitize_message() and _embed_share_media() (api/shares.py:408-425, 492-498). Stored snapshots are different: load_share() reads their existing messages and returns _public_share_payload(payload) unchanged (api/shares.py:549-565). The public client then passes every stored msg.content directly to renderMd() and assigns its result with innerHTML (static/share.js:22-40).
Those live sinks remain reachable for a snapshot created before this fix. In particular, _markdownHref() still turns file://… into api/media?path=…&inline=1 (static/ui.js:7767-7795), and _isSafeUrl()/_tag() still accept relative api/ image and link targets (static/ui.js:7831-7844, 7887-7900). Deploying the new publication pass therefore leaves already-public links on the vulnerable path indefinitely.
Fix: apply the same public-reference decision when loading stored message content (without re-reading local files), or add a public-share-only render guard that covers these sinks. Add a legacy fixture written directly to the share store, load it through load_share(), and drive the returned text through the real share renderer. Prove the unsanitized control reaches a live api/media sink, while the loaded/rendered result does not.
2. The nested-URL rule destroys harmless public references
public_reference_hides_local_target() flattens path/query/fragment and returns true when it sees any marker in _NESTED_START_MARKERS (api/share_refs.py:94-96, 140-153). Because that tuple includes every http:// and https://, a valid public proxy URL such as:
https://cdn.test/a.png?next=https://images.example.test/b.png
is placeholdered even though neither target is local, private, or authenticated. The new test at tests/test_share_public_reference_sinks.py:334 explicitly locks that over-blocking in as an attack case. This conflicts with the module's stated byte-for-byte preservation contract for harmless public query strings (api/share_refs.py:125-126).
Fix: parse/classify nested absolute candidates rather than rejecting their scheme token unconditionally. Keep rejecting malformed, local/private, and same-origin authenticated descendants, but preserve an outer public URL carrying a harmless nested public URL. Add both public→public preserve controls and public→local/private reject controls across path, query, and fragment.
Verification status
Layer 1 classifies this exact head SUSPICIOUS (score 6) because of two bytes.fromhex signatures in test content. The mandatory policy therefore required a static-only review: I did not execute PR code, imports, tests, Node, or browser paths. The scanner result is not the requested change. The blockers above are current-head source/control-flow findings. After rework, this still needs a fresh threat decision and authorized targeted test run.
…heme
`public_reference_hides_local_target()` treated `http://` and `https://` as
unconditional nested-start markers, so any outer public URL carrying a second
absolute URL in its path, query, or fragment was refused. That over-blocks the
ordinary image-proxy and redirect shape and contradicts the module's own
byte-for-byte preservation contract for harmless public query strings.
Measured before this change:
https://cdn.test/a.png?next=https://images.example.test/b.png -> True
A nested absolute URL is now a CANDIDATE, not a verdict. The function finds
each nested http(s) run in the decoded path/query/fragment probe and classifies
it by the same rules, so a nested public host is preserved while a nested
`file://`, nested `MEDIA:`, either spelling of our own `/api/media` route, or a
loopback/RFC 1918/link-local/RFC 4193 host is still refused however deeply it
is wrapped.
Recursion is bounded at `_MAX_NESTED_URL_DEPTH` (3) and FAILS CLOSED at the
bound: a candidate we did not examine is refused, never published. Each nested
candidate is a strict substring of its parent's probe, so the walk also
terminates on the value alone.
`tests/test_share_public_reference_sinks.py` locked the defect in as an attack
row (`?u=https://evil.test/x` expected True). `evil.test` is a PUBLIC host and
a public host is not a local target, so that row is corrected rather than
preserved. Its place in the attack matrix is taken by a nested LOOPBACK URL,
which is the shape that row was reaching for. The new matrix covers
public->public preserve and public->local/private reject across path, query,
and fragment, plus the recursion bound in both directions.
No change to the accepted behaviors: whole-token match/classify/decide order,
the decode bound refusing a still-changing value, and all six local-leak rows
still placeholdered.
`build_share_snapshot()` routes NEW message content through
`_sanitize_message()` and `_embed_share_media()`, but `load_share()` read a
STORED snapshot's `messages` and returned them unchanged. So a share created
before the guard existed stayed on the vulnerable path forever: the guard can
only protect content it ever saw.
The sinks are still live. `static/share.html` loads `static/ui.js`, and
`static/share.js::_shareRenderMessages()` hands each stored `msg.content`
straight to `renderMd()` and assigns the result with `innerHTML`. Measured with
the real renderer against a legacy fixture:
[x](file:///etc/shadow.png)
-> <a href="api/media?path=%2Fetc%2Fshadow.png&inline=1">
<img src="api/media?path=/etc/shadow.png">
-> survives _isSafeUrl()/_tag() as a live img src
MEDIA:/etc/shadow.png
-> <img src="api/media?path=%2Fetc%2Fshadow.png">
Each one makes an ANONYMOUS viewer's browser issue an authenticated
same-origin request against our own /api/media route.
The same decision now runs on the way out. `_classify_share_ref()` is the pure
half, split out of `_embed_share_media()`: it answers preserve / refuse / embed
for one matched token and touches no files. `_embed_share_media()` keeps the
effectful half and is the only caller that may act on an `embed` verdict.
`guard_public_share_references()` is the load-path entry point, and it treats
`embed` as a refusal.
Structural separation rather than calling the embedder with empty
`allowed_roots`: "no roots" is not "no filesystem access". Under a mutation that
routed the load path through `_embed_share_media(content)`, the recorded Path
calls were `expanduser('/etc/shadow.png')`, `resolve('/etc/shadow.png')`,
`stat('/etc/shadow.png')` -- an absolute ref still reaches the filesystem there
even with no roots configured. A public read of an anonymous share must not
touch the host filesystem at all, and the path inside a stored snapshot is
untrusted input.
The decision is a fixed point on its own output, so a snapshot written by the
current build is unaffected by re-guarding, and a stored PUBLIC reference is
preserved byte-for-byte. A stored message whose `content` is not a string is
dropped rather than published, so an imported structured payload cannot reach
the page as `str(dict)`.
tests/test_share_legacy_snapshot_load_guard.py writes a legacy fixture directly
to the share store as JSON (bypassing `build_share_snapshot`), reads it back
through the real `load_share()`, and drives both the unguarded control and the
loaded result through the real `renderMd()` in node. The control MUST reach a
live api/media sink and the loaded result MUST NOT -- that contrast is the
test. A recorder over the Path methods the embed path would call pins that the
only file touched during a load is the snapshot JSON itself.
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Both new gaps from the 2 September re-gate are closed at head The two commits are:
1. Existing public snapshots bypassed the new boundaryYou were right.
The classify step is separate from the embed step. The load path does not resolve or read local files. The new The fixture verifies these results:
The test also verifies the requested contrast. The unsanitized control reaches a live The render assertion appears first by design. A regression fails that assertion before an earlier text assertion can mask the render failure. 2. The nested URL rule destroyed harmless public referencesYou were right. My test at line 334 treated harmless public content as an attack and locked the wrong behavior in place. I corrected the code and that test row. One named constant, Measured with the real function:
Regression verificationAll six local rows on the publish path still become the placeholder. The decode bound still rejects the still-changing value The whole-token match-classify-decide order is unchanged. The range contains zero changes to The combined media and share selector increased from 434 passed to 461 passed, plus 18 subtests. The new load-guard file adds nine tests. Disclosures
The branch is behind |
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Changes requested: static exact-head re-gate at 5e90f1fad3cb
Thanks for moving legacy snapshots onto the read-time reference guard and for preserving ordinary public-to-public nested URLs. Those parts are real improvements. Two deterministic public-boundary gaps remain at this exact head.
1. Legacy snapshots are not projected back to the public message schema
api/shares.py::_guarded_public_message() checks only that a row is a dictionary with string content, then returns {**message, "content": guarded}. That republishes every stored field and every stored role unchanged. A pre-fix snapshot can therefore return system or tool rows and arbitrary siblings such as provider_details, tool_calls, workspace/local metadata, or raw result fields through the anonymous /api/share/<token> response. static/share.js::_shareRenderMessages() renders every returned row.
This contradicts the existing public-share contract in tests/test_session_public_share.py::test_public_share_payload_is_sanitized_and_read_only, which requires only user/assistant rows and no provider details. The same load projection stringifies a structured title and trusts a stored message_count even after rows are dropped.
Fix: treat stored snapshot JSON as untrusted and rebuild each public message rather than spreading it. Require role user or assistant, require non-empty string content, apply the pure read-time guards, and return only role, content, plus a finite numeric timestamp. Drop unknown/system/tool rows and all unapproved sibling fields. Accept only a string title and recompute message_count from the guarded list. Keep all referenced-file resolution unreachable from this read-only path. Add a raw legacy fixture containing invalid roles, secret extra fields, a structured title, and stale/malformed count, then assert the exact anonymous API projection.
2. Nested-target classification still misses browser-normalized local descendants
api/share_refs.py::_NESTED_CANDIDATE_RE recognizes only literal http:// and https:// starts. After the outer URL is classified, public_reference_hides_local_target() otherwise performs raw marker substring checks. It does not enumerate scheme-relative or relative URL candidates and does not normalize browser backslashes/dot segments before checking hosts and authenticated routes. For example, an outer public wrapper carrying ?next=//127.0.0.1/x.png contains none of the current literal markers and no absolute-regex candidate, so it reaches the preserve arm. Encoded scheme-relative private descendants and backslash/dot-segment authenticated-route forms have the same gap.
Fix: use a bounded scanner that examines every overlapping absolute, scheme-relative, and relative candidate in path/query/fragment. Resolve //host/... with the containing scheme, browser-normalize backslashes and dot segments, validate authorities/ports, and fail closed on decode/depth/byte/candidate exhaustion. Preserve harmless public-to-public references byte-for-byte. Add private/public scheme-relative controls, encoded/backslash/dot-segment authenticated-route cases, malformed authorities, and overlapping-start discriminators.
Verification status
Layer 1 is SUSPICIOUS (score 6) because two existing added test comments contain the scanner's bytes.fromhex signature. The mandatory policy therefore required a static-only review: no PR code, tests, imports, Node, browser, or server path was executed. This scan verdict is not the requested change; the blockers above are direct source/control-flow findings. After rework, the current head still needs a fresh threat decision and an authorized targeted test run.
…ants Closes both blockers from the 3 September re-gate at 5e90f1f. 1. Legacy snapshots were not projected back to the public message schema _guarded_public_message() checked only that a row was a dict with string content, then returned {**message, "content": guarded}. That republished every stored field and every stored role, so a pre-fix snapshot could serve `system` and `tool` rows plus siblings such as provider_details, tool_calls, raw_result, and workspace paths through the anonymous /api/share/<token> response. static/share.js::_shareRenderMessages() renders every returned row. Measured on the pre-fix code, writing a legacy fixture straight to the share store and reading it through the real load_share(): - 3 forbidden roles published: system, tool, debug - 4 unapproved sibling fields published: provider_details, raw_result, tool_calls, workspace - the strings sk-SHOULD-NOT-LEAK, /etc/shadow and /home/samfp/private all reached the payload - the stored message_count of 99 survived while 7 rows were returned - a non-numeric timestamp was published verbatim Each row is now REBUILT from approved keys rather than spread: role must be user or assistant, content must be a non-empty string, and only role, content, and a finite numeric timestamp are returned. The title is accepted only as a string, so a structured title no longer publishes its repr. message_count is recomputed from the surviving rows. The role set moves to one module constant, _PUBLIC_SHARE_ROLES, consulted by both _sanitize_message (write) and _guarded_public_message (read). A read that accepted a wider set than the write is exactly how a legacy snapshot served rows a fresh snapshot can never contain. This makes the read path satisfy the contract tests/test_session_public_share.py::test_public_share_payload_is_sanitized_and_read_only already states for the write path. The load path still performs zero filesystem access: classification only, no resolution and no embedding. 2. Nested-target classification missed browser-normalized local descendants _NESTED_CANDIDATE_RE recognized only literal http:// and https:// starts, and the remaining checks were raw marker substring tests. A scheme-relative descendant such as ?next=//127.0.0.1/x.png carries no scheme token and matches no marker, so it reached the preserve arm and published a live private reference. Measured on the pre-fix code across a 20-row probe: 8 rows wrongly reached the preserve arm, including //169.254.169.254 (the cloud metadata endpoint), //10.0.0.5, //localhost:8080, the percent-encoded spelling, and the backslash form \\127.0.0.1\\x.png. Two additions: - _browser_normalize() converts backslashes to forward slashes and collapses dot segments on the PATH portion only, so \\api\\media?path= and /foo/../api/media?path= are compared as the authenticated route they resolve to. The query is left untouched, because a `..` in a query value is not a path segment and rewriting it would break byte-for-byte preservation. - _scheme_relative_candidates() enumerates every //host/... run, and each one is resolved with the CONTAINING scheme and classified by the same recursive function, so an http parent classifies its descendant as http. Verified against a real URL parser rather than assumed: new URL('///127.0.0.1/x.png', 'https://cdn.test/a.png') resolves to host 127.0.0.1, because extra leading slashes collapse. So a triple slash is enumerated too. An earlier version of the new test asserted the opposite and was wrong; the test now pins the real behaviour. Verification - tests/test_share_read_boundary_projection.py: 34 passed. Every test drives the real production functions, and the legacy fixture is raw JSON written straight to the store so no write-path sanitizer can touch it first. - 6 preserve controls guard against over-blocking, including a public scheme-relative descendant //images.example.test/b.png. A classifier that refused every scheme-relative form would pass all 12 refusal cases and still be wrong. - Mutation witness: restoring pre-fix api/shares.py fails 11 of 34; restoring pre-fix api/share_refs.py fails 14; dropping only the scheme-relative enumeration fails 11; dropping only the browser normalization fails 3; trusting the stored message_count again fails exactly 1. - Filtered suite (-k "share or media or reference or public or snapshot"): 932 passed, 4 skipped, 0 failed. Disclosure on scope: _NESTED_SCHEME_RELATIVE_RE does not stop at & or , for the same reason _NESTED_CANDIDATE_RE does not. A longer candidate can only carry more evidence, so the ambiguity resolves in the fail-closed direction.
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I fixed both blockers at head 1. Legacy snapshot projectionYou were right: It checked only for a dict with string
The read path now rebuilds each row from approved keys instead of a spread. It accepts only The same fixture now returns 4 rows, all One constant, The load path still performs zero filesystem access: classification only, no resolution or embedding. A new test tracks 2. Descendant classificationYou were right:
Two additions fix this:
The classifier now compares I also corrected my assertion that The new module includes 6 preserve controls, including the public scheme-relative descendant
VerificationAll 34 tests in
The new module plus Branch scopeI kept unrelated local commit The branch reports BEHIND |
| no_slash = r"[^\s)\]" + extra_exclude + r"/]" | ||
| word_no_dot_no_slash = ( | ||
| r"(?!MEDIA:)[^\s)\]." + extra_exclude + r"/]+" | ||
| ) | ||
| final_with_ext_no_slash = ( | ||
| r"(?!MEDIA:)" + no_slash + r"+?\.[A-Za-z0-9]+" | ||
| ) |
`){kind=link}
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When a complete token is followed by prose ending in a slash-bearing filename, such as MEDIA:/tmp/a.png see /other/README.md, the slash-excluding discriminator fails and the spaced branch captures the entire fragment. The renderer and backend consumers then use /tmp/a.png see /other/README.md as a nonexistent path, losing the attachment and swallowing the trailing prose.
2 participants
Problem
A
MEDIA:path containing a space rendered wrong and could not be fetched.Every
MEDIA:parser captured the path with a[^\s)\]]+class, which stops atthe first space. Given a real artifact path:
the renderer produced a card labelled
Meeting(wrong basename) and spilledNotes/2026-07-29 - SDE Focus Group.mdinto the message bubble as raw prose.Spaces were never a problem downstream —
/api/mediapercent-encodes the path.Only the capture was wrong.
Second, unrelated bug found in the same screenshot: Bedrock/Vertex model IDs are
dotted, and the region+vendor head survived into the display label —
us.anthropic.claude-opus-5rendered as "Us.anthropic.claude Opus 5" in theturn footer and status bar.
Root cause
Both are one-line-class bugs with more than one home.
MEDIA capture — the truncating class lived at four frontend call sites and
two backend ones (see Siblings). The backend copies matter functionally: a
truncated capture never matches the real on-disk path, so
/api/mediadeniesa legitimate assistant-emitted artifact and the public-share inliner silently
fails to embed it. Fixing only the renderer would have made this worse — the
frontend would start requesting the correct full path while the allow-list still
truncated, turning a cosmetic bug into a broken download.
Model label —
getModelLabel()consults the server-provided_dynamicModelLabelscache before normalising, so fixing the JS alone changednothing. The producer,
api/config.py::_get_label_for_model, split only on/and
-, never..Fix
One shared MEDIA shape per language, consumed by every call site:
static/ui.js::_mediaPathSrc()— frontend source of truth;messages.jsimports it so the streamed and settled renderings of one token stay identical.
api/helpers.py::media_token_pattern()— backend source of truth; consumed bythe
/api/mediaallow-list and the share inliner.The widening is deliberately bounded. Unbounded space tolerance would swallow
trailing prose (
MEDIA:/tmp/a.png looks good) and glue an adjacent tag(
MEDIA:/a.png MEDIA:/b.png) into one invalid path. So the bare form is anchoredon a file extension and tempered: it crosses single spaces only while still
reaching a
.ext, never crosses a newline, and carries a(?!MEDIA:)guard oneach continuation token. Extension-less paths (
MEDIA:/tmp/Caddyfile) keepmatching via the original no-space fallback, so nothing that resolved before
stops resolving.
I hit both of those regressions during development; they are now pinned by tests.
Model label — both the JS and the Python producer drop leading
letters-only dot segments and stop at the first segment containing a digit or
hyphen. That letters-only test is what makes version dots provably safe:
gpt-4.1splits togpt-4/1, andgpt-4is not letters-only, so nothing isstripped. After normalising, the ID is re-run through the label tables so
us.anthropic.claude-sonnet-4-5lands on the same entry asanthropic/claude-sonnet-4-5instead of falling through to the raw ID.Siblings found (rule 1)
The same truncating class, all fixed at the shared chokepoint:
static/ui.jsrenderMd()MEDIA stashstatic/messages.js_smdMediaTailFlushEntry()anchored matcherstatic/messages.js_smdMediaAwareAddText()run-slicerstatic/messages.jsapi/routes.py_MEDIA_TOKEN_RE→/api/mediaallow-listapi/shares.py_SHARE_MEDIA_RE→ public-share inlinerModel-label producers:
static/ui.js::getModelLabelandapi/config.py::_get_label_for_model.Deliberately out of scope:
gateway/platforms/base.pyin the Hermes Agentrepo (a different codebase) already solved this bug class for outbound delivery —
its comments track it as #24032/#68773 — and the bounded, extension-anchored
approach here is modelled on it. Nothing in this repo depends on that copy.
Proof the tests bite (rule 6)
New file
tests/test_media_spaced_paths.py(15 cases). Verified RED before thefix by restoring the old class in both backend files:
The first failure is behavioral, not a source-string check: it drives the real
_session_media_token_allows_path()predicate with a real file on disk and anassistant message, and shows the allow-list denying a legitimate spaced path.
After the fix:
15 passed.The adversarial cases (trailing prose, two glued tags, parenthesised,
newline-bounded, extension-less) are asserted in the same file so a future
widening cannot silently re-break them. The threat model is pinned too:
user-authored
MEDIA:tokens still cannot mint allow-list entries, and a spacedtoken does not widen into admitting a different file in the same directory.
Verification run (rule 9)
npm run lint:runtimeclean.new Function(...)smoke check).Neighbouring sweeps run explicitly, not just the new file:
test_smd_media_in_stream.py(real vendored smd parser driven through splitchunks — proves a half-arrived spaced path buffers instead of emitting a
truncated card),
test_media_inline.py,test_data_uri_images.py,test_renderer_js_behaviour.py,test_issue347.py,test_issue2768_workspace_links.py, plus the model-label suitestest_issue3429_uri_scheme_model_*.py,test_ollama_model_chip_label_regression.py,test_issue6068_used_model_footer.py.Verified in the browser, against served bytes
Unit tests prove the local file; they don't prove the server serves it. Fetched
/static/ui.jsover HTTP and ran the page's ownrenderMd()/getModelLabel()in a real DOM:
0 console errors on load.
Test-harness note
Several suites white-box-extract production functions from source by counting
brace depth, and that counter does not skip string literals or comments. Two
consequences shaped the implementation:
functiondeclarations, because a top-levelconstisinvisible to the extractor (its caller then dies with
_mediaPathSrc is not defined);{1,8}quantifier, a literal
}in a character class, or even a comment mentioningone truncates extraction mid-literal and yields
SyntaxError: Unexpected end of input.\x7b/\x7dis not a substitute:inside a regex it means a literal brace, not a quantifier.
+plus thetrailing boundary gives the same bound.
Nine harnesses across two extraction styles needed the new helpers added to
their eval lists, and one source-text assertion that pinned the old inline
regex (
assertIn("/^MEDIA:([^", MESSAGES_JS)) now asserts the shared helperinstead of being deleted.
What I could not verify
DOM (element counts, card
textContent, absence of leftover text) rather thanpixels. Rule 10 does not apply — no control was moved or added.
_SHARE_MEDIA_REas a sibling and unit-tested the pattern (including the>boundary and http-URL skip), but I did not create a real share and confirm a
spaced-path image embeds as base64 in the snapshot HTML.
text/markdownis not in the stockMIME_MAP. The allow-list test injectsit via
monkeypatch. The bug and fix are MIME-independent, but that means thetest does not prove a
.mdartifact is fetchable through/api/mediawithdefault config.
fallback isn't involved.
dotted head is always region/vendor and always letters-only. That holds for all
61 IDs in the live picker (
us.,eu.,apac.,global.), but I have notfound an AWS document guaranteeing no future region token contains a digit. If
one ever does, the label degrades to today's cosmetic behaviour rather than
breaking — the segment loop simply stops earlier.
Notes (not in the diff, rule 9)
Two pre-existing issues in
_get_label_for_modelthat I left alone because theyare outside this task:
openai/gpt-4orenders asGPT 4O(over-eagerupper-casing of short alnum tokens) and
google/gemini-2.5-proasGemini 2.5 PRO. Both predate this change and are unaffected by it.