security: validate URLs to prevent SSRF in content fetching endpoints - #8476
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User-supplied URLs passed to GetContentURIAsBase64() and downloadFile() were fetched without validation, allowing SSRF attacks against internal services. Added URL validation that blocks private IPs, loopback, link-local, and cloud metadata endpoints before fetching.
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mudler
approved these changes
Feb 10, 2026
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Vulnerability identified and fix provided by Kolega.dev
Description
This PR fixes a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in multiple endpoints that accept user-provided URLs and fetch them without validation.
Vulnerability Details
Location:
pkg/utils/base64.go(GetContentURIAsBase64),core/http/endpoints/openai/image.go(downloadFile), and callers incore/http/middleware/request.go(lines 331, 341, 356) andcore/http/endpoints/localai/detection.go(line 34).Description: The
GetContentURIAsBase64()function anddownloadFile()function fetch arbitrary user-supplied URLs without any validation. This allows attackers to probe internal networks, access cloud metadata services (e.g.,169.254.169.254on AWS/GCP), and reach internal services via loopback or private IP ranges.Fix Applied: Added a
ValidateExternalURL()function inpkg/utils/urlfetch.gothat performs DNS resolution on the target URL hostname and verifies all resolved IPs are public. It blocks:This validation is called at the entry point of both
GetContentURIAsBase64()anddownloadFile()before any HTTP request is made.Notes for Reviewers
Tests/Linters Ran
go vet ./pkg/utils/...go build ./pkg/utils/...gofmt -l(all changed files)go test ./pkg/utils/... -vContribution Notes
golangci-lintwas not available in the build environment butgo vetwas run as a substituteSigned commits