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SecurityPkg: Tcg2Smm: Inspect target address before usage (#195)
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## Description

This change uses abstracted interface from MemLib to validate incoming
nested pointer before usage to ensure user supplied legitimate NVS
buffer for corresponding TCG operations.

- [x] Impacts functionality?
- **Functionality** - Does the change ultimately impact how firmware
functions?
- Examples: Add a new library, publish a new PPI, update an algorithm,
...
- [ ] Impacts security?
- **Security** - Does the change have a direct security impact on an
application,
    flow, or firmware?
  - Examples: Crypto algorithm change, buffer overflow fix, parameter
    validation improvement, ...
- [ ] Breaking change?
- **Breaking change** - Will anyone consuming this change experience a
break
    in build or boot behavior?
- Examples: Add a new library class, move a module to a different repo,
call
    a function in a new library class in a pre-existing module, ...
- [ ] Includes tests?
  - **Tests** - Does the change include any explicit test code?
  - Examples: Unit tests, integration tests, robot tests, ...
- [ ] Includes documentation?
- **Documentation** - Does the change contain explicit documentation
additions
    outside direct code modifications (and comments)?
- Examples: Update readme file, add feature readme file, link to
documentation
    on an a separate Web page, ...

## How This Was Tested

This change is validated on proprietary hardware platform.

## Integration Instructions

N/A

---------

Signed-off-by: Kun Qin <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Michael Kubacki <[email protected]>
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kuqin12 and makubacki authored Oct 28, 2023
1 parent 3e98f83 commit 64a814a
Showing 1 changed file with 9 additions and 0 deletions.
9 changes: 9 additions & 0 deletions SecurityPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Smm/Tcg2Smm.c
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -86,6 +86,15 @@ TpmNvsCommunciate (
switch (CommParams->Function) {
case TpmNvsMmExchangeInfo:
DEBUG ((DEBUG_VERBOSE, "[%a] - Function requested: MM_EXCHANGE_NVS_INFO\n", __FUNCTION__));
// MU_CHANGE TCBZ4378 [BEGIN] - Check for invalid NVS buffer location
if (!IsBufferOutsideMmValid (CommParams->TargetAddress, sizeof (TCG_NVS))) {
DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "[%a] - NVS buffer in invalid location!\n", __func__));

Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;
break;
}

// MU_CHANGE TCBZ4378 [END]
CommParams->RegisteredPpSwiValue = mPpSoftwareSmi;
CommParams->RegisteredMcSwiValue = mMcSoftwareSmi;
mTcgNvs = (TCG_NVS *)(UINTN)CommParams->TargetAddress;
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