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MSC2775: Lazy loading over federation #2775
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A first cut at an MSC to define how to massively speed up joins (and MSC #2444 peeks) by sending irrelevant events after you join rather than up front
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Clients which are lazy loading members however may return the initial `/join` | ||
or `/peek` before `/state` has completed. However, we need a way to tell | ||
clients once the server has finished synchronising its local state. For |
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need to spec how the client tells the server that it knows how to handle SS LL
[requirements of the CS API](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/blob/1c7a6a9c7fa2b47877ce8790ea5e5c588df5fa90/api/client-server/sync.yaml#L148)) | ||
* any members which are in the auth chain for the state events in the response | ||
* any members which are power events (aka control events): bans & kicks. | ||
* one joined member per server (if we want to be able to send messages while |
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I worry that this will create a potential race at the protocol level that may be exploitable by a bad actor in the room.
For example, in the situation that you join a room with two or more other users that are resident on the same server remote.com
. You learn about user A but not about B, C or D.
User A detects your join and then leaves the room immediately before you are able to retrieve the rest of the room state, therefore you think you are the only occupant of the room. As you don’t know about any users from remote.com
anymore, you no longer know if that server is still resident in the room and therefore you don’t know if you can ask it for room state.
The impact of this is lessened if you can include more than one membership from a given homeserver—even knowing about two or three users reduces the chance of this ever being an issue.
The joining server can then sync in the remaining membership events by calling | ||
`/state` as of the user's join event. To avoid retrieving duplicate data, we | ||
propose adding a parameter of `lazy_load_members_only: true` to the JSON | ||
request body which would then only return the missing `m.room.member` events. |
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This implies that the homeserver needs to track which membership events have been sent to which users, which feels like it might create a lot of additional complexity for homeserver implementors. It might just be better (certainly a lot simpler) to send the entire room state and deal with the duplicates.
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The vast majority of state events in Matrix today are `m.room.member` events. | ||
For instance, 99.4% (30661 out of 30856) of Matrix HQ's state is | ||
`m.room.member`s (see Stats section below). |
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It would be interesting to know how many of these are actually ”membership”: “join”
and not users that have left.
Certainly another optimisation would be to not bother telling homeservers about ”leave”
membership events until they need to know them for some reason (which is probably when processing their next join and, even then, unless they are ”invite”
or ”ban”
I’m still not sure why we care about their previous ”leave”
as long as join rules permit).
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Looks like it's approximately 2:1 join:leave for #matrix:matrix.org, but approximately even for #fdroid:f-droid.org. It'd be a trickier query for "not users that have left".
select json::json#>>'{content,membership}' as membership, count(*) from state_events natural join event_json where type='m.room.member' and room_id='!OGEhHVWSdvArJzumhm:matrix.org' group by membership order by count(*) desc;
membership | count
------------+-------
join | 24269
leave | 12029
ban | 307
invite | 145
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current figures for #matrix
:
count | membership
-------+------------
1458 | ban
26287 | join
26251 | leave
to) | ||
* any membership events with membership `invite` (to mitigate risk of double invites) | ||
* any members for user_ids which are referred to by the content of state events | ||
in the response (e.g. `m.room.power_levels`) <-- TBD. These could be irrelevant, |
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This does seem irrelevant, as the power levels are still enforced even for users that we don’t know about yet. Anything that’s important for auth will already be in the auth chain.
server has fully synchronised the state for this room. Operations which are | ||
blocked on state being fully synchronised are: | ||
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* Sending E2EE messages, otherwise some of the users will not have the keys |
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Something to consider here is that we can’t even start sending device list updates for users until we learn about those users, let alone exchanging keys, so this might create another protocol-level race when joining E2E rooms if you start sending messages into the room before you know about all the devices in the room (resulting in UTDs).
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@neilalexander I'm not really following you here. You seem to be saying the same thing as the MSC (if a user sends E2E messages before they have the user list, their client will not know who to encrypt for).
calculate resolved state as of that event for authorising events and servicing | ||
/state queries etc. Loading the power events up front lets us authorise new | ||
events (backfilled & new traffic) using partial state - when you receive an | ||
event you do the lookup of the event to the list of event state keys you need |
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It’s worth calling out that checking for soft-failures depends on us not just knowing the state at the time of the event, but also the current room state, therefore it’s essential to retrieve the latest membership state for a user too in addition to the membership event supplied in the newly-received event’s auth events (which may be out of date).
We need to be able to consult a server that we know to be in the room right now for that information.
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We need to be able to consult a server that we know to be in the room right now for that information.
Consider we receive an event from a user which the federation as a whole doesn't believe is currently in the room. Clearly the sending server believes that user is in the room, because it let the user send a message.
In short, we'd need to carefully consider which server we consult.
That said - maybe it's ok to allow such events through for the period we are syncing state.
* Room state can be big. For instance, a /send_join response for Matrix HQ is | ||
currently 24MB of JSON covering 28,188 events, and could easily take tens of | ||
seconds to calculate and send (especially on lower-end hardware). | ||
* All these events have to be verified by the receiving server. |
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* All these events have to be verified by the receiving server. | |
* All these events have to be verified and persisted by the receiving server. |
Our testing shows the main problem is writing the events to the database.
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Is it possible to keep them in ram and persist them in the background while users can already use the room? Probably not because the server might crash...
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The vast majority of state events in Matrix today are `m.room.member` events. | ||
For instance, 99.4% (30661 out of 30856) of Matrix HQ's state is | ||
`m.room.member`s (see Stats section below). |
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current figures for #matrix
:
count | membership
-------+------------
1458 | ban
26287 | join
26251 | leave
[requirements of the CS API](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/blob/1c7a6a9c7fa2b47877ce8790ea5e5c588df5fa90/api/client-server/sync.yaml#L148)) | ||
* any members which are in the auth chain for the state events in the response | ||
* any members which are power events (aka control events): bans & kicks. | ||
* one joined member per server (if we want to be able to send messages while |
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for context, this will be 2462 membership events for Matrix HQ (of 54194 total state) at present.
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Can we just ask the server we join via to send us a list of the servers in the room? There doesn't seem to be any need to have actual membership events for them.
server has fully synchronised the state for this room. Operations which are | ||
blocked on state being fully synchronised are: | ||
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* Sending E2EE messages, otherwise some of the users will not have the keys |
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@neilalexander I'm not really following you here. You seem to be saying the same thing as the MSC (if a user sends E2E messages before they have the user list, their client will not know who to encrypt for).
calculate resolved state as of that event for authorising events and servicing | ||
/state queries etc. Loading the power events up front lets us authorise new | ||
events (backfilled & new traffic) using partial state - when you receive an | ||
event you do the lookup of the event to the list of event state keys you need |
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We need to be able to consult a server that we know to be in the room right now for that information.
Consider we receive an event from a user which the federation as a whole doesn't believe is currently in the room. Clearly the sending server believes that user is in the room, because it let the user send a message.
In short, we'd need to carefully consider which server we consult.
That said - maybe it's ok to allow such events through for the period we are syncing state.
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Causes include: | ||
* Room state can be big. For instance, a /send_join response for Matrix HQ is | ||
currently 24MB of JSON covering 28,188 events, and could easily take tens of |
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now 115M and 144K events, for the record.
/state queries etc. Loading the power events up front lets us authorise new | ||
events (backfilled & new traffic) using partial state - when you receive an | ||
event you do the lookup of the event to the list of event state keys you need | ||
to auth; and if any of those are missing you need to fetch them from the | ||
remote server by type & state_key via /state (and auth them too). |
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The problem here is that we're effectively trusting a remote server to tell us about part of the state at a given point in the DAG.
Currently we trust one single server to give us a correct impression of the room state, via the /send_join
response - but in that case we've normally chosen a specific server via the room alias. I'm a bit worried about opening it up so that any server in the federation (not even necessarily in the room) can make claims about room state.
Given we should already have the ACL list and the kick/ban list, I'm not sure I can think of a way to abuse this too much that isn't already a problem, but I think it's something we need to be careful about.
events (backfilled & new traffic) using partial state - when you receive an | ||
event you do the lookup of the event to the list of event state keys you need | ||
to auth; and if any of those are missing you need to fetch them from the | ||
remote server by type & state_key via /state (and auth them too). |
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It may also be worth noting that the auth chain for some events can be pretty huge, since it includes all past joins and leaves for a given user, meaning that some users in HQ now have auth chains thousands of events long.
of all the new events we've been sent since joining the room. We should not | ||
need to re-auth these events, given the new state should not impact their | ||
auth results. This ensures that the server ends up with correct historical |
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We should not need to re-auth these events, given the new state should not impact their auth results.
Per the above, I think this is a risky assumption. The new state totally could affect their auth results.
We currently trust the server we join via to provide us with accurate room state. | ||
This proposal doesn't make this any better or worse. |
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per the above, I think it does, since we now trust lots of servers to give us accurate room state - at least while we're lazy-loading the state.
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Therefore, in the response to `/send_join` (or a MSC2444 `/peek`), we propose | ||
sending only the following `m.room.member` events (if the initiating server | ||
includes `lazy_load_members: true` in their JSON request body): |
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the request body for a /send_join
is the membership event itself, so we'll have to put this flag elsewhere. Suggest a lazy_load_members=true|false
query-param.
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also, needs an unstable prefix, I guess.
Suggest org.matrix.msc2775.lazy_load_members
* the "hero" room members which are needed for clients to display | ||
a summary of the room (based on the | ||
[requirements of the CS API](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/blob/1c7a6a9c7fa2b47877ce8790ea5e5c588df5fa90/api/client-server/sync.yaml#L148)) | ||
* any members which are in the auth chain for the state events in the response |
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the auth chain ends up in a separate section, so I think this is a no-op.
* the "hero" room members which are needed for clients to display | ||
a summary of the room (based on the | ||
[requirements of the CS API](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/blob/1c7a6a9c7fa2b47877ce8790ea5e5c588df5fa90/api/client-server/sync.yaml#L148)) |
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do we really need this as well as a summary
?
a summary of the room (based on the | ||
[requirements of the CS API](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/blob/1c7a6a9c7fa2b47877ce8790ea5e5c588df5fa90/api/client-server/sync.yaml#L148)) | ||
* any members which are in the auth chain for the state events in the response | ||
* any members which are power events (aka control events): bans & kicks. |
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why do we need kicks here?
`/send_join` or `/peek` must include a `lazy_load_members: true` field if the | ||
state is partial and members need to be subsequently loaded by `/state`. | ||
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Clients which are not lazy loading members (by MSC1227) must block returning |
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what does it mean for a client to "block returning" an API?
Clients which are lazy loading members however may return the initial `/join` | ||
or `/peek` before `/state` has completed. However, we need a way to tell | ||
clients once the server has finished synchronising its local state. We do this | ||
by adding an `syncing: true` field to the room's `state` block in the `/sync` |
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what exactly do clients do with this field? I thought that clients which do lazy-loading syncs were obliged to expect partial state
blocks anyway?
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they do expect partial state blocks, but they currently don't know that they're partial - and so then go and hit /members anyway to fill in the missing members. so this i think is fixing that thinko by giving the client a clear way to know that state is partial and they need to fill it in.
* the "hero" room members which are needed for clients to display | ||
a summary of the room (based on the | ||
[requirements of the CS API](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/blob/1c7a6a9c7fa2b47877ce8790ea5e5c588df5fa90/api/client-server/sync.yaml#L148)) | ||
* any members which are in the auth chain for the state events in the response | ||
* any members which are power events (aka control events): bans & kicks. | ||
* one joined member per server (if we want to be able to send messages while | ||
the room state is synchronising, otherwise we won't know where to send them | ||
to) | ||
* any membership events with membership `invite` (to mitigate risk of double invites) | ||
* any members for user_ids which are referred to by the content of state events | ||
in the response (e.g. `m.room.power_levels`) <-- TBD. These could be irrelevant, | ||
plus we don't know where to look for user_ids in arbitrary state events. |
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something else I'd like to change while we're messing about with /send_join
responses: we should make it explicit that events do not need to be duplicated between state
and auth_chain
. For example, the m.room.create
is necessarily both part of state
but is also on the auth chain for all the events in the response. There is no point in sending two copies of such events - servers should be able to elide them from auth_chain
.
This needs to be opt-in, because existing implementations (such as Synapse) rely on at least the create event being returned in auth_chain
- so this is a good time to change it (when we are adding a query param anyway).
We should do something similar to /state
.
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Causes include: | ||
* Room state can be big. For instance, a /send_join response for Matrix HQ is | ||
currently 24MB of JSON covering 28,188 events, and could easily take tens of |
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I think there is some duplication we can get rid of. Some state events are also mentioned in the auth chain. Maybe this can be fixed by only sending it as one list of event jsons and one list of only the event ids that are in the state
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Ah, this was mentioned already in #2775 (comment)
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Causes include: | ||
* Room state can be big. For instance, a /send_join response for Matrix HQ is | ||
currently 24MB of JSON covering 28,188 events, and could easily take tens of |
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We can also think about how we can improve the auth chain size. Member events don't have to mention the previous member event in most cases and can instead mention an old member event or none at all in public rooms
* Room state can be big. For instance, a /send_join response for Matrix HQ is | ||
currently 24MB of JSON covering 28,188 events, and could easily take tens of | ||
seconds to calculate and send (especially on lower-end hardware). | ||
* All these events have to be verified by the receiving server. |
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Is it possible to keep them in ram and persist them in the background while users can already use the room? Probably not because the server might crash...
seconds to calculate and send (especially on lower-end hardware). | ||
* All these events have to be verified by the receiving server. | ||
* Your server may have to fetch ths signing keys for all the servers who have | ||
sent state into the room. |
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This can be improved by including the public key in the event (instead of the server name?)
closing as above. |
Rendered
An MSC to define how to massively speed up joins (and MSC #2444 peeks) by incrementally sending
m.room.member
events after your server has joined/peeked the room, rather than up front.