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First practical showcase for leaking secret encryption keys from a secure SGX enclave.

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Cache-timing Attacks on Intel SGX

We present an access-driven cache-timing attack on AES when running inside an Intel SGX enclave. Using Neve and Seifert’s elimination method, as well as a cache probing mechanism relying on Intel PCM, we are able to extract the AES secret key in less than 10 seconds by investigating 480 encrypted blocks on average. The AES implementation we attack is based on a Gladman AES implementation taken from an older version of OpenSSL, which is known to be vulnerable to cache-timing attacks. In contrast to previous works on cache-timing attacks, our attack has to be exe- cuted with root privileges running on the same host as the vulnerable enclave. Intel SGX, however, was designed to precisely protect applications against root-level attacks. As a consequence, we demonstrate that SGX cannot withstand its designated attacker model when it comes to side-channel vulnerabilities. To the contrary, the attack surface for side- channels increases dramatically in the scenario of SGX due to the power of root-level attackers, for example, by exploiting the accuracy of PCM, which is restricted to kernel code.

Visit https://www1.cs.fau.de/sgx-timing for more information.

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First practical showcase for leaking secret encryption keys from a secure SGX enclave.

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