Mi and save/load support of pid_tracker #9

PSRCode · 2015-04-24T22:38:29Z

@jgalar @compudj
These commits aims to provide support for new feature pid_tracker.

On the mi side this pr offer support for track and untrack command. It also add pid_tracker information to the list command under the domain node.

As for the save/load of sessions we save a pid_tracker node under the domain node.

Signed-off-by: Jonathan Rajotte <[email protected]>

Xml schema updated Signed-off-by: Jonathan Rajotte <[email protected]>

Signed-off-by: Jonathan Rajotte <[email protected]>

The node_exist argument permit a more flexible way to extract informations within test suites. We can check the presence of a node and not only list the content of a final node. Signed-off-by: Jonathan Rajotte <[email protected]>

Signed-off-by: Jonathan Rajotte <[email protected]>

Also removed some dead code. Signed-off-by: Jonathan Rajotte <[email protected]>

Found by Coverity: 2. var_compare_op: Comparing arg to null implies that arg might be null. CID 1256137 (#1 of 9): Dereference after null check (FORWARD_NULL)14. var_deref_model: Passing null pointer arg to strdup, which dereferences it. [... same for #2 through lttng#9 ] This should not really be an issue since 1) options that use the "arg" parameter will not be set by popt if one is not provided, 2) the configuration file parser will never invoke set_option with a NULL argument; if no "value" is provided in the file, an empty string is passed. The second point is the reason for the "arg && arg[0] == '\0'" check; we already know that the argument is invalid since an empty string is never a valid argument for the supported options. Nonetheless, it makes sense for Coverity to flag this and moving the check to individual cases, although very verbose, is clear. Signed-off-by: Jérémie Galarneau <[email protected]>

CID 1388095 (lttng#9-14 of 14): Resource leak (RESOURCE_LEAK) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Rajotte <[email protected]>

Observed issue ============== A NULL pointer dereference occurs during the creation of a session that is associated with a peer older than 2.11. The resulting backtrace follows: Program terminated with signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. #0 0x0000564af45b755b in lttng_trace_chunk_set_as_owner (chunk=0x7f8ca8004730, session_output_directory=0x7f8ca8004680) at trace-chunk.c:1033 1033 if (chunk->path[0] != '\0') { [Current thread is 1 (Thread 0x7f8cb808d700 (LWP 7300))] #0 0x0000564af45b755b in lttng_trace_chunk_set_as_owner (chunk=0x7f8ca8004730, session_output_directory=0x7f8ca8004680) at trace-chunk.c:1033 #1 0x0000564af45a6a78 in session_set_anonymous_chunk (session=0x7f8ca8001380) at session.c:229 #2 session_create (session_name=<optimized out>, hostname=<optimized out>, base_path=<optimized out>, live_timer=<optimized out>, snapshot=<optimized out>, sessiond_uuid=<optimized out>, id_sessiond=<optimized out>, current_chunk_id=<optimized out>, creation_time=<optimized out>, major=<optimized out>, minor=<optimized out>, session_name_contains_creation_time=<optimized out>) at session.c:416 #3 0x0000564af459207e in relay_create_session (conn=0x7f8ca0000f60, payload=<optimized out>, recv_hdr=<optimized out>) at main.c:1428 #4 0x0000564af4594f12 in relay_process_control_command (payload=0x7f8cb808c940, header=0x7f8ca0001000, conn=0x7f8ca0000f60) at main.c:3218 #5 relay_process_control_receive_payload (conn=0x7f8ca0000f60) at main.c:3361 #6 0x0000564af45980b0 in relay_process_control (conn=0x7f8ca0000f60) at main.c:3478 #7 relay_thread_worker (data=<optimized out>) at main.c:3927 #8 0x00007f8cbba9a46f in start_thread () from /usr/lib/libpthread.so.0 #9 0x00007f8cbb9ca3d3 in clone () from /usr/lib/libc.so.6 Cause ===== lttng_trace_chunk_set_as_owner() correctly handles the case where a trace chunk has no output path, but expects the path to be an empty string rather than being NULL. This is not correct as an anonymous chunk, created in backward compatibility mode when interacting with older peers, has no path; the path is transmitted as part of the streams' attributes upon their creation. Solution ======== Simply check for a NULL pointer in the same place where the empty chunk path string is created. The rest of the code in trace-chunk.c doesn't assume that the chunk's path is non-NULL. Note ==== The problem was introduced during the 2.12 release cycle (clear feature); this doesn't need to be backported. Signed-off-by: Jérémie Galarneau <[email protected]> Change-Id: Iaeb41e1648d61fbbe78d70b21191fd6d720900df

Observed issue -------------- While running the out-of-tree java agent tests [1], the session daemon and agent often end up in a deadlock. Attaching gdb to the session daemon, we can see that two threads are blocked in an intriguing state. Thread 13 (Thread 0x7f89027fc700 (LWP 9636)): #0 0x00007f891e81a4cf in __lll_lock_wait () from /usr/lib/libpthread.so.0 #1 0x00007f891e812e03 in pthread_mutex_lock () from /usr/lib/libpthread.so.0 #2 0x000055637f1fbd92 in session_lock_list () at session.c:156 #3 0x000055637f25dc47 in update_agent_app (app=0x7f88ec003480) at agent-thread.c:56 #4 0x000055637f25ec0a in thread_agent_management (data=0x556380cd2400) at agent-thread.c:426 #5 0x000055637f22fb3a in launch_thread (data=0x556380cd24a0) at thread.c:65 #6 0x00007f891e81046f in start_thread () from /usr/lib/libpthread.so.0 #7 0x00007f891e7203d3 in clone () from /usr/lib/libc.so.6 Thread 8 (Thread 0x7f8919309700 (LWP 9631)): #0 0x00007f891e81b44d in recvmsg () from /usr/lib/libpthread.so.0 #1 0x000055637f267847 in lttcomm_recvmsg_inet_sock (sock=0x7f88ec0033c0, buf=0x7f89192f5d5c, len=4, flags=0) at inet.c:367 #2 0x000055637f2146c6 in recv_reply (sock=0x7f88ec0033c0, buf=0x7f89192f5d5c, size=4) at agent.c:275 #3 0x000055637f215202 in app_context_op (app=0x7f88ec003400, ctx=0x7f8908020900, cmd=AGENT_CMD_APP_CTX_DISABLE) at agent.c:552 #4 0x000055637f215c2d in disable_context (ctx=0x7f8908020900, domain=LTTNG_DOMAIN_JUL) at agent.c:841 #5 0x000055637f217480 in agent_destroy (agt=0x7f890801dc20) at agent.c:1326 #6 0x000055637f243448 in trace_ust_destroy_session (session=0x7f8908004010) at trace-ust.c:1408 #7 0x000055637f1fd775 in session_release (ref=0x7f8908001e70) at session.c:873 #8 0x000055637f1fb9ac in urcu_ref_put (ref=0x7f8908001e70, release=0x55637f1fd62a <session_release>) at /usr/include/urcu/ref.h:68 lttng#9 0x000055637f1fdad2 in session_put (session=0x7f8908000d10) at session.c:942 lttng#10 0x000055637f2369e6 in process_client_msg (cmd_ctx=0x7f890800e6e0, sock=0x7f8919308560, sock_error=0x7f8919308564) at client.c:2102 lttng#11 0x000055637f2375ab in thread_manage_clients (data=0x556380cd1840) at client.c:2347 lttng#12 0x000055637f22fb3a in launch_thread (data=0x556380cd18b0) at thread.c:65 lttng#13 0x00007f891e81046f in start_thread () from /usr/lib/libpthread.so.0 lttng#14 0x00007f891e7203d3 in clone () from /usr/lib/libc.so.6 T8 is holding session list lock while the cmd_destroy_session command is being processed. More specifically, it is attempting to destroy an "agent_context" by communicating with an "agent" application. Meanwhile, T13 is still registering that same "agent" application. Cause ----- The deadlock itself is pretty simple to understand. The "agent thread" (T13) has the responsability of accepting new agent application connections. When such a connection occurs, the thread creates a new `agent_app` instance and sends the current sessions' configuration (i.e. their event rules and contexts) to the agent application. When that "update" is complete, a "registration done" message is sent to the new agent application. From the stacktrace above, we can see that T13 is attempting to update the agent application with its initial configuration, but it is blocked on the acquisition of the session list lock. The application's agent is also blocked since it is waiting for the "registration done" message before allowing tracing to proceed (not shown here, but seen in the test logs). Meanwhile, T8 is holding the session list lock while destroying a session. This is expected as all client commands are executed with this lock held. It is, amongst other reasons, used to serialize changes to the sessions' configuration and configuration updates sent to the tracers (i.e. because new apps appear or to keep existing tracers in sync with the users' session configuration). The question becomes: why is T8 tearing down an application that is not yet registered? First, inspecting `agent_app` immediately shows that this structure has no built-in synchronization mechanism. Therefore, the fact that two threads are accessing it at the same time raises a big red flag. Speculating on the intentions of the original design, my intuition is that the "agent_management" thread's role is limited to instantiating an `agent_app` and synchronizing it with the various sessions' configuration. Once that synchronization is performed, the agent application should be published and never accessed again by the "agent thread". Configuration updates (i.e. new event rules, contexts) are then sent synchronously as they are requested by a client in the context of the client thread. Those updates are performed while holding the session list lock. Hence, there is only one thread that should manipulate the agent application at any given time making an explicit `agent_app` lock unnecessary. Overall, this would echo what is done when a 'user space tracer' application registers to the session daemon (see dispatch.c:368). Evidently this isn't what is happening here. The agent thread creates the `agent_app`, publishes it, and then performs an "agent app update" (sending the configuration) while holding the session list lock. This means that there is a window where an agent application is visible to the other threads, yet has not been properly registered. Solution -------- The acquisition of the session list lock is moved outside of update_agent_app() to allow the "agent thread" to hold the session list lock during the "configuration update" phase of the agent application registration. Essentially, the sequence of operation changes from: - Agent tcp connection established - call handle_registration() - agent version check - allocation of agent_app instance - new agent_add is published through the global agent_apps_ht_by_sock hashtable *** it is now reachable by all other threads without any form of exclusivity synchronization. *** - update_agent_app - acquire session list lock - iterate over sessions - send configuration - release session list lock - send registration done to: - Agent tcp connection established - call accept_agent_registration() - agent version check - allocation of agent_app instance - acquire session list lock - update_agent_app - iterate over sessions - send configuration - send registration done - new agent_add is published through the global agent_apps_ht_by_sock hashtable - release session list lock Links ----- [1] https://github.com/lttng/lttng-ust-java-tests Signed-off-by: Jérémie Galarneau <[email protected]> Change-Id: Ia34c5ad81ed3936acbca756b425423e0cb8dbddf

Observed issue -------------- While running the out-of-tree java agent tests [1], the session daemon and agent often end up in a deadlock. Attaching gdb to the session daemon, we can see that two threads are blocked in an intriguing state. Thread 13 (Thread 0x7f89027fc700 (LWP 9636)): #0 0x00007f891e81a4cf in __lll_lock_wait () from /usr/lib/libpthread.so.0 #1 0x00007f891e812e03 in pthread_mutex_lock () from /usr/lib/libpthread.so.0 #2 0x000055637f1fbd92 in session_lock_list () at session.c:156 #3 0x000055637f25dc47 in update_agent_app (app=0x7f88ec003480) at agent-thread.c:56 #4 0x000055637f25ec0a in thread_agent_management (data=0x556380cd2400) at agent-thread.c:426 #5 0x000055637f22fb3a in launch_thread (data=0x556380cd24a0) at thread.c:65 #6 0x00007f891e81046f in start_thread () from /usr/lib/libpthread.so.0 #7 0x00007f891e7203d3 in clone () from /usr/lib/libc.so.6 Thread 8 (Thread 0x7f8919309700 (LWP 9631)): #0 0x00007f891e81b44d in recvmsg () from /usr/lib/libpthread.so.0 #1 0x000055637f267847 in lttcomm_recvmsg_inet_sock (sock=0x7f88ec0033c0, buf=0x7f89192f5d5c, len=4, flags=0) at inet.c:367 #2 0x000055637f2146c6 in recv_reply (sock=0x7f88ec0033c0, buf=0x7f89192f5d5c, size=4) at agent.c:275 #3 0x000055637f215202 in app_context_op (app=0x7f88ec003400, ctx=0x7f8908020900, cmd=AGENT_CMD_APP_CTX_DISABLE) at agent.c:552 #4 0x000055637f215c2d in disable_context (ctx=0x7f8908020900, domain=LTTNG_DOMAIN_JUL) at agent.c:841 #5 0x000055637f217480 in agent_destroy (agt=0x7f890801dc20) at agent.c:1326 #6 0x000055637f243448 in trace_ust_destroy_session (session=0x7f8908004010) at trace-ust.c:1408 #7 0x000055637f1fd775 in session_release (ref=0x7f8908001e70) at session.c:873 #8 0x000055637f1fb9ac in urcu_ref_put (ref=0x7f8908001e70, release=0x55637f1fd62a <session_release>) at /usr/include/urcu/ref.h:68 #9 0x000055637f1fdad2 in session_put (session=0x7f8908000d10) at session.c:942 #10 0x000055637f2369e6 in process_client_msg (cmd_ctx=0x7f890800e6e0, sock=0x7f8919308560, sock_error=0x7f8919308564) at client.c:2102 #11 0x000055637f2375ab in thread_manage_clients (data=0x556380cd1840) at client.c:2347 #12 0x000055637f22fb3a in launch_thread (data=0x556380cd18b0) at thread.c:65 #13 0x00007f891e81046f in start_thread () from /usr/lib/libpthread.so.0 #14 0x00007f891e7203d3 in clone () from /usr/lib/libc.so.6 T8 is holding session list lock while the cmd_destroy_session command is being processed. More specifically, it is attempting to destroy an "agent_context" by communicating with an "agent" application. Meanwhile, T13 is still registering that same "agent" application. Cause ----- The deadlock itself is pretty simple to understand. The "agent thread" (T13) has the responsability of accepting new agent application connections. When such a connection occurs, the thread creates a new `agent_app` instance and sends the current sessions' configuration (i.e. their event rules and contexts) to the agent application. When that "update" is complete, a "registration done" message is sent to the new agent application. From the stacktrace above, we can see that T13 is attempting to update the agent application with its initial configuration, but it is blocked on the acquisition of the session list lock. The application's agent is also blocked since it is waiting for the "registration done" message before allowing tracing to proceed (not shown here, but seen in the test logs). Meanwhile, T8 is holding the session list lock while destroying a session. This is expected as all client commands are executed with this lock held. It is, amongst other reasons, used to serialize changes to the sessions' configuration and configuration updates sent to the tracers (i.e. because new apps appear or to keep existing tracers in sync with the users' session configuration). The question becomes: why is T8 tearing down an application that is not yet registered? First, inspecting `agent_app` immediately shows that this structure has no built-in synchronization mechanism. Therefore, the fact that two threads are accessing it at the same time raises a big red flag. Speculating on the intentions of the original design, my intuition is that the "agent_management" thread's role is limited to instantiating an `agent_app` and synchronizing it with the various sessions' configuration. Once that synchronization is performed, the agent application should be published and never accessed again by the "agent thread". Configuration updates (i.e. new event rules, contexts) are then sent synchronously as they are requested by a client in the context of the client thread. Those updates are performed while holding the session list lock. Hence, there is only one thread that should manipulate the agent application at any given time making an explicit `agent_app` lock unnecessary. Overall, this would echo what is done when a 'user space tracer' application registers to the session daemon (see dispatch.c:368). Evidently this isn't what is happening here. The agent thread creates the `agent_app`, publishes it, and then performs an "agent app update" (sending the configuration) while holding the session list lock. This means that there is a window where an agent application is visible to the other threads, yet has not been properly registered. Solution -------- The acquisition of the session list lock is moved outside of update_agent_app() to allow the "agent thread" to hold the session list lock during the "configuration update" phase of the agent application registration. Essentially, the sequence of operation changes from: - Agent tcp connection established - call handle_registration() - agent version check - allocation of agent_app instance - new agent_add is published through the global agent_apps_ht_by_sock hashtable *** it is now reachable by all other threads without any form of exclusivity synchronization. *** - update_agent_app - acquire session list lock - iterate over sessions - send configuration - release session list lock - send registration done to: - Agent tcp connection established - call accept_agent_registration() - agent version check - allocation of agent_app instance - acquire session list lock - update_agent_app - iterate over sessions - send configuration - send registration done - new agent_add is published through the global agent_apps_ht_by_sock hashtable - release session list lock Links ----- [1] https://github.com/lttng/lttng-ust-java-tests Signed-off-by: Jérémie Galarneau <[email protected]> Change-Id: Ia34c5ad81ed3936acbca756b425423e0cb8dbddf

Observed issue ============== Core dump: #0 __GI_raise (sig=sig@entry=6) at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/raise.c:50 #1 0x0000003eb4025548 in __GI_abort () at abort.c:79 #2 0x0000003eb402542f in __assert_fail_base (fmt=0x3eb4184ae0 "%s%s%s:%u: %s%sAssertion `%s' failed.\n%n", assertion=0x4cdee0 "(trace_chunk->timestamp_close).is_set", file=0x4cde78 "../../../lttng-tools-2.11.3/src/common/trace-chunk.c", line=903, function=0x4cf4a0 <__PRETTY_FUNCTION__.6756> "lttng_trace_chunk_move_to_completed") at assert.c:92 #3 0x0000003eb4033af2 in __GI___assert_fail (assertion=assertion@entry=0x4cdee0 "(trace_chunk->timestamp_close).is_set", file=file@entry=0x4cde78 "../../../lttng-tools-2.11.3/src/common/trace-chunk.c", line=line@entry=903, function=function@entry=0x4cf4a0 <__PRETTY_FUNCTION__.6756> "lttng_trace_chunk_move_to_completed") at assert.c:101 #4 0x000000000047f37e in lttng_trace_chunk_move_to_completed (trace_chunk=0x7fcb5c00e570) at ../../../lttng-tools-2.11.3/src/common/trace-chunk.c:903 #5 0x0000000000480755 in lttng_trace_chunk_release (ref=0x7fcb5c00e598) at ../../../lttng-tools-2.11.3/src/common/trace-chunk.c:1117 #6 urcu_ref_put (release=<optimized out>, ref=0x7fcb5c00e598) at /usr/include/urcu/ref.h:68 #7 lttng_trace_chunk_put (chunk=0x7fcb5c00e570) at ../../../lttng-tools-2.11.3/src/common/trace-chunk.c:1150 #8 0x0000000000429c22 in cmd_rotate_session (session=0x7fcb5c003ff0, rotate_return=rotate_return@entry=0x7fcb6b7ed470, quiet_rotation=quiet_rotation@entry=false) at ../../../../lttng-tools-2.11.3/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/cmd.c:5037 #9 0x00000000004451d7 in process_client_msg (cmd_ctx=0x7fcb5c00e760, sock=sock@entry=0x7fcb6b7fd4c0, sock_error=sock_error@entry=0x7fcb6b7fd4c4) at ../../../../lttng-tools-2.11.3/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/client.c:1852 #10 0x00000000004474c6 in thread_manage_clients (data=<optimized out>) at ../../../../lttng-tools-2.11.3/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/client.c:2199 #11 0x00000000004422f2 in launch_thread (data=0x4f97a0) at ../../../../lttng-tools-2.11.3/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/thread.c:75 #12 0x0000003eb4408ed4 in start_thread (arg=<optimized out>) at pthread_create.c:479 #13 0x0000003eb40f8e6f in clone () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone.S:95 Reproduction: Disable ntp/any time management mechanism. lttng create lttng enable-event -u 'lttng_ust_tracef:*' lttng start lttng rotate date --set="$(date --date='-1 hour')" lttng rotate auto-20200515-142503 Waiting for rotation to complete Error: Failed to query the state of the rotation. Logs: DEBUG1 - 12:25:28.570037987 [2660/2717]: Setting trace chunk close command to "move to completed chunk folder" (in lttng_trace_chunk_set_close_command() at ../../../lttng-tools-2.11.3/src/common/trace-chunk.c:1073) Error: Failed to set trace chunk close timestamp: close timestamp is before creation timestamp Error: Failed to set the close timestamp of the current trace chunk of session "auto-20200515-142503" lttng-sessiond: ../../../lttng-tools-2.11.3/src/common/trace-chunk.c:903: lttng_trace_chunk_move_to_completed: Assertion `(trace_chunk->timestamp_close).is_set' failed. ... Aborted (core dumped) root@X10SDV-8C-TLN4F:~# DEBUG1 - 12:25:29.534263017 [2739/2739]: Releasing trace chunk registry to all trace chunks (in lttng_trace_chunk_registry_put_each_chunk() at ../../../lttng-tools-2.11.3/src/common/trace-chunk.c:1414) DEBUG1 - 12:25:29.534317468 [2739/2739]: Releasing reference to trace chunk: session_id = 0chunk_id = 2, name = "20200515T122528+0000-2", status = closed (in lttng_trace_chunk_registry_put_each_chunk() at ../../../lttng-tools-2.11.3/src/common/trace-chunk.c:1435) DEBUG1 - 12:25:29.534365653 [2739/2739]: Releasing reference to trace chunk: session_id = 0chunk_id = 1, name = "20200515T142520+0000-1", status = closed (in lttng_trace_chunk_registry_put_each_chunk() at ../../../lttng-tools-2.11.3/src/common/trace-chunk.c:1435) DEBUG1 - 12:25:29.534400638 [2739/2739]: Released reference to 2 trace chunks in lttng_trace_chunk_registry_put_each_chunk() (in lttng_trace_chunk_registry_put_each_chunk() at ../../../lttng-tools-2.11.3/src/common/trace-chunk.c:1447) Error: 2 trace chunks are leaked by lttng-consumerd. This can be caused by an internal error of the session daemon. Cause ===== The trace_chunk->timestamp_close is not set since the result from time() is smaller than the creation timestamp. The close timestamp is smaller because the calendar system time is modified by an administrator. time() offers no monotonicity guarantee and hence is exposed to time modification of the system. The begin and close timestamps are strictly used in the name generation of the chunk/archives. Given the current usage of these timestamps validating monotonicity should not be a fatal error. Name uniqueness is provided by the chunk name suffix (auto increment). Solution ======== Do not enforce monotonicity for the begin and close timestamps but warn on unexpected return (begin > close). Known drawbacks ========= None. Signed-off-by: Jonathan Rajotte <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jérémie Galarneau <[email protected]> Change-Id: Ic4b17285d150358d1569d6821c451c243e64e9a1

Observed issue ============== Deadlock between the notification thread and the action executor thread. Thread 5 holds cmd_queue.lock and request the client lock. Thread 6 holds the client lock and request the cmd_queue lock. Thread 5 have little value in holding the queue lock considering it effectively to a "pop" of the cmd_queue. Thread 9 is waiting on the cmd_queue lock but does not hold any other locks and thus not part of the deadlock but is a casualties of this deadlock and leave a client "hanging". Other threads are all in their respective waiting state. Thread 9 (Thread 0x7f76f2ffd700 (LWP 240467)): #0 __lll_lock_wait (futex=futex@entry=0x1ad1308, private=0) at lowlevellock.c:52 [1070/1123] #1 0x00007f77052c80a3 in __GI___pthread_mutex_lock (mutex=0x1ad1308) at ../nptl/pthread_mutex_lock.c:80 #2 0x00000000004611dd in run_command_wait (handle=0x1ad12f0, cmd=0x7f76f2fe31e0) at notification-thread-commands.c:31 lttng#3 0x000000000046143a in notification_thread_command_unregister_trigger (handle=0x1ad12f0, trigger=0x7f76e4000ef0) at notification-thread-commands.c:148 lttng#4 0x00000000004444af in cmd_unregister_trigger (cmd_ctx=0x7f76e4000d40, sock=68, notification_thread=0x1ad12f0) at cmd.c:4618 lttng#5 0x0000000000483d23 in process_client_msg (cmd_ctx=0x7f76e4000d40, sock=0x7f76f2ffcba4, sock_error=0x7f76f2ffcb90) at client.c:2001 lttng#6 0x000000000047f00b in thread_manage_clients (data=0x1ad1a80) at client.c:2402 lttng#7 0x000000000047b303 in launch_thread (data=0x1ad1af0) at thread.c:66 lttng#8 0x00007f77052c5609 in start_thread (arg=<optimized out>) at pthread_create.c:477 lttng#9 0x00007f77051cc103 in clone () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone.S:95 Thread 6 (Thread 0x7f7700fcf700 (LWP 240464)): #0 __lll_lock_wait (futex=futex@entry=0x1ad1308, private=0) at lowlevellock.c:52 #1 0x00007f77052c80a3 in __GI___pthread_mutex_lock (mutex=0x1ad1308) at ../nptl/pthread_mutex_lock.c:80 #2 0x0000000000461bf2 in run_command_no_wait (handle=0x1ad12f0, in_cmd=0x7f7700fce340) at notification-thread-commands.c:87 lttng#3 0x0000000000461b93 in notification_thread_client_communication_update (handle=0x1ad12f0, id=1, transmission_status=CLIENT_TRANSMISSION_STATUS_QUEUED) at notification-thread-commands.c:400 lttng#4 0x0000000000497658 in client_handle_transmission_status (client=0x7f76f8004e30, status=CLIENT_TRANSMISSION_STATUS_QUEUED, user_data=0x7f76f8004a00) at action-executor.c:154 lttng#5 0x0000000000467be7 in notification_client_list_send_evaluation (client_list=0x7f76f8004fe0, condition=0x7f76e40041a0, evaluation=0x7f76cc000cc0, trigger_creds=0x7f76e4004288, source_object_creds=0x0, client_report=0x4971a0 <client_ha ndle_transmission_status>, user_data=0x7f76f8004a00) at notification-thread-events.c:4007 lttng#6 0x00000000004956bb in action_executor_notify_handler (executor=0x7f76f8004a00, work_item=0x7f76f80062d0, action=0x7f76e4004210) at action-executor.c:199 lttng#7 0x00000000004953fd in action_executor_generic_handler (executor=0x7f76f8004a00, work_item=0x7f76f80062d0, action=0x7f76e4004210) at action-executor.c:493 lttng#8 0x0000000000495101 in action_work_item_execute (executor=0x7f76f8004a00, work_item=0x7f76f80062d0) at action-executor.c:506 lttng#9 0x0000000000493ff5 in action_executor_thread (_data=0x7f76f8004a00) at action-executor.c:559 lttng#10 0x000000000047b303 in launch_thread (data=0x7f76f8004aa0) at thread.c:66 lttng#11 0x00007f77052c5609 in start_thread (arg=<optimized out>) at pthread_create.c:477 lttng#12 0x00007f77051cc103 in clone () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone.S:95 Thread 5 (Thread 0x7f77017d0700 (LWP 240463)): #0 __lll_lock_wait (futex=futex@entry=0x7f76f8004e30, private=0) at lowlevellock.c:52 #1 0x00007f77052c80a3 in __GI___pthread_mutex_lock (mutex=0x7f76f8004e30) at ../nptl/pthread_mutex_lock.c:80 #2 0x0000000000463080 in handle_notification_thread_command (handle=0x1ad12f0, state=0x7f77017cfb00) at notification-thread-events.c:2936 lttng#3 0x000000000045e881 in thread_notification (data=0x1ad12f0) at notification-thread.c:705 lttng#4 0x000000000047b303 in launch_thread (data=0x1ad1420) at thread.c:66 lttng#5 0x00007f77052c5609 in start_thread (arg=<optimized out>) at pthread_create.c:477 lttng#6 0x00007f77051cc103 in clone () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone.S:95 Cause ===== The action executor holds the client lock across the communication to prevent simultaneous update to the client state. The notification thread holds the cmd_queue lock across operation for no apparent reason (TODO make sure there is no internal add to the queue. if so we should reacquire the lock only when necessery.) Solution ======== Reduce the windows for which the cmd_queue lock is held by the notification thread to only the "pop" action on the queue. As soon as we have the lock, get the cmd, remove it from the list and release the lock. This prevent inverted lock acquisition base on the pattern of the action executor thread. Signed-off-by: Jonathan Rajotte <[email protected]> Change-Id: I91d30c134bc1a128c96058f0e0cdd325808c91bc Depends-on: lttng-ust: I8423c510bf6af2f9bf85256e8d6f931d36f7054b

Observed issue -------------- While running the out-of-tree java agent tests [1], the session daemon and agent often end up in a deadlock. Attaching gdb to the session daemon, we can see that two threads are blocked in an intriguing state. Thread 13 (Thread 0x7f89027fc700 (LWP 9636)): #0 0x00007f891e81a4cf in __lll_lock_wait () from /usr/lib/libpthread.so.0 #1 0x00007f891e812e03 in pthread_mutex_lock () from /usr/lib/libpthread.so.0 #2 0x000055637f1fbd92 in session_lock_list () at session.c:156 #3 0x000055637f25dc47 in update_agent_app (app=0x7f88ec003480) at agent-thread.c:56 #4 0x000055637f25ec0a in thread_agent_management (data=0x556380cd2400) at agent-thread.c:426 #5 0x000055637f22fb3a in launch_thread (data=0x556380cd24a0) at thread.c:65 #6 0x00007f891e81046f in start_thread () from /usr/lib/libpthread.so.0 #7 0x00007f891e7203d3 in clone () from /usr/lib/libc.so.6 Thread 8 (Thread 0x7f8919309700 (LWP 9631)): #0 0x00007f891e81b44d in recvmsg () from /usr/lib/libpthread.so.0 #1 0x000055637f267847 in lttcomm_recvmsg_inet_sock (sock=0x7f88ec0033c0, buf=0x7f89192f5d5c, len=4, flags=0) at inet.c:367 #2 0x000055637f2146c6 in recv_reply (sock=0x7f88ec0033c0, buf=0x7f89192f5d5c, size=4) at agent.c:275 #3 0x000055637f215202 in app_context_op (app=0x7f88ec003400, ctx=0x7f8908020900, cmd=AGENT_CMD_APP_CTX_DISABLE) at agent.c:552 #4 0x000055637f215c2d in disable_context (ctx=0x7f8908020900, domain=LTTNG_DOMAIN_JUL) at agent.c:841 #5 0x000055637f217480 in agent_destroy (agt=0x7f890801dc20) at agent.c:1326 #6 0x000055637f243448 in trace_ust_destroy_session (session=0x7f8908004010) at trace-ust.c:1408 #7 0x000055637f1fd775 in session_release (ref=0x7f8908001e70) at session.c:873 #8 0x000055637f1fb9ac in urcu_ref_put (ref=0x7f8908001e70, release=0x55637f1fd62a <session_release>) at /usr/include/urcu/ref.h:68 lttng#9 0x000055637f1fdad2 in session_put (session=0x7f8908000d10) at session.c:942 lttng#10 0x000055637f2369e6 in process_client_msg (cmd_ctx=0x7f890800e6e0, sock=0x7f8919308560, sock_error=0x7f8919308564) at client.c:2102 lttng#11 0x000055637f2375ab in thread_manage_clients (data=0x556380cd1840) at client.c:2347 lttng#12 0x000055637f22fb3a in launch_thread (data=0x556380cd18b0) at thread.c:65 lttng#13 0x00007f891e81046f in start_thread () from /usr/lib/libpthread.so.0 lttng#14 0x00007f891e7203d3 in clone () from /usr/lib/libc.so.6 T8 is holding session list lock while the cmd_destroy_session command is being processed. More specifically, it is attempting to destroy an "agent_context" by communicating with an "agent" application. Meanwhile, T13 is still registering that same "agent" application. Cause ----- The deadlock itself is pretty simple to understand. The "agent thread" (T13) has the responsability of accepting new agent application connections. When such a connection occurs, the thread creates a new `agent_app` instance and sends the current sessions' configuration (i.e. their event rules and contexts) to the agent application. When that "update" is complete, a "registration done" message is sent to the new agent application. From the stacktrace above, we can see that T13 is attempting to update the agent application with its initial configuration, but it is blocked on the acquisition of the session list lock. The application's agent is also blocked since it is waiting for the "registration done" message before allowing tracing to proceed (not shown here, but seen in the test logs). Meanwhile, T8 is holding the session list lock while destroying a session. This is expected as all client commands are executed with this lock held. It is, amongst other reasons, used to serialize changes to the sessions' configuration and configuration updates sent to the tracers (i.e. because new apps appear or to keep existing tracers in sync with the users' session configuration). The question becomes: why is T8 tearing down an application that is not yet registered? First, inspecting `agent_app` immediately shows that this structure has no built-in synchronization mechanism. Therefore, the fact that two threads are accessing it at the same time raises a big red flag. Speculating on the intentions of the original design, my intuition is that the "agent_management" thread's role is limited to instantiating an `agent_app` and synchronizing it with the various sessions' configuration. Once that synchronization is performed, the agent application should be published and never accessed again by the "agent thread". Configuration updates (i.e. new event rules, contexts) are then sent synchronously as they are requested by a client in the context of the client thread. Those updates are performed while holding the session list lock. Hence, there is only one thread that should manipulate the agent application at any given time making an explicit `agent_app` lock unnecessary. Overall, this would echo what is done when a 'user space tracer' application registers to the session daemon (see dispatch.c:368). Evidently this isn't what is happening here. The agent thread creates the `agent_app`, publishes it, and then performs an "agent app update" (sending the configuration) while holding the session list lock. This means that there is a window where an agent application is visible to the other threads, yet has not been properly registered. Solution -------- The acquisition of the session list lock is moved outside of update_agent_app() to allow the "agent thread" to hold the session list lock during the "configuration update" phase of the agent application registration. Essentially, the sequence of operation changes from: - Agent tcp connection established - call handle_registration() - agent version check - allocation of agent_app instance - new agent_add is published through the global agent_apps_ht_by_sock hashtable *** it is now reachable by all other threads without any form of exclusivity synchronization. *** - update_agent_app - acquire session list lock - iterate over sessions - send configuration - release session list lock - send registration done to: - Agent tcp connection established - call accept_agent_registration() - agent version check - allocation of agent_app instance - acquire session list lock - update_agent_app - iterate over sessions - send configuration - send registration done - new agent_add is published through the global agent_apps_ht_by_sock hashtable - release session list lock Links ----- [1] https://github.com/lttng/lttng-ust-java-tests Signed-off-by: Jérémie Galarneau <[email protected]> Change-Id: Ia34c5ad81ed3936acbca756b425423e0cb8dbddf

Observed issue ============== Deadlock between the notification thread and the action executor thread. Thread 5 holds cmd_queue.lock and request the client lock. Thread 6 holds the client lock and request the cmd_queue lock. Thread 5 have little value in holding the queue lock considering it effectively to a "pop" of the cmd_queue. Thread 9 is waiting on the cmd_queue lock but does not hold any other locks and thus not part of the deadlock but is a casualties of this deadlock and leave a client "hanging". Other threads are all in their respective waiting state. Thread 9 (Thread 0x7f76f2ffd700 (LWP 240467)): #0 __lll_lock_wait (futex=futex@entry=0x1ad1308, private=0) at lowlevellock.c:52 [1070/1123] #1 0x00007f77052c80a3 in __GI___pthread_mutex_lock (mutex=0x1ad1308) at ../nptl/pthread_mutex_lock.c:80 #2 0x00000000004611dd in run_command_wait (handle=0x1ad12f0, cmd=0x7f76f2fe31e0) at notification-thread-commands.c:31 lttng#3 0x000000000046143a in notification_thread_command_unregister_trigger (handle=0x1ad12f0, trigger=0x7f76e4000ef0) at notification-thread-commands.c:148 lttng#4 0x00000000004444af in cmd_unregister_trigger (cmd_ctx=0x7f76e4000d40, sock=68, notification_thread=0x1ad12f0) at cmd.c:4618 lttng#5 0x0000000000483d23 in process_client_msg (cmd_ctx=0x7f76e4000d40, sock=0x7f76f2ffcba4, sock_error=0x7f76f2ffcb90) at client.c:2001 lttng#6 0x000000000047f00b in thread_manage_clients (data=0x1ad1a80) at client.c:2402 lttng#7 0x000000000047b303 in launch_thread (data=0x1ad1af0) at thread.c:66 lttng#8 0x00007f77052c5609 in start_thread (arg=<optimized out>) at pthread_create.c:477 lttng#9 0x00007f77051cc103 in clone () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone.S:95 Thread 6 (Thread 0x7f7700fcf700 (LWP 240464)): #0 __lll_lock_wait (futex=futex@entry=0x1ad1308, private=0) at lowlevellock.c:52 #1 0x00007f77052c80a3 in __GI___pthread_mutex_lock (mutex=0x1ad1308) at ../nptl/pthread_mutex_lock.c:80 #2 0x0000000000461bf2 in run_command_no_wait (handle=0x1ad12f0, in_cmd=0x7f7700fce340) at notification-thread-commands.c:87 lttng#3 0x0000000000461b93 in notification_thread_client_communication_update (handle=0x1ad12f0, id=1, transmission_status=CLIENT_TRANSMISSION_STATUS_QUEUED) at notification-thread-commands.c:400 lttng#4 0x0000000000497658 in client_handle_transmission_status (client=0x7f76f8004e30, status=CLIENT_TRANSMISSION_STATUS_QUEUED, user_data=0x7f76f8004a00) at action-executor.c:154 lttng#5 0x0000000000467be7 in notification_client_list_send_evaluation (client_list=0x7f76f8004fe0, condition=0x7f76e40041a0, evaluation=0x7f76cc000cc0, trigger_creds=0x7f76e4004288, source_object_creds=0x0, client_report=0x4971a0 <client_ha ndle_transmission_status>, user_data=0x7f76f8004a00) at notification-thread-events.c:4007 lttng#6 0x00000000004956bb in action_executor_notify_handler (executor=0x7f76f8004a00, work_item=0x7f76f80062d0, action=0x7f76e4004210) at action-executor.c:199 lttng#7 0x00000000004953fd in action_executor_generic_handler (executor=0x7f76f8004a00, work_item=0x7f76f80062d0, action=0x7f76e4004210) at action-executor.c:493 lttng#8 0x0000000000495101 in action_work_item_execute (executor=0x7f76f8004a00, work_item=0x7f76f80062d0) at action-executor.c:506 lttng#9 0x0000000000493ff5 in action_executor_thread (_data=0x7f76f8004a00) at action-executor.c:559 lttng#10 0x000000000047b303 in launch_thread (data=0x7f76f8004aa0) at thread.c:66 lttng#11 0x00007f77052c5609 in start_thread (arg=<optimized out>) at pthread_create.c:477 lttng#12 0x00007f77051cc103 in clone () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone.S:95 Thread 5 (Thread 0x7f77017d0700 (LWP 240463)): #0 __lll_lock_wait (futex=futex@entry=0x7f76f8004e30, private=0) at lowlevellock.c:52 #1 0x00007f77052c80a3 in __GI___pthread_mutex_lock (mutex=0x7f76f8004e30) at ../nptl/pthread_mutex_lock.c:80 #2 0x0000000000463080 in handle_notification_thread_command (handle=0x1ad12f0, state=0x7f77017cfb00) at notification-thread-events.c:2936 lttng#3 0x000000000045e881 in thread_notification (data=0x1ad12f0) at notification-thread.c:705 lttng#4 0x000000000047b303 in launch_thread (data=0x1ad1420) at thread.c:66 lttng#5 0x00007f77052c5609 in start_thread (arg=<optimized out>) at pthread_create.c:477 lttng#6 0x00007f77051cc103 in clone () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone.S:95 Cause ===== The action executor holds the client lock across the communication to prevent simultaneous update to the client state. The notification thread holds the cmd_queue lock across operation for no apparent reason (TODO make sure there is no internal add to the queue. if so we should reacquire the lock only when necessery.) Solution ======== Reduce the windows for which the cmd_queue lock is held by the notification thread to only the "pop" action on the queue. As soon as we have the lock, get the cmd, remove it from the list and release the lock. This prevent inverted lock acquisition base on the pattern of the action executor thread. Signed-off-by: Jonathan Rajotte <[email protected]> Change-Id: I91d30c134bc1a128c96058f0e0cdd325808c91bc Depends-on: lttng-ust: I8423c510bf6af2f9bf85256e8d6f931d36f7054b

Observed issue ============== Deadlock between the notification thread and the action executor thread. Thread 5 holds cmd_queue.lock and request the client lock. Thread 6 holds the client lock and request the cmd_queue lock. Thread 5 have little value in holding the queue lock considering it effectively to a "pop" of the cmd_queue. Thread 9 is waiting on the cmd_queue lock but does not hold any other locks and thus not part of the deadlock but is a casualties of this deadlock and leave a client "hanging". Other threads are all in their respective waiting state. Thread 9 (Thread 0x7f76f2ffd700 (LWP 240467)): #0 __lll_lock_wait (futex=futex@entry=0x1ad1308, private=0) at lowlevellock.c:52 [1070/1123] #1 0x00007f77052c80a3 in __GI___pthread_mutex_lock (mutex=0x1ad1308) at ../nptl/pthread_mutex_lock.c:80 #2 0x00000000004611dd in run_command_wait (handle=0x1ad12f0, cmd=0x7f76f2fe31e0) at notification-thread-commands.c:31 #3 0x000000000046143a in notification_thread_command_unregister_trigger (handle=0x1ad12f0, trigger=0x7f76e4000ef0) at notification-thread-commands.c:148 #4 0x00000000004444af in cmd_unregister_trigger (cmd_ctx=0x7f76e4000d40, sock=68, notification_thread=0x1ad12f0) at cmd.c:4618 #5 0x0000000000483d23 in process_client_msg (cmd_ctx=0x7f76e4000d40, sock=0x7f76f2ffcba4, sock_error=0x7f76f2ffcb90) at client.c:2001 #6 0x000000000047f00b in thread_manage_clients (data=0x1ad1a80) at client.c:2402 #7 0x000000000047b303 in launch_thread (data=0x1ad1af0) at thread.c:66 #8 0x00007f77052c5609 in start_thread (arg=<optimized out>) at pthread_create.c:477 #9 0x00007f77051cc103 in clone () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone.S:95 Thread 6 (Thread 0x7f7700fcf700 (LWP 240464)): #0 __lll_lock_wait (futex=futex@entry=0x1ad1308, private=0) at lowlevellock.c:52 #1 0x00007f77052c80a3 in __GI___pthread_mutex_lock (mutex=0x1ad1308) at ../nptl/pthread_mutex_lock.c:80 #2 0x0000000000461bf2 in run_command_no_wait (handle=0x1ad12f0, in_cmd=0x7f7700fce340) at notification-thread-commands.c:87 #3 0x0000000000461b93 in notification_thread_client_communication_update (handle=0x1ad12f0, id=1, transmission_status=CLIENT_TRANSMISSION_STATUS_QUEUED) at notification-thread-commands.c:400 #4 0x0000000000497658 in client_handle_transmission_status (client=0x7f76f8004e30, status=CLIENT_TRANSMISSION_STATUS_QUEUED, user_data=0x7f76f8004a00) at action-executor.c:154 #5 0x0000000000467be7 in notification_client_list_send_evaluation (client_list=0x7f76f8004fe0, condition=0x7f76e40041a0, evaluation=0x7f76cc000cc0, trigger_creds=0x7f76e4004288, source_object_creds=0x0, client_report=0x4971a0 <client_ha ndle_transmission_status>, user_data=0x7f76f8004a00) at notification-thread-events.c:4007 #6 0x00000000004956bb in action_executor_notify_handler (executor=0x7f76f8004a00, work_item=0x7f76f80062d0, action=0x7f76e4004210) at action-executor.c:199 #7 0x00000000004953fd in action_executor_generic_handler (executor=0x7f76f8004a00, work_item=0x7f76f80062d0, action=0x7f76e4004210) at action-executor.c:493 #8 0x0000000000495101 in action_work_item_execute (executor=0x7f76f8004a00, work_item=0x7f76f80062d0) at action-executor.c:506 #9 0x0000000000493ff5 in action_executor_thread (_data=0x7f76f8004a00) at action-executor.c:559 #10 0x000000000047b303 in launch_thread (data=0x7f76f8004aa0) at thread.c:66 #11 0x00007f77052c5609 in start_thread (arg=<optimized out>) at pthread_create.c:477 #12 0x00007f77051cc103 in clone () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone.S:95 Thread 5 (Thread 0x7f77017d0700 (LWP 240463)): #0 __lll_lock_wait (futex=futex@entry=0x7f76f8004e30, private=0) at lowlevellock.c:52 #1 0x00007f77052c80a3 in __GI___pthread_mutex_lock (mutex=0x7f76f8004e30) at ../nptl/pthread_mutex_lock.c:80 #2 0x0000000000463080 in handle_notification_thread_command (handle=0x1ad12f0, state=0x7f77017cfb00) at notification-thread-events.c:2936 #3 0x000000000045e881 in thread_notification (data=0x1ad12f0) at notification-thread.c:705 #4 0x000000000047b303 in launch_thread (data=0x1ad1420) at thread.c:66 #5 0x00007f77052c5609 in start_thread (arg=<optimized out>) at pthread_create.c:477 #6 0x00007f77051cc103 in clone () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone.S:95 Cause ===== The action executor holds the client lock across the communication to prevent simultaneous update to the client state. The notification thread holds the cmd_queue lock across operation for no apparent reason (TODO make sure there is no internal add to the queue. if so we should reacquire the lock only when necessery.) Solution ======== Reduce the windows for which the cmd_queue lock is held by the notification thread to only the "pop" action on the queue. As soon as we have the lock, get the cmd, remove it from the list and release the lock. This prevent inverted lock acquisition base on the pattern of the action executor thread. Signed-off-by: Jonathan Rajotte <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jérémie Galarneau <[email protected]> Change-Id: I91d30c134bc1a128c96058f0e0cdd325808c91bc

Observed issue ============== Deadlock between the notification thread and the action executor thread. Thread 5 holds cmd_queue.lock and request the client lock. Thread 6 holds the client lock and request the cmd_queue lock. Thread 5 have little value in holding the queue lock considering it effectively to a "pop" of the cmd_queue. Thread 9 is waiting on the cmd_queue lock but does not hold any other locks and thus not part of the deadlock but is a casualties of this deadlock and leave a client "hanging". Other threads are all in their respective waiting state. Thread 9 (Thread 0x7f76f2ffd700 (LWP 240467)): #0 __lll_lock_wait (futex=futex@entry=0x1ad1308, private=0) at lowlevellock.c:52 [1070/1123] #1 0x00007f77052c80a3 in __GI___pthread_mutex_lock (mutex=0x1ad1308) at ../nptl/pthread_mutex_lock.c:80 #2 0x00000000004611dd in run_command_wait (handle=0x1ad12f0, cmd=0x7f76f2fe31e0) at notification-thread-commands.c:31 lttng#3 0x000000000046143a in notification_thread_command_unregister_trigger (handle=0x1ad12f0, trigger=0x7f76e4000ef0) at notification-thread-commands.c:148 lttng#4 0x00000000004444af in cmd_unregister_trigger (cmd_ctx=0x7f76e4000d40, sock=68, notification_thread=0x1ad12f0) at cmd.c:4618 lttng#5 0x0000000000483d23 in process_client_msg (cmd_ctx=0x7f76e4000d40, sock=0x7f76f2ffcba4, sock_error=0x7f76f2ffcb90) at client.c:2001 lttng#6 0x000000000047f00b in thread_manage_clients (data=0x1ad1a80) at client.c:2402 lttng#7 0x000000000047b303 in launch_thread (data=0x1ad1af0) at thread.c:66 lttng#8 0x00007f77052c5609 in start_thread (arg=<optimized out>) at pthread_create.c:477 lttng#9 0x00007f77051cc103 in clone () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone.S:95 Thread 6 (Thread 0x7f7700fcf700 (LWP 240464)): #0 __lll_lock_wait (futex=futex@entry=0x1ad1308, private=0) at lowlevellock.c:52 #1 0x00007f77052c80a3 in __GI___pthread_mutex_lock (mutex=0x1ad1308) at ../nptl/pthread_mutex_lock.c:80 #2 0x0000000000461bf2 in run_command_no_wait (handle=0x1ad12f0, in_cmd=0x7f7700fce340) at notification-thread-commands.c:87 lttng#3 0x0000000000461b93 in notification_thread_client_communication_update (handle=0x1ad12f0, id=1, transmission_status=CLIENT_TRANSMISSION_STATUS_QUEUED) at notification-thread-commands.c:400 lttng#4 0x0000000000497658 in client_handle_transmission_status (client=0x7f76f8004e30, status=CLIENT_TRANSMISSION_STATUS_QUEUED, user_data=0x7f76f8004a00) at action-executor.c:154 lttng#5 0x0000000000467be7 in notification_client_list_send_evaluation (client_list=0x7f76f8004fe0, condition=0x7f76e40041a0, evaluation=0x7f76cc000cc0, trigger_creds=0x7f76e4004288, source_object_creds=0x0, client_report=0x4971a0 <client_ha ndle_transmission_status>, user_data=0x7f76f8004a00) at notification-thread-events.c:4007 lttng#6 0x00000000004956bb in action_executor_notify_handler (executor=0x7f76f8004a00, work_item=0x7f76f80062d0, action=0x7f76e4004210) at action-executor.c:199 lttng#7 0x00000000004953fd in action_executor_generic_handler (executor=0x7f76f8004a00, work_item=0x7f76f80062d0, action=0x7f76e4004210) at action-executor.c:493 lttng#8 0x0000000000495101 in action_work_item_execute (executor=0x7f76f8004a00, work_item=0x7f76f80062d0) at action-executor.c:506 lttng#9 0x0000000000493ff5 in action_executor_thread (_data=0x7f76f8004a00) at action-executor.c:559 lttng#10 0x000000000047b303 in launch_thread (data=0x7f76f8004aa0) at thread.c:66 lttng#11 0x00007f77052c5609 in start_thread (arg=<optimized out>) at pthread_create.c:477 lttng#12 0x00007f77051cc103 in clone () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone.S:95 Thread 5 (Thread 0x7f77017d0700 (LWP 240463)): #0 __lll_lock_wait (futex=futex@entry=0x7f76f8004e30, private=0) at lowlevellock.c:52 #1 0x00007f77052c80a3 in __GI___pthread_mutex_lock (mutex=0x7f76f8004e30) at ../nptl/pthread_mutex_lock.c:80 #2 0x0000000000463080 in handle_notification_thread_command (handle=0x1ad12f0, state=0x7f77017cfb00) at notification-thread-events.c:2936 lttng#3 0x000000000045e881 in thread_notification (data=0x1ad12f0) at notification-thread.c:705 lttng#4 0x000000000047b303 in launch_thread (data=0x1ad1420) at thread.c:66 lttng#5 0x00007f77052c5609 in start_thread (arg=<optimized out>) at pthread_create.c:477 lttng#6 0x00007f77051cc103 in clone () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone.S:95 Cause ===== The action executor holds the client lock across the communication to prevent simultaneous update to the client state. The notification thread holds the cmd_queue lock across operation for no apparent reason (TODO make sure there is no internal add to the queue. if so we should reacquire the lock only when necessery.) Solution ======== Reduce the windows for which the cmd_queue lock is held by the notification thread to only the "pop" action on the queue. As soon as we have the lock, get the cmd, remove it from the list and release the lock. This prevent inverted lock acquisition base on the pattern of the action executor thread. Signed-off-by: Jonathan Rajotte <[email protected]> Change-Id: I91d30c134bc1a128c96058f0e0cdd325808c91bc

Observed issue ============== The clear tests occasionally fail with the following babeltrace error when a live session is stopped following a "clear". Unfortunately, this problem only seems to occur on certain machines. In my case, I only managed to reproduce this on the CI's workers. 10-07 12:39:48.333 7679 7679 E PLUGIN/SRC.CTF.LTTNG-LIVE/VIEWER [email protected]:1610 [lttng-live] Received get_data_packet response: error 10-07 12:39:48.333 7679 7679 E PLUGIN/CTF/MSG-ITER [email protected]:563 [lttng-live] User function failed: status=ERROR 10-07 12:39:48.333 7679 7679 E PLUGIN/CTF/MSG-ITER [email protected]:2899 [lttng-live] Cannot handle state: msg-it-addr=0x5603c28e2830, state=DSCOPE_TRACE_PACKET_HEADER_BEGIN 10-07 12:39:48.333 7679 7679 E PLUGIN/SRC.CTF.LTTNG-LIVE lttng_live_iterator_next_handle_one_active_data_stream@lttng-live.c:845 [lttng-live] CTF message iterator failed to get next message: msg-iter=0x5603c28e2830, msg-iter-status=ERROR 10-07 12:39:48.333 7679 7679 E PLUGIN/SRC.CTF.LTTNG-LIVE [email protected]:1665 [lttng-live] Error preparing the next batch of messages: live-iter-status=LTTNG_LIVE_ITERATOR_STATUS_ERROR 10-07 12:39:48.333 7679 7679 W LIB/MSG-ITER [email protected]:864 Component input port message iterator's "next" method failed: iter-addr=0x5603c28cb0f0, iter-upstream-comp-name="lttng-live", iter-upstream-comp-log-level=WARNING, iter-upstream-comp-class-type=SOURCE, iter-upstream-comp-class-name="lttng-live", iter-upstream-comp-class-partial-descr="Connect to an LTTng relay daemon", iter-upstream-port-type=OUTPUT, iter-upstream-port-name="out", status=ERROR 10-07 12:39:48.333 7679 7679 E PLUGIN/FLT.UTILS.MUXER [email protected]:454 [muxer] Upstream iterator's next method returned an error: status=ERROR 10-07 12:39:48.333 7679 7679 E PLUGIN/FLT.UTILS.MUXER [email protected]:991 [muxer] Cannot validate muxer's upstream message iterator wrapper: muxer-msg-iter-addr=0x5603c28dbe70, muxer-upstream-msg-iter-wrap-addr=0x5603c28cd0f0 10-07 12:39:48.333 7679 7679 E PLUGIN/FLT.UTILS.MUXER [email protected]:1415 [muxer] Cannot get next message: comp-addr=0x5603c28dc960, muxer-comp-addr=0x5603c28db0a0, muxer-msg-iter-addr=0x5603c28dbe70, msg-iter-addr=0x5603c28caf80, status=ERROR 10-07 12:39:48.333 7679 7679 W LIB/MSG-ITER [email protected]:864 Component input port message iterator's "next" method failed: iter-addr=0x5603c28caf80, iter-upstream-comp-name="muxer", iter-upstream-comp-log-level=WARNING, iter-upstream-comp-class-type=FILTER, iter-upstream-comp-class-name="muxer", iter-upstream-comp-class-partial-descr="Sort messages from multiple inpu", iter-upstream-port-type=OUTPUT, iter-upstream-port-name="out", status=ERROR 10-07 12:39:48.333 7679 7679 W LIB/GRAPH [email protected]:473 Component's "consume" method failed: status=ERROR, comp-addr=0x5603c28dcb60, comp-name="pretty", comp-log-level=WARNING, comp-class-type=SINK, comp-class-name="pretty", comp-class-partial-descr="Pretty-print messages (`text` fo", comp-class-is-frozen=0, comp-class-so-handle-addr=0x5603c28c8140, comp-class-so-handle-path="/home/jenkins/jgalar-debug/build/usr/lib/babeltrace2/plugins/babeltrace-plugin-text.so", comp-input-port-count=1, comp-output-port-count=0 10-07 12:39:48.333 7679 7679 E CLI [email protected]:2548 Graph failed to complete successfully 10-07 12:39:48.333 7679 7679 E PLUGIN/SRC.CTF.LTTNG-LIVE/VIEWER [email protected]:1227 [lttng-live] Unknown detach return code 0 ERROR: [Babeltrace CLI] (babeltrace2.c:2548) Graph failed to complete successfully CAUSED BY [libbabeltrace2] (graph.c:473) Component's "consume" method failed: status=ERROR, comp-addr=0x5603c28dcb60, comp-name="pretty", comp-log-level=WARNING, comp-class-type=SINK, comp-class-name="pretty", comp-class-partial-descr="Pretty-print messages (`text` fo", comp-class-is-frozen=0, comp-class-so-handle-addr=0x5603c28c8140, comp-class-so-handle-path="/home/jenkins/jgalar-debug/build/usr/lib/babeltrace2/plugins/babeltrace-plugin-text.so", comp-input-port-count=1, comp-output-port-count=0 CAUSED BY [libbabeltrace2] (iterator.c:864) Component input port message iterator's "next" method failed: iter-addr=0x5603c28caf80, iter-upstream-comp-name="muxer", iter-upstream-comp-log-level=WARNING, iter-upstream-comp-class-type=FILTER, iter-upstream-comp-class-name="muxer", iter-upstream-comp-class-partial-descr="Sort messages from multiple inpu", iter-upstream-port-type=OUTPUT, iter-upstream-port-name="out", status=ERROR CAUSED BY [muxer: 'filter.utils.muxer'] (muxer.c:991) Cannot validate muxer's upstream message iterator wrapper: muxer-msg-iter-addr=0x5603c28dbe70, muxer-upstream-msg-iter-wrap-addr=0x5603c28cd0f0 CAUSED BY [muxer: 'filter.utils.muxer'] (muxer.c:454) Upstream iterator's next method returned an error: status=ERROR CAUSED BY [libbabeltrace2] (iterator.c:864) Component input port message iterator's "next" method failed: iter-addr=0x5603c28cb0f0, iter-upstream-comp-name="lttng-live", iter-upstream-comp-log-level=WARNING, iter-upstream-comp-class-type=SOURCE, iter-upstream-comp-class-name="lttng-live", iter-upstream-comp-class-partial-descr="Connect to an LTTng relay daemon", iter-upstream-port-type=OUTPUT, iter-upstream-port-name="out", status=ERROR CAUSED BY [lttng-live: 'source.ctf.lttng-live'] (lttng-live.c:1665) Error preparing the next batch of messages: live-iter-status=LTTNG_LIVE_ITERATOR_STATUS_ERROR CAUSED BY [lttng-live: 'source.ctf.lttng-live'] (lttng-live.c:845) CTF message iterator failed to get next message: msg-iter=0x5603c28e2830, msg-iter-status=ERROR CAUSED BY [lttng-live: 'source.ctf.lttng-live'] (msg-iter.c:2899) Cannot handle state: msg-it-addr=0x5603c28e2830, state=DSCOPE_TRACE_PACKET_HEADER_BEGIN CAUSED BY [lttng-live: 'source.ctf.lttng-live'] (msg-iter.c:563) User function failed: status=ERROR CAUSED BY [lttng-live: 'source.ctf.lttng-live'] (viewer-connection.c:1610) Received get_data_packet response: error This occurs immediately following a 'stop' on the session. As the error indicates, a request to obtain a data packet fails with a generic error reply. Moreover, the following LTTNG_VIEWER_DETACH_SESSION appears to fail with an invalid status code. This is addressed in a different commit. Reproducing the test's failure without redirecting the relay daemon's allows us to see the following errors after the first stop: PERROR - 14:33:44.929675253 [25108/25115]: Failed to open fs handle to ust/uid/1001/64-bit/index/chan_0.idx, open() returned: No such file or directory (in fd_tracker_open_fs_handle() at fd-tracker.c:550) PERROR - 14:33:45.030037417 [25108/25115]: Failed to open fs handle to ust/uid/1001/64-bit/index/chan_0.idx, open() returned: No such file or directory (in fd_tracker_open_fs_handle() at fd-tracker.c:550) PERROR - 14:33:45.130429370 [25108/25115]: Failed to open fs handle to ust/uid/1001/64-bit/index/chan_0.idx, open() returned: No such file or directory (in fd_tracker_open_fs_handle() at fd-tracker.c:550) PERROR - 14:33:45.230829447 [25108/25115]: Failed to open fs handle to ust/uid/1001/64-bit/index/chan_0.idx, open() returned: No such file or directory (in fd_tracker_open_fs_handle() at fd-tracker.c:550) PERROR - 14:33:45.331223320 [25108/25115]: Failed to open fs handle to ust/uid/1001/64-bit/index/chan_0.idx, open() returned: No such file or directory (in fd_tracker_open_fs_handle() at fd-tracker.c:550) This is produced with the following back-trace: (gdb) bt #0 __GI_raise (sig=sig@entry=6) at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/raise.c:51 #1 0x00007ffff69648b1 in __GI_abort () at abort.c:79 #2 0x00005555555b4f1f in fd_tracker_open_fs_handle (tracker=0x55555582c620, directory=0x7fffe8006680, path=0x7ffff0a25870 "ust/uid/1001/64-bit/index/chan_1.idx", flags=0, mode=0x7ffff0a24508) at fd-tracker.c:550 #3 0x0000555555595c34 in _lttng_trace_chunk_open_fs_handle_locked (chunk=0x7fffe0002130, file_path=0x7ffff0a25870 "ust/uid/1001/64-bit/index/chan_1.idx", flags=0, mode=432, out_handle=0x7ffff0a24710, expect_no_file=true) at trace-chunk.c:1388 #4 0x0000555555595eef in lttng_trace_chunk_open_fs_handle (chunk=0x7fffe0002130, file_path=0x7ffff0a25870 "ust/uid/1001/64-bit/index/chan_1.idx", flags=0, mode=432, out_handle=0x7ffff0a24710, expect_no_file=true) at trace-chunk.c:1433 #5 0x00005555555da6c2 in _lttng_index_file_create_from_trace_chunk (chunk=0x7fffe0002130, channel_path=0x7fffe8018c30 "ust/uid/1001/64-bit", stream_name=0x7fffe8018c10 "chan_1", stream_file_size=0, stream_file_index=0, index_major=1, index_minor=1, unlink_existing_file=false, flags=0, expect_no_file=true, file=0x7fffe0002270) at index.c:97 #6 0x00005555555dad8a in lttng_index_file_create_from_trace_chunk_read_only (chunk=0x7fffe0002130, channel_path=0x7fffe8018c30 "ust/uid/1001/64-bit", stream_name=0x7fffe8018c10 "chan_1", stream_file_size=0, stream_file_index=0, index_major=1, index_minor=1, expect_no_file=true, file=0x7fffe0002270) at index.c:186 #7 0x000055555557640f in try_open_index (vstream=0x7fffe0002250, rstream=0x7fffe8018c50) at live.c:1378 #8 0x0000555555577155 in viewer_get_next_index (conn=0x7fffd4001440) at live.c:1643 #9 0x0000555555579a01 in process_control (recv_hdr=0x7ffff0a27c30, conn=0x7fffd4001440) at live.c:2311 #10 0x000055555557a1db in thread_worker (data=0x0) at live.c:2482 #11 0x00007ffff6d1c6db in start_thread (arg=0x7ffff0a28700) at pthread_create.c:463 #12 0x00007ffff6a45a3f in clone () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone.S:95 That problem is mostly cosmetic in nature (the open can fail "legitimately") as the PERROR should simply not be printed and is addressed in a different commit. This error is also produced after a 'clear' is issued: PERROR - 14:33:45.532782268 [25108/25115]: Failed to read from file system handle of viewer stream id 1, offset: 4096: No such file or directory (in viewer_get_packet() at live.c:1849) Which is produced with the following back-trace: #0 __GI_raise (sig=sig@entry=6) at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/raise.c:51 #1 0x00007f53e297c8b1 in __GI_abort () at abort.c:79 #2 0x000055dd77ccef2c in viewer_get_packet (conn=0x7f53c4001100) at live.c:1850 #3 0x000055dd77cd0a15 in process_control (recv_hdr=0x7f53dca3fc30, conn=0x7f53c4001100) at live.c:2315 #4 0x000055dd77cd11db in thread_worker (data=0x0) at live.c:2483 #5 0x00007f53e2d346db in start_thread (arg=0x7f53dca40700) at pthread_create.c:463 #6 0x00007f53e2a5da3f in clone () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone.S:95 A similar problem occurs, although more rarely, when reading an index entry in viewer_get_next_index(). Cause ===== The following situation leads to both failures to get a packet and failures to get the next index: - Viewer connects to an existing session, - Viewer consumes a number of packets, alternating the GET_NEXT_INDEX and GET_PACKET command, - The session's streams are rotated to a new trace chunk (as part of a clear), - The session is started and stopped, causing new packets to be produced and received, - The session is stopped and destroyed, causing the session's streams to rotate into a "null" trace chunk (no active trace files), - Viewer issues GET_NEXT_INDEX or GET_PACKET, but the fact that a rotation occurred on the receiving end is not detected as the relay streams' trace chunk are "null". The crux of the problem is that lttng_trace_chunk_ids_equal() is bypassed when the current trace chunk of a relay stream is "null". The rationale for skipping this check is that it is assumed that the files currently opened by the live server can can still be used even if the consumer has rotated the corresponding streams into a 'null' trace chunk, meaning no trace chunk is 'set' for those streams. This makes sense in one scenario: the session was destroyed and we wish to allow a connected live client to finish consuming the trace packets up to the end of the session's lifetime. Here, the situation is different. The viewer is reading chunk 'A'. Meanwhile, a rotation occurs into chunk 'B' and packets are received for chunk 'B'. Then, a rotation to a 'null' chunk (no active chunk) occurs. In essence, the live server never sees the rotation between chunk 'A' and 'B', and simply assumes that a rotation from 'A' to 'null' occurred, as would happen at the end of a session. In terms of the code, in viewer_get_next_index(), a call to check_index_status() is performed to determine if an index is available. The function checks that `index_received_seqcount` is greater than `index_sent_seqcount`. In that case, it determines that an index must be available. Unfortunately, there is no way for the live server to determine that the remaining indexes are in a chunk that doesn't exist anymore (chunk 'B'). Thus, viewer_get_next_index() attempts to read an index entry from the current index file and fails. Solution ======== 1) lttng_trace_chunk_ids_equal() is modified to properly handle 'null' trace chunks: - A null and a non-null trace chunk are not equal, - Two null trace chunks are equal. 2) Rotation count A rotation counter is introduced to track the number of rotations that occurred during a relay stream's lifetime. This counter is sampled by the matching viewer streams on creation and on rotation and is used to determine if all rotations were "seen" by the viewer stream. Hence, this allows us to handle the special case where a viewer is consuming the contents of a relay stream that just transitioned into a 'null' trace chunk (see comments in patch). The rest of the modifications simply allow the live server to handle null trace chunks in viewer streams. This fixes another unrelated bug that I observed while investigating this: sessions that don't have an active trace chunk are not shown when listing sessions with babeltrace. To reproduce, simply stop, clear a session, and attempt to list the sessions of the associated relay daemon. Known drawbacks =============== None. Signed-off-by: Jérémie Galarneau <[email protected]> Change-Id: Ibb3116990e34b7ec3b477f3482d0c0ff1e848d09

…tion Issue ===== The code of this function triggers the following heap-buffer-overflow warning when compiled with `-fsanitize=address` in specific situation: ==247225==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x602000001310 at pc 0x5559db6c575a bp 0x7f193e6faeb0 sp 0x7f193e6faea0 READ of size 4 at 0x602000001310 thread T4 (Notification) #0 0x5559db6c5759 in hashlittle /home/frdeso/projets/lttng/tools/src/common/hashtable/utils.c:315 #1 0x5559db6c6df4 in hash_key_str /home/frdeso/projets/lttng/tools/src/common/hashtable/utils.c:490 #2 0x5559db5e3282 in hash_trigger_by_name_uid /home/frdeso/projets/lttng/tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/notification-thread-events.c:378 lttng#3 0x5559db5ecbe3 in trigger_name_taken /home/frdeso/projets/lttng/tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/notification-thread-events.c:2333 lttng#4 0x5559db5ecd7c in generate_trigger_name /home/frdeso/projets/lttng/tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/notification-thread-events.c:2362 lttng#5 0x5559db5ed6e0 in handle_notification_thread_command_register_trigger /home/frdeso/projets/lttng/tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/notification-thread-events.c:2491 lttng#6 0x5559db5ef967 in handle_notification_thread_command /home/frdeso/projets/lttng/tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/notification-thread-events.c:2927 lttng#7 0x5559db5ddbb7 in thread_notification /home/frdeso/projets/lttng/tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/notification-thread.c:693 lttng#8 0x5559db60e56d in launch_thread /home/frdeso/projets/lttng/tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/thread.c:66 lttng#9 0x7f19456ec608 in start_thread /build/glibc-ZN95T4/glibc-2.31/nptl/pthread_create.c:477 lttng#10 0x7f1945602292 in __clone (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x122292) Given that the `k` pointer used in this loop is a `uint32_t *` we might read bytes outside of the allocated key if the key is less than 4 bytes long. As the comment about Valgrind explains, this is not a real problem because memory protections are typically word bounded. I tried to use the `__SANITIZE_ADDRESS__` define to select the Valgrind implementation of this code when building with AddressSanitizer but that still triggers the same head-buffer-overflow warning. Why wasn't that a problem before? ======================================= The trigger feature will use small default names like "T0". Workaround ========== Exclude this function from the sanitizing using the compiler attribute "no_sanitize_address". Drawback ======== This remove our sanitizing coverage for this function. Signed-off-by: Francis Deslauriers <[email protected]> Change-Id: I82d0d3539916ed889faa93871f9b700064f2c52a

…tion Issue ===== The code of this function triggers the following heap-buffer-overflow warning when compiled with `-fsanitize=address` in specific situation: ==247225==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x602000001310 at pc 0x5559db6c575a bp 0x7f193e6faeb0 sp 0x7f193e6faea0 READ of size 4 at 0x602000001310 thread T4 (Notification) #0 0x5559db6c5759 in hashlittle /home/frdeso/projets/lttng/tools/src/common/hashtable/utils.c:315 #1 0x5559db6c6df4 in hash_key_str /home/frdeso/projets/lttng/tools/src/common/hashtable/utils.c:490 #2 0x5559db5e3282 in hash_trigger_by_name_uid /home/frdeso/projets/lttng/tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/notification-thread-events.c:378 #3 0x5559db5ecbe3 in trigger_name_taken /home/frdeso/projets/lttng/tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/notification-thread-events.c:2333 #4 0x5559db5ecd7c in generate_trigger_name /home/frdeso/projets/lttng/tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/notification-thread-events.c:2362 #5 0x5559db5ed6e0 in handle_notification_thread_command_register_trigger /home/frdeso/projets/lttng/tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/notification-thread-events.c:2491 #6 0x5559db5ef967 in handle_notification_thread_command /home/frdeso/projets/lttng/tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/notification-thread-events.c:2927 #7 0x5559db5ddbb7 in thread_notification /home/frdeso/projets/lttng/tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/notification-thread.c:693 #8 0x5559db60e56d in launch_thread /home/frdeso/projets/lttng/tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/thread.c:66 #9 0x7f19456ec608 in start_thread /build/glibc-ZN95T4/glibc-2.31/nptl/pthread_create.c:477 #10 0x7f1945602292 in __clone (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x122292) Given that the `k` pointer used in this loop is a `uint32_t *` we might read bytes outside of the allocated key if the key is less than 4 bytes long. As the comment about Valgrind explains, this is not a real problem because memory protections are typically word bounded. I tried to use the `__SANITIZE_ADDRESS__` define to select the Valgrind implementation of this code when building with AddressSanitizer but that still triggers the same head-buffer-overflow warning. Why wasn't that a problem before? ======================================= The trigger feature will use small default names like "T0". Workaround ========== Exclude this function from the sanitizing using the compiler attribute "no_sanitize_address". Drawback ======== This removes our sanitizing coverage for this function. Signed-off-by: Francis Deslauriers <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jérémie Galarneau <[email protected]> Change-Id: I82d0d3539916ed889faa93871f9b700064f2c52a

Observed issue ============== When consumer_stream_destroy() is called from, for example, the error path in setup_metadata(), consumer_stream_free() can end up being called twice on the same stream. Since the stream->metadata_bucket is not set to NULL after being destroyed, it leads to a use-after-free: ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x604000000318 READ of size 8 at 0x604000000318 thread T7 #0 in metadata_bucket_destroy #1 in consumer_stream_free #2 in consumer_stream_destroy #3 in setup_metadata #4 in lttng_ustconsumer_recv_cmd #5 in lttng_consumer_recv_cmd #6 in consumer_thread_sessiond_poll #7 in start_thread nptl/pthread_create.c:481 #8 in clone (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0xfcbde) 0x604000000318 is located 8 bytes inside of 48-byte region [0x604000000310,0x604000000340) freed by thread T7 here: #0 in __interceptor_free #1 in metadata_bucket_destroy #2 in consumer_stream_free #3 in consumer_stream_destroy #4 in clean_channel_stream_list #5 in consumer_del_channel #6 in consumer_stream_destroy #7 in setup_metadata #8 in lttng_ustconsumer_recv_cmd #9 in lttng_consumer_recv_cmd #10 in consumer_thread_sessiond_poll #11 in start_thread nptl/pthread_create.c:481 previously allocated by thread T7 here: #0 in __interceptor_calloc #1 in zmalloc #2 in metadata_bucket_create #3 in consumer_stream_enable_metadata_bucketization #4 in lttng_ustconsumer_set_stream_ops #5 in lttng_ustconsumer_on_recv_stream #6 in lttng_consumer_on_recv_stream #7 in create_ust_streams #8 in ask_channel #9 in lttng_ustconsumer_recv_cmd #10 in lttng_consumer_recv_cmd #11 in consumer_thread_sessiond_poll #12 in start_thread nptl/pthread_create.c:481 Thread T7 created by T0 here: #0 in __interceptor_pthread_create #1 in main #2 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:332 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free in metadata_bucket_destroy This can be easily reproduced by forcing a failure during the setup of the metadata reproducible using the following change: diff --git a/src/common/ust-consumer/ust-consumer.c b/src/common/ust-consumer/ust-consumer.c index fa1c71299..97ed59632 100644 --- a/src/common/ust-consumer/ust-consumer.c +++ b/src/common/ust-consumer/ust-consumer.c @@ -908,8 +908,7 @@ static int setup_metadata(struct lttng_consumer_local_data *ctx, uint64_t key) /* Send metadata stream to relayd if needed. */ if (metadata->metadata_stream->net_seq_idx != (uint64_t) -1ULL) { - ret = consumer_send_relayd_stream(metadata->metadata_stream, - metadata->pathname); + ret = -1; if (ret < 0) { ret = LTTCOMM_CONSUMERD_ERROR_METADATA; goto error; Cause ===== Channels have a list of streams that are being "setup" and are not yet monitored for consumption. During this setup phase, the streams are owned by the channel. On destruction of the channel, any stream in that list will thus be cleaned-up. When destroying a consumer stream, a reference to its channel is 'put'. This can result in the destruction of the channel. In the situation described above, the release of the channel's reference is done before the stream is removed from the channel's stream list. This causes the channel's clean-up to invoke (again) the current stream's clean-up, resulting in the double-free of the metadata bucket. This problem is present in a number of error paths. Solution ======== Some error paths already manually removed the consumer stream from it's channel's stream list before invoking consumer_stream_destroy(). The various error paths that have to deal with this possible situation are changed to simply invoke consumer_stream_destroy(). consumer_stream_destroy() is modified to always remove the stream from its channel's list before performing the rest of the clean-up. This ensures that those double clean-ups can't occur. Drawbacks ========= None. Reported-by: Vincent Whitchurch <[email protected]> Tested-by: Vincent Whitchurch <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jérémie Galarneau <[email protected]> Change-Id: Ibeca9b675b86fc46be3f57826f7158de4da43df8

Observed issue ============== Scenario: gdb lttng-sessiond set non-stop break rotation-thread.cpp:584 ^ simulates a slow rotation thread or not scheduled thread. lttng create test1 lttng enable-event -u -a lttng start test1 lttng create test2 lttng enable-event -u -a lttng start test2 lttng destroy test1 This will hang on rotation pending checks on the CLI side. In another shell: lttng destroy test2 This will hang on rotation pending checks on the CLI side. Back to gdb thread 7 continue Results in: #0 __GI_raise (sig=sig@entry=6) at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/raise.c:50 #1 0x00007ffff786c859 in __GI_abort () at abort.c:79 #2 0x00007ffff786c729 in __assert_fail_base (fmt=0x7ffff7a02588 "%s%s%s:%u: %s%sAssertion `%s' failed.\n%n", assertion=0x5555556bb148 "count == lttng_ht_get_count(ltt_sessions_ht_by_name)", file=0x5555556bae9f "session.cpp", line=395, function=<optimized out>) at assert.c:92 #3 0x00007ffff787e006 in __GI___assert_fail (assertion=0x5555556bb148 "count == lttng_ht_get_count(ltt_sessions_ht_by_name)", file=0x5555556bae9f "session.cpp", line=395, function=0x5555556bb129 "int ltt_sessions_ht_empty()") at assert.c:101 #4 0x0000555555586d59 in ltt_sessions_ht_empty () at session.cpp:395 #5 0x0000555555586e53 in del_session_ht (ls=0x7fffdc000c30) at session.cpp:418 #6 0x0000555555588a95 in session_release (ref=0x7fffdc001e50) at session.cpp:999 #7 0x000055555558620f in urcu_ref_put (ref=0x7fffdc001e50, release=0x5555555886eb <session_release(urcu_ref*)>) at /home/joraj/lttng/master/install/include/urcu/ref.h:68 #8 0x0000555555588c8f in session_put (session=0x7fffdc000c30) at session.cpp:1048 #9 0x00005555555bf995 in handle_job_queue (handle=0x55555575d260, state=0x7fffeeffc240, queue=0x555555758960) at rotation-thread.cpp:612 #10 0x00005555555c05da in thread_rotation (data=0x55555575d260) at rotation-thread.cpp:847 #11 0x00005555555c3b1c in launch_thread (data=0x55555575d2f0) at thread.cpp:66 #12 0x00007ffff7a46609 in start_thread (arg=<optimized out>) at pthread_create.c:477 #13 0x00007ffff7969163 in clone () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone.S:95 Other scenarios can lead to a similar backtrace when using the `--no-wait` lttng destroy option. Cause ===== Since ed41e57 [1], hash table removal for the session object for the `ltt_sessions_ht_by_name` and `ltt_sessions_ht_by_name` are "decoupled". Removal from `ltt_sessions_ht_by_name` is done early in `session_destroy()` while removal from `ltt_sessions_ht_by_id` is done during `session_release` when the last reference of a session object is released. This can leads to `imbalances` between the size of the two hash tables when multiple sessions are at play. Solution ======== Rework `ltt_sessions_ht_empty()` to exit early when `ltt_sessions_ht_by_id` is not empty. Perform a sanity check on `ltt_sessions_ht_by_name` only when `ltt_sessions_ht_by_id` is empty. Note ======== Ideally both hash tables' lifetime would be managed separately but it seems easier in term of initialization to bundle them together for now considering the limited scope of the `ltt_sessions_ht_by_name` hash table. Signed-off-by: Jonathan Rajotte <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jérémie Galarneau <[email protected]> Change-Id: I66c459f80298f929add703ac977cccd1da6dd556

Observed issue ============== During high throughput event notification generation scenarios the following deadlock happens: Thread 14 (Thread 0x7f74b4ff9700 (LWP 76062)): #0 __lll_lock_wait (futex=futex@entry=0x56408765dde8, private=0) at lowlevellock.c:52 #1 0x00007f74c941a0a3 in __GI___pthread_mutex_lock (mutex=0x56408765dde8) at ../nptl/pthread_mutex_lock.c:80 #2 0x000056408704b207 in run_command_wait (handle=0x56408765ddd0, cmd=0x7f74b4ff7f70) at notification-thread-commands.cpp:31 #3 0x000056408704bcef in notification_thread_command_remove_tracer_event_source (handle=0x56408765ddd0, tracer_event_source_fd=54) at notification-thread-commands.cpp:319 #4 0x000056408708a0c1 in delete_ust_app (app=0x7f749c000bf0) at ust-app.cpp:1059 #5 0x000056408708a511 in delete_ust_app_rcu (head=0x7f749c000ca0) at ust-app.cpp:1122 #6 0x00007f74c988b4a7 in call_rcu_thread (arg=0x7f74b8004a80) at ../src/urcu-call-rcu-impl.h:369 #7 0x00007f74c9417609 in start_thread (arg=<optimized out>) at pthread_create.c:477 #8 0x00007f74c933a163 in clone () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone.S:95 Thread 13 (Thread 0x7f74b57fa700 (LWP 76047)): #0 0x00007f74c933a49e in epoll_wait (epfd=48, events=0x7f74a4000b60, maxevents=2, timeout=-1) at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/epoll_wait.c:30 #1 0x00005640870eafa6 in compat_epoll_wait (events=0x7f74b57f9240, timeout=-1, interruptible=false) at compat/poll.cpp:280 #2 0x00005640870abb65 in thread_agent_management (data=0x56408765f0b0) at agent-thread.cpp:424 #3 0x0000564087062b1a in launch_thread (data=0x56408765f150) at thread.cpp:66 #4 0x00007f74c9417609 in start_thread (arg=<optimized out>) at pthread_create.c:477 #5 0x00007f74c933a163 in clone () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone.S:95 Thread 12 (Thread 0x7f74b5ffb700 (LWP 76046)): [630/709] #0 0x00007f74c933a49e in epoll_wait (epfd=47, events=0x7f74a0000b60, maxevents=2, timeout=-1) at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/epoll_wait.c:30 #1 0x00005640870eafa6 in compat_epoll_wait (events=0x7f74b5ffa170, timeout=-1, interruptible=false) at compat/poll.cpp:280 #2 0x00005640870a4095 in thread_application_notification (data=0x56408765ee40) at notify-apps.cpp:78 #3 0x0000564087062b1a in launch_thread (data=0x56408765eed0) at thread.cpp:66 #4 0x00007f74c9417609 in start_thread (arg=<optimized out>) at pthread_create.c:477 #5 0x00007f74c933a163 in clone () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone.S:95 Thread 11 (Thread 0x7f74b67fc700 (LWP 76045)): #0 0x00007f74c933a49e in epoll_wait (epfd=44, events=0x7f74ac000b60, maxevents=2, timeout=-1) at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/epoll_wait.c:30 #1 0x00005640870eafa6 in compat_epoll_wait (events=0x7f74b67fb170, timeout=-1, interruptible=false) at compat/poll.cpp:280 #2 0x00005640870723db in thread_application_management (data=0x56408765ebd0) at manage-apps.cpp:93 #3 0x0000564087062b1a in launch_thread (data=0x56408765ec60) at thread.cpp:66 #4 0x00007f74c9417609 in start_thread (arg=<optimized out>) at pthread_create.c:477 #5 0x00007f74c933a163 in clone () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone.S:95 Thread 10 (Thread 0x7f74b6ffd700 (LWP 76044)): #0 0x00007f74c933a49e in epoll_wait (epfd=39, events=0x7f74a8000b60, maxevents=2, timeout=-1) at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/epoll_wait.c:30 #1 0x00005640870eafa6 in compat_epoll_wait (events=0x7f74b6ffc130, timeout=-1, interruptible=false) at compat/poll.cpp:280 #2 0x0000564087070a27 in thread_application_registration (data=0x56408765e940) at register.cpp:214 #3 0x0000564087062b1a in launch_thread (data=0x56408765e9f0) at thread.cpp:66 #4 0x00007f74c9417609 in start_thread (arg=<optimized out>) at pthread_create.c:477 #5 0x00007f74c933a163 in clone () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone.S:95 Thread 9 (Thread 0x7f74b77fe700 (LWP 76043)): [654/709] #0 syscall () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/syscall.S:38 #1 0x00005640870c8e25 in futex (uaddr=0x5640871e2800 <ust_cmd_queue>, op=0, val=-1, timeout=0x0, uaddr2=0x0, val3=0) at /home/joraj/lttng/master/install/include/urcu/futex.h:72 #2 0x00005640870c8e6d in futex_async (uaddr=0x5640871e2800 <ust_cmd_queue>, op=0, val=-1, timeout=0x0, uaddr2=0x0, val3=0) at /home/joraj/lttng/master/install/include/urcu/futex.h:104 #3 0x00005640870c939a in futex_nto1_wait (futex=0x5640871e2800 <ust_cmd_queue>) at futex.cpp:77 #4 0x000056408706f2af in thread_dispatch_ust_registration (data=0x56408765e740) at dispatch.cpp:453 #5 0x0000564087062b1a in launch_thread (data=0x56408765e760) at thread.cpp:66 #6 0x00007f74c9417609 in start_thread (arg=<optimized out>) at pthread_create.c:477 #7 0x00007f74c933a163 in clone () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone.S:95 Thread 8 (Thread 0x7f74b7fff700 (LWP 76042)): #0 0x00007f74c933a49e in epoll_wait (epfd=33, events=0x7f74b0000b60, maxevents=2, timeout=-1) at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/epoll_wait.c:30 #1 0x00005640870eafa6 in compat_epoll_wait (events=0x7f74b7ffad40, timeout=-1, interruptible=false) at compat/poll.cpp:280 #2 0x000056408706c424 in thread_manage_clients (data=0x56408765e4f0) at client.cpp:2528 #3 0x0000564087062b1a in launch_thread (data=0x56408765e560) at thread.cpp:66 #4 0x00007f74c9417609 in start_thread (arg=<optimized out>) at pthread_create.c:477 #5 0x00007f74c933a163 in clone () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone.S:95 Thread 7 (Thread 0x7f74c4b8f700 (LWP 76041)): [672/709] #0 0x00007f74c933a49e in epoll_wait (epfd=31, events=0x7f74bc000b60, maxevents=3, timeout=-1) at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/epoll_wait.c:30 #1 0x00005640870eafa6 in compat_epoll_wait (events=0x7f74c4b8e240, timeout=-1, interruptible=false) at compat/poll.cpp:280 #2 0x000056408705f2b6 in thread_rotation (data=0x56408765e280) at rotation-thread.cpp:804 #3 0x0000564087062b1a in launch_thread (data=0x56408765e310) at thread.cpp:66 #4 0x00007f74c9417609 in start_thread (arg=<optimized out>) at pthread_create.c:477 #5 0x00007f74c933a163 in clone () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone.S:95 Thread 6 (Thread 0x7f74c5390700 (LWP 76040)): #0 0x00007f74c925f1d2 in __GI___sigtimedwait (set=0x7f74c538f090, info=0x7f74c538f110, timeout=0x0) at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/sigtimedwait.c:29 #1 0x000056408706138a in thread_timer (data=0x7ffc1fcbe3f0) at timer.cpp:359 #2 0x0000564087062b1a in launch_thread (data=0x56408765e0a0) at thread.cpp:66 #3 0x00007f74c9417609 in start_thread (arg=<optimized out>) at pthread_create.c:477 #4 0x00007f74c933a163 in clone () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone.S:95 Thread 5 (Thread 0x7f74c5b91700 (LWP 76039)): #0 __libc_write (nbytes=8, buf=0x7f74c5b8fc88, fd=24) at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/write.c:26 #1 __libc_write (fd=24, buf=0x7f74c5b8fc88, nbytes=8) at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/write.c:24 #2 0x00005640870eeb4f in lttng_write (fd=24, buf=0x7f74c5b8fc88, count=8) at readwrite.cpp:77 #3 0x000056408704b535 in run_command_no_wait (handle=0x56408765ddd0, in_cmd=0x7f74c5b8fdf0) at notification-thread-commands.cpp:92 #4 0x000056408704bf49 in notification_thread_client_communication_update (handle=0x56408765ddd0, id=2, transmission_status=CLIENT_TRANSMISSION_STATUS_QUEUED) at notification-thread-command #5 0x000056408707bc62 in client_handle_transmission_status (client=0x7f74b80050d0, status=CLIENT_TRANSMISSION_STATUS_QUEUED, user_data=0x7f74b8004410) at action-executor.cpp:258 #6 0x0000564087057525 in notification_client_list_send_evaluation (client_list=0x7f74b8004df0, trigger=0x7f74b0001030, evaluation=0x7f74b815d1d0, source_object_creds=0x0, client_report=0x5 #7 0x000056408707bce9 in action_executor_notify_handler (executor=0x7f74b8004410, work_item=0x7f74b815d430, item=0x7f74b80e48e0) at action-executor.cpp:269 #8 0x000056408707dd6d in action_executor_generic_handler (executor=0x7f74b8004410, work_item=0x7f74b815d430, item=0x7f74b80e48e0) at action-executor.cpp:670 #9 0x000056408707df01 in action_work_item_execute (executor=0x7f74b8004410, work_item=0x7f74b815d430) at action-executor.cpp:689 #10 0x000056408707e525 in action_executor_thread (_data=0x7f74b8004410) at action-executor.cpp:771 [698/709] #11 0x0000564087062b1a in launch_thread (data=0x7f74b80044b0) at thread.cpp:66 #12 0x00007f74c9417609 in start_thread (arg=<optimized out>) at pthread_create.c:477 #13 0x00007f74c933a163 in clone () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone.S:95 Thread 4 (Thread 0x7f74c6392700 (LWP 76038)): #0 __lll_lock_wait (futex=futex@entry=0x56408765dde8, private=0) at lowlevellock.c:52 #1 0x00007f74c941a0a3 in __GI___pthread_mutex_lock (mutex=0x56408765dde8) at ../nptl/pthread_mutex_lock.c:80 #2 0x0000564087053c89 in handle_notification_thread_command (handle=0x56408765ddd0, state=0x7f74c63911b0) at notification-thread-events.cpp:3142 #3 0x000056408704ac81 in thread_notification (data=0x56408765ddd0) at notification-thread.cpp:715 #4 0x0000564087062b1a in launch_thread (data=0x56408765dec0) at thread.cpp:66 #5 0x00007f74c9417609 in start_thread (arg=<optimized out>) at pthread_create.c:477 #run_command_no_wait6 0x00007f74c933a163 in clone () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone.S:95 Thread 3 (Thread 0x7f74c6b93700 (LWP 76037)): #0 0x00007f74c933a49e in epoll_wait (epfd=21, events=0x7f74c0000b60, maxevents=2, timeout=-1) at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/epoll_wait.c:30 #1 0x00005640870eafa6 in compat_epoll_wait (events=0x7f74c6b92170, timeout=-1, interruptible=false) at compat/poll.cpp:280 #2 0x000056408706400a in thread_manage_health (data=0x56408765db50) at health.cpp:140 #3 0x0000564087062b1a in launch_thread (data=0x56408765dbf0) at thread.cpp:66 #4 0x00007f74c9417609 in start_thread (arg=<optimized out>) at pthread_create.c:477 #5 0x00007f74c933a163 in clone () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone.S:95 Thread 2 (Thread 0x7f74c7394700 (LWP 76036)): #0 syscall () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/syscall.S:38 #1 0x00007f74c987d238 in futex (uaddr=0x564087659b10, op=0, val=-1, timeout=0x0, uaddr2=0x0, val3=0) at ../include/urcu/futex.h:72 #2 futex_async (uaddr=0x564087659b10, op=0, val=-1, timeout=0x0, uaddr2=0x0, val3=0) at ../include/urcu/futex.h:104 #3 futex_wait (futex=0x564087659b10) at workqueue.c:136 #4 0x00007f74c987ced2 in workqueue_thread (arg=0x564087659ad0) at workqueue.c:237 #5 0x00007f74c9417609 in start_thread (arg=<optimized out>) at pthread_create.c:477 #6 0x00007f74c933a163 in clone () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone.S:95 Thread 1 (Thread 0x7f74c73cd300 (LWP 76034)): #0 0x00007f74c933a49e in epoll_wait (epfd=50, events=0x564087666880, maxevents=1, timeout=-1) at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/epoll_wait.c:30 #1 0x00005640870eafa6 in compat_epoll_wait (events=0x7ffc1fcbe280, timeout=-1, interruptible=false) at compat/poll.cpp:280 #2 0x0000564087062244 in sessiond_wait_for_quit_pipe (timeout_ms=-1) at thread-utils.cpp:83 #3 0x00005640870127dc in main (argc=1, argv=0x7ffc1fcbe668) at main.cpp:1921 Cause ===== The event_pipe used to notify the notification poll loop is full and the lttng_write call blocks with the locks for both the client and the cmd_queue held. Solution ======== Go back to using eventfd but without the use of EFD_SEMAPHORE (linux 2.6.30) to continue supporting kernel between 2.6.27 and 2.6.29. The EFD_SEMAPHORE is emulated with a read, decrement, write as explained by the initial committer of EFD_SEMAPHORE [1]. Known drawbacks ========= This does not solve the actual block+lock problem but simply push it back further. The lttng_write on the eventfd can block when reaching UINT64_MAX. This would represent, at 1 command queued per ns (which is ridiculous), ~584 years of queueing without a dequeue operation. Reference ======= [1] https://lwn.net/Articles/318151/ Signed-off-by: Jonathan Rajotte <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jérémie Galarneau <[email protected]> Change-Id: Ie749c4169708f57463fe3cfab2366f1015bae4e0

Observed issue ============== When servicing a large number of tracer notifications and sending notifications to clients, the session daemon occasionally hits an assertion: #4 0x00007fb224d7d116 in __assert_fail () from /usr/lib/libc.so.6 #5 0x000056038b2fe4d7 in client_flush_outgoing_queue (client=0x7fb21400c3b0) at notification-thread-events.cpp:3586 #6 0x000056038b2ff819 in handle_notification_thread_client_out (state=0x7fb221974090, socket=77) at notification-thread-events.cpp:4104 #7 0x000056038b2f3d77 in thread_notification (data=0x56038cc7fe90) at notification-thread.cpp:763 #8 0x000056038b30ca7d in launch_thread (data=0x56038cc7e220) at thread.cpp:66 #9 0x00007fb224dcf5c2 in start_thread () from /usr/lib/libc.so.6 #10 0x00007fb224e54584 in clone () from /usr/lib/libc.so.6 Cause ===== A client "out" event can be received when no payload is left to send under some circumstances. Many threads can flush a client's outgoing queue and, if they had to queue their message (socket was full), will use the "communication update" command to signal the (e)poll thread to monitor for space being made available in the socket. Commands are sent over an internal pipe serviced by the same thread as the client sockets. When space is made available in the socket, there is a race between the (e)poll thread and the other threads that may wish to use the client's socket to flush its outgoing queue. A non-(e)poll thread may attempt (and succeed) in flushing the queue before the (e)poll thread gets a chance to service the client's "out" event. In this situation, the (e)poll thread processing the client out event will see an empty payload: there is nothing to do. Solution ======== The (e)poll thread can simply ignore the "client out" event when an empty payload is seen. There is also no need to update the transmission status as the other thread has already enqueued a "communication update" command to do so. Known drawbacks =============== None. Signed-off-by: Jérémie Galarneau <[email protected]> Change-Id: I8a181bea1e37e8e14cc67b624b76d139b488eded

Observed issue ============== During high throughput event notification generation scenarios the following deadlock happens: Thread 14 (Thread 0x7f74b4ff9700 (LWP 76062)): #0 __lll_lock_wait (futex=futex@entry=0x56408765dde8, private=0) at lowlevellock.c:52 #1 0x00007f74c941a0a3 in __GI___pthread_mutex_lock (mutex=0x56408765dde8) at ../nptl/pthread_mutex_lock.c:80 #2 0x000056408704b207 in run_command_wait (handle=0x56408765ddd0, cmd=0x7f74b4ff7f70) at notification-thread-commands.cpp:31 #3 0x000056408704bcef in notification_thread_command_remove_tracer_event_source (handle=0x56408765ddd0, tracer_event_source_fd=54) at notification-thread-commands.cpp:319 #4 0x000056408708a0c1 in delete_ust_app (app=0x7f749c000bf0) at ust-app.cpp:1059 #5 0x000056408708a511 in delete_ust_app_rcu (head=0x7f749c000ca0) at ust-app.cpp:1122 #6 0x00007f74c988b4a7 in call_rcu_thread (arg=0x7f74b8004a80) at ../src/urcu-call-rcu-impl.h:369 #7 0x00007f74c9417609 in start_thread (arg=<optimized out>) at pthread_create.c:477 #8 0x00007f74c933a163 in clone () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone.S:95 Thread 13 (Thread 0x7f74b57fa700 (LWP 76047)): #0 0x00007f74c933a49e in epoll_wait (epfd=48, events=0x7f74a4000b60, maxevents=2, timeout=-1) at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/epoll_wait.c:30 #1 0x00005640870eafa6 in compat_epoll_wait (events=0x7f74b57f9240, timeout=-1, interruptible=false) at compat/poll.cpp:280 #2 0x00005640870abb65 in thread_agent_management (data=0x56408765f0b0) at agent-thread.cpp:424 #3 0x0000564087062b1a in launch_thread (data=0x56408765f150) at thread.cpp:66 #4 0x00007f74c9417609 in start_thread (arg=<optimized out>) at pthread_create.c:477 #5 0x00007f74c933a163 in clone () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone.S:95 Thread 12 (Thread 0x7f74b5ffb700 (LWP 76046)): [630/709] #0 0x00007f74c933a49e in epoll_wait (epfd=47, events=0x7f74a0000b60, maxevents=2, timeout=-1) at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/epoll_wait.c:30 #1 0x00005640870eafa6 in compat_epoll_wait (events=0x7f74b5ffa170, timeout=-1, interruptible=false) at compat/poll.cpp:280 #2 0x00005640870a4095 in thread_application_notification (data=0x56408765ee40) at notify-apps.cpp:78 #3 0x0000564087062b1a in launch_thread (data=0x56408765eed0) at thread.cpp:66 #4 0x00007f74c9417609 in start_thread (arg=<optimized out>) at pthread_create.c:477 #5 0x00007f74c933a163 in clone () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone.S:95 Thread 11 (Thread 0x7f74b67fc700 (LWP 76045)): #0 0x00007f74c933a49e in epoll_wait (epfd=44, events=0x7f74ac000b60, maxevents=2, timeout=-1) at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/epoll_wait.c:30 #1 0x00005640870eafa6 in compat_epoll_wait (events=0x7f74b67fb170, timeout=-1, interruptible=false) at compat/poll.cpp:280 #2 0x00005640870723db in thread_application_management (data=0x56408765ebd0) at manage-apps.cpp:93 #3 0x0000564087062b1a in launch_thread (data=0x56408765ec60) at thread.cpp:66 #4 0x00007f74c9417609 in start_thread (arg=<optimized out>) at pthread_create.c:477 #5 0x00007f74c933a163 in clone () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone.S:95 Thread 10 (Thread 0x7f74b6ffd700 (LWP 76044)): #0 0x00007f74c933a49e in epoll_wait (epfd=39, events=0x7f74a8000b60, maxevents=2, timeout=-1) at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/epoll_wait.c:30 #1 0x00005640870eafa6 in compat_epoll_wait (events=0x7f74b6ffc130, timeout=-1, interruptible=false) at compat/poll.cpp:280 #2 0x0000564087070a27 in thread_application_registration (data=0x56408765e940) at register.cpp:214 #3 0x0000564087062b1a in launch_thread (data=0x56408765e9f0) at thread.cpp:66 #4 0x00007f74c9417609 in start_thread (arg=<optimized out>) at pthread_create.c:477 #5 0x00007f74c933a163 in clone () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone.S:95 Thread 9 (Thread 0x7f74b77fe700 (LWP 76043)): [654/709] #0 syscall () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/syscall.S:38 #1 0x00005640870c8e25 in futex (uaddr=0x5640871e2800 <ust_cmd_queue>, op=0, val=-1, timeout=0x0, uaddr2=0x0, val3=0) at /home/joraj/lttng/master/install/include/urcu/futex.h:72 #2 0x00005640870c8e6d in futex_async (uaddr=0x5640871e2800 <ust_cmd_queue>, op=0, val=-1, timeout=0x0, uaddr2=0x0, val3=0) at /home/joraj/lttng/master/install/include/urcu/futex.h:104 #3 0x00005640870c939a in futex_nto1_wait (futex=0x5640871e2800 <ust_cmd_queue>) at futex.cpp:77 #4 0x000056408706f2af in thread_dispatch_ust_registration (data=0x56408765e740) at dispatch.cpp:453 #5 0x0000564087062b1a in launch_thread (data=0x56408765e760) at thread.cpp:66 #6 0x00007f74c9417609 in start_thread (arg=<optimized out>) at pthread_create.c:477 #7 0x00007f74c933a163 in clone () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone.S:95 Thread 8 (Thread 0x7f74b7fff700 (LWP 76042)): #0 0x00007f74c933a49e in epoll_wait (epfd=33, events=0x7f74b0000b60, maxevents=2, timeout=-1) at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/epoll_wait.c:30 #1 0x00005640870eafa6 in compat_epoll_wait (events=0x7f74b7ffad40, timeout=-1, interruptible=false) at compat/poll.cpp:280 #2 0x000056408706c424 in thread_manage_clients (data=0x56408765e4f0) at client.cpp:2528 #3 0x0000564087062b1a in launch_thread (data=0x56408765e560) at thread.cpp:66 #4 0x00007f74c9417609 in start_thread (arg=<optimized out>) at pthread_create.c:477 #5 0x00007f74c933a163 in clone () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone.S:95 Thread 7 (Thread 0x7f74c4b8f700 (LWP 76041)): [672/709] #0 0x00007f74c933a49e in epoll_wait (epfd=31, events=0x7f74bc000b60, maxevents=3, timeout=-1) at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/epoll_wait.c:30 #1 0x00005640870eafa6 in compat_epoll_wait (events=0x7f74c4b8e240, timeout=-1, interruptible=false) at compat/poll.cpp:280 #2 0x000056408705f2b6 in thread_rotation (data=0x56408765e280) at rotation-thread.cpp:804 #3 0x0000564087062b1a in launch_thread (data=0x56408765e310) at thread.cpp:66 #4 0x00007f74c9417609 in start_thread (arg=<optimized out>) at pthread_create.c:477 #5 0x00007f74c933a163 in clone () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone.S:95 Thread 6 (Thread 0x7f74c5390700 (LWP 76040)): #0 0x00007f74c925f1d2 in __GI___sigtimedwait (set=0x7f74c538f090, info=0x7f74c538f110, timeout=0x0) at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/sigtimedwait.c:29 #1 0x000056408706138a in thread_timer (data=0x7ffc1fcbe3f0) at timer.cpp:359 #2 0x0000564087062b1a in launch_thread (data=0x56408765e0a0) at thread.cpp:66 #3 0x00007f74c9417609 in start_thread (arg=<optimized out>) at pthread_create.c:477 #4 0x00007f74c933a163 in clone () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone.S:95 Thread 5 (Thread 0x7f74c5b91700 (LWP 76039)): #0 __libc_write (nbytes=8, buf=0x7f74c5b8fc88, fd=24) at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/write.c:26 #1 __libc_write (fd=24, buf=0x7f74c5b8fc88, nbytes=8) at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/write.c:24 #2 0x00005640870eeb4f in lttng_write (fd=24, buf=0x7f74c5b8fc88, count=8) at readwrite.cpp:77 #3 0x000056408704b535 in run_command_no_wait (handle=0x56408765ddd0, in_cmd=0x7f74c5b8fdf0) at notification-thread-commands.cpp:92 #4 0x000056408704bf49 in notification_thread_client_communication_update (handle=0x56408765ddd0, id=2, transmission_status=CLIENT_TRANSMISSION_STATUS_QUEUED) at notification-thread-command #5 0x000056408707bc62 in client_handle_transmission_status (client=0x7f74b80050d0, status=CLIENT_TRANSMISSION_STATUS_QUEUED, user_data=0x7f74b8004410) at action-executor.cpp:258 #6 0x0000564087057525 in notification_client_list_send_evaluation (client_list=0x7f74b8004df0, trigger=0x7f74b0001030, evaluation=0x7f74b815d1d0, source_object_creds=0x0, client_report=0x5 #7 0x000056408707bce9 in action_executor_notify_handler (executor=0x7f74b8004410, work_item=0x7f74b815d430, item=0x7f74b80e48e0) at action-executor.cpp:269 #8 0x000056408707dd6d in action_executor_generic_handler (executor=0x7f74b8004410, work_item=0x7f74b815d430, item=0x7f74b80e48e0) at action-executor.cpp:670 #9 0x000056408707df01 in action_work_item_execute (executor=0x7f74b8004410, work_item=0x7f74b815d430) at action-executor.cpp:689 #10 0x000056408707e525 in action_executor_thread (_data=0x7f74b8004410) at action-executor.cpp:771 [698/709] #11 0x0000564087062b1a in launch_thread (data=0x7f74b80044b0) at thread.cpp:66 #12 0x00007f74c9417609 in start_thread (arg=<optimized out>) at pthread_create.c:477 #13 0x00007f74c933a163 in clone () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone.S:95 Thread 4 (Thread 0x7f74c6392700 (LWP 76038)): #0 __lll_lock_wait (futex=futex@entry=0x56408765dde8, private=0) at lowlevellock.c:52 #1 0x00007f74c941a0a3 in __GI___pthread_mutex_lock (mutex=0x56408765dde8) at ../nptl/pthread_mutex_lock.c:80 #2 0x0000564087053c89 in handle_notification_thread_command (handle=0x56408765ddd0, state=0x7f74c63911b0) at notification-thread-events.cpp:3142 #3 0x000056408704ac81 in thread_notification (data=0x56408765ddd0) at notification-thread.cpp:715 #4 0x0000564087062b1a in launch_thread (data=0x56408765dec0) at thread.cpp:66 #5 0x00007f74c9417609 in start_thread (arg=<optimized out>) at pthread_create.c:477 #run_command_no_wait6 0x00007f74c933a163 in clone () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone.S:95 Thread 3 (Thread 0x7f74c6b93700 (LWP 76037)): #0 0x00007f74c933a49e in epoll_wait (epfd=21, events=0x7f74c0000b60, maxevents=2, timeout=-1) at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/epoll_wait.c:30 #1 0x00005640870eafa6 in compat_epoll_wait (events=0x7f74c6b92170, timeout=-1, interruptible=false) at compat/poll.cpp:280 #2 0x000056408706400a in thread_manage_health (data=0x56408765db50) at health.cpp:140 #3 0x0000564087062b1a in launch_thread (data=0x56408765dbf0) at thread.cpp:66 #4 0x00007f74c9417609 in start_thread (arg=<optimized out>) at pthread_create.c:477 #5 0x00007f74c933a163 in clone () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone.S:95 Thread 2 (Thread 0x7f74c7394700 (LWP 76036)): #0 syscall () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/syscall.S:38 #1 0x00007f74c987d238 in futex (uaddr=0x564087659b10, op=0, val=-1, timeout=0x0, uaddr2=0x0, val3=0) at ../include/urcu/futex.h:72 #2 futex_async (uaddr=0x564087659b10, op=0, val=-1, timeout=0x0, uaddr2=0x0, val3=0) at ../include/urcu/futex.h:104 #3 futex_wait (futex=0x564087659b10) at workqueue.c:136 #4 0x00007f74c987ced2 in workqueue_thread (arg=0x564087659ad0) at workqueue.c:237 #5 0x00007f74c9417609 in start_thread (arg=<optimized out>) at pthread_create.c:477 #6 0x00007f74c933a163 in clone () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone.S:95 Thread 1 (Thread 0x7f74c73cd300 (LWP 76034)): #0 0x00007f74c933a49e in epoll_wait (epfd=50, events=0x564087666880, maxevents=1, timeout=-1) at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/epoll_wait.c:30 #1 0x00005640870eafa6 in compat_epoll_wait (events=0x7ffc1fcbe280, timeout=-1, interruptible=false) at compat/poll.cpp:280 #2 0x0000564087062244 in sessiond_wait_for_quit_pipe (timeout_ms=-1) at thread-utils.cpp:83 #3 0x00005640870127dc in main (argc=1, argv=0x7ffc1fcbe668) at main.cpp:1921 Cause ===== The event_pipe used to notify the notification poll loop is full and the lttng_write call blocks with the locks for both the client and the cmd_queue held. Solution ======== Go back to using eventfd but without the use of EFD_SEMAPHORE (linux 2.6.30) to continue supporting kernel between 2.6.27 and 2.6.29. The EFD_SEMAPHORE is emulated with a read, decrement, write as explained by the initial committer of EFD_SEMAPHORE [1]. Known drawbacks ========= This does not solve the actual block+lock problem but simply push it back further. The lttng_write on the eventfd can block when reaching UINT64_MAX. This would represent, at 1 command queued per ns (which is ridiculous), ~584 years of queueing without a dequeue operation. Reference ======= [1] https://lwn.net/Articles/318151/ Signed-off-by: Jonathan Rajotte <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jérémie Galarneau <[email protected]> Change-Id: Ie749c4169708f57463fe3cfab2366f1015bae4e0

Observed issue ============== When servicing a large number of tracer notifications and sending notifications to clients, the session daemon occasionally hits an assertion: #4 0x00007fb224d7d116 in __assert_fail () from /usr/lib/libc.so.6 #5 0x000056038b2fe4d7 in client_flush_outgoing_queue (client=0x7fb21400c3b0) at notification-thread-events.cpp:3586 #6 0x000056038b2ff819 in handle_notification_thread_client_out (state=0x7fb221974090, socket=77) at notification-thread-events.cpp:4104 #7 0x000056038b2f3d77 in thread_notification (data=0x56038cc7fe90) at notification-thread.cpp:763 #8 0x000056038b30ca7d in launch_thread (data=0x56038cc7e220) at thread.cpp:66 #9 0x00007fb224dcf5c2 in start_thread () from /usr/lib/libc.so.6 #10 0x00007fb224e54584 in clone () from /usr/lib/libc.so.6 Cause ===== A client "out" event can be received when no payload is left to send under some circumstances. Many threads can flush a client's outgoing queue and, if they had to queue their message (socket was full), will use the "communication update" command to signal the (e)poll thread to monitor for space being made available in the socket. Commands are sent over an internal pipe serviced by the same thread as the client sockets. When space is made available in the socket, there is a race between the (e)poll thread and the other threads that may wish to use the client's socket to flush its outgoing queue. A non-(e)poll thread may attempt (and succeed) in flushing the queue before the (e)poll thread gets a chance to service the client's "out" event. In this situation, the (e)poll thread processing the client out event will see an empty payload: there is nothing to do. Solution ======== The (e)poll thread can simply ignore the "client out" event when an empty payload is seen. There is also no need to update the transmission status as the other thread has already enqueued a "communication update" command to do so. Known drawbacks =============== None. Signed-off-by: Jérémie Galarneau <[email protected]> Change-Id: I8a181bea1e37e8e14cc67b624b76d139b488eded

Issue observed ============== Address sanitizer reports the following invalid accesses while running the test_mi test. ❯ ASAN_OPTIONS=detect_odr_violation=0 lttng-sessiond ================================================================= ==289173==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60400000e280 at pc 0x55cbbe35e2e0 bp 0x7f01672f1550 sp 0x7f01672f1540 WRITE of size 4 at 0x60400000e280 thread T13 #0 0x55cbbe35e2df in mark_thread_as_ready /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/manage-consumer.cpp:32 #1 0x55cbbe360160 in thread_consumer_management /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/manage-consumer.cpp:267 #2 0x55cbbe336ac4 in launch_thread /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/thread.cpp:66 #3 0x7f01729c15c1 in start_thread (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x8d5c1) #4 0x7f0172a46583 in __clone (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x112583) 0x60400000e280 is located 8 bytes to the right of 40-byte region [0x60400000e250,0x60400000e278) allocated by thread T7 here: #0 0x7f01733b1fb9 in __interceptor_calloc /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:154 #1 0x55cbbe33adf3 in zmalloc_internal ../../../src/common/macros.hpp:60 #2 0x55cbbe33ae03 in thread_notifiers* zmalloc<thread_notifiers>() ../../../src/common/macros.hpp:89 #3 0x55cbbe3617f9 in launch_consumer_management_thread(consumer_data*) /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/manage-consumer.cpp:440 #4 0x55cbbe33cf49 in spawn_consumer_thread /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/client.cpp:188 #5 0x55cbbe33f7cf in start_consumerd /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/client.cpp:394 #6 0x55cbbe345713 in process_client_msg /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/client.cpp:1277 #7 0x55cbbe34d74b in thread_manage_clients /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/client.cpp:2622 #8 0x55cbbe336ac4 in launch_thread /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/thread.cpp:66 #9 0x7f01729c15c1 in start_thread (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x8d5c1) Thread T13 created by T7 here: #0 0x7f0173353eb7 in __interceptor_pthread_create /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_interceptors.cpp:216 #1 0x55cbbe336f9e in lttng_thread_create(char const*, void* (*)(void*), bool (*)(void*), void (*)(void*), void*) /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/thread.cpp:106 #2 0x55cbbe3618cc in launch_consumer_management_thread(consumer_data*) /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/manage-consumer.cpp:453 #3 0x55cbbe33cf49 in spawn_consumer_thread /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/client.cpp:188 #4 0x55cbbe33f7cf in start_consumerd /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/client.cpp:394 #5 0x55cbbe345713 in process_client_msg /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/client.cpp:1277 #6 0x55cbbe34d74b in thread_manage_clients /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/client.cpp:2622 #7 0x55cbbe336ac4 in launch_thread /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/thread.cpp:66 #8 0x7f01729c15c1 in start_thread (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x8d5c1) Thread T7 created by T0 here: #0 0x7f0173353eb7 in __interceptor_pthread_create /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_interceptors.cpp:216 #1 0x55cbbe336f9e in lttng_thread_create(char const*, void* (*)(void*), bool (*)(void*), void (*)(void*), void*) /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/thread.cpp:106 #2 0x55cbbe34eebf in launch_client_thread() /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/client.cpp:2756 #3 0x55cbbe27f31a in main /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/main.cpp:1838 #4 0x7f017296130f in __libc_start_call_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2d30f) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/manage-consumer.cpp:32 in mark_thread_as_ready Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c087fff9c00: fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa 0x0c087fff9c10: fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa 0x0c087fff9c20: fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa 0x0c087fff9c30: fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa 0x0c087fff9c40: fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 fa =>0x0c087fff9c50:[fa]fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c087fff9c60: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c087fff9c70: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c087fff9c80: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c087fff9c90: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c087fff9ca0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb Shadow gap: cc ==289173==ABORTING Cause ===== The start functions of the various worker threads of the session daemon are implemented in separate translation units (TU). To make use of the lttng_thread API, they all define different control structures to control their shutdown. Those structures are all named 'thread_notifiers' and are all allocated using zmalloc<>. The various instances of zmalloc<thread_notifiers> all end up having the same mangled name (e.g. _Z7zmallocI16thread_notifiersEPT_v). At link time, only one instance of zmalloc<thread_notifiers> is kept. Since those structures all have different layout/sizes, this is problematic. However, it is an acceptable behaviour according to the ODR [1]. I first considered making the various memory allocation functions in macros.hpp 'static' which results in each TU holding the appropriate specialization of the various functions. While this works, it doesn't make us ODR-compliant. To make a long story short, a program defining multiple types sharing the same name, in the same namespace, is ill-formed. Another concern is that marking all templated free-functions as static will eventually result in code bloat. Solution ======== All structures defined in TUs (but not in a header) are placed in unnamed namespaces (also called anonymous namespaces) [2]. This results in separate copies of the templated functions being generated when specialized using a structure in an anonymous namespace (e.g. _Z7zmallocIN12_GLOBAL__N_116thread_notifiersEEPT_v). We could have renamed the various `thread_notifiers` structures to give them different names. However, I found those are not the only structures sharing a name in different TUs. For instance, the same problem applies to `struct lttng_index` (index in a stream, index in a map). I propose we systematically namespace structures defined in TUs in the future. This will also save us trouble if those POD structures eventually become non-POD: we would experience the same "clashes" if those structures had constructors, for example. References ========== [1] https://en.cppreference.com/w/cpp/language/definition [2] https://en.cppreference.com/w/cpp/language/namespace Signed-off-by: Jérémie Galarneau <[email protected]> Change-Id: I867e5a287ad8cf3ada617335bc1a80b800bf0833

LeakSanitizer reports the following leak: ==974957==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 32 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7fdb86fcd1b2 in __interceptor_realloc /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:164 #1 0x7fdb86d7c296 in lttng_dynamic_buffer_set_capacity(lttng_dynamic_buffer*, unsigned long) /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/common/dynamic-buffer.cpp:159 #2 0x7fdb86d7c060 in lttng_dynamic_buffer_set_size(lttng_dynamic_buffer*, unsigned long) /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/common/dynamic-buffer.cpp:112 #3 0x7fdb86d2589a in recv_payload_sessiond /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/lib/lttng-ctl/lttng-ctl.cpp:230 #4 0x7fdb86d26fa5 in lttng_ctl_ask_sessiond_payload(lttng_payload_view*, lttng_payload*) /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/lib/lttng-ctl/lttng-ctl.cpp:662 #5 0x7fdb86d2cd8d in lttng_list_tracepoint_fields /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/lib/lttng-ctl/lttng-ctl.cpp:1767 #6 0x56481623cb4c in list_ust_event_fields commands/list.cpp:850 #7 0x5648162448d9 in cmd_list(int, char const**) commands/list.cpp:2394 #8 0x56481628fb3e in handle_command /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng/lttng.cpp:238 #9 0x564816290601 in parse_args /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng/lttng.cpp:427 #10 0x564816290908 in main /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng/lttng.cpp:476 #11 0x7fdb8661730f in __libc_start_call_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2d30f) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 32 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s). The session daemon's reply is indeed never released in lttng_list_tracepoint_fields. Signed-off-by: Jérémie Galarneau <[email protected]> Change-Id: Idd244b52a69f3b74e5c131c1c36c6ee6d76f4285

==1429021==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 8 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7fe305f031b2 in __interceptor_realloc /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:164 #1 0x559f1b022238 in lttng_dynamic_buffer_set_capacity(lttng_dynamic_buffer*, unsigned long) /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/common/dynamic-buffer.cpp:159 #2 0x559f1b021d9f in lttng_dynamic_buffer_append(lttng_dynamic_buffer*, void const*, unsigned long) /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/common/dynamic-buffer.cpp:52 #3 0x559f1b02144a in lttng_dynamic_array_add_element(lttng_dynamic_array*, void const*) /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/common/dynamic-array.cpp:58 #4 0x559f1b07d07b in lttng_action_path_copy(lttng_action_path const*, lttng_action_path*) actions/path.cpp:116 #5 0x559f1b02383f in lttng_error_query_action_create /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/common/error-query.cpp:232 #6 0x559f1b02760e in lttng_error_query_create_from_payload(lttng_payload_view*, lttng_error_query**) /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/common/error-query.cpp:911 #7 0x559f1af5c361 in receive_lttng_error_query /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/client.cpp:740 #8 0x559f1af64eba in process_client_msg /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/client.cpp:2336 #9 0x559f1af67378 in thread_manage_clients /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/client.cpp:2624 #10 0x559f1af50642 in launch_thread /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/thread.cpp:68 #11 0x7fe3055225c1 in start_thread (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x8d5c1) Signed-off-by: Jérémie Galarneau <[email protected]> Change-Id: I7a6f7d2a9746124581eebf30877466f16db67a6b

==1501334==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Indirect leak of 16386 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f95efc3cdd9 in __interceptor_malloc /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:145 #1 0x55acb0681ed3 in lttng_filter_yyalloc(unsigned long, void*) filter/filter-lexer.cpp:2511 #2 0x55acb067f2f2 in lttng_filter_yy_create_buffer(_IO_FILE*, int, void*) filter/filter-lexer.cpp:1895 #3 0x55acb067ea44 in yyrestart(_IO_FILE*, void*) filter/filter-lexer.cpp:1824 #4 0x55acb0649a43 in filter_parser_ctx_alloc(_IO_FILE*) filter/filter-parser.ypp:271 #5 0x55acb0649e7f in filter_parser_ctx_create_from_filter_expression(char const*, filter_parser_ctx**) filter/filter-parser.ypp:332 #6 0x55acb058ee89 in parse_event_rule commands/add_trigger.cpp:783 #7 0x55acb05920c0 in handle_condition_event commands/add_trigger.cpp:1361 #8 0x55acb0592739 in parse_condition commands/add_trigger.cpp:1457 #9 0x55acb0596b56 in cmd_add_trigger(int, char const**) commands/add_trigger.cpp:2304 #10 0x55acb05a5b80 in handle_command /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng/lttng.cpp:238 #11 0x55acb05a6643 in parse_args /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng/lttng.cpp:427 #12 0x55acb05a694a in main /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng/lttng.cpp:476 #13 0x7f95ef28730f in __libc_start_call_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2d30f) Signed-off-by: Jérémie Galarneau <[email protected]> Change-Id: I6fa21e7d066e0cf48afc3f91ceefbfd19c6b86fd

==1769573==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 24 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7fef37a29fb9 in __interceptor_calloc /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:154 #1 0x7fef37792f2f in zmalloc_internal ../../../src/common/macros.hpp:60 #2 0x7fef3779573a in lttng_rotation_schedules* zmalloc<lttng_rotation_schedules>() ../../../src/common/macros.hpp:89 #3 0x7fef377947cc in lttng_rotation_schedules_create /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/lib/lttng-ctl/rotate.cpp:353 #4 0x7fef37794aa0 in get_schedules /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/lib/lttng-ctl/rotate.cpp:392 #5 0x7fef377956dc in lttng_session_list_rotation_schedules /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/lib/lttng-ctl/rotate.cpp:665 #6 0x5646131713f2 in test_add_list_remove_schedule /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/tests/regression/tools/rotation/schedule_api.c:252 #7 0x56461317157b in test_add_list_remove_size_schedule /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/tests/regression/tools/rotation/schedule_api.c:270 #8 0x564613171680 in main /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/tests/regression/tools/rotation/schedule_api.c:307 #9 0x7fef373ae30f in __libc_start_call_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2d30f) Signed-off-by: Jérémie Galarneau <[email protected]> Change-Id: I9b7eb537d158791db76f9a7676ffeb5d4a1f2203

==1801304==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 224 byte(s) in 2 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7fe0f4e73fb9 in __interceptor_calloc /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:154 #1 0x559fbeb64175 in zmalloc_internal ../../src/common/macros.hpp:60 #2 0x559fbeb6a291 in lttng_trigger* zmalloc<lttng_trigger>() ../../src/common/macros.hpp:89 #3 0x559fbeb64aa6 in lttng_trigger_create /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/common/trigger.cpp:58 #4 0x559fbe9dc417 in subscribe_session_consumed_size_rotation(ltt_session*, unsigned long, notification_thread_handle*) /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/rotate.cpp:87 #5 0x559fbe995d6f in cmd_rotation_set_schedule(ltt_session*, bool, lttng_rotation_schedule_type, unsigned long, notification_thread_handle*) /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/cmd.cpp:5993 #6 0x559fbe9fe559 in process_client_msg /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/client.cpp:2246 #7 0x559fbea01378 in thread_manage_clients /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/client.cpp:2624 #8 0x559fbe9ea642 in launch_thread /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/thread.cpp:68 #9 0x7fe0f44935c1 in start_thread (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x8d5c1) Indirect leak of 208 byte(s) in 2 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7fe0f4e73fb9 in __interceptor_calloc /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:154 #1 0x559fbeb16e21 in zmalloc_internal ../../src/common/macros.hpp:60 #2 0x559fbeb16e31 in lttng_action_notify* zmalloc<lttng_action_notify>() ../../src/common/macros.hpp:89 #3 0x559fbeb168a0 in lttng_action_notify_create actions/notify.cpp:135 #4 0x559fbe9dc34b in subscribe_session_consumed_size_rotation(ltt_session*, unsigned long, notification_thread_handle*) /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/rotate.cpp:80 #5 0x559fbe995d6f in cmd_rotation_set_schedule(ltt_session*, bool, lttng_rotation_schedule_type, unsigned long, notification_thread_handle*) /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/cmd.cpp:5993 #6 0x559fbe9fe559 in process_client_msg /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/client.cpp:2246 #7 0x559fbea01378 in thread_manage_clients /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/client.cpp:2624 #8 0x559fbe9ea642 in launch_thread /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/thread.cpp:68 #9 0x7fe0f44935c1 in start_thread (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x8d5c1) Indirect leak of 160 byte(s) in 2 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7fe0f4e73fb9 in __interceptor_calloc /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:154 #1 0x559fbeb3d7a1 in zmalloc_internal ../../src/common/macros.hpp:60 #2 0x559fbeb3fa35 in lttng_condition_session_consumed_size* zmalloc<lttng_condition_session_consumed_size>() ../../src/common/macros.hpp:89 #3 0x559fbeb3e6fd in lttng_condition_session_consumed_size_create conditions/session-consumed-size.cpp:206 #4 0x559fbe9dc0f1 in subscribe_session_consumed_size_rotation(ltt_session*, unsigned long, notification_thread_handle*) /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/rotate.cpp:54 #5 0x559fbe995d6f in cmd_rotation_set_schedule(ltt_session*, bool, lttng_rotation_schedule_type, unsigned long, notification_thread_handle*) /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/cmd.cpp:5993 #6 0x559fbe9fe559 in process_client_msg /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/client.cpp:2246 #7 0x559fbea01378 in thread_manage_clients /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/client.cpp:2624 #8 0x559fbe9ea642 in launch_thread /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/thread.cpp:68 #9 0x7fe0f44935c1 in start_thread (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x8d5c1) Indirect leak of 112 byte(s) in 2 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7fe0f4e73fb9 in __interceptor_calloc /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:154 #1 0x559fbeb242ad in zmalloc_internal ../../src/common/macros.hpp:60 #2 0x559fbeb27062 in zmalloc<(anonymous namespace)::lttng_rate_policy_every_n> ../../src/common/macros.hpp:89 #3 0x559fbeb25e9f in lttng_rate_policy_every_n_create actions/rate-policy.cpp:492 #4 0x559fbeb168b9 in lttng_action_notify_create actions/notify.cpp:141 #5 0x559fbe9dc34b in subscribe_session_consumed_size_rotation(ltt_session*, unsigned long, notification_thread_handle*) /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/rotate.cpp:80 #6 0x559fbe995d6f in cmd_rotation_set_schedule(ltt_session*, bool, lttng_rotation_schedule_type, unsigned long, notification_thread_handle*) /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/cmd.cpp:5993 #7 0x559fbe9fe559 in process_client_msg /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/client.cpp:2246 #8 0x559fbea01378 in thread_manage_clients /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/client.cpp:2624 #9 0x559fbe9ea642 in launch_thread /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/thread.cpp:68 #10 0x7fe0f44935c1 in start_thread (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x8d5c1) Indirect leak of 34 byte(s) in 2 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7fe0f4e19319 in __interceptor_strdup /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_interceptors.cpp:454 #1 0x559fbeb3f603 in lttng_condition_session_consumed_size_set_session_name conditions/session-consumed-size.cpp:442 #2 0x559fbe9dc2c4 in subscribe_session_consumed_size_rotation(ltt_session*, unsigned long, notification_thread_handle*) /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/rotate.cpp:71 #3 0x559fbe995d6f in cmd_rotation_set_schedule(ltt_session*, bool, lttng_rotation_schedule_type, unsigned long, notification_thread_handle*) /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/cmd.cpp:5993 #4 0x559fbe9fe559 in process_client_msg /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/client.cpp:2246 #5 0x559fbea01378 in thread_manage_clients /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/client.cpp:2624 #6 0x559fbe9ea642 in launch_thread /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/thread.cpp:68 #7 0x7fe0f44935c1 in start_thread (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x8d5c1) The rotation trigger of a session (used for size-based rotations) is never cleaned-up. It is now cleaned up every time its condition is hit and whenever the session is destroyed. Signed-off-by: Jérémie Galarneau <[email protected]> Change-Id: I5a89341535f87b7851b548ded9838c18bd1ccb95

LeakSanitizer reports the following leak: ==974957==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 32 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7fdb86fcd1b2 in __interceptor_realloc /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:164 #1 0x7fdb86d7c296 in lttng_dynamic_buffer_set_capacity(lttng_dynamic_buffer*, unsigned long) /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/common/dynamic-buffer.cpp:159 #2 0x7fdb86d7c060 in lttng_dynamic_buffer_set_size(lttng_dynamic_buffer*, unsigned long) /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/common/dynamic-buffer.cpp:112 #3 0x7fdb86d2589a in recv_payload_sessiond /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/lib/lttng-ctl/lttng-ctl.cpp:230 #4 0x7fdb86d26fa5 in lttng_ctl_ask_sessiond_payload(lttng_payload_view*, lttng_payload*) /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/lib/lttng-ctl/lttng-ctl.cpp:662 #5 0x7fdb86d2cd8d in lttng_list_tracepoint_fields /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/lib/lttng-ctl/lttng-ctl.cpp:1767 #6 0x56481623cb4c in list_ust_event_fields commands/list.cpp:850 #7 0x5648162448d9 in cmd_list(int, char const**) commands/list.cpp:2394 #8 0x56481628fb3e in handle_command /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng/lttng.cpp:238 #9 0x564816290601 in parse_args /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng/lttng.cpp:427 #10 0x564816290908 in main /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng/lttng.cpp:476 #11 0x7fdb8661730f in __libc_start_call_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2d30f) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 32 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s). The session daemon's reply is indeed never released in lttng_list_tracepoint_fields. Signed-off-by: Jérémie Galarneau <[email protected]> Change-Id: Idd244b52a69f3b74e5c131c1c36c6ee6d76f4285

==1429021==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 8 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7fe305f031b2 in __interceptor_realloc /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:164 #1 0x559f1b022238 in lttng_dynamic_buffer_set_capacity(lttng_dynamic_buffer*, unsigned long) /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/common/dynamic-buffer.cpp:159 #2 0x559f1b021d9f in lttng_dynamic_buffer_append(lttng_dynamic_buffer*, void const*, unsigned long) /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/common/dynamic-buffer.cpp:52 #3 0x559f1b02144a in lttng_dynamic_array_add_element(lttng_dynamic_array*, void const*) /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/common/dynamic-array.cpp:58 #4 0x559f1b07d07b in lttng_action_path_copy(lttng_action_path const*, lttng_action_path*) actions/path.cpp:116 #5 0x559f1b02383f in lttng_error_query_action_create /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/common/error-query.cpp:232 #6 0x559f1b02760e in lttng_error_query_create_from_payload(lttng_payload_view*, lttng_error_query**) /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/common/error-query.cpp:911 #7 0x559f1af5c361 in receive_lttng_error_query /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/client.cpp:740 #8 0x559f1af64eba in process_client_msg /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/client.cpp:2336 #9 0x559f1af67378 in thread_manage_clients /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/client.cpp:2624 #10 0x559f1af50642 in launch_thread /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/thread.cpp:68 #11 0x7fe3055225c1 in start_thread (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x8d5c1) Signed-off-by: Jérémie Galarneau <[email protected]> Change-Id: I7a6f7d2a9746124581eebf30877466f16db67a6b

==1501334==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Indirect leak of 16386 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f95efc3cdd9 in __interceptor_malloc /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:145 #1 0x55acb0681ed3 in lttng_filter_yyalloc(unsigned long, void*) filter/filter-lexer.cpp:2511 #2 0x55acb067f2f2 in lttng_filter_yy_create_buffer(_IO_FILE*, int, void*) filter/filter-lexer.cpp:1895 #3 0x55acb067ea44 in yyrestart(_IO_FILE*, void*) filter/filter-lexer.cpp:1824 #4 0x55acb0649a43 in filter_parser_ctx_alloc(_IO_FILE*) filter/filter-parser.ypp:271 #5 0x55acb0649e7f in filter_parser_ctx_create_from_filter_expression(char const*, filter_parser_ctx**) filter/filter-parser.ypp:332 #6 0x55acb058ee89 in parse_event_rule commands/add_trigger.cpp:783 #7 0x55acb05920c0 in handle_condition_event commands/add_trigger.cpp:1361 #8 0x55acb0592739 in parse_condition commands/add_trigger.cpp:1457 #9 0x55acb0596b56 in cmd_add_trigger(int, char const**) commands/add_trigger.cpp:2304 #10 0x55acb05a5b80 in handle_command /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng/lttng.cpp:238 #11 0x55acb05a6643 in parse_args /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng/lttng.cpp:427 #12 0x55acb05a694a in main /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng/lttng.cpp:476 #13 0x7f95ef28730f in __libc_start_call_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2d30f) Signed-off-by: Jérémie Galarneau <[email protected]> Change-Id: I6fa21e7d066e0cf48afc3f91ceefbfd19c6b86fd

==1769573==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 24 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7fef37a29fb9 in __interceptor_calloc /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:154 #1 0x7fef37792f2f in zmalloc_internal ../../../src/common/macros.hpp:60 #2 0x7fef3779573a in lttng_rotation_schedules* zmalloc<lttng_rotation_schedules>() ../../../src/common/macros.hpp:89 #3 0x7fef377947cc in lttng_rotation_schedules_create /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/lib/lttng-ctl/rotate.cpp:353 #4 0x7fef37794aa0 in get_schedules /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/lib/lttng-ctl/rotate.cpp:392 #5 0x7fef377956dc in lttng_session_list_rotation_schedules /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/lib/lttng-ctl/rotate.cpp:665 #6 0x5646131713f2 in test_add_list_remove_schedule /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/tests/regression/tools/rotation/schedule_api.c:252 #7 0x56461317157b in test_add_list_remove_size_schedule /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/tests/regression/tools/rotation/schedule_api.c:270 #8 0x564613171680 in main /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/tests/regression/tools/rotation/schedule_api.c:307 #9 0x7fef373ae30f in __libc_start_call_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2d30f) Signed-off-by: Jérémie Galarneau <[email protected]> Change-Id: I9b7eb537d158791db76f9a7676ffeb5d4a1f2203

==1801304==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 224 byte(s) in 2 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7fe0f4e73fb9 in __interceptor_calloc /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:154 #1 0x559fbeb64175 in zmalloc_internal ../../src/common/macros.hpp:60 #2 0x559fbeb6a291 in lttng_trigger* zmalloc<lttng_trigger>() ../../src/common/macros.hpp:89 #3 0x559fbeb64aa6 in lttng_trigger_create /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/common/trigger.cpp:58 #4 0x559fbe9dc417 in subscribe_session_consumed_size_rotation(ltt_session*, unsigned long, notification_thread_handle*) /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/rotate.cpp:87 #5 0x559fbe995d6f in cmd_rotation_set_schedule(ltt_session*, bool, lttng_rotation_schedule_type, unsigned long, notification_thread_handle*) /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/cmd.cpp:5993 #6 0x559fbe9fe559 in process_client_msg /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/client.cpp:2246 #7 0x559fbea01378 in thread_manage_clients /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/client.cpp:2624 #8 0x559fbe9ea642 in launch_thread /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/thread.cpp:68 #9 0x7fe0f44935c1 in start_thread (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x8d5c1) Indirect leak of 208 byte(s) in 2 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7fe0f4e73fb9 in __interceptor_calloc /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:154 #1 0x559fbeb16e21 in zmalloc_internal ../../src/common/macros.hpp:60 #2 0x559fbeb16e31 in lttng_action_notify* zmalloc<lttng_action_notify>() ../../src/common/macros.hpp:89 #3 0x559fbeb168a0 in lttng_action_notify_create actions/notify.cpp:135 #4 0x559fbe9dc34b in subscribe_session_consumed_size_rotation(ltt_session*, unsigned long, notification_thread_handle*) /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/rotate.cpp:80 #5 0x559fbe995d6f in cmd_rotation_set_schedule(ltt_session*, bool, lttng_rotation_schedule_type, unsigned long, notification_thread_handle*) /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/cmd.cpp:5993 #6 0x559fbe9fe559 in process_client_msg /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/client.cpp:2246 #7 0x559fbea01378 in thread_manage_clients /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/client.cpp:2624 #8 0x559fbe9ea642 in launch_thread /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/thread.cpp:68 #9 0x7fe0f44935c1 in start_thread (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x8d5c1) Indirect leak of 160 byte(s) in 2 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7fe0f4e73fb9 in __interceptor_calloc /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:154 #1 0x559fbeb3d7a1 in zmalloc_internal ../../src/common/macros.hpp:60 #2 0x559fbeb3fa35 in lttng_condition_session_consumed_size* zmalloc<lttng_condition_session_consumed_size>() ../../src/common/macros.hpp:89 #3 0x559fbeb3e6fd in lttng_condition_session_consumed_size_create conditions/session-consumed-size.cpp:206 #4 0x559fbe9dc0f1 in subscribe_session_consumed_size_rotation(ltt_session*, unsigned long, notification_thread_handle*) /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/rotate.cpp:54 #5 0x559fbe995d6f in cmd_rotation_set_schedule(ltt_session*, bool, lttng_rotation_schedule_type, unsigned long, notification_thread_handle*) /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/cmd.cpp:5993 #6 0x559fbe9fe559 in process_client_msg /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/client.cpp:2246 #7 0x559fbea01378 in thread_manage_clients /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/client.cpp:2624 #8 0x559fbe9ea642 in launch_thread /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/thread.cpp:68 #9 0x7fe0f44935c1 in start_thread (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x8d5c1) Indirect leak of 112 byte(s) in 2 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7fe0f4e73fb9 in __interceptor_calloc /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:154 #1 0x559fbeb242ad in zmalloc_internal ../../src/common/macros.hpp:60 #2 0x559fbeb27062 in zmalloc<(anonymous namespace)::lttng_rate_policy_every_n> ../../src/common/macros.hpp:89 #3 0x559fbeb25e9f in lttng_rate_policy_every_n_create actions/rate-policy.cpp:492 #4 0x559fbeb168b9 in lttng_action_notify_create actions/notify.cpp:141 #5 0x559fbe9dc34b in subscribe_session_consumed_size_rotation(ltt_session*, unsigned long, notification_thread_handle*) /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/rotate.cpp:80 #6 0x559fbe995d6f in cmd_rotation_set_schedule(ltt_session*, bool, lttng_rotation_schedule_type, unsigned long, notification_thread_handle*) /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/cmd.cpp:5993 #7 0x559fbe9fe559 in process_client_msg /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/client.cpp:2246 #8 0x559fbea01378 in thread_manage_clients /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/client.cpp:2624 #9 0x559fbe9ea642 in launch_thread /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/thread.cpp:68 #10 0x7fe0f44935c1 in start_thread (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x8d5c1) Indirect leak of 34 byte(s) in 2 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7fe0f4e19319 in __interceptor_strdup /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_interceptors.cpp:454 #1 0x559fbeb3f603 in lttng_condition_session_consumed_size_set_session_name conditions/session-consumed-size.cpp:442 #2 0x559fbe9dc2c4 in subscribe_session_consumed_size_rotation(ltt_session*, unsigned long, notification_thread_handle*) /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/rotate.cpp:71 #3 0x559fbe995d6f in cmd_rotation_set_schedule(ltt_session*, bool, lttng_rotation_schedule_type, unsigned long, notification_thread_handle*) /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/cmd.cpp:5993 #4 0x559fbe9fe559 in process_client_msg /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/client.cpp:2246 #5 0x559fbea01378 in thread_manage_clients /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/client.cpp:2624 #6 0x559fbe9ea642 in launch_thread /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/thread.cpp:68 #7 0x7fe0f44935c1 in start_thread (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x8d5c1) The rotation trigger of a session (used for size-based rotations) is never cleaned-up. It is now cleaned up every time its condition is hit and whenever the session is destroyed. Signed-off-by: Jérémie Galarneau <[email protected]> Change-Id: I5a89341535f87b7851b548ded9838c18bd1ccb95

==1769573==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 24 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7fef37a29fb9 in __interceptor_calloc /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:154 #1 0x7fef37792f2f in zmalloc_internal ../../../src/common/macros.hpp:60 #2 0x7fef3779573a in lttng_rotation_schedules* zmalloc<lttng_rotation_schedules>() ../../../src/common/macros.hpp:89 #3 0x7fef377947cc in lttng_rotation_schedules_create /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/lib/lttng-ctl/rotate.cpp:353 #4 0x7fef37794aa0 in get_schedules /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/lib/lttng-ctl/rotate.cpp:392 #5 0x7fef377956dc in lttng_session_list_rotation_schedules /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/lib/lttng-ctl/rotate.cpp:665 #6 0x5646131713f2 in test_add_list_remove_schedule /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/tests/regression/tools/rotation/schedule_api.c:252 #7 0x56461317157b in test_add_list_remove_size_schedule /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/tests/regression/tools/rotation/schedule_api.c:270 #8 0x564613171680 in main /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/tests/regression/tools/rotation/schedule_api.c:307 #9 0x7fef373ae30f in __libc_start_call_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2d30f) Signed-off-by: Jérémie Galarneau <[email protected]> Change-Id: I9b7eb537d158791db76f9a7676ffeb5d4a1f2203

==1801304==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 224 byte(s) in 2 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7fe0f4e73fb9 in __interceptor_calloc /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:154 #1 0x559fbeb64175 in zmalloc_internal ../../src/common/macros.hpp:60 #2 0x559fbeb6a291 in lttng_trigger* zmalloc<lttng_trigger>() ../../src/common/macros.hpp:89 #3 0x559fbeb64aa6 in lttng_trigger_create /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/common/trigger.cpp:58 #4 0x559fbe9dc417 in subscribe_session_consumed_size_rotation(ltt_session*, unsigned long, notification_thread_handle*) /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/rotate.cpp:87 #5 0x559fbe995d6f in cmd_rotation_set_schedule(ltt_session*, bool, lttng_rotation_schedule_type, unsigned long, notification_thread_handle*) /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/cmd.cpp:5993 #6 0x559fbe9fe559 in process_client_msg /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/client.cpp:2246 #7 0x559fbea01378 in thread_manage_clients /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/client.cpp:2624 #8 0x559fbe9ea642 in launch_thread /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/thread.cpp:68 #9 0x7fe0f44935c1 in start_thread (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x8d5c1) Indirect leak of 208 byte(s) in 2 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7fe0f4e73fb9 in __interceptor_calloc /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:154 #1 0x559fbeb16e21 in zmalloc_internal ../../src/common/macros.hpp:60 #2 0x559fbeb16e31 in lttng_action_notify* zmalloc<lttng_action_notify>() ../../src/common/macros.hpp:89 #3 0x559fbeb168a0 in lttng_action_notify_create actions/notify.cpp:135 #4 0x559fbe9dc34b in subscribe_session_consumed_size_rotation(ltt_session*, unsigned long, notification_thread_handle*) /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/rotate.cpp:80 #5 0x559fbe995d6f in cmd_rotation_set_schedule(ltt_session*, bool, lttng_rotation_schedule_type, unsigned long, notification_thread_handle*) /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/cmd.cpp:5993 #6 0x559fbe9fe559 in process_client_msg /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/client.cpp:2246 #7 0x559fbea01378 in thread_manage_clients /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/client.cpp:2624 #8 0x559fbe9ea642 in launch_thread /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/thread.cpp:68 #9 0x7fe0f44935c1 in start_thread (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x8d5c1) Indirect leak of 160 byte(s) in 2 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7fe0f4e73fb9 in __interceptor_calloc /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:154 #1 0x559fbeb3d7a1 in zmalloc_internal ../../src/common/macros.hpp:60 #2 0x559fbeb3fa35 in lttng_condition_session_consumed_size* zmalloc<lttng_condition_session_consumed_size>() ../../src/common/macros.hpp:89 #3 0x559fbeb3e6fd in lttng_condition_session_consumed_size_create conditions/session-consumed-size.cpp:206 #4 0x559fbe9dc0f1 in subscribe_session_consumed_size_rotation(ltt_session*, unsigned long, notification_thread_handle*) /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/rotate.cpp:54 #5 0x559fbe995d6f in cmd_rotation_set_schedule(ltt_session*, bool, lttng_rotation_schedule_type, unsigned long, notification_thread_handle*) /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/cmd.cpp:5993 #6 0x559fbe9fe559 in process_client_msg /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/client.cpp:2246 #7 0x559fbea01378 in thread_manage_clients /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/client.cpp:2624 #8 0x559fbe9ea642 in launch_thread /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/thread.cpp:68 #9 0x7fe0f44935c1 in start_thread (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x8d5c1) Indirect leak of 112 byte(s) in 2 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7fe0f4e73fb9 in __interceptor_calloc /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:154 #1 0x559fbeb242ad in zmalloc_internal ../../src/common/macros.hpp:60 #2 0x559fbeb27062 in zmalloc<(anonymous namespace)::lttng_rate_policy_every_n> ../../src/common/macros.hpp:89 #3 0x559fbeb25e9f in lttng_rate_policy_every_n_create actions/rate-policy.cpp:492 #4 0x559fbeb168b9 in lttng_action_notify_create actions/notify.cpp:141 #5 0x559fbe9dc34b in subscribe_session_consumed_size_rotation(ltt_session*, unsigned long, notification_thread_handle*) /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/rotate.cpp:80 #6 0x559fbe995d6f in cmd_rotation_set_schedule(ltt_session*, bool, lttng_rotation_schedule_type, unsigned long, notification_thread_handle*) /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/cmd.cpp:5993 #7 0x559fbe9fe559 in process_client_msg /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/client.cpp:2246 #8 0x559fbea01378 in thread_manage_clients /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/client.cpp:2624 #9 0x559fbe9ea642 in launch_thread /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/thread.cpp:68 #10 0x7fe0f44935c1 in start_thread (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x8d5c1) Indirect leak of 34 byte(s) in 2 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7fe0f4e19319 in __interceptor_strdup /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_interceptors.cpp:454 #1 0x559fbeb3f603 in lttng_condition_session_consumed_size_set_session_name conditions/session-consumed-size.cpp:442 #2 0x559fbe9dc2c4 in subscribe_session_consumed_size_rotation(ltt_session*, unsigned long, notification_thread_handle*) /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/rotate.cpp:71 #3 0x559fbe995d6f in cmd_rotation_set_schedule(ltt_session*, bool, lttng_rotation_schedule_type, unsigned long, notification_thread_handle*) /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/cmd.cpp:5993 #4 0x559fbe9fe559 in process_client_msg /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/client.cpp:2246 #5 0x559fbea01378 in thread_manage_clients /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/client.cpp:2624 #6 0x559fbe9ea642 in launch_thread /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/thread.cpp:68 #7 0x7fe0f44935c1 in start_thread (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x8d5c1) The rotation trigger of a session (used for size-based rotations) is never cleaned-up. It is now cleaned up every time its condition is hit and whenever the session is destroyed. Signed-off-by: Jérémie Galarneau <[email protected]> Change-Id: I5a89341535f87b7851b548ded9838c18bd1ccb95

Observed issue ============== While a snapshot is being taken, the containing folder can disappear unexpectedly. This can lead to the following errors, which are expected and mostly handled fine: PERROR - 14:47:32.002564464 [2922498/2922507]: Failed to open file relative to trace chunk file_path = "channel0_0", flags = 577, mode = 432: No such file or directory (in _lttng_trace_chunk_open_fs_handle_locked() at trace-chunk.cpp:1411) Error: Failed to open stream file "channel0_0" Error: Snapshot channel failed The problem happens on the subsequent snapshot for the session: #0 __GI_raise (sig=sig@entry=6) at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/raise.c:50 #1 0x00007fbbdadb3859 in __GI_abort () at abort.c:79 #2 0x00007fbbdadb3729 in __assert_fail_base (fmt=0x7fbbdaf49588 "%s%s%s:%u: %s%sAssertion `%s' failed.\n%n", assertion=0x55c4212cfbb5 "!stream->trace_chunk", file=0x55c4212cf820 "kernel-co #3 0x00007fbbdadc5006 in __GI___assert_fail (assertion=0x55c4212cfbb5 "!stream->trace_chunk", file=0x55c4212cf820 "kernel-consumer/kernel-consumer.cpp", line=188, function=0x55c4212cfb00 " #4 0x000055c421268cc6 in lttng_kconsumer_snapshot_channel (channel=0x7fbbc4000b60, key=1, path=0x7fbbd37f8fd4 "", relayd_id=18446744073709551615, nb_packets_per_stream=0) at kernel-consume #5 0x000055c42126b39d in lttng_kconsumer_recv_cmd (ctx=0x55c421b80a90, sock=31, consumer_sockpoll=0x7fbbd37fd280) at kernel-consumer/kernel-consumer.cpp:986 #6 0x000055c4212546d1 in lttng_consumer_recv_cmd (ctx=0x55c421b80a90, sock=31, consumer_sockpoll=0x7fbbd37fd280) at consumer/consumer.cpp:2090 #7 0x000055c421259963 in consumer_thread_sessiond_poll (data=0x55c421b80a90) at consumer/consumer.cpp:3281 #8 0x00007fbbdaf8b609 in start_thread (arg=<optimized out>) at pthread_create.c:477 #9 0x00007fbbdaeb0163 in clone () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone.S:95 How to reproduce: 1. Setting a breakpoint on snapshot_channel() inside src/common/ust-consumer/ust-consumer.cpp 2. When the breakpoint hits, remove the the complete lttng directory containing the session data. 3. Continue the lttng_consumerd process from gdb. 4. In that case you see a negative return value -1 from consumer_stream_create_output_files() inside snapshot_channel(). 5. Take another snapshot and lttng_consumerd crashes because of the `assert(!stream->trace_chunk)` in snapshot_channel(). This last action does not require any breakpoint intervention. Cause ===== During the snapshot, the stream is assigned the channel current chunk. It is expected that the stream does not have a chunk at this point. The error handling is faulty here, the stream chunk must be invalidated/reset on error to allow its reuse later on. The problem exists for both consumer domains (user/kernel). Solution ======== For the ust consumer, we can directly use the `error_close_stream` label. For the kernel consumer, the code path is slightly different since it does not uses `consumer_stream_close`. Note that `consumer_stream_close` cannot be used as is for the kernel consumer. The current implementation partially resembles `consumer_stream_close` at the end of the iteration. It is extracted to its own function for easier reuse from the new `error_finalize_stream` label. Known drawbacks ========= None. Fixes: #1352 Signed-off-by: Marcel Hamer <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Rajotte <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jérémie Galarneau <[email protected]> Change-Id: I9fc81917b19aa436ed8e8679672648f2d5baf41a

When converting msgpack objects to their event_field_value equivalent, the following assertion fails: LTTNG_ASSERT(val); #4 0x00007f1f65349486 in __assert_fail () from /usr/lib/libc.so.6 #5 0x00007f1f65584da7 in lttng_event_field_value_string_create_with_size (val=0x0, size=0) at event-field-value.cpp:186 #6 0x00007f1f65576a1a in event_field_value_from_obj (obj=0x557f597ccdb8, field_val=0x7ffcc9675dd0) at conditions/event-rule-matches.cpp:1120 #7 0x00007f1f65577176 in event_field_value_from_capture_payload (condition=0x557f597c8520, capture_payload=0x557f597c825b "\221\240", capture_payload_size=2) at conditions/event-rule-matches.cpp:1340 #8 0x00007f1f655772ea in lttng_evaluation_event_rule_matches_create (condition=0x557f597c8520, capture_payload=0x557f597c825b "\221\240", capture_payload_size=2, decode_capture_payload=true) at conditions/event-rule-matches.cpp:1398 #9 0x00007f1f655765fc in lttng_evaluation_event_rule_matches_create_from_payload (condition=0x557f597c8520, view=0x7ffcc9675ff0, _evaluation=0x7ffcc9676080) at conditions/event-rule-matches.cpp:990 #10 0x00007f1f6557f273 in lttng_evaluation_create_from_payload (condition=0x557f597c8520, src_view=0x7ffcc9676100, evaluation=0x7ffcc9676080) at evaluation.cpp:120 #11 0x00007f1f6559ba36 in lttng_notification_create_from_payload (src_view=0x7ffcc9676190, notification=0x7ffcc9676180) at notification.cpp:123 #12 0x00007f1f65552577 in create_notification_from_current_message (channel=0x557f597c8ee0) at channel.cpp:124 #13 0x00007f1f6555298c in lttng_notification_channel_get_next_notification (channel=0x557f597c8ee0, _notification=0x7ffcc9676280) at channel.cpp:292 The msgpack API represents string as p-style while the implementation of event_field_value relies on null-terminated strings. When an empty string is captured by a tracer, it is decoded as a msgpack_object with `str = {size = 0, ptr = 0x0}`. lttng_event_field_value_string_create_with_size does not require a null-terminated string since it also receives the length. Hence, this fix causes lttng_event_field_value_string_create_with_size to accept null strings when their length is zero. A copy of an empty string is made to accomodate the null-termination convention used by the rest of that API. Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jérémie Galarneau <[email protected]> Change-Id: I7c3a839dbbeeb95a1b3bf6ddc3205a2f6b4538e3

Observed issue ============== While a snapshot is being taken, the containing folder can disappear unexpectedly. This can lead to the following errors, which are expected and mostly handled fine: PERROR - 14:47:32.002564464 [2922498/2922507]: Failed to open file relative to trace chunk file_path = "channel0_0", flags = 577, mode = 432: No such file or directory (in _lttng_trace_chunk_open_fs_handle_locked() at trace-chunk.cpp:1411) Error: Failed to open stream file "channel0_0" Error: Snapshot channel failed The problem happens on the subsequent snapshot for the session: #0 __GI_raise (sig=sig@entry=6) at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/raise.c:50 #1 0x00007fbbdadb3859 in __GI_abort () at abort.c:79 #2 0x00007fbbdadb3729 in __assert_fail_base (fmt=0x7fbbdaf49588 "%s%s%s:%u: %s%sAssertion `%s' failed.\n%n", assertion=0x55c4212cfbb5 "!stream->trace_chunk", file=0x55c4212cf820 "kernel-co #3 0x00007fbbdadc5006 in __GI___assert_fail (assertion=0x55c4212cfbb5 "!stream->trace_chunk", file=0x55c4212cf820 "kernel-consumer/kernel-consumer.cpp", line=188, function=0x55c4212cfb00 " #4 0x000055c421268cc6 in lttng_kconsumer_snapshot_channel (channel=0x7fbbc4000b60, key=1, path=0x7fbbd37f8fd4 "", relayd_id=18446744073709551615, nb_packets_per_stream=0) at kernel-consume #5 0x000055c42126b39d in lttng_kconsumer_recv_cmd (ctx=0x55c421b80a90, sock=31, consumer_sockpoll=0x7fbbd37fd280) at kernel-consumer/kernel-consumer.cpp:986 #6 0x000055c4212546d1 in lttng_consumer_recv_cmd (ctx=0x55c421b80a90, sock=31, consumer_sockpoll=0x7fbbd37fd280) at consumer/consumer.cpp:2090 #7 0x000055c421259963 in consumer_thread_sessiond_poll (data=0x55c421b80a90) at consumer/consumer.cpp:3281 #8 0x00007fbbdaf8b609 in start_thread (arg=<optimized out>) at pthread_create.c:477 #9 0x00007fbbdaeb0163 in clone () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone.S:95 How to reproduce: 1. Setting a breakpoint on snapshot_channel() inside src/common/ust-consumer/ust-consumer.cpp 2. When the breakpoint hits, remove the the complete lttng directory containing the session data. 3. Continue the lttng_consumerd process from gdb. 4. In that case you see a negative return value -1 from consumer_stream_create_output_files() inside snapshot_channel(). 5. Take another snapshot and lttng_consumerd crashes because of the `assert(!stream->trace_chunk)` in snapshot_channel(). This last action does not require any breakpoint intervention. Cause ===== During the snapshot, the stream is assigned the channel current chunk. It is expected that the stream does not have a chunk at this point. The error handling is faulty here, the stream chunk must be invalidated/reset on error to allow its reuse later on. The problem exists for both consumer domains (user/kernel). Solution ======== For the ust consumer, we can directly use the `error_close_stream` label. For the kernel consumer, the code path is slightly different since it does not uses `consumer_stream_close`. Note that `consumer_stream_close` cannot be used as is for the kernel consumer. The current implementation partially resembles `consumer_stream_close` at the end of the iteration. It is extracted to its own function for easier reuse from the new `error_finalize_stream` label. Known drawbacks ========= None. Fixes: #1352 Signed-off-by: Marcel Hamer <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Rajotte <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jérémie Galarneau <[email protected]> Change-Id: I9fc81917b19aa436ed8e8679672648f2d5baf41a

When converting msgpack objects to their event_field_value equivalent, the following assertion fails: LTTNG_ASSERT(val); #4 0x00007f1f65349486 in __assert_fail () from /usr/lib/libc.so.6 #5 0x00007f1f65584da7 in lttng_event_field_value_string_create_with_size (val=0x0, size=0) at event-field-value.cpp:186 #6 0x00007f1f65576a1a in event_field_value_from_obj (obj=0x557f597ccdb8, field_val=0x7ffcc9675dd0) at conditions/event-rule-matches.cpp:1120 #7 0x00007f1f65577176 in event_field_value_from_capture_payload (condition=0x557f597c8520, capture_payload=0x557f597c825b "\221\240", capture_payload_size=2) at conditions/event-rule-matches.cpp:1340 #8 0x00007f1f655772ea in lttng_evaluation_event_rule_matches_create (condition=0x557f597c8520, capture_payload=0x557f597c825b "\221\240", capture_payload_size=2, decode_capture_payload=true) at conditions/event-rule-matches.cpp:1398 #9 0x00007f1f655765fc in lttng_evaluation_event_rule_matches_create_from_payload (condition=0x557f597c8520, view=0x7ffcc9675ff0, _evaluation=0x7ffcc9676080) at conditions/event-rule-matches.cpp:990 #10 0x00007f1f6557f273 in lttng_evaluation_create_from_payload (condition=0x557f597c8520, src_view=0x7ffcc9676100, evaluation=0x7ffcc9676080) at evaluation.cpp:120 #11 0x00007f1f6559ba36 in lttng_notification_create_from_payload (src_view=0x7ffcc9676190, notification=0x7ffcc9676180) at notification.cpp:123 #12 0x00007f1f65552577 in create_notification_from_current_message (channel=0x557f597c8ee0) at channel.cpp:124 #13 0x00007f1f6555298c in lttng_notification_channel_get_next_notification (channel=0x557f597c8ee0, _notification=0x7ffcc9676280) at channel.cpp:292 The msgpack API represents string as p-style while the implementation of event_field_value relies on null-terminated strings. When an empty string is captured by a tracer, it is decoded as a msgpack_object with `str = {size = 0, ptr = 0x0}`. lttng_event_field_value_string_create_with_size does not require a null-terminated string since it also receives the length. Hence, this fix causes lttng_event_field_value_string_create_with_size to accept null strings when their length is zero. A copy of an empty string is made to accomodate the null-termination convention used by the rest of that API. Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jérémie Galarneau <[email protected]> Change-Id: I7c3a839dbbeeb95a1b3bf6ddc3205a2f6b4538e3

Issue observed -------------- When using the CLI to list the configuration of a session that has an event rule which makes use of multiple exclusions, the session daemon crashes with the following stack trace: (gdb) bt #0 0x00007fa9ed401445 in ?? () from /usr/lib/libc.so.6 #1 0x0000560cd5fc5199 in lttng_strnlen (str=0x615f6f6c6c6568 <error: Cannot access memory at address 0x615f6f6c6c6568>, max=256) at ../../src/common/compat/string.h:19 #2 0x0000560cd5fc6b39 in lttng_event_serialize (event=0x7fa9cc01d8b0, exclusion_count=2, exclusion_list=0x7fa9cc011794, filter_expression=0x0, bytecode_len=0, bytecode=0x0, payload=0x7fa9d3ffda88) at event.c:767 #3 0x0000560cd5f380b5 in list_lttng_ust_global_events (nb_events=<synthetic pointer>, reply_payload=0x7fa9d3ffda88, ust_global=<optimized out>, channel_name=<optimized out>) at cmd.c:472 #4 cmd_list_events (domain=<optimized out>, session=<optimized out>, channel_name=<optimized out>, reply_payload=0x7fa9d3ffda88) at cmd.c:3860 #5 0x0000560cd5f6d76a in process_client_msg (cmd_ctx=0x7fa9d3ffa710, sock=0x7fa9d3ffa5b0, sock_error=0x7fa9d3ffa5b4) at client.c:1890 #6 0x0000560cd5f6f876 in thread_manage_clients (data=0x560cd7879490) at client.c:2629 #7 0x0000560cd5f65a54 in launch_thread (data=0x560cd7879500) at thread.c:66 #8 0x00007fa9ed32d44b in ?? () from /usr/lib/libc.so.6 #9 0x00007fa9ed3b0e40 in ?? () from /usr/lib/libc.so.6 Cause ----- lttng_event_serialize expects a `char **` list of exclusion names, as provided by the other callsite in liblttng-ctl. However, the callsite in list_lttng_ust_global_events passes pointer to the exclusions as stored in lttng_event_exclusion. lttng_event_exclusion contains an array of fixed-length strings (with a stride of 256 bytes) which isn't an expected layout for lttng_event_serialize. Solution -------- A temporary array of pointers is constructed before invoking lttng_event_serialize to construct a list of exclusions with the layout that lttng_event_serialize expects. The array itself is reused for all events, limiting the number of allocations. Note ---- None. Change-Id: I266a1cc9e9f18e0476177a0047b1d8f468110575 Signed-off-by: Jérémie Galarneau <[email protected]>

Issue observed -------------- When running the session daemon under ASAN, the following report is produced: Direct leak of 104 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f93866e0cd1 in __interceptor_calloc /usr/src/debug/gcc/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:77 #1 0x55c55a7c4963 in zmalloc_internal /home/simark/src/lttng-tools/src/common/macros.hpp:60 #2 0x55c55a7c4973 in lttng_pipe* zmalloc<lttng_pipe>() /home/simark/src/lttng-tools/src/common/macros.hpp:88 #3 0x55c55a7c26eb in _pipe_create /home/simark/src/lttng-tools/src/common/pipe.cpp:111 #4 0x55c55a7c351d in lttng_pipe_open(int) /home/simark/src/lttng-tools/src/common/pipe.cpp:185 #5 0x55c55a586dd6 in operator() /home/simark/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/rotation-thread.cpp:403 #6 0x55c55a58744a in lttng::sessiond::rotation_thread::rotation_thread(lttng::sessiond::rotation_thread_timer_queue&, notification_thread_handle&) /home/simark/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/rotation-thread.cpp:402 #7 0x55c55a46377f in std::unique_ptr<lttng::sessiond::rotation_thread, std::default_delete<lttng::sessiond::rotation_thread> > lttng::make_unique<lttng::sessiond::rotation_thread, lttng::sessiond::rotation_thread_timer_queue&, notification_thread_handle&>(lttng::sessiond::rotation_thread_timer_queue&, notification_thread_handle&) /home/simark/src/lttng-tools/src/common/make-unique.hpp:18 #8 0x55c55a455024 in _main /home/simark/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/main.cpp:1773 #9 0x55c55a455c2e in main /home/simark/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/main.cpp:1982 #10 0x7f9385c1484f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2384f) (BuildId: 2f005a79cd1a8e385972f5a102f16adba414d75e) Cause ----- On destruction, the std::unique_ptr wrapper of lttng_pipe (lttng_pipe::uptr) invokes `lttng_pipe_close` (which only closes the file descriptors of the underlying pipe) rather than `lttng_pipe_destroy` which closes the file descriptors _and_ frees the memory allocated by lttng_open. Currently, the rotation thread is the only user of this wrapper (through its quit_pipe). Solution -------- The deleter of lttng_pipe::uptr is replaced to invoke lttng_pipe_destroy. Fixes #1380 Signed-off-by: Jérémie Galarneau <[email protected]> Change-Id: I5715ac6131c5aa134cfd18d8b677f31aabed36f0

Issue observed -------------- ASAN reports the following leak when running the tests/regression/tools/context/test_ust.py test suite: Direct leak of 8 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f32e5ae0cd1 in __interceptor_calloc /usr/src/debug/gcc/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:77 #1 0x5653e1092088 in zmalloc_internal ../../../src/common/macros.hpp:60 #2 0x5653e10922b3 in char* calloc<char>(unsigned long) string-utils/../macros.hpp:113 #3 0x5653e119d68f in get_context_type commands/add_context.cpp:1012 #4 0x5653e119ddf5 in cmd_add_context(int, char const**) commands/add_context.cpp:1059 #5 0x5653e11e12e7 in handle_command /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng/lttng.cpp:237 #6 0x5653e11e2027 in parse_args /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng/lttng.cpp:427 #7 0x5653e11e24e1 in _main /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng/lttng.cpp:474 #8 0x5653e11e25bd in main /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng/lttng.cpp:485 #9 0x7f32e3e3984f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2384f) (BuildId: 2f005a79cd1a8e385972f5a102f16adba414d75e) Direct leak of 5 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f32e5ae0cd1 in __interceptor_calloc /usr/src/debug/gcc/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:77 #1 0x5653e1092088 in zmalloc_internal ../../../src/common/macros.hpp:60 #2 0x5653e10922b3 in char* calloc<char>(unsigned long) string-utils/../macros.hpp:113 #3 0x5653e119d2ae in get_context_type commands/add_context.cpp:1003 #4 0x5653e119ddf5 in cmd_add_context(int, char const**) commands/add_context.cpp:1059 #5 0x5653e11e12e7 in handle_command /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng/lttng.cpp:237 #6 0x5653e11e2027 in parse_args /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng/lttng.cpp:427 #7 0x5653e11e24e1 in _main /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng/lttng.cpp:474 #8 0x5653e11e25bd in main /home/jgalar/EfficiOS/src/lttng-tools/src/bin/lttng/lttng.cpp:485 #9 0x7f32e3e3984f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2384f) (BuildId: 2f005a79cd1a8e385972f5a102f16adba414d75e) Cause ----- The context and provider names are dynamically allocated by get_context_type() and stored in ctx_type. However, destroy_ctx_type() never frees those members when the structure is of type CONTEXT_APP_CONTEXT. Solution -------- Free both names when an application context type is destroyed. Signed-off-by: Jérémie Galarneau <[email protected]> Change-Id: I86dde1eed9f0cc63499c936cf373b094168035e2

PSRCode added 7 commits April 11, 2015 00:36

Mi: track/untrack/listing

7c8e569

Signed-off-by: Jonathan Rajotte <[email protected]>

Save/load: pid_tracker feature.

a3c343e

Xml schema updated Signed-off-by: Jonathan Rajotte <[email protected]>

Mi: track/untrack: validation

56303f7

Signed-off-by: Jonathan Rajotte <[email protected]>

Util: xml_extract: add node_exist option

9ce9441

The node_exist argument permit a more flexible way to extract informations within test suites. We can check the presence of a node and not only list the content of a final node. Signed-off-by: Jonathan Rajotte <[email protected]>

Test: mi: track/untrack feature

254e2bf

Signed-off-by: Jonathan Rajotte <[email protected]>

Test: save/load: pid_tracker basic test

ba697f1

Signed-off-by: Jonathan Rajotte <[email protected]>

Cleanup: reuse tracker* element from config

5a07a54

Also removed some dead code. Signed-off-by: Jonathan Rajotte <[email protected]>

PSRCode closed this Jun 22, 2015

jgalar pushed a commit to jgalar/lttng-tools that referenced this pull request Apr 4, 2018

Fix: destroy schedule attr

4b7e956

CID 1388095 (lttng#9-14 of 14): Resource leak (RESOURCE_LEAK) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Rajotte <[email protected]>

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Mi and save/load support of pid_tracker #9

Mi and save/load support of pid_tracker #9

PSRCode commented Apr 24, 2015

Mi and save/load support of pid_tracker #9

Mi and save/load support of pid_tracker #9

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PSRCode commented Apr 24, 2015