qubes init script and improved TPM disk encryption with LUKS headers …

…(issue #123 and #6)

config/x230-qubes.config

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 # Configuration for a x230 running Qubes OS
 BOARD=x230
+
 CONFIG_CRYPTSETUP=y
 CONFIG_FLASHROM=y
 CONFIG_GPG=y
@@ -15,3 +16,9 @@ CONFIG_XEN=y
 
 CONFIG_LINUX_USB=y
 CONFIG_LINUX_E1000E=y
+
+CONFIG_BOOTSCRIPT=/bin/qubes-init
+
+# Disks encrypted by the TPM LUKS key
+CONFIG_QUBES_BOOT_DEV="/dev/sda1"
+CONFIG_QUBES_DEVS="/dev/sda2 /dev/sda3 /dev/sda5"

initrd/bin/mount-usb

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# Mount a USB device
+die() { echo >&2 "!!!!! $@"; exit 1; }
+
+if ! lsmod | grep -q ehci_hcd; then
+	insmod /lib/modules/ehci-hcd.ko \
+	|| die "ehci_hcd: module load failed"
+fi
+if ! lsmod | grep -q ehci_pci; then
+	insmod /lib/modules/ehci-pci.ko \
+	|| die "ehci_pci: module load failed"
+fi
+
+if [ ! -d /media ]; then
+	mkdir /media
+fi
+
+mount -o ro $1 /media

initrd/bin/qubes-init

@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# Boot a Qubes installation that has already been setup.
+# This depends on the PCR 4 being "normal-boot":
+# f8fa3b6e32e7c6fe04c366e74636e505b28f3b0d
+# which is only set if the top level /init script has started
+# without user intervention or dropping into a recovery shell.
+
+recovery() {
+	echo >&2 "!!!!! $@"
+	rm -f /tmp/secret.key
+	tpm extend -ix 4 -if recovery
+
+	echo >&2 "!!!!! Starting recovery shell"
+	exec /bin/ash
+}
+
+. /config
+
+# TODO: Allow /boot to be encrypted?
+# This would require a different TPM key or a user
+# passphrase to decrypt it.
+mount -o ro "$CONFIG_QUBES_BOOT_DEV" /boot \
+	|| recovery '$CONFIG_BOOT_DEV: Unable to mount /boot'
+
+# TODO: Allow these to be specified on the /boot device
+XEN=/boot/xen-4.6.3.heads
+INITRD=/boot/initramfs-4.4.31-11.pvops.qubes.x86_64.img
+KERNEL=/boot/vmlinuz-4.4.31-11.pvops.qubes.x86_64
+
+echo "+++ Checking $XEN"
+gpgv "${XEN}.asc" "${XEN}" \
+	|| recovery 'Xen signature failed'
+
+echo "+++ Checking $INITRD"
+gpgv "${INITRD}.asc" "${INITRD}" \
+	|| recovery 'Initrd signature failed'
+
+echo "+++ Checking $KERNEL"
+gpgv "${KERNEL}.asc" "${KERNEL}" \
+	|| recovery 'Kernel signature failed'
+
+# Measure the LUKS headers before we unseal the disk key
+/bin/qubes-measure-luks $CONFIG_QUBES_DEVS \
+	|| recovery "LUKS measure failed"
+
+# Attempt to unseal the disk key from the TPM
+# should we give this some number of tries?
+unseal-key \
+	|| recovery 'Unseal disk key failed. Starting recovery shell'
+
+# command line arguments are in the hash, so they are "correct".
+kexec \
+	-l \
+	--module "${KERNEL} root=LABEL=root rhgb" \
+	--module "${INITRD}" \
+	--command-line "no-real-mode reboot=no console=vga dom0_mem=min:1024M dom0_mem=max:4096M" \
+	"${XEN}" \
+|| recovery "kexec load failed"
+
+# Last step is to override PCR 6 so that user can't read the key
+tpm extend -ix 4 -ic qubes \
+	|| recovery 'Unable to scramble PCR'
+
+echo "+++ Starting Qubes..."
+exec kexec -e

initrd/bin/qubes-measure-luks

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# Measure all of the luks disk encryption headers into
+# a PCR so that we can detect disk swap attacks.
+
+die() { echo >&2 "$@"; exit 1; }
+
+# Measure the luks headers into PCR 6
+for dev in "$@"; do
+	cryptsetup luksDump $dev \
+	|| die "$dev: Unable to measure"
+done > /tmp/luksDump.txt
+
+tpm extend -ix 6 -if /tmp/luksDump.txt \
+|| die "Unable to extend PCR"

initrd/bin/seal-key

@@ -7,15 +7,36 @@ TPM_INDEX=3
 TPM_SIZE=312
 KEY_FILE=/tmp/secret.key
 
-die() { echo >&2 "$@"; exit 1; }
+. /config
+
+die() {
+	echo >&2 "$@";
+	rm -f /tmp/secret.key /tmp/recovery.key /tmp/sealed
+	exit 1;
+}
 warn() { echo >&2 "$@"; }
 
-read -s -p "New key password: " key_password
+# Key slot 0 is the manual recovery pass phrase
+# that they user entered when they installed Qubes,
+# key slot 1 is the one that we've generated.
+read -s -p "Enter disk recovery key: " disk_password
+echo -n "$disk_password" > /tmp/recovery.key
+echo
+
+for dev in $CONFIG_QUBES_DEVS; do
+	echo "++++++ $dev: Removing old key slot"
+	cryptsetup luksKillSlot \
+		--key-file /tmp/recovery.key \
+		$dev 1 \
+	|| warn "$dev: ignoring problem"
+done
+
+read -s -p "New disk decryption password for booting: " key_password
 echo
 read -s -p "Repeat password: " key_password2
 echo
 
-if [ "$key_password" -ne "$key_password2" ]; then
+if [ "$key_password" != "$key_password2" ]; then
 	die "Key passwords do not match"
 fi
 
@@ -27,11 +48,28 @@ dd \
 	2>/dev/null \
 || die "Unable to generate 128 random bytes"
 
-
-# Use the current values of the PCRs, which will be read
+for dev in $CONFIG_QUBES_DEVS; do
+	echo "+++++ $dev: Adding key"
+	cryptsetup luksAddKey \
+		--key-file /tmp/recovery.key \
+		--key-slot 1 \
+		$dev "$KEY_FILE" \
+	|| die "$dev: Unable to add key"
+done
+
+# Now that we have setup the new keys, measure the PCRs
+/bin/qubes-measure-luks $CONFIG_QUBES_DEVS \
+	|| die "Unable to measure the LUKS headers"
+
+# Note that PCR 4 needs to be set with the "normal-boot"
+# path value, which we do not have right now since we are
+# in a recovery shell.
+# PCR 5 must be all zero since no kernel modules should have
+# been loaded during a normal boot, but might have been
+# loaded in the recovery shell.
+# Otherwise use the current values of the PCRs, which will be read
 # from the TPM as part of the sealing ("X").
-# should this read the storage root key?
-sealfile2 \
+tpm sealfile2 \
 	-if "$KEY_FILE" \
 	-of /tmp/sealed \
 	-pwdd "$key_password" \
@@ -40,35 +78,36 @@ sealfile2 \
 	-ix 1 X \
 	-ix 2 X \
 	-ix 3 X \
-	-ix 4 X \
+	-ix 4 f8fa3b6e32e7c6fe04c366e74636e505b28f3b0d \
+	-ix 5 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 \
+	-ix 6 X \
 || die "Unable to seal secret"
 
-rm "$KEY_FILE"
+rm -f "$KEY_FILE"
 
 
 # to create an nvram space we need the TPM owner password
 # and the TPM physical presence must be asserted.
 #
 # The permissions are 0 since there is nothing special
 # about the sealed file
-physicalpresence -s \
+tpm physicalpresence -s \
 || warn "Warning: Unable to assert physical presence"
 
 read -s -p "TPM Owner password: " tpm_password
 echo
 
-nv_definespace \
+tpm nv_definespace \
 	-in $TPM_INDEX \
 	-sz $TPM_SIZE \
 	-pwdo "$tpm_password" \
 	-per 0 \
-|| die "Warning: Unable to define NVRAM space; trying anyway"
+|| warn "Warning: Unable to define NVRAM space; trying anyway"
 
 
-nv_writevalue \
+tpm nv_writevalue \
 	-in $TPM_INDEX \
 	-if /tmp/sealed \
 || die "Unable to write sealed secret to NVRAM"
 
 rm /tmp/sealed
-

initrd/bin/unseal-key

@@ -13,22 +13,22 @@ if [ -z "$key_file" ]; then
 	key_file=/tmp/secret.key
 fi
 
-read -s -p "Encryption password: " tpm_password
+read -s -p "Disk encryption password: " tpm_password
 echo
 
-nv_readvalue \
+tpm nv_readvalue \
 	-in "$TPM_INDEX" \
 	-sz "$TPM_SIZE" \
 	-of /tmp/sealed \
 || die "Unable to read key from TPM NVRAM"
 
-unsealfile \
+tpm unsealfile \
 	-if /tmp/sealed \
 	-of "$key_file" \
 	-pwdd "$tpm_password" \
 	-hk 40000000 \
 || die "Unable to unseal disk encryption key"
 
-rm /tmp/sealed
-
+rm -f /tmp/sealed
 
+exit 0

initrd/init

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #!/bin/ash
 # First thing it is vital to mount the /dev and other system directories
-mkdir /proc /sys /dev /tmp /boot 2>&- 1>&-
+mkdir /proc /sys /dev /tmp /boot /media 2>&- 1>&-
 mount -t devtmpfs none /dev
 mount -t proc none /proc
 mount -t sysfs none /sys