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Pick a licence for the specs #2

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josephpoon opened this issue Nov 15, 2016 · 3 comments
Closed

Pick a licence for the specs #2

josephpoon opened this issue Nov 15, 2016 · 3 comments

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@josephpoon
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CC-BY?
GNU FDL?
WTFPL?

@Roasbeef
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My vote is for the WTFPL 🙌🏾.

WTFPL

rustyrussell referenced this issue in rustyrussell/lightning-rfc Nov 15, 2016
Calculations are put in 05-onchain.md, and referred to by 02-peer-protocol.

The number is 600, comfortably under the 626 theoretical limit.

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <[email protected]>
rustyrussell referenced this issue in rustyrussell/lightning-rfc Nov 15, 2016
Calculations are put in 05-onchain.md, and referred to by 02-peer-protocol.

The number is 600, comfortably under the 626 theoretical limit.

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <[email protected]>
rustyrussell added a commit that referenced this issue Nov 15, 2016
Calculations are put in 05-onchain.md, and referred to by 02-peer-protocol.

The number is 600, comfortably under the 626 theoretical limit.

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <[email protected]>
rustyrussell added a commit that referenced this issue Nov 15, 2016
And remove a duplicate sentence.

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <[email protected]>
@cdecker
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cdecker commented Nov 15, 2016

I quite like CC-BY but I have no idea of the implications :-)

@rustyrussell
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Joseph Poon [email protected] writes:

CC-BY?
GNU FDL?
WTFPL?

CC-BY would be my default guess, but I'll ask People Who Know This Stuff
and see if there's some reason to prefer something else here.

Cheers,
Rusty.

rustyrussell pushed a commit that referenced this issue Nov 18, 2016
(Rebased by Rusty Russell <[email protected]>)
rustyrussell pushed a commit that referenced this issue Nov 18, 2016
(Rebased by Rusty Russell <[email protected]>)
rustyrussell referenced this issue in rustyrussell/lightning-rfc Nov 21, 2016
It's already in the next paragraph.

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <[email protected]>
rustyrussell added a commit that referenced this issue Nov 22, 2016
Closes: #2
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <[email protected]>
@rustyrussell rustyrussell mentioned this issue Nov 22, 2016
rustyrussell referenced this issue in rustyrussell/lightning-rfc Jan 3, 2017
…A wrong.

Suggested-by: Olaoluwa Osuntokun <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <[email protected]>
rustyrussell referenced this issue in rustyrussell/lightning-rfc Jan 5, 2017
…A wrong.

Suggested-by: Olaoluwa Osuntokun <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <[email protected]>
rustyrussell added a commit that referenced this issue Jan 5, 2017
…A wrong.

Suggested-by: Olaoluwa Osuntokun <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <[email protected]>
andrewshvv referenced this issue in andrewshvv/lightning-rfc Jul 2, 2017
My apology if I have missed the context of the conversation, but it seems for me that in order to update the sphinx onion packet version in the future we have to have onion packet size decoupled from the `update_add_htlc` message, so that we could make smooth transitions, by simultaneously maintaining several types of the onion packet.
Roasbeef referenced this issue in Roasbeef/lightning-rfc Jul 24, 2017
This commit modifies the glossary to add a new entry which defines the
usage of `chain_hash` throughout the remainder of the documents.
Additionally, we now also specify which chain hash we expect for
Bitcoin within the glossary.

This commit also modifies BOLT #2 and #7 to omit the definition of the
expected `chain_hash` value for Bitcoin.
Roasbeef referenced this issue in Roasbeef/lightning-rfc Jul 24, 2017
This commit modifies the glossary to add a new entry which defines the
usage of `chain_hash` throughout the remainder of the documents.
Additionally, we now also specify which chain hash we expect for
Bitcoin within the glossary.

This commit also modifies BOLT #2 and #7 to omit the definition of the
expected `chain_hash` value for Bitcoin.
rustyrussell referenced this issue in Roasbeef/lightning-rfc Aug 8, 2017
This commit modifies the glossary to add a new entry which defines the
usage of `chain_hash` throughout the remainder of the documents.
Additionally, we now also specify which chain hash we expect for
Bitcoin within the glossary.

This commit also modifies BOLT #2 and #7 to omit the definition of the
expected `chain_hash` value for Bitcoin.
rustyrussell pushed a commit that referenced this issue Aug 8, 2017
This commit modifies the glossary to add a new entry which defines the
usage of `chain_hash` throughout the remainder of the documents.
Additionally, we now also specify which chain hash we expect for
Bitcoin within the glossary.

This commit also modifies BOLT #2 and #7 to omit the definition of the
expected `chain_hash` value for Bitcoin.
rustyrussell referenced this issue in rustyrussell/lightning-rfc Oct 2, 2017
There's a mistake in the spec, where we were using the outgoing side of
a channel to control the CTLV delta.  But it's the receipient which is
vulnerable if it's too low, so the recipient should set it.

This exchanges values at channel open, and relies on the counterparty
to advertize it correctly in its `channel_update` messages.

There's another patch which changes the "Risks With HTLC Timeouts"
section to cover the setting of cltv_expiry_delta in detail, but
that's not ready yet.

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <[email protected]>
rustyrussell referenced this issue in rustyrussell/lightning-rfc Oct 3, 2017
There's a mistake in the spec, where we were using the outgoing side of
a channel to control the CTLV delta.  But it's the receipient which is
vulnerable if it's too low, so the recipient should set it.

This exchanges values at channel open, and relies on the counterparty
to advertize it correctly in its `channel_update` messages.

There's another patch which changes the "Risks With HTLC Timeouts"
section to cover the setting of cltv_expiry_delta in detail, but
that's not ready yet.

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <[email protected]>
rustyrussell referenced this issue in rustyrussell/lightning-rfc Oct 3, 2017
There's a mistake in the spec, where we were using the outgoing side of
a channel to control the CTLV delta.  But it's the receipient which is
vulnerable if it's too low, so the recipient should set it.

This exchanges values at channel open, and relies on the counterparty
to advertize it correctly in its `channel_update` messages.

There's another patch which changes the "Risks With HTLC Timeouts"
section to cover the setting of cltv_expiry_delta in detail, but
that's not ready yet.

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <[email protected]>
rustyrussell referenced this issue in rustyrussell/lightning-rfc Oct 3, 2017
There's a mistake in the spec, where we were using the outgoing side of
a channel to control the CTLV delta.  But it's the receipient which is
vulnerable if it's too low, so the recipient should set it.

This exchanges values at channel open, and relies on the counterparty
to advertize it correctly in its `channel_update` messages.

There's another patch which changes the "Risks With HTLC Timeouts"
section to cover the setting of cltv_expiry_delta in detail, but
that's not ready yet.

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <[email protected]>
rustyrussell referenced this issue in rustyrussell/lightning-rfc Jan 30, 2018
I got an unexpected update_fee message after `shutdown` exchange,
which is currently legal:

A: shutdown (no htlcs)
                          B: receive shutdown
                          B: reply with shutdown & closing_signed

A: send update_fee & commitment_signed
A: receive shutdown

Simplest to ban any updates (currently, just update_fee) from adding a
new commitment tx while we're at the end of shutdown.

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <[email protected]>
rustyrussell referenced this issue in rustyrussell/lightning-rfc Feb 5, 2018
I got an unexpected update_fee message after `shutdown` exchange,
which is currently legal:

A: shutdown (no htlcs)
                          B: receive shutdown
                          B: reply with shutdown & closing_signed

A: send update_fee & commitment_signed
A: receive shutdown

Simplest to ban any updates (currently, just update_fee) from adding a
new commitment tx while we're at the end of shutdown.

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <[email protected]>
rustyrussell added a commit that referenced this issue Feb 5, 2018
I got an unexpected update_fee message after `shutdown` exchange,
which is currently legal:

A: shutdown (no htlcs)
                          B: receive shutdown
                          B: reply with shutdown & closing_signed

A: send update_fee & commitment_signed
A: receive shutdown

Simplest to ban any updates (currently, just update_fee) from adding a
new commitment tx while we're at the end of shutdown.

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <[email protected]>
rustyrussell referenced this issue in rustyrussell/lightning-rfc Oct 21, 2018
We express it has how the outputs are ordered, but the only way you can
detect that is by the htlc_signatures order, which is the part which really
matters.

I finally reproduced this, BTW, which is why I'm digging it up!

Closes: lightning#448
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <[email protected]>
fjahr referenced this issue in fjahr/lightning-mw Jan 5, 2019
fjahr referenced this issue in fjahr/lightning-mw Jan 10, 2019
fjahr referenced this issue in fjahr/lightning-mw Jan 10, 2019
cdecker referenced this issue in rustyrussell/lightning-rfc Jan 22, 2019
We express it has how the outputs are ordered, but the only way you can
detect that is by the htlc_signatures order, which is the part which really
matters.

I finally reproduced this, BTW, which is why I'm digging it up!

Closes: lightning#448
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <[email protected]>
cdecker pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jan 22, 2019
We express it has how the outputs are ordered, but the only way you can
detect that is by the htlc_signatures order, which is the part which really
matters.

I finally reproduced this, BTW, which is why I'm digging it up!

Closes: #448
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <[email protected]>
@lightning lightning deleted a comment Aug 12, 2021
@animatedbarber animatedbarber mentioned this issue Sep 18, 2021
Crypt-iQ pushed a commit to Crypt-iQ/bolts that referenced this issue Sep 20, 2022
This is especially useful for protocols such as splicing; for
simplified commitment transactions, there is already an implied
initiator at each point, so having the negotiation at splicing
time would be redundant.

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <[email protected]>
ProofOfKeags pushed a commit to ProofOfKeags/bolts that referenced this issue Apr 10, 2024
This is especially useful for protocols such as splicing; for
simplified commitment transactions, there is already an implied
initiator at each point, so having the negotiation at splicing
time would be redundant.

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <[email protected]>
rustyrussell added a commit that referenced this issue Jun 17, 2024
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <[email protected]>




Header from folded patch 'bolt_2__set_an_initiator_in_quiescence.patch':

BOLT #2: Set an initiator in quiescence.

This is especially useful for protocols such as splicing; for
simplified commitment transactions, there is already an implied
initiator at each point, so having the negotiation at splicing
time would be redundant.

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <[email protected]>



Header from folded patch 'option_quiesce__feature_to_support_stfu_method.patch':

option_quiesce: feature to support stfu method.

In practice, sftu is useless unless you have something (e.g. channel_upgrade)
which uses it, but adding a feature is best practice IMHO.

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <[email protected]>
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