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This PR had never actually run the expensive CI legs — like several others opened the same day, it was waiting on workflow approval, so the checks that looked clean were only the lightweight gates. I approved the run; here is the first real result.
That hostname exists in the suite specifically to pin the opposite of what this change decides. The case asserts that with only So the question is not whether the patch works. It is which contract wins:
Both cannot hold for a non-SOCKS If you conclude the existing case is wrong, say why in the PR and change it deliberately, keeping the fall-through for the cases where it is still correct. If you conclude The four new cases you added are good and read correctly; the scheme-mismatch ones in particular pin something that was previously only implied. Leaving this open rather than merging. |
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In `@src/lib/proxy-env.ts`:
- Line 117: Update effectiveProxyFor to validate ALL_PROXY with URL parsing and
only return it when its protocol is http: or https:, ignoring malformed values
such as http://. Add a regression assertion covering a malformed ALL_PROXY and
verify it does not enable proxy-only routing.
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src/lib/proxy-env.tstests/providers/provider-outbound.test.ts
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Author follow-up on the contract question — argued rather than settled by assertion edits. The current head keeps the existing case exactly where it is true and narrows only the shape where the old contract was unfalsifiable:
So no third state: the boolean stays, but it now answers "will carry this request" precisely — which is what both the fake-IP admission gate and the DNS-failure deferral need. The existing case was not wrong; it was under-specified about which ALL_PROXY shapes can carry, and it is preserved exactly where they can. One corollary to flag rather than silently edit: on Windows, Bun native fetch does not consult |
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A scheme-mismatched proxy variable (HTTP_PROXY for an https: target), a NO_PROXY match, or a non-SOCKS ALL_PROXY still admitted benchmark/fake-IP DNS answers, downgraded the validated-address transport to an unpinned fetch, and raised a spurious NO_PROXY error for private providers. Gate every one of those decisions on proxyApplies — a scheme-matched effectiveProxyFor result that NO_PROXY does not exempt — so requests that will not ride a proxy keep the pinned transport.
Bun fetch honours a non-SOCKS ALL_PROXY for plain http: targets on POSIX — the e2e suite proves the request reaches the proxy there — while on Windows it does not consult ALL_PROXY at all. effectiveProxyFor now returns the variable for http: targets off Windows, so proxyApplies is true for a request that will actually ride the proxy; https: targets keep the socks5-wrapper-only route.
A malformed ALL_PROXY such as http:// previously passed the scheme regex, making proxyApplies true with no usable proxy. Parse the value and require an http: or https: protocol.
… too HTTP_PROXY/HTTPS_PROXY returned any non-empty value, so a malformed or non-http(s) value still marked proxyApplies and downgraded DNS pinning although Bun fetch cannot use it (UnsupportedProxyProtocol or an unresolvable proxy host). Share the ALL_PROXY usable-URL check across both paths.
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Requesting changes on exact head 375b785b7904294ae0a0998ff8aeaccc1ba0916d.
The scheme/NO_PROXY classification is now much closer to the right contract, but the security comment's “snapshot once before the DNS await” guarantee is not actually preserved on the DNS-failure path. effectiveProxy is captured before resolvePublicAddresses(), yet the catch branch calls:
configuredOutboundFetch(url, { ...init, method, redirect: "manual" })without the captured proxy. That function re-reads the live proxy environment. If the environment changes while DNS resolution is pending, admission can be decided for one proxy/NO_PROXY state and the request can leave through a different proxy or direct path. The same issue exists because effectiveProxyFor(parsed) and noProxyMatches(parsed) read process.env separately rather than one immutable snapshot.
Capture the relevant upper/lower-case proxy and NO_PROXY values once, derive both effectiveProxy and proxyApplies from that snapshot, and pass the captured proxy explicitly to every proxy transport branch, including DNS-failure fallback. The explicit path must work for both the SOCKS wrapper and Bun's HTTP(S) proxy option. Add a deferred-DNS regression that mutates proxy/NO_PROXY variables between admission and dispatch and proves the actual transport remains the one that was validated.
This is a DNS-pinning/credential-destination boundary, so keep it unmerged until that race and exact-head Cross-platform CI are green.
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Superseded by #5264, merged to Your request-scoped decision is the shape that landed: pinning and transport are now chosen by whether a proxy actually applies to the request rather than by whether one is configured, with scheme mismatch, Closing as superseded rather than stale. The per-provider egress work that builds on this decision is tracked separately in #2894. |
The global `proxy` is one value for every upstream, so it cannot express the split #2894 describes: one gateway must exit through a regional proxy while another stays direct on the local network. `src/lib/provider-egress.ts` is the single authority that answers that question for one request, in the same shape #5087 established for the global decision -- the question is never "is a proxy configured" but "does a proxy apply to THIS request". Four states, resolved against the destination: absent inherit the global decision, byte-identical to today "direct" / null never use the global proxy for this provider http(s) URL this provider's own HTTP(S) proxy socks5(h) URL this provider's own SOCKS5 proxy `providers.<name>.noProxy` is applied to whichever route resolved, so it carves an exemption out of the provider's own proxy AND out of an inherited global one. That second case is how a provider exempts a single host without owning a proxy of its own. Two deliberate divergences from the issue's sketch. An empty string is rejected rather than read as a third spelling of DIRECT: a dashboard field the operator merely cleared must not silently switch a provider from inheriting the global proxy to refusing it. And a malformed value throws instead of degrading, because falling back to the global proxy would send a credential out a route nobody chose while falling back to direct would leave a restricted network with no exit -- both read as success at the call site. Direct egress is expressed to the runtime as `proxy: false`, which overrides HTTP_PROXY, HTTPS_PROXY, ALL_PROXY and NO_PROXY alike. `undefined`, `null` and `""` all mean "no option given" and fall back to the environment, so none of them can express it. `configuredOutboundFetch` had to learn the same distinction: reading `false` as "no string supplied" fell through to ALL_PROXY and sent a request pinned to direct egress through the global SOCKS proxy instead, which would have succeeded by the wrong exit. Configuration and request time share one definition through `providerEgressConfigError`, so a value the loader or the dashboard accepts is one the transport can carry. `proxy` is classified credential-bearing alongside `apiKey`: a proxy URL routinely embeds `user:password@`, so it never reaches the dashboard DTO, and nothing derived from it is logged -- not a hash, not a prefix, because a short digest over a known host is a guessable stand-in for the secret and a durable correlation key. Co-authored-by: jingzxy <113401179+jingzxy@users.noreply.github.com>
… provider (#5289) * feat(proxy): decide a provider's outbound egress per request The global `proxy` is one value for every upstream, so it cannot express the split #2894 describes: one gateway must exit through a regional proxy while another stays direct on the local network. `src/lib/provider-egress.ts` is the single authority that answers that question for one request, in the same shape #5087 established for the global decision -- the question is never "is a proxy configured" but "does a proxy apply to THIS request". Four states, resolved against the destination: absent inherit the global decision, byte-identical to today "direct" / null never use the global proxy for this provider http(s) URL this provider's own HTTP(S) proxy socks5(h) URL this provider's own SOCKS5 proxy `providers.<name>.noProxy` is applied to whichever route resolved, so it carves an exemption out of the provider's own proxy AND out of an inherited global one. That second case is how a provider exempts a single host without owning a proxy of its own. Two deliberate divergences from the issue's sketch. An empty string is rejected rather than read as a third spelling of DIRECT: a dashboard field the operator merely cleared must not silently switch a provider from inheriting the global proxy to refusing it. And a malformed value throws instead of degrading, because falling back to the global proxy would send a credential out a route nobody chose while falling back to direct would leave a restricted network with no exit -- both read as success at the call site. Direct egress is expressed to the runtime as `proxy: false`, which overrides HTTP_PROXY, HTTPS_PROXY, ALL_PROXY and NO_PROXY alike. `undefined`, `null` and `""` all mean "no option given" and fall back to the environment, so none of them can express it. `configuredOutboundFetch` had to learn the same distinction: reading `false` as "no string supplied" fell through to ALL_PROXY and sent a request pinned to direct egress through the global SOCKS proxy instead, which would have succeeded by the wrong exit. Configuration and request time share one definition through `providerEgressConfigError`, so a value the loader or the dashboard accepts is one the transport can carry. `proxy` is classified credential-bearing alongside `apiKey`: a proxy URL routinely embeds `user:password@`, so it never reaches the dashboard DTO, and nothing derived from it is logged -- not a hash, not a prefix, because a short digest over a known host is a guessable stand-in for the secret and a durable correlation key. Co-authored-by: jingzxy <113401179+jingzxy@users.noreply.github.com> * feat(proxy): apply the provider route to inference, discovery and quota Three transport owners now consume the decision instead of re-deriving it. Inference (`providerFetch`). The route is resolved per request rather than once per wrapper, because `noProxy` is evaluated against the destination and two sends through the same executor can legitimately take different exits. The resolved value reaches the dispatch init, so it survives `dispatchOverride` and the fresh-connection policy. Discovery and quota (`providerOutboundRequest`). This is the chokepoint every `providerOutboundGet`/`Post` caller shares -- provider discovery, the model-catalog gather, the management provider test and the Ollama show probe. A provider route replaces the global decision outright rather than combining with it: an explicit proxy applies even where global NO_PROXY exempts the host, because the operator named that proxy for that provider and `providers.<name>.noProxy` is the exemption belonging to that choice. A provider pinned to `direct` keeps the DNS-pinned transport, which reaches the peer through node:http and therefore needs nothing from the runtime's proxy handling -- the one path where direct egress is available by construction. An explicit proxy is pinned onto the request unconditionally, including through the DNS-failure degradation. Letting fetch re-infer the route there would move the request to a different exit at the exact moment local DNS stopped working, which is when the proxy matters most. Quota (`vendor-probes-key.ts`). Seventeen probes were bare global fetches, so a provider pinned to its own proxy still sent its quota probe by the process-wide route -- reporting a healthy account while inference failed, or sending the key out an exit the operator did not choose. Each probe already receives its provider config, so the route was available; only the transport was wrong. Where the route cannot be carried it is refused rather than dropped. A caller-supplied `provider.fetch` executor owns its own routing, so an explicit route throws instead of running the executor by a contradicting route. The WebSocket upstream selects its proxy from the process environment when it dials, so an explicit route serves those turns over HTTP/SSE and says so once per provider; a transport change nobody asked for is the same class of silent substitution this batch exists to remove. The regressions assert which transport carried each request and which proxy value it was pinned to. Asserting a 200 would pass with the route dropped entirely, which is the defect, not the fix. Co-authored-by: jingzxy <113401179+jingzxy@users.noreply.github.com> * docs(proxy): document per-provider egress and its uncovered surface The provider guide gains the two fields and a worked example matching the issue's real case. The transport inventory records, per request path, whether a provider route is honoured -- and where it is not, which is the part that matters: OAuth token exchange and refresh, the OAuth-backed quota probes and the API-key validation probes all reach fixed vendor endpoints from modules that hold no provider config, so a provider pinned to its own proxy still refreshes credentials by the process-wide route. Cursor's HTTP/2 transport, the coding-agent subprocess providers and the Lab pinned sender are recorded for the same reason. The lane document records the egress work, the disposition for the CodeBuddy and native-wire bundle, and the union-defect sweep. * fix(proxy): resolve the provider route at the physical send Adversarial review of the branch found three defects in the first pass. The route was resolved when the fetch wrapper was built, but a `dispatchOverride` can rebuild a queued request against a different upstream host before it leaves -- account reselection moves the regional host for Copilot, and Anthropic pool rotation rebuilds the request entirely. The original `dispatchInit` was reused with its now-stale proxy value, so a host-scoped `noProxy` decision could be inverted and a bearer could leave by a route the operator excluded. The decision now sits in `sendWithConnectionPolicy`, against the destination actually being sent to and around whichever executor was just selected. That is the same boundary and the same reason as #4992, which that function's own comment already records for the connection policy. Refusing every `provider.fetch` as transport-owning was too broad. The xAI route installs a wrapper on every request that only adds a generated request id and forwards the init, so an explicit route would have thrown for xAI -- one of the two providers #2894 names. Executors that forward their init are now marked transparent and carry the route; the mark is opt-in, so an executor arriving from configuration stays opaque and is still refused. The executor `providerFetch` returns is marked too, because Cursor hands it back as `provider.fetch`. xAI's default executor also fell back to the bare global fetch, which ignores a socks5 value. A per-provider SOCKS5 route would have sent the request unproxied while the configuration named a proxy. It now routes through `configuredOutboundFetch` like every other default. Two smaller ones: the WebSocket downgrade notice logged a configuration-controlled provider name unredacted, which this repository treats as potentially token-shaped everywhere else, and its notice set had no bound. * fix(proxy): bind the route on native Chat sends and refuse before dispatch Two more defects from review of the previous commit. Native Chat builds its own physical send and calls the connection policy with `activeProvider.fetch ?? execute`. A provider transport wins over the executor that carries the egress binding, so that send omitted the route entirely -- and since the xAI route now always installs a transport, xAI native Chat would have followed global routing while its configuration named a proxy, and an opaque executor would have been invoked instead of refused. The binding now travels with that send, resolved against the provider the send actually uses, which matters because reselection can replace it mid-dispatch. Moving the refusal to the physical send also moved it after `options.beforeDispatch`, which commits attempt accounting and consumes admission state. A refusal firing after it would charge an attempt for a send that never happens, and a throwing hook would mask the egress error with an unrelated one. The wrapper now fails fast before the hook; the authoritative decision still happens at the send, against the destination that send uses. * fix(proxy): decide the route once at the outermost physical boundary A third review round found that the executor `providerFetch` hands to a `dispatchOverride` was not marked transparent. Every override selects `provider.fetch ?? execute`, so for an ordinary provider with no custom transport that executor IS the selected one -- and an explicit route would have been refused on every overridden path, after the attempt had already been recorded by `commitKeyAttemptSend` or `noteProviderAttemptSend`. Only xAI escaped it, because its own wrapper carries the mark. None of the existing regressions covered the production-shaped nested send, so two now do. Marking it alone would have been wrong in the other direction: these calls nest, and the inner pass would have recomputed the route from the closure's provider after the override had already decided with the reselected one. The outermost boundary now decides and marks the init; the inner pass honours the mark. An override that simply calls the executor still gets a decision rather than losing the route. The pre-dispatch fast fail is narrowed to match. With no override, the input and executor at that point are the final ones, so the full decision is made before `beforeDispatch`. With an override, only the configured value is validated, because refusing against a destination the override is about to replace would reject a request whose real route is fine. A refusal caused by `noProxy` now names `noProxy` rather than telling the operator to remove a `proxy` override they never wrote. The provider guide gained the coverage limits it was missing -- it described the three states without saying which transports cannot carry them. * fix(proxy): give the provider egress config fields a declared output type The two zod field schemas used `z.unknown().superRefine(...)` so the shared resolver could produce the message, but never narrowed the result. That makes the parsed provider record carry `proxy: unknown` and `noProxy: unknown`, which is not assignable to `OcxProviderConfig` -- four errors in `config-schema.ts`, and a typecheck-based adapter contract test that asserts zero errors reported one. Both CI failures had this single cause. They now transform to their declared types, matching the superRefine-plus-transform idiom the neighbouring field schemas already use. Validation is unchanged and still delegates to `providerEgressConfigError`, so configuration and request time keep one definition of a usable value. The fetch-helpers import boundary test pins the exact runtime-import list for that file; it gains the two modules this lane added. * test(proxy): keep credentialed proxy fixtures off the email pattern The privacy scan reads a URL userinfo pair as an address: `user:pw@host.tld` looks exactly like `pw@host.tld`. Three fixtures that deliberately carry a credential to prove it never reaches a log or an error tripped it. They move to a `.test` host, which the scanner already allows for fixtures and which the repository uses elsewhere for the same reason. The assertions are unchanged: the credential must still not appear in the sanitized label, the described route, or the validation error. * docs(devlog): record the lane F outcome and the defects each gate caught Names the exact-head CI evidence, the three route-seam defects adversarial review caught before CI ran, and the two CI caught after review had cleared them. * docs(devlog): describe the credential-fixture defect without reproducing it The lane document explained why the privacy scan rejected the credentialed proxy fixtures by quoting the shape that triggered it, which tripped the same scan on the document. It now describes the shape instead of writing one. --------- Co-authored-by: jingzxy <113401179+jingzxy@users.noreply.github.com>
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Motivation
The outbound transport decision still treats "some proxy variable exists" (
outboundProxyConfigured) as proof that this request will ride a proxy. A scheme-mismatched variable (HTTP_PROXYfor anhttps:target), aNO_PROXYmatch, or a non-SOCKSALL_PROXYtherefore still admits benchmark/fake-IP DNS answers, downgrades the validated-address transport to an unpinned fetch, and raises a spuriousNO_PROXYerror for private providers — reopening the DNS-rebinding window the pinned transport exists to close.Description
proxyApplies(scheme-matchedeffectiveProxyForresult thatNO_PROXYdoes not exempt) and use it for benchmark-address admission, the DNS-failure proxy fallback, the post-resolution transport choice, and the private-networkNO_PROXYerror.Tests
bun test tests/providers/provider-outbound.test.ts— 24 pass; new regressions assert scheme-mismatched variables andNO_PROXYmatches retain the pinned transport, do not admit benchmark addresses, and no longer demandNO_PROXYfor private providers.bun test tests/providers/provider-outbound-private-network.test.ts tests/server/proxy-env.test.ts— 44 pass.bun run typecheck— clean.Review readiness checklist
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Summary by CodeRabbit
NO_PROXY.ALL_PROXYsettings.