amlogic gxl spi mode is stuck in mode 1 and mode 2 #11

dsx724 · 2022-07-27T02:56:55Z

SPI mode change with CPOL and CPHA registers do not seem to reflect actual mode.

The following was evaluated with an oscilloscope:
set mode -> detected waveform

mode 0 -> mode 2
mode 1 -> mode 1
mode 2 -> mode 1
mode 3 -> mode 2

bit 1 cpol, bit 2 cpha

Test Image: https://distro.libre.computer/manual/2022-07-26/ubuntu-22.04-preinstalled-server-arm64%2Baml-s905x-cc-spi.img.xz

Username: test
Password: test

cd ldto
sudo test/spi.sh

This will run through testing each mode for approximately 10 seconds at increasing frequency.

Schematic here: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1U3z0Gb8HUEfCIMkvqzmhMpJfzRqjPXq7mFLC-hvbKlE/edit?usp=sharing

The code for the Linux kernel to drive spicc: ~/linux/drivers/spi/spi-meson-spicc.c
S905X datasheet page 483

The Linux kernel is precompiled in the ~/linux directory. Just modify the code and then run:
make
sudo make install
sudo apt remove -y linux-image-5.19.0-rc8-01020-gaf0ef98a9cd7 #remove the existing kernel
sudo reboot

dsx724 · 2022-08-02T08:28:05Z

Sending the letter 'S' 0b01010011 in mode 0 through 3

dsx724 · 2022-08-03T07:10:42Z

Below are logs of a dump of the registers on the board associated with the waveforms above for each mode. The only difference between cycling through the mode observed on the scope is an inversion of the SCLK lines switching from mode 2 to mode 3 and mode 1 to mode 2.

set mode -> detected waveform
mode 0 -> mode 2
SCLK inversion
mode 1 -> mode 1
mode 2 -> mode 1
SCLK inversion
mode 3 -> mode 2


test@ubuntu:~/ldto$ sudo test/spi.sh 
Overlay spidev-spicc-cs1: removed
Overlay spidev-spicc-cs1: applied

Testing /dev/spidev0.0 in mode 0 at speed 1000000 Hz

c1108d88: 87 00 3e 20 10 00 00 00 00 ba 03 00 0a 00 00 00    ..> ............
c1108d98: 00 00 00 00 c8 08 15 00                            ........
 
Testing /dev/spidev0.0 in mode 1 at speed 1000000 Hz

 c1108d88: a7 00 3e 20 08 00 00 00 00 ba 03 00 00 00 00 00    ..> ............
c1108d98: 00 00 00 00 00 0c 15 00                            ........

Testing /dev/spidev0.0 in mode 2 at speed 1000000 Hz

   c1108d88: 97 00 3e 20 10 00 00 00 00 ba 03 00 0a 00 00 00    ..> ............
c1108d98: 00 00 00 00 4c 08 15 00                            ....L...

Testing /dev/spidev0.0 in mode 3 at speed 1000000 Hz

    c1108d88: b7 00 3e 20 08 00 00 00 00 ba 03 00 00 00 00 00    ..> ............
c1108d98: 00 00 00 00 05 0c 15 00                            ........

Testing /dev/spidev0.0 in mode 0 at speed 1000000 Hz

   c1108d88: 87 00 3e 20 08 00 00 00 00 ba 03 00 08 00 00 00    ..> ............
c1108d98: 00 00 00 00 04 08 15 00                            ........

Testing /dev/spidev0.0 in mode 1 at speed 1000000 Hz

   c1108d88: a7 00 3e 20 10 00 00 00 00 ba 03 00 0a 00 00 00    ..> ............
c1108d98: 00 00 00 00 2d 08 15 00                            ....-...

Testing /dev/spidev0.0 in mode 2 at speed 1000000 Hz

    c1108d88: 97 00 3e 20 10 00 00 00 00 ba 03 00 0a 00 00 00    ..> ............
c1108d98: 00 00 00 00 6b 08 15 00                            ....k...

Testing /dev/spidev0.0 in mode 3 at speed 1000000 Hz

   c1108d88: b7 00 3e 20 10 00 00 00 00 ba 03 00 08 00 00 00    ..> ............
c1108d98: 00 00 00 00 e7 08 15 00                            ........

dsx724 · 2022-08-05T19:28:36Z

setting the pin-bias to down on SPI pins corrected the phase necessary to achieve mode 0 but the waveform is still defective for application

dsx724 · 2022-08-10T18:12:39Z

Fix in upstream via mode specific pin biases.

commit 573ae4f upstream. With special lengths supplied by user space, register_shm_helper() has an integer overflow when calculating the number of pages covered by a supplied user space memory region. This causes internal_get_user_pages_fast() a helper function of pin_user_pages_fast() to do a NULL pointer dereference: Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000010 Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 173 Comm: optee_example_a Not tainted 5.19.0 #11 Hardware name: QEMU QEMU Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 pc : internal_get_user_pages_fast+0x474/0xa80 Call trace: internal_get_user_pages_fast+0x474/0xa80 pin_user_pages_fast+0x24/0x4c register_shm_helper+0x194/0x330 tee_shm_register_user_buf+0x78/0x120 tee_ioctl+0xd0/0x11a0 __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xa8/0xec invoke_syscall+0x48/0x114 Fix this by adding an an explicit call to access_ok() in tee_shm_register_user_buf() to catch an invalid user space address early. Fixes: 033ddf1 ("tee: add register user memory") Cc: [email protected] Reported-by: Nimish Mishra <[email protected]> Reported-by: Anirban Chakraborty <[email protected]> Reported-by: Debdeep Mukhopadhyay <[email protected]> Suggested-by: Jerome Forissier <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 93c660c ] ASAN reports an use-after-free in btf_dump_name_dups: ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0xffff927006db at pc 0xaaaab5dfb618 bp 0xffffdd89b890 sp 0xffffdd89b928 READ of size 2 at 0xffff927006db thread T0 #0 0xaaaab5dfb614 in __interceptor_strcmp.part.0 (test_progs+0x21b614) #1 0xaaaab635f144 in str_equal_fn tools/lib/bpf/btf_dump.c:127 #2 0xaaaab635e3e0 in hashmap_find_entry tools/lib/bpf/hashmap.c:143 #3 0xaaaab635e72c in hashmap__find tools/lib/bpf/hashmap.c:212 #4 0xaaaab6362258 in btf_dump_name_dups tools/lib/bpf/btf_dump.c:1525 #5 0xaaaab636240c in btf_dump_resolve_name tools/lib/bpf/btf_dump.c:1552 #6 0xaaaab6362598 in btf_dump_type_name tools/lib/bpf/btf_dump.c:1567 #7 0xaaaab6360b48 in btf_dump_emit_struct_def tools/lib/bpf/btf_dump.c:912 #8 0xaaaab6360630 in btf_dump_emit_type tools/lib/bpf/btf_dump.c:798 #9 0xaaaab635f720 in btf_dump__dump_type tools/lib/bpf/btf_dump.c:282 #10 0xaaaab608523c in test_btf_dump_incremental tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/btf_dump.c:236 #11 0xaaaab6097530 in test_btf_dump tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/btf_dump.c:875 #12 0xaaaab6314ed0 in run_one_test tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.c:1062 #13 0xaaaab631a0a8 in main tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.c:1697 #14 0xffff9676d214 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308 #15 0xaaaab5d65990 (test_progs+0x185990) 0xffff927006db is located 11 bytes inside of 16-byte region [0xffff927006d0,0xffff927006e0) freed by thread T0 here: #0 0xaaaab5e2c7c4 in realloc (test_progs+0x24c7c4) #1 0xaaaab634f4a0 in libbpf_reallocarray tools/lib/bpf/libbpf_internal.h:191 #2 0xaaaab634f840 in libbpf_add_mem tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:163 #3 0xaaaab636643c in strset_add_str_mem tools/lib/bpf/strset.c:106 #4 0xaaaab6366560 in strset__add_str tools/lib/bpf/strset.c:157 #5 0xaaaab6352d70 in btf__add_str tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:1519 #6 0xaaaab6353e10 in btf__add_field tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:2032 #7 0xaaaab6084fcc in test_btf_dump_incremental tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/btf_dump.c:232 #8 0xaaaab6097530 in test_btf_dump tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/btf_dump.c:875 #9 0xaaaab6314ed0 in run_one_test tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.c:1062 #10 0xaaaab631a0a8 in main tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.c:1697 #11 0xffff9676d214 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308 #12 0xaaaab5d65990 (test_progs+0x185990) previously allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0xaaaab5e2c7c4 in realloc (test_progs+0x24c7c4) #1 0xaaaab634f4a0 in libbpf_reallocarray tools/lib/bpf/libbpf_internal.h:191 #2 0xaaaab634f840 in libbpf_add_mem tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:163 #3 0xaaaab636643c in strset_add_str_mem tools/lib/bpf/strset.c:106 #4 0xaaaab6366560 in strset__add_str tools/lib/bpf/strset.c:157 #5 0xaaaab6352d70 in btf__add_str tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:1519 #6 0xaaaab6353ff0 in btf_add_enum_common tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:2070 #7 0xaaaab6354080 in btf__add_enum tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:2102 #8 0xaaaab6082f50 in test_btf_dump_incremental tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/btf_dump.c:162 #9 0xaaaab6097530 in test_btf_dump tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/btf_dump.c:875 #10 0xaaaab6314ed0 in run_one_test tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.c:1062 #11 0xaaaab631a0a8 in main tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.c:1697 #12 0xffff9676d214 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308 #13 0xaaaab5d65990 (test_progs+0x185990) The reason is that the key stored in hash table name_map is a string address, and the string memory is allocated by realloc() function, when the memory is resized by realloc() later, the old memory may be freed, so the address stored in name_map references to a freed memory, causing use-after-free. Fix it by storing duplicated string address in name_map. Fixes: 919d2b1 ("libbpf: Allow modification of BTF and add btf__add_str API") Signed-off-by: Xu Kuohai <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <[email protected]> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

…g the sock [ Upstream commit 3cf7203 ] There is a race condition in vxlan that when deleting a vxlan device during receiving packets, there is a possibility that the sock is released after getting vxlan_sock vs from sk_user_data. Then in later vxlan_ecn_decapsulate(), vxlan_get_sk_family() we will got NULL pointer dereference. e.g. #0 [ffffa25ec6978a38] machine_kexec at ffffffff8c669757 #1 [ffffa25ec6978a90] __crash_kexec at ffffffff8c7c0a4d #2 [ffffa25ec6978b58] crash_kexec at ffffffff8c7c1c48 #3 [ffffa25ec6978b60] oops_end at ffffffff8c627f2b #4 [ffffa25ec6978b80] page_fault_oops at ffffffff8c678fcb #5 [ffffa25ec6978bd8] exc_page_fault at ffffffff8d109542 #6 [ffffa25ec6978c00] asm_exc_page_fault at ffffffff8d200b62 [exception RIP: vxlan_ecn_decapsulate+0x3b] RIP: ffffffffc1014e7b RSP: ffffa25ec6978cb0 RFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000008 RBX: ffff8aa000888000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 000000000000000e RSI: ffff8a9fc7ab803e RDI: ffff8a9fd1168700 RBP: ffff8a9fc7ab803e R8: 0000000000700000 R9: 00000000000010ae R10: ffff8a9fcb748980 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8a9fd1168700 R13: ffff8aa000888000 R14: 00000000002a0000 R15: 00000000000010ae ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #7 [ffffa25ec6978ce8] vxlan_rcv at ffffffffc10189cd [vxlan] #8 [ffffa25ec6978d90] udp_queue_rcv_one_skb at ffffffff8cfb6507 #9 [ffffa25ec6978dc0] udp_unicast_rcv_skb at ffffffff8cfb6e45 #10 [ffffa25ec6978dc8] __udp4_lib_rcv at ffffffff8cfb8807 #11 [ffffa25ec6978e20] ip_protocol_deliver_rcu at ffffffff8cf76951 #12 [ffffa25ec6978e48] ip_local_deliver at ffffffff8cf76bde #13 [ffffa25ec6978ea0] __netif_receive_skb_one_core at ffffffff8cecde9b #14 [ffffa25ec6978ec8] process_backlog at ffffffff8cece139 #15 [ffffa25ec6978f00] __napi_poll at ffffffff8ceced1a #16 [ffffa25ec6978f28] net_rx_action at ffffffff8cecf1f3 #17 [ffffa25ec6978fa0] __softirqentry_text_start at ffffffff8d4000ca #18 [ffffa25ec6978ff0] do_softirq at ffffffff8c6fbdc3 Reproducer: https://github.com/Mellanox/ovs-tests/blob/master/test-ovs-vxlan-remove-tunnel-during-traffic.sh Fix this by waiting for all sk_user_data reader to finish before releasing the sock. Reported-by: Jianlin Shi <[email protected]> Suggested-by: Jakub Sitnicki <[email protected]> Fixes: 6a93cc9 ("udp-tunnel: Add a few more UDP tunnel APIs") Signed-off-by: Hangbin Liu <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 91621be ] When --overwrite and --max-size options of perf record are used together, a segmentation fault occurs. The following is an example: # perf record -e sched:sched* --overwrite --max-size 1K -a -- sleep 1 [ perf record: Woken up 1 times to write data ] perf: Segmentation fault Obtained 12 stack frames. ./perf/perf(+0x197673) [0x55f99710b673] /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(+0x3ef0f) [0x7fa45f3cff0f] ./perf/perf(+0x8eb40) [0x55f997002b40] ./perf/perf(+0x1f6882) [0x55f99716a882] ./perf/perf(+0x794c2) [0x55f996fed4c2] ./perf/perf(+0x7b7c7) [0x55f996fef7c7] ./perf/perf(+0x9074b) [0x55f99700474b] ./perf/perf(+0x12e23c) [0x55f9970a223c] ./perf/perf(+0x12e54a) [0x55f9970a254a] ./perf/perf(+0x7db60) [0x55f996ff1b60] /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0xe6) [0x7fa45f3b2c86] ./perf/perf(+0x7dfe9) [0x55f996ff1fe9] Segmentation fault (core dumped) backtrace of the core file is as follows: (gdb) bt #0 record__bytes_written (rec=0x55f99755a200 <record>) at builtin-record.c:234 #1 record__output_max_size_exceeded (rec=0x55f99755a200 <record>) at builtin-record.c:242 #2 record__write (map=0x0, size=12816, bf=0x55f9978da2e0, rec=0x55f99755a200 <record>) at builtin-record.c:263 #3 process_synthesized_event (tool=tool@entry=0x55f99755a200 <record>, event=event@entry=0x55f9978da2e0, sample=sample@entry=0x0, machine=machine@entry=0x55f997893658) at builtin-record.c:618 #4 0x000055f99716a883 in __perf_event__synthesize_id_index (tool=tool@entry=0x55f99755a200 <record>, process=process@entry=0x55f997002aa0 <process_synthesized_event>, evlist=0x55f9978928b0, machine=machine@entry=0x55f997893658, from=from@entry=0) at util/synthetic-events.c:1895 #5 0x000055f99716a91f in perf_event__synthesize_id_index (tool=tool@entry=0x55f99755a200 <record>, process=process@entry=0x55f997002aa0 <process_synthesized_event>, evlist=<optimized out>, machine=machine@entry=0x55f997893658) at util/synthetic-events.c:1905 #6 0x000055f996fed4c3 in record__synthesize (tail=tail@entry=true, rec=0x55f99755a200 <record>) at builtin-record.c:1997 #7 0x000055f996fef7c8 in __cmd_record (argc=argc@entry=2, argv=argv@entry=0x7ffc67551260, rec=0x55f99755a200 <record>) at builtin-record.c:2802 #8 0x000055f99700474c in cmd_record (argc=<optimized out>, argv=0x7ffc67551260) at builtin-record.c:4258 #9 0x000055f9970a223d in run_builtin (p=0x55f997564d88 <commands+264>, argc=10, argv=0x7ffc67551260) at perf.c:330 #10 0x000055f9970a254b in handle_internal_command (argc=10, argv=0x7ffc67551260) at perf.c:384 #11 0x000055f996ff1b61 in run_argv (argcp=<synthetic pointer>, argv=<synthetic pointer>) at perf.c:428 #12 main (argc=<optimized out>, argv=0x7ffc67551260) at perf.c:562 The reason is that record__bytes_written accesses the freed memory rec->thread_data, The process is as follows: __cmd_record -> record__free_thread_data -> zfree(&rec->thread_data) // free rec->thread_data -> record__synthesize -> perf_event__synthesize_id_index -> process_synthesized_event -> record__write -> record__bytes_written // access rec->thread_data We add a member variable "thread_bytes_written" in the struct "record" to save the data size written by the threads. Fixes: 6d57581 ("perf record: Add support for limit perf output file size") Signed-off-by: Yang Jihong <[email protected]> Acked-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]> Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Cc: Jiwei Sun <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CAM9d7ci_TRrqBQVQNW8=GwakUr7SsZpYxaaty-S4bxF8zJWyqw@mail.gmail.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4e264be ] When a system with E810 with existing VFs gets rebooted the following hang may be observed. Pid 1 is hung in iavf_remove(), part of a network driver: PID: 1 TASK: ffff965400e5a340 CPU: 24 COMMAND: "systemd-shutdow" #0 [ffffaad04005fa50] __schedule at ffffffff8b3239cb #1 [ffffaad04005fae8] schedule at ffffffff8b323e2d #2 [ffffaad04005fb00] schedule_hrtimeout_range_clock at ffffffff8b32cebc #3 [ffffaad04005fb80] usleep_range_state at ffffffff8b32c930 #4 [ffffaad04005fbb0] iavf_remove at ffffffffc12b9b4c [iavf] #5 [ffffaad04005fbf0] pci_device_remove at ffffffff8add7513 #6 [ffffaad04005fc10] device_release_driver_internal at ffffffff8af08baa #7 [ffffaad04005fc40] pci_stop_bus_device at ffffffff8adcc5fc #8 [ffffaad04005fc60] pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device at ffffffff8adcc81e #9 [ffffaad04005fc70] pci_iov_remove_virtfn at ffffffff8adf9429 #10 [ffffaad04005fca8] sriov_disable at ffffffff8adf98e4 #11 [ffffaad04005fcc8] ice_free_vfs at ffffffffc04bb2c8 [ice] #12 [ffffaad04005fd10] ice_remove at ffffffffc04778fe [ice] #13 [ffffaad04005fd38] ice_shutdown at ffffffffc0477946 [ice] #14 [ffffaad04005fd50] pci_device_shutdown at ffffffff8add58f1 #15 [ffffaad04005fd70] device_shutdown at ffffffff8af05386 #16 [ffffaad04005fd98] kernel_restart at ffffffff8a92a870 #17 [ffffaad04005fda8] __do_sys_reboot at ffffffff8a92abd6 #18 [ffffaad04005fee0] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff8b317159 #19 [ffffaad04005ff08] __context_tracking_enter at ffffffff8b31b6fc #20 [ffffaad04005ff18] syscall_exit_to_user_mode at ffffffff8b31b50d #21 [ffffaad04005ff28] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff8b317169 #22 [ffffaad04005ff50] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe at ffffffff8b40009b RIP: 00007f1baa5c13d7 RSP: 00007fffbcc55a98 RFLAGS: 00000202 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f1baa5c13d7 RDX: 0000000001234567 RSI: 0000000028121969 RDI: 00000000fee1dead RBP: 00007fffbcc55ca0 R8: 0000000000000000 R9: 00007fffbcc54e90 R10: 00007fffbcc55050 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000005 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007fffbcc55af0 R15: 0000000000000000 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a9 CS: 0033 SS: 002b During reboot all drivers PM shutdown callbacks are invoked. In iavf_shutdown() the adapter state is changed to __IAVF_REMOVE. In ice_shutdown() the call chain above is executed, which at some point calls iavf_remove(). However iavf_remove() expects the VF to be in one of the states __IAVF_RUNNING, __IAVF_DOWN or __IAVF_INIT_FAILED. If that's not the case it sleeps forever. So if iavf_shutdown() gets invoked before iavf_remove() the system will hang indefinitely because the adapter is already in state __IAVF_REMOVE. Fix this by returning from iavf_remove() if the state is __IAVF_REMOVE, as we already went through iavf_shutdown(). Fixes: 9745780 ("iavf: Add waiting so the port is initialized in remove") Fixes: a841733 ("iavf: Fix race condition between iavf_shutdown and iavf_remove") Reported-by: Marius Cornea <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Stefan Assmann <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Michal Kubiak <[email protected]> Tested-by: Rafal Romanowski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

As reported by Christoph, the mptcp protocol can run the worker when the relevant msk socket is in an unexpected state: connect() // incoming reset + fastclose // the mptcp worker is scheduled mptcp_disconnect() // msk is now CLOSED listen() mptcp_worker() Leading to the following splat: divide error: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP CPU: 1 PID: 21 Comm: kworker/1:0 Not tainted 6.3.0-rc1-gde5e8fd0123c #11 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-2.el7 04/01/2014 Workqueue: events mptcp_worker RIP: 0010:__tcp_select_window+0x22c/0x4b0 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:3018 RSP: 0018:ffffc900000b3c98 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: 000000000000ffd7 RBX: 000000000000ffd7 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff8214ce97 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 000000000000ffd7 R08: 0000000000000004 R09: 0000000000010000 R10: 000000000000ffd7 R11: ffff888005afa148 R12: 000000000000ffd7 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88803ed00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000405270 CR3: 000000003011e006 CR4: 0000000000370ee0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> tcp_select_window net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:262 [inline] __tcp_transmit_skb+0x356/0x1280 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:1345 tcp_transmit_skb net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:1417 [inline] tcp_send_active_reset+0x13e/0x320 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:3459 mptcp_check_fastclose net/mptcp/protocol.c:2530 [inline] mptcp_worker+0x6c7/0x800 net/mptcp/protocol.c:2705 process_one_work+0x3bd/0x950 kernel/workqueue.c:2390 worker_thread+0x5b/0x610 kernel/workqueue.c:2537 kthread+0x138/0x170 kernel/kthread.c:376 ret_from_fork+0x2c/0x50 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:308 </TASK> This change addresses the issue explicitly checking for bad states before running the mptcp worker. Fixes: e16163b ("mptcp: refactor shutdown and close") Cc: [email protected] Reported-by: Christoph Paasch <[email protected]> Link: multipath-tcp/mptcp_net-next#374 Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts <[email protected]> Tested-by: Christoph Paasch <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

commit d6a0443 upstream. As reported by Christoph, the mptcp protocol can run the worker when the relevant msk socket is in an unexpected state: connect() // incoming reset + fastclose // the mptcp worker is scheduled mptcp_disconnect() // msk is now CLOSED listen() mptcp_worker() Leading to the following splat: divide error: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP CPU: 1 PID: 21 Comm: kworker/1:0 Not tainted 6.3.0-rc1-gde5e8fd0123c #11 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-2.el7 04/01/2014 Workqueue: events mptcp_worker RIP: 0010:__tcp_select_window+0x22c/0x4b0 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:3018 RSP: 0018:ffffc900000b3c98 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: 000000000000ffd7 RBX: 000000000000ffd7 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff8214ce97 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 000000000000ffd7 R08: 0000000000000004 R09: 0000000000010000 R10: 000000000000ffd7 R11: ffff888005afa148 R12: 000000000000ffd7 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88803ed00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000405270 CR3: 000000003011e006 CR4: 0000000000370ee0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> tcp_select_window net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:262 [inline] __tcp_transmit_skb+0x356/0x1280 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:1345 tcp_transmit_skb net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:1417 [inline] tcp_send_active_reset+0x13e/0x320 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:3459 mptcp_check_fastclose net/mptcp/protocol.c:2530 [inline] mptcp_worker+0x6c7/0x800 net/mptcp/protocol.c:2705 process_one_work+0x3bd/0x950 kernel/workqueue.c:2390 worker_thread+0x5b/0x610 kernel/workqueue.c:2537 kthread+0x138/0x170 kernel/kthread.c:376 ret_from_fork+0x2c/0x50 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:308 </TASK> This change addresses the issue explicitly checking for bad states before running the mptcp worker. Fixes: e16163b ("mptcp: refactor shutdown and close") Cc: [email protected] Reported-by: Christoph Paasch <[email protected]> Link: multipath-tcp/mptcp_net-next#374 Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts <[email protected]> Tested-by: Christoph Paasch <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

The mptcp worker and mptcp_accept() can race, as reported by Christoph: refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free. WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 14351 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0x105/0x1b0 lib/refcount.c:25 Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 14351 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.3.0-rc1-gde5e8fd0123c #11 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-2.el7 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0x105/0x1b0 lib/refcount.c:25 Code: 02 31 ff 89 de e8 1b f0 a7 ff 84 db 0f 85 6e ff ff ff e8 3e f5 a7 ff 48 c7 c7 d8 c7 34 83 c6 05 6d 2d 0f 02 01 e8 cb 3d 90 ff <0f> 0b e9 4f ff ff ff e8 1f f5 a7 ff 0f b6 1d 54 2d 0f 02 31 ff 89 RSP: 0018:ffffc90000a47bf8 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffff88802eae98c0 RSI: ffffffff81097d4f RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: ffff88802e712180 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffff88802eaea148 R12: ffff88802e712100 R13: ffff88802e712a88 R14: ffff888005cb93a8 R15: ffff88802e712a88 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88803ed00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f277fd89120 CR3: 0000000035486002 CR4: 0000000000370ee0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> __refcount_add include/linux/refcount.h:199 [inline] __refcount_inc include/linux/refcount.h:250 [inline] refcount_inc include/linux/refcount.h:267 [inline] sock_hold include/net/sock.h:775 [inline] __mptcp_close+0x4c6/0x4d0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:3051 mptcp_close+0x24/0xe0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:3072 inet_release+0x56/0xa0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:429 __sock_release+0x51/0xf0 net/socket.c:653 sock_close+0x18/0x20 net/socket.c:1395 __fput+0x113/0x430 fs/file_table.c:321 task_work_run+0x96/0x100 kernel/task_work.c:179 exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:38 [inline] do_exit+0x4fc/0x10c0 kernel/exit.c:869 do_group_exit+0x51/0xf0 kernel/exit.c:1019 get_signal+0x12b0/0x1390 kernel/signal.c:2859 arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x25/0x260 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:306 exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:168 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x131/0x1a0 kernel/entry/common.c:203 __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:285 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x19/0x40 kernel/entry/common.c:296 do_syscall_64+0x46/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc RIP: 0033:0x7fec4b4926a9 Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0x7fec4b49267f. RSP: 002b:00007fec49f9dd78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000ca RAX: fffffffffffffe00 RBX: 00000000006bc058 RCX: 00007fec4b4926a9 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000080 RDI: 00000000006bc058 RBP: 00000000006bc050 R08: 00000000007df998 R09: 00000000007df998 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000006bc05c R13: fffffffffffffea8 R14: 000000000000000b R15: 000000000001fe40 </TASK> The root cause is that the worker can force fallback to TCP the first mptcp subflow, actually deleting the unaccepted msk socket. We can explicitly prevent the race delaying the unaccepted msk deletion at listener shutdown time. In case the closed subflow is later accepted, just drop the mptcp context and let the user-space deal with the paired mptcp socket. Fixes: b6985b9 ("mptcp: use the workqueue to destroy unaccepted sockets") Cc: [email protected] Reported-by: Christoph Paasch <[email protected]> Link: multipath-tcp/mptcp_net-next#375 Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts <[email protected]> Tested-by: Christoph Paasch <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>

commit 6374044 upstream. The mptcp worker and mptcp_accept() can race, as reported by Christoph: refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free. WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 14351 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0x105/0x1b0 lib/refcount.c:25 Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 14351 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.3.0-rc1-gde5e8fd0123c #11 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-2.el7 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0x105/0x1b0 lib/refcount.c:25 Code: 02 31 ff 89 de e8 1b f0 a7 ff 84 db 0f 85 6e ff ff ff e8 3e f5 a7 ff 48 c7 c7 d8 c7 34 83 c6 05 6d 2d 0f 02 01 e8 cb 3d 90 ff <0f> 0b e9 4f ff ff ff e8 1f f5 a7 ff 0f b6 1d 54 2d 0f 02 31 ff 89 RSP: 0018:ffffc90000a47bf8 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffff88802eae98c0 RSI: ffffffff81097d4f RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: ffff88802e712180 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffff88802eaea148 R12: ffff88802e712100 R13: ffff88802e712a88 R14: ffff888005cb93a8 R15: ffff88802e712a88 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88803ed00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f277fd89120 CR3: 0000000035486002 CR4: 0000000000370ee0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> __refcount_add include/linux/refcount.h:199 [inline] __refcount_inc include/linux/refcount.h:250 [inline] refcount_inc include/linux/refcount.h:267 [inline] sock_hold include/net/sock.h:775 [inline] __mptcp_close+0x4c6/0x4d0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:3051 mptcp_close+0x24/0xe0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:3072 inet_release+0x56/0xa0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:429 __sock_release+0x51/0xf0 net/socket.c:653 sock_close+0x18/0x20 net/socket.c:1395 __fput+0x113/0x430 fs/file_table.c:321 task_work_run+0x96/0x100 kernel/task_work.c:179 exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:38 [inline] do_exit+0x4fc/0x10c0 kernel/exit.c:869 do_group_exit+0x51/0xf0 kernel/exit.c:1019 get_signal+0x12b0/0x1390 kernel/signal.c:2859 arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x25/0x260 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:306 exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:168 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x131/0x1a0 kernel/entry/common.c:203 __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:285 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x19/0x40 kernel/entry/common.c:296 do_syscall_64+0x46/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc RIP: 0033:0x7fec4b4926a9 Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0x7fec4b49267f. RSP: 002b:00007fec49f9dd78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000ca RAX: fffffffffffffe00 RBX: 00000000006bc058 RCX: 00007fec4b4926a9 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000080 RDI: 00000000006bc058 RBP: 00000000006bc050 R08: 00000000007df998 R09: 00000000007df998 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000006bc05c R13: fffffffffffffea8 R14: 000000000000000b R15: 000000000001fe40 </TASK> The root cause is that the worker can force fallback to TCP the first mptcp subflow, actually deleting the unaccepted msk socket. We can explicitly prevent the race delaying the unaccepted msk deletion at listener shutdown time. In case the closed subflow is later accepted, just drop the mptcp context and let the user-space deal with the paired mptcp socket. Fixes: b6985b9 ("mptcp: use the workqueue to destroy unaccepted sockets") Cc: [email protected] Reported-by: Christoph Paasch <[email protected]> Link: multipath-tcp/mptcp_net-next#375 Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts <[email protected]> Tested-by: Christoph Paasch <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit 6374044 upstream. The mptcp worker and mptcp_accept() can race, as reported by Christoph: refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free. WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 14351 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0x105/0x1b0 lib/refcount.c:25 Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 14351 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.3.0-rc1-gde5e8fd0123c #11 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-2.el7 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0x105/0x1b0 lib/refcount.c:25 Code: 02 31 ff 89 de e8 1b f0 a7 ff 84 db 0f 85 6e ff ff ff e8 3e f5 a7 ff 48 c7 c7 d8 c7 34 83 c6 05 6d 2d 0f 02 01 e8 cb 3d 90 ff <0f> 0b e9 4f ff ff ff e8 1f f5 a7 ff 0f b6 1d 54 2d 0f 02 31 ff 89 RSP: 0018:ffffc90000a47bf8 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffff88802eae98c0 RSI: ffffffff81097d4f RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: ffff88802e712180 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffff88802eaea148 R12: ffff88802e712100 R13: ffff88802e712a88 R14: ffff888005cb93a8 R15: ffff88802e712a88 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88803ed00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f277fd89120 CR3: 0000000035486002 CR4: 0000000000370ee0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> __refcount_add include/linux/refcount.h:199 [inline] __refcount_inc include/linux/refcount.h:250 [inline] refcount_inc include/linux/refcount.h:267 [inline] sock_hold include/net/sock.h:775 [inline] __mptcp_close+0x4c6/0x4d0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:3051 mptcp_close+0x24/0xe0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:3072 inet_release+0x56/0xa0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:429 __sock_release+0x51/0xf0 net/socket.c:653 sock_close+0x18/0x20 net/socket.c:1395 __fput+0x113/0x430 fs/file_table.c:321 task_work_run+0x96/0x100 kernel/task_work.c:179 exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:38 [inline] do_exit+0x4fc/0x10c0 kernel/exit.c:869 do_group_exit+0x51/0xf0 kernel/exit.c:1019 get_signal+0x12b0/0x1390 kernel/signal.c:2859 arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x25/0x260 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:306 exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:168 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x131/0x1a0 kernel/entry/common.c:203 __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:285 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x19/0x40 kernel/entry/common.c:296 do_syscall_64+0x46/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc RIP: 0033:0x7fec4b4926a9 Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0x7fec4b49267f. RSP: 002b:00007fec49f9dd78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000ca RAX: fffffffffffffe00 RBX: 00000000006bc058 RCX: 00007fec4b4926a9 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000080 RDI: 00000000006bc058 RBP: 00000000006bc050 R08: 00000000007df998 R09: 00000000007df998 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000006bc05c R13: fffffffffffffea8 R14: 000000000000000b R15: 000000000001fe40 </TASK> The root cause is that the worker can force fallback to TCP the first mptcp subflow, actually deleting the unaccepted msk socket. We can explicitly prevent the race delaying the unaccepted msk deletion at listener shutdown time. In case the closed subflow is later accepted, just drop the mptcp context and let the user-space deal with the paired mptcp socket. Fixes: b6985b9 ("mptcp: use the workqueue to destroy unaccepted sockets") Cc: [email protected] Reported-by: Christoph Paasch <[email protected]> Link: multipath-tcp/mptcp_net-next#375 Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts <[email protected]> Tested-by: Christoph Paasch <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 05bb016 ] ACPICA commit 770653e3ba67c30a629ca7d12e352d83c2541b1e Before this change we see the following UBSAN stack trace in Fuchsia: #0 0x000021e4213b3302 in acpi_ds_init_aml_walk(struct acpi_walk_state*, union acpi_parse_object*, struct acpi_namespace_node*, u8*, u32, struct acpi_evaluate_info*, u8) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/dispatcher/dswstate.c:682 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x233302 #1.2 0x000020d0f660777f in ubsan_get_stack_trace() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:41 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x3d77f #1.1 0x000020d0f660777f in maybe_print_stack_trace() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:51 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x3d77f #1 0x000020d0f660777f in ~scoped_report() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:387 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x3d77f #2 0x000020d0f660b96d in handlepointer_overflow_impl() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_handlers.cpp:809 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x4196d #3 0x000020d0f660b50d in compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_handlers.cpp:815 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x4150d #4 0x000021e4213b3302 in acpi_ds_init_aml_walk(struct acpi_walk_state*, union acpi_parse_object*, struct acpi_namespace_node*, u8*, u32, struct acpi_evaluate_info*, u8) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/dispatcher/dswstate.c:682 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x233302 #5 0x000021e4213e2369 in acpi_ds_call_control_method(struct acpi_thread_state*, struct acpi_walk_state*, union acpi_parse_object*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/dispatcher/dsmethod.c:605 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x262369 #6 0x000021e421437fac in acpi_ps_parse_aml(struct acpi_walk_state*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/parser/psparse.c:550 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2b7fac #7 0x000021e4214464d2 in acpi_ps_execute_method(struct acpi_evaluate_info*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/parser/psxface.c:244 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2c64d2 #8 0x000021e4213aa052 in acpi_ns_evaluate(struct acpi_evaluate_info*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/namespace/nseval.c:250 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x22a052 #9 0x000021e421413dd8 in acpi_ns_init_one_device(acpi_handle, u32, void*, void**) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/namespace/nsinit.c:735 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x293dd8 #10 0x000021e421429e98 in acpi_ns_walk_namespace(acpi_object_type, acpi_handle, u32, u32, acpi_walk_callback, acpi_walk_callback, void*, void**) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/namespace/nswalk.c:298 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2a9e98 #11 0x000021e4214131ac in acpi_ns_initialize_devices(u32) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/namespace/nsinit.c:268 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2931ac #12 0x000021e42147c40d in acpi_initialize_objects(u32) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/utilities/utxfinit.c:304 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2fc40d #13 0x000021e42126d603 in acpi::acpi_impl::initialize_acpi(acpi::acpi_impl*) ../../src/devices/board/lib/acpi/acpi-impl.cc:224 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0xed603 Add a simple check that avoids incrementing a pointer by zero, but otherwise behaves as before. Note that our findings are against ACPICA 20221020, but the same code exists on master. Link: acpica/acpica@770653e3 Signed-off-by: Bob Moore <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

commit 8703dd6 upstream. Commit 349d03f ("crypto: s390 - add crypto library interface for ChaCha20") added a library interface to the s390 specific ChaCha20 implementation. However no check was added to verify if the required facilities are installed before branching into the assembler code. If compiled into the kernel, this will lead to the following crash, if vector instructions are not available: data exception: 0007 ilc:3 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.3.0-rc7+ #11 Hardware name: IBM 3931 A01 704 (KVM/Linux) Krnl PSW : 0704e00180000000 000000001857277a (chacha20_vx+0x32/0x818) R:0 T:1 IO:1 EX:1 Key:0 M:1 W:0 P:0 AS:3 CC:2 PM:0 RI:0 EA:3 Krnl GPRS: 0000037f0000000a ffffffffffffff60 000000008184b000 0000000019f5c8e6 0000000000000109 0000037fffb13c58 0000037fffb13c78 0000000019bb1780 0000037fffb13c58 0000000019f5c8e6 000000008184b000 0000000000000109 00000000802d8000 0000000000000109 0000000018571ebc 0000037fffb13718 Krnl Code: 000000001857276a: c07000b1f80b larl %r7,0000000019bb1780 0000000018572770: a708000a lhi %r0,10 #0000000018572774: e78950000c36 vlm %v24,%v25,0(%r5),0 >000000001857277a: e7a060000806 vl %v26,0(%r6),0 0000000018572780: e7bf70004c36 vlm %v27,%v31,0(%r7),4 0000000018572786: e70b00000456 vlr %v0,%v27 000000001857278c: e71800000456 vlr %v1,%v24 0000000018572792: e74b00000456 vlr %v4,%v27 Call Trace: [<000000001857277a>] chacha20_vx+0x32/0x818 Last Breaking-Event-Address: [<0000000018571eb6>] chacha20_crypt_s390.constprop.0+0x6e/0xd8 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x0000000b Fix this by adding a missing MACHINE_HAS_VX check. Fixes: 349d03f ("crypto: s390 - add crypto library interface for ChaCha20") Reported-by: Marc Hartmayer <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> # 5.19+ Reviewed-by: Harald Freudenberger <[email protected]> [[email protected]: remove duplicates in commit message] Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 05bb016 ] ACPICA commit 770653e3ba67c30a629ca7d12e352d83c2541b1e Before this change we see the following UBSAN stack trace in Fuchsia: #0 0x000021e4213b3302 in acpi_ds_init_aml_walk(struct acpi_walk_state*, union acpi_parse_object*, struct acpi_namespace_node*, u8*, u32, struct acpi_evaluate_info*, u8) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/dispatcher/dswstate.c:682 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x233302 #1.2 0x000020d0f660777f in ubsan_get_stack_trace() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:41 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x3d77f #1.1 0x000020d0f660777f in maybe_print_stack_trace() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:51 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x3d77f #1 0x000020d0f660777f in ~scoped_report() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:387 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x3d77f #2 0x000020d0f660b96d in handlepointer_overflow_impl() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_handlers.cpp:809 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x4196d #3 0x000020d0f660b50d in compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_handlers.cpp:815 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x4150d #4 0x000021e4213b3302 in acpi_ds_init_aml_walk(struct acpi_walk_state*, union acpi_parse_object*, struct acpi_namespace_node*, u8*, u32, struct acpi_evaluate_info*, u8) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/dispatcher/dswstate.c:682 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x233302 #5 0x000021e4213e2369 in acpi_ds_call_control_method(struct acpi_thread_state*, struct acpi_walk_state*, union acpi_parse_object*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/dispatcher/dsmethod.c:605 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x262369 #6 0x000021e421437fac in acpi_ps_parse_aml(struct acpi_walk_state*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/parser/psparse.c:550 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2b7fac #7 0x000021e4214464d2 in acpi_ps_execute_method(struct acpi_evaluate_info*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/parser/psxface.c:244 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2c64d2 #8 0x000021e4213aa052 in acpi_ns_evaluate(struct acpi_evaluate_info*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/namespace/nseval.c:250 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x22a052 #9 0x000021e421413dd8 in acpi_ns_init_one_device(acpi_handle, u32, void*, void**) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/namespace/nsinit.c:735 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x293dd8 #10 0x000021e421429e98 in acpi_ns_walk_namespace(acpi_object_type, acpi_handle, u32, u32, acpi_walk_callback, acpi_walk_callback, void*, void**) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/namespace/nswalk.c:298 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2a9e98 #11 0x000021e4214131ac in acpi_ns_initialize_devices(u32) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/namespace/nsinit.c:268 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2931ac #12 0x000021e42147c40d in acpi_initialize_objects(u32) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/utilities/utxfinit.c:304 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2fc40d #13 0x000021e42126d603 in acpi::acpi_impl::initialize_acpi(acpi::acpi_impl*) ../../src/devices/board/lib/acpi/acpi-impl.cc:224 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0xed603 Add a simple check that avoids incrementing a pointer by zero, but otherwise behaves as before. Note that our findings are against ACPICA 20221020, but the same code exists on master. Link: acpica/acpica@770653e3 Signed-off-by: Bob Moore <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

Commit 349d03f ("crypto: s390 - add crypto library interface for ChaCha20") added a library interface to the s390 specific ChaCha20 implementation. However no check was added to verify if the required facilities are installed before branching into the assembler code. If compiled into the kernel, this will lead to the following crash, if vector instructions are not available: data exception: 0007 ilc:3 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.3.0-rc7+ #11 Hardware name: IBM 3931 A01 704 (KVM/Linux) Krnl PSW : 0704e00180000000 000000001857277a (chacha20_vx+0x32/0x818) R:0 T:1 IO:1 EX:1 Key:0 M:1 W:0 P:0 AS:3 CC:2 PM:0 RI:0 EA:3 Krnl GPRS: 0000037f0000000a ffffffffffffff60 000000008184b000 0000000019f5c8e6 0000000000000109 0000037fffb13c58 0000037fffb13c78 0000000019bb1780 0000037fffb13c58 0000000019f5c8e6 000000008184b000 0000000000000109 00000000802d8000 0000000000000109 0000000018571ebc 0000037fffb13718 Krnl Code: 000000001857276a: c07000b1f80b larl %r7,0000000019bb1780 0000000018572770: a708000a lhi %r0,10 #0000000018572774: e78950000c36 vlm %v24,%v25,0(%r5),0 >000000001857277a: e7a060000806 vl %v26,0(%r6),0 0000000018572780: e7bf70004c36 vlm %v27,%v31,0(%r7),4 0000000018572786: e70b00000456 vlr %v0,%v27 000000001857278c: e71800000456 vlr %v1,%v24 0000000018572792: e74b00000456 vlr %v4,%v27 Call Trace: [<000000001857277a>] chacha20_vx+0x32/0x818 Last Breaking-Event-Address: [<0000000018571eb6>] chacha20_crypt_s390.constprop.0+0x6e/0xd8 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x0000000b Fix this by adding a missing MACHINE_HAS_VX check. Fixes: 349d03f ("crypto: s390 - add crypto library interface for ChaCha20") Reported-by: Marc Hartmayer <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> # 5.19+ Reviewed-by: Harald Freudenberger <[email protected]> [[email protected]: remove duplicates in commit message] Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 05bb016 ] ACPICA commit 770653e3ba67c30a629ca7d12e352d83c2541b1e Before this change we see the following UBSAN stack trace in Fuchsia: #0 0x000021e4213b3302 in acpi_ds_init_aml_walk(struct acpi_walk_state*, union acpi_parse_object*, struct acpi_namespace_node*, u8*, u32, struct acpi_evaluate_info*, u8) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/dispatcher/dswstate.c:682 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x233302 #1.2 0x000020d0f660777f in ubsan_get_stack_trace() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:41 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x3d77f #1.1 0x000020d0f660777f in maybe_print_stack_trace() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:51 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x3d77f #1 0x000020d0f660777f in ~scoped_report() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:387 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x3d77f #2 0x000020d0f660b96d in handlepointer_overflow_impl() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_handlers.cpp:809 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x4196d #3 0x000020d0f660b50d in compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_handlers.cpp:815 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x4150d #4 0x000021e4213b3302 in acpi_ds_init_aml_walk(struct acpi_walk_state*, union acpi_parse_object*, struct acpi_namespace_node*, u8*, u32, struct acpi_evaluate_info*, u8) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/dispatcher/dswstate.c:682 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x233302 #5 0x000021e4213e2369 in acpi_ds_call_control_method(struct acpi_thread_state*, struct acpi_walk_state*, union acpi_parse_object*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/dispatcher/dsmethod.c:605 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x262369 #6 0x000021e421437fac in acpi_ps_parse_aml(struct acpi_walk_state*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/parser/psparse.c:550 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2b7fac #7 0x000021e4214464d2 in acpi_ps_execute_method(struct acpi_evaluate_info*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/parser/psxface.c:244 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2c64d2 #8 0x000021e4213aa052 in acpi_ns_evaluate(struct acpi_evaluate_info*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/namespace/nseval.c:250 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x22a052 #9 0x000021e421413dd8 in acpi_ns_init_one_device(acpi_handle, u32, void*, void**) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/namespace/nsinit.c:735 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x293dd8 #10 0x000021e421429e98 in acpi_ns_walk_namespace(acpi_object_type, acpi_handle, u32, u32, acpi_walk_callback, acpi_walk_callback, void*, void**) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/namespace/nswalk.c:298 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2a9e98 #11 0x000021e4214131ac in acpi_ns_initialize_devices(u32) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/namespace/nsinit.c:268 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2931ac #12 0x000021e42147c40d in acpi_initialize_objects(u32) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/utilities/utxfinit.c:304 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2fc40d #13 0x000021e42126d603 in acpi::acpi_impl::initialize_acpi(acpi::acpi_impl*) ../../src/devices/board/lib/acpi/acpi-impl.cc:224 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0xed603 Add a simple check that avoids incrementing a pointer by zero, but otherwise behaves as before. Note that our findings are against ACPICA 20221020, but the same code exists on master. Link: acpica/acpica@770653e3 Signed-off-by: Bob Moore <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

commit 8703dd6 upstream. Commit 349d03f ("crypto: s390 - add crypto library interface for ChaCha20") added a library interface to the s390 specific ChaCha20 implementation. However no check was added to verify if the required facilities are installed before branching into the assembler code. If compiled into the kernel, this will lead to the following crash, if vector instructions are not available: data exception: 0007 ilc:3 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.3.0-rc7+ #11 Hardware name: IBM 3931 A01 704 (KVM/Linux) Krnl PSW : 0704e00180000000 000000001857277a (chacha20_vx+0x32/0x818) R:0 T:1 IO:1 EX:1 Key:0 M:1 W:0 P:0 AS:3 CC:2 PM:0 RI:0 EA:3 Krnl GPRS: 0000037f0000000a ffffffffffffff60 000000008184b000 0000000019f5c8e6 0000000000000109 0000037fffb13c58 0000037fffb13c78 0000000019bb1780 0000037fffb13c58 0000000019f5c8e6 000000008184b000 0000000000000109 00000000802d8000 0000000000000109 0000000018571ebc 0000037fffb13718 Krnl Code: 000000001857276a: c07000b1f80b larl %r7,0000000019bb1780 0000000018572770: a708000a lhi %r0,10 #0000000018572774: e78950000c36 vlm %v24,%v25,0(%r5),0 >000000001857277a: e7a060000806 vl %v26,0(%r6),0 0000000018572780: e7bf70004c36 vlm %v27,%v31,0(%r7),4 0000000018572786: e70b00000456 vlr %v0,%v27 000000001857278c: e71800000456 vlr %v1,%v24 0000000018572792: e74b00000456 vlr %v4,%v27 Call Trace: [<000000001857277a>] chacha20_vx+0x32/0x818 Last Breaking-Event-Address: [<0000000018571eb6>] chacha20_crypt_s390.constprop.0+0x6e/0xd8 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x0000000b Fix this by adding a missing MACHINE_HAS_VX check. Fixes: 349d03f ("crypto: s390 - add crypto library interface for ChaCha20") Reported-by: Marc Hartmayer <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> # 5.19+ Reviewed-by: Harald Freudenberger <[email protected]> [[email protected]: remove duplicates in commit message] Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 37c3b9f ] The cited commit adds a compeletion to remove dependency on rtnl lock. But it causes a deadlock for multiple encapsulations: crash> bt ffff8aece8a64000 PID: 1514557 TASK: ffff8aece8a64000 CPU: 3 COMMAND: "tc" #0 [ffffa6d14183f368] __schedule at ffffffffb8ba7f45 #1 [ffffa6d14183f3f8] schedule at ffffffffb8ba8418 #2 [ffffa6d14183f418] schedule_preempt_disabled at ffffffffb8ba8898 #3 [ffffa6d14183f428] __mutex_lock at ffffffffb8baa7f8 #4 [ffffa6d14183f4d0] mutex_lock_nested at ffffffffb8baabeb #5 [ffffa6d14183f4e0] mlx5e_attach_encap at ffffffffc0f48c17 [mlx5_core] #6 [ffffa6d14183f628] mlx5e_tc_add_fdb_flow at ffffffffc0f39680 [mlx5_core] #7 [ffffa6d14183f688] __mlx5e_add_fdb_flow at ffffffffc0f3b636 [mlx5_core] #8 [ffffa6d14183f6f0] mlx5e_tc_add_flow at ffffffffc0f3bcdf [mlx5_core] #9 [ffffa6d14183f728] mlx5e_configure_flower at ffffffffc0f3c1d1 [mlx5_core] #10 [ffffa6d14183f790] mlx5e_rep_setup_tc_cls_flower at ffffffffc0f3d529 [mlx5_core] #11 [ffffa6d14183f7a0] mlx5e_rep_setup_tc_cb at ffffffffc0f3d714 [mlx5_core] #12 [ffffa6d14183f7b0] tc_setup_cb_add at ffffffffb8931bb8 #13 [ffffa6d14183f810] fl_hw_replace_filter at ffffffffc0dae901 [cls_flower] #14 [ffffa6d14183f8d8] fl_change at ffffffffc0db5c57 [cls_flower] #15 [ffffa6d14183f970] tc_new_tfilter at ffffffffb8936047 #16 [ffffa6d14183fac8] rtnetlink_rcv_msg at ffffffffb88c7c31 #17 [ffffa6d14183fb50] netlink_rcv_skb at ffffffffb8942853 #18 [ffffa6d14183fbc0] rtnetlink_rcv at ffffffffb88c1835 #19 [ffffa6d14183fbd0] netlink_unicast at ffffffffb8941f27 #20 [ffffa6d14183fc18] netlink_sendmsg at ffffffffb8942245 #21 [ffffa6d14183fc98] sock_sendmsg at ffffffffb887d482 #22 [ffffa6d14183fcb8] ____sys_sendmsg at ffffffffb887d81a #23 [ffffa6d14183fd38] ___sys_sendmsg at ffffffffb88806e2 #24 [ffffa6d14183fe90] __sys_sendmsg at ffffffffb88807a2 #25 [ffffa6d14183ff28] __x64_sys_sendmsg at ffffffffb888080f #26 [ffffa6d14183ff38] do_syscall_64 at ffffffffb8b9b6a8 #27 [ffffa6d14183ff50] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe at ffffffffb8c0007c crash> bt 0xffff8aeb07544000 PID: 1110766 TASK: ffff8aeb07544000 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "kworker/u20:9" #0 [ffffa6d14e6b7bd8] __schedule at ffffffffb8ba7f45 #1 [ffffa6d14e6b7c68] schedule at ffffffffb8ba8418 #2 [ffffa6d14e6b7c88] schedule_timeout at ffffffffb8baef88 #3 [ffffa6d14e6b7d10] wait_for_completion at ffffffffb8ba968b #4 [ffffa6d14e6b7d60] mlx5e_take_all_encap_flows at ffffffffc0f47ec4 [mlx5_core] #5 [ffffa6d14e6b7da0] mlx5e_rep_update_flows at ffffffffc0f3e734 [mlx5_core] #6 [ffffa6d14e6b7df8] mlx5e_rep_neigh_update at ffffffffc0f400bb [mlx5_core] #7 [ffffa6d14e6b7e50] process_one_work at ffffffffb80acc9c #8 [ffffa6d14e6b7ed0] worker_thread at ffffffffb80ad012 #9 [ffffa6d14e6b7f10] kthread at ffffffffb80b615d #10 [ffffa6d14e6b7f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffffb8001b2f After the first encap is attached, flow will be added to encap entry's flows list. If neigh update is running at this time, the following encaps of the flow can't hold the encap_tbl_lock and sleep. If neigh update thread is waiting for that flow's init_done, deadlock happens. Fix it by holding lock outside of the for loop. If neigh update is running, prevent encap flows from offloading. Since the lock is held outside of the for loop, concurrent creation of encap entries is not allowed. So remove unnecessary wait_for_completion call for res_ready. Fixes: 95435ad ("net/mlx5e: Only access fully initialized flows in neigh update") Signed-off-by: Chris Mi <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Roi Dayan <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Vlad Buslov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit de9df6c ] Currently, the per cpu upcall counters are allocated after the vport is created and inserted into the system. This could lead to the datapath accessing the counters before they are allocated resulting in a kernel Oops. Here is an example: PID: 59693 TASK: ffff0005f4f51500 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "ovs-vswitchd" #0 [ffff80000a39b5b0] __switch_to at ffffb70f0629f2f4 #1 [ffff80000a39b5d0] __schedule at ffffb70f0629f5cc #2 [ffff80000a39b650] preempt_schedule_common at ffffb70f0629fa60 #3 [ffff80000a39b670] dynamic_might_resched at ffffb70f0629fb58 #4 [ffff80000a39b680] mutex_lock_killable at ffffb70f062a1388 #5 [ffff80000a39b6a0] pcpu_alloc at ffffb70f0594460c #6 [ffff80000a39b750] __alloc_percpu_gfp at ffffb70f05944e68 #7 [ffff80000a39b760] ovs_vport_cmd_new at ffffb70ee6961b90 [openvswitch] ... PID: 58682 TASK: ffff0005b2f0bf00 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "kworker/0:3" #0 [ffff80000a5d2f40] machine_kexec at ffffb70f056a0758 #1 [ffff80000a5d2f70] __crash_kexec at ffffb70f057e2994 #2 [ffff80000a5d3100] crash_kexec at ffffb70f057e2ad8 #3 [ffff80000a5d3120] die at ffffb70f0628234c #4 [ffff80000a5d31e0] die_kernel_fault at ffffb70f062828a8 #5 [ffff80000a5d3210] __do_kernel_fault at ffffb70f056a31f4 #6 [ffff80000a5d3240] do_bad_area at ffffb70f056a32a4 #7 [ffff80000a5d3260] do_translation_fault at ffffb70f062a9710 #8 [ffff80000a5d3270] do_mem_abort at ffffb70f056a2f74 #9 [ffff80000a5d32a0] el1_abort at ffffb70f06297dac #10 [ffff80000a5d32d0] el1h_64_sync_handler at ffffb70f06299b24 #11 [ffff80000a5d3410] el1h_64_sync at ffffb70f056812dc #12 [ffff80000a5d3430] ovs_dp_upcall at ffffb70ee6963c84 [openvswitch] #13 [ffff80000a5d3470] ovs_dp_process_packet at ffffb70ee6963fdc [openvswitch] #14 [ffff80000a5d34f0] ovs_vport_receive at ffffb70ee6972c78 [openvswitch] #15 [ffff80000a5d36f0] netdev_port_receive at ffffb70ee6973948 [openvswitch] #16 [ffff80000a5d3720] netdev_frame_hook at ffffb70ee6973a28 [openvswitch] #17 [ffff80000a5d3730] __netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0 at ffffb70f06079f90 We moved the per cpu upcall counter allocation to the existing vport alloc and free functions to solve this. Fixes: 95637d9 ("net: openvswitch: release vport resources on failure") Fixes: 1933ea3 ("net: openvswitch: Add support to count upcall packets") Signed-off-by: Eelco Chaudron <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]> Acked-by: Aaron Conole <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 05bb016 ] ACPICA commit 770653e3ba67c30a629ca7d12e352d83c2541b1e Before this change we see the following UBSAN stack trace in Fuchsia: #0 0x000021e4213b3302 in acpi_ds_init_aml_walk(struct acpi_walk_state*, union acpi_parse_object*, struct acpi_namespace_node*, u8*, u32, struct acpi_evaluate_info*, u8) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/dispatcher/dswstate.c:682 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x233302 #1.2 0x000020d0f660777f in ubsan_get_stack_trace() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:41 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x3d77f #1.1 0x000020d0f660777f in maybe_print_stack_trace() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:51 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x3d77f #1 0x000020d0f660777f in ~scoped_report() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:387 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x3d77f #2 0x000020d0f660b96d in handlepointer_overflow_impl() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_handlers.cpp:809 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x4196d #3 0x000020d0f660b50d in compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_handlers.cpp:815 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x4150d #4 0x000021e4213b3302 in acpi_ds_init_aml_walk(struct acpi_walk_state*, union acpi_parse_object*, struct acpi_namespace_node*, u8*, u32, struct acpi_evaluate_info*, u8) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/dispatcher/dswstate.c:682 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x233302 #5 0x000021e4213e2369 in acpi_ds_call_control_method(struct acpi_thread_state*, struct acpi_walk_state*, union acpi_parse_object*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/dispatcher/dsmethod.c:605 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x262369 #6 0x000021e421437fac in acpi_ps_parse_aml(struct acpi_walk_state*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/parser/psparse.c:550 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2b7fac #7 0x000021e4214464d2 in acpi_ps_execute_method(struct acpi_evaluate_info*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/parser/psxface.c:244 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2c64d2 #8 0x000021e4213aa052 in acpi_ns_evaluate(struct acpi_evaluate_info*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/namespace/nseval.c:250 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x22a052 #9 0x000021e421413dd8 in acpi_ns_init_one_device(acpi_handle, u32, void*, void**) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/namespace/nsinit.c:735 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x293dd8 #10 0x000021e421429e98 in acpi_ns_walk_namespace(acpi_object_type, acpi_handle, u32, u32, acpi_walk_callback, acpi_walk_callback, void*, void**) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/namespace/nswalk.c:298 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2a9e98 #11 0x000021e4214131ac in acpi_ns_initialize_devices(u32) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/namespace/nsinit.c:268 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2931ac #12 0x000021e42147c40d in acpi_initialize_objects(u32) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/utilities/utxfinit.c:304 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2fc40d #13 0x000021e42126d603 in acpi::acpi_impl::initialize_acpi(acpi::acpi_impl*) ../../src/devices/board/lib/acpi/acpi-impl.cc:224 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0xed603 Add a simple check that avoids incrementing a pointer by zero, but otherwise behaves as before. Note that our findings are against ACPICA 20221020, but the same code exists on master. Link: acpica/acpica@770653e3 Signed-off-by: Bob Moore <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

Currently, the per cpu upcall counters are allocated after the vport is created and inserted into the system. This could lead to the datapath accessing the counters before they are allocated resulting in a kernel Oops. Here is an example: PID: 59693 TASK: ffff0005f4f51500 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "ovs-vswitchd" #0 [ffff80000a39b5b0] __switch_to at ffffb70f0629f2f4 #1 [ffff80000a39b5d0] __schedule at ffffb70f0629f5cc #2 [ffff80000a39b650] preempt_schedule_common at ffffb70f0629fa60 #3 [ffff80000a39b670] dynamic_might_resched at ffffb70f0629fb58 #4 [ffff80000a39b680] mutex_lock_killable at ffffb70f062a1388 #5 [ffff80000a39b6a0] pcpu_alloc at ffffb70f0594460c #6 [ffff80000a39b750] __alloc_percpu_gfp at ffffb70f05944e68 #7 [ffff80000a39b760] ovs_vport_cmd_new at ffffb70ee6961b90 [openvswitch] ... PID: 58682 TASK: ffff0005b2f0bf00 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "kworker/0:3" #0 [ffff80000a5d2f40] machine_kexec at ffffb70f056a0758 #1 [ffff80000a5d2f70] __crash_kexec at ffffb70f057e2994 #2 [ffff80000a5d3100] crash_kexec at ffffb70f057e2ad8 #3 [ffff80000a5d3120] die at ffffb70f0628234c #4 [ffff80000a5d31e0] die_kernel_fault at ffffb70f062828a8 #5 [ffff80000a5d3210] __do_kernel_fault at ffffb70f056a31f4 #6 [ffff80000a5d3240] do_bad_area at ffffb70f056a32a4 #7 [ffff80000a5d3260] do_translation_fault at ffffb70f062a9710 #8 [ffff80000a5d3270] do_mem_abort at ffffb70f056a2f74 #9 [ffff80000a5d32a0] el1_abort at ffffb70f06297dac #10 [ffff80000a5d32d0] el1h_64_sync_handler at ffffb70f06299b24 #11 [ffff80000a5d3410] el1h_64_sync at ffffb70f056812dc #12 [ffff80000a5d3430] ovs_dp_upcall at ffffb70ee6963c84 [openvswitch] #13 [ffff80000a5d3470] ovs_dp_process_packet at ffffb70ee6963fdc [openvswitch] #14 [ffff80000a5d34f0] ovs_vport_receive at ffffb70ee6972c78 [openvswitch] #15 [ffff80000a5d36f0] netdev_port_receive at ffffb70ee6973948 [openvswitch] #16 [ffff80000a5d3720] netdev_frame_hook at ffffb70ee6973a28 [openvswitch] #17 [ffff80000a5d3730] __netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0 at ffffb70f06079f90 We moved the per cpu upcall counter allocation to the existing vport alloc and free functions to solve this. Fixes: 95637d9 ("net: openvswitch: release vport resources on failure") Fixes: 1933ea3 ("net: openvswitch: Add support to count upcall packets") Signed-off-by: Eelco Chaudron <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]> Acked-by: Aaron Conole <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 99d4850 ] Found by leak sanitizer: ``` ==1632594==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 21 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f2953a7077b in __interceptor_strdup ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_interceptors.cpp:439 #1 0x556701d6fbbf in perf_env__read_cpuid util/env.c:369 #2 0x556701d70589 in perf_env__cpuid util/env.c:465 #3 0x55670204bba2 in x86__is_amd_cpu arch/x86/util/env.c:14 #4 0x5567020487a2 in arch__post_evsel_config arch/x86/util/evsel.c:83 #5 0x556701d8f78b in evsel__config util/evsel.c:1366 #6 0x556701ef5872 in evlist__config util/record.c:108 #7 0x556701cd6bcd in test__PERF_RECORD tests/perf-record.c:112 #8 0x556701cacd07 in run_test tests/builtin-test.c:236 #9 0x556701cacfac in test_and_print tests/builtin-test.c:265 #10 0x556701cadddb in __cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:402 #11 0x556701caf2aa in cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:559 #12 0x556701d3b557 in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:323 #13 0x556701d3bac8 in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:377 #14 0x556701d3be90 in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:421 #15 0x556701d3c3f8 in main tools/perf/perf.c:537 #16 0x7f2952a46189 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 21 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s). ``` Fixes: f7b58cb ("perf mem/c2c: Add load store event mappings for AMD") Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]> Acked-by: Ravi Bangoria <[email protected]> Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]> Cc: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]> Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Ravi Bangoria <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

syzkaller reported infinite recursive calls of fib6_dump_done() during netlink socket destruction. [1] From the log, syzkaller sent an AF_UNSPEC RTM_GETROUTE message, and then the response was generated. The following recvmmsg() resumed the dump for IPv6, but the first call of inet6_dump_fib() failed at kzalloc() due to the fault injection. [0] 12:01:34 executing program 3: r0 = socket$nl_route(0x10, 0x3, 0x0) sendmsg$nl_route(r0, ... snip ...) recvmmsg(r0, ... snip ...) (fail_nth: 8) Here, fib6_dump_done() was set to nlk_sk(sk)->cb.done, and the next call of inet6_dump_fib() set it to nlk_sk(sk)->cb.args[3]. syzkaller stopped receiving the response halfway through, and finally netlink_sock_destruct() called nlk_sk(sk)->cb.done(). fib6_dump_done() calls fib6_dump_end() and nlk_sk(sk)->cb.done() if it is still not NULL. fib6_dump_end() rewrites nlk_sk(sk)->cb.done() by nlk_sk(sk)->cb.args[3], but it has the same function, not NULL, calling itself recursively and hitting the stack guard page. To avoid the issue, let's set the destructor after kzalloc(). [0]: FAULT_INJECTION: forcing a failure. name failslab, interval 1, probability 0, space 0, times 0 CPU: 1 PID: 432110 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 6.8.0-12821-g537c2e91d354-dirty #11 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:117) should_fail_ex (lib/fault-inject.c:52 lib/fault-inject.c:153) should_failslab (mm/slub.c:3733) kmalloc_trace (mm/slub.c:3748 mm/slub.c:3827 mm/slub.c:3992) inet6_dump_fib (./include/linux/slab.h:628 ./include/linux/slab.h:749 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:662) rtnl_dump_all (net/core/rtnetlink.c:4029) netlink_dump (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2269) netlink_recvmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1988) ____sys_recvmsg (net/socket.c:1046 net/socket.c:2801) ___sys_recvmsg (net/socket.c:2846) do_recvmmsg (net/socket.c:2943) __x64_sys_recvmmsg (net/socket.c:3041 net/socket.c:3034 net/socket.c:3034) [1]: BUG: TASK stack guard page was hit at 00000000f2fa9af1 (stack is 00000000b7912430..000000009a436beb) stack guard page: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 1 PID: 223719 Comm: kworker/1:3 Not tainted 6.8.0-12821-g537c2e91d354-dirty #11 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Workqueue: events netlink_sock_destruct_work RIP: 0010:fib6_dump_done (net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:570) Code: 3c 24 e8 f3 e9 51 fd e9 28 fd ff ff 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 41 57 41 56 41 55 41 54 55 48 89 fd <53> 48 8d 5d 60 e8 b6 4d 07 fd 48 89 da 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff RSP: 0018:ffffc9000d980000 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffff84405990 RCX: ffffffff844059d3 RDX: ffff8881028e0000 RSI: ffffffff84405ac2 RDI: ffff88810c02f358 RBP: ffff88810c02f358 R08: 0000000000000007 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000224 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff888007c82c78 R14: ffff888007c82c68 R15: ffff888007c82c68 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88811b100000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffffc9000d97fff8 CR3: 0000000102309002 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <#DF> </#DF> <TASK> fib6_dump_done (net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:572 (discriminator 1)) fib6_dump_done (net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:572 (discriminator 1)) ... fib6_dump_done (net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:572 (discriminator 1)) fib6_dump_done (net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:572 (discriminator 1)) netlink_sock_destruct (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:401) __sk_destruct (net/core/sock.c:2177 (discriminator 2)) sk_destruct (net/core/sock.c:2224) __sk_free (net/core/sock.c:2235) sk_free (net/core/sock.c:2246) process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3259) worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3329 kernel/workqueue.c:3416) kthread (kernel/kthread.c:388) ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:153) ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:256) Modules linked in: Fixes: 1da177e ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-by: syzkaller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: David Ahern <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

commit d21d406 upstream. syzkaller reported infinite recursive calls of fib6_dump_done() during netlink socket destruction. [1] From the log, syzkaller sent an AF_UNSPEC RTM_GETROUTE message, and then the response was generated. The following recvmmsg() resumed the dump for IPv6, but the first call of inet6_dump_fib() failed at kzalloc() due to the fault injection. [0] 12:01:34 executing program 3: r0 = socket$nl_route(0x10, 0x3, 0x0) sendmsg$nl_route(r0, ... snip ...) recvmmsg(r0, ... snip ...) (fail_nth: 8) Here, fib6_dump_done() was set to nlk_sk(sk)->cb.done, and the next call of inet6_dump_fib() set it to nlk_sk(sk)->cb.args[3]. syzkaller stopped receiving the response halfway through, and finally netlink_sock_destruct() called nlk_sk(sk)->cb.done(). fib6_dump_done() calls fib6_dump_end() and nlk_sk(sk)->cb.done() if it is still not NULL. fib6_dump_end() rewrites nlk_sk(sk)->cb.done() by nlk_sk(sk)->cb.args[3], but it has the same function, not NULL, calling itself recursively and hitting the stack guard page. To avoid the issue, let's set the destructor after kzalloc(). [0]: FAULT_INJECTION: forcing a failure. name failslab, interval 1, probability 0, space 0, times 0 CPU: 1 PID: 432110 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 6.8.0-12821-g537c2e91d354-dirty #11 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:117) should_fail_ex (lib/fault-inject.c:52 lib/fault-inject.c:153) should_failslab (mm/slub.c:3733) kmalloc_trace (mm/slub.c:3748 mm/slub.c:3827 mm/slub.c:3992) inet6_dump_fib (./include/linux/slab.h:628 ./include/linux/slab.h:749 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:662) rtnl_dump_all (net/core/rtnetlink.c:4029) netlink_dump (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2269) netlink_recvmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1988) ____sys_recvmsg (net/socket.c:1046 net/socket.c:2801) ___sys_recvmsg (net/socket.c:2846) do_recvmmsg (net/socket.c:2943) __x64_sys_recvmmsg (net/socket.c:3041 net/socket.c:3034 net/socket.c:3034) [1]: BUG: TASK stack guard page was hit at 00000000f2fa9af1 (stack is 00000000b7912430..000000009a436beb) stack guard page: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 1 PID: 223719 Comm: kworker/1:3 Not tainted 6.8.0-12821-g537c2e91d354-dirty #11 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Workqueue: events netlink_sock_destruct_work RIP: 0010:fib6_dump_done (net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:570) Code: 3c 24 e8 f3 e9 51 fd e9 28 fd ff ff 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 41 57 41 56 41 55 41 54 55 48 89 fd <53> 48 8d 5d 60 e8 b6 4d 07 fd 48 89 da 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff RSP: 0018:ffffc9000d980000 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffff84405990 RCX: ffffffff844059d3 RDX: ffff8881028e0000 RSI: ffffffff84405ac2 RDI: ffff88810c02f358 RBP: ffff88810c02f358 R08: 0000000000000007 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000224 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff888007c82c78 R14: ffff888007c82c68 R15: ffff888007c82c68 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88811b100000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffffc9000d97fff8 CR3: 0000000102309002 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <#DF> </#DF> <TASK> fib6_dump_done (net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:572 (discriminator 1)) fib6_dump_done (net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:572 (discriminator 1)) ... fib6_dump_done (net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:572 (discriminator 1)) fib6_dump_done (net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:572 (discriminator 1)) netlink_sock_destruct (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:401) __sk_destruct (net/core/sock.c:2177 (discriminator 2)) sk_destruct (net/core/sock.c:2224) __sk_free (net/core/sock.c:2235) sk_free (net/core/sock.c:2246) process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3259) worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3329 kernel/workqueue.c:3416) kthread (kernel/kthread.c:388) ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:153) ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:256) Modules linked in: Fixes: 1da177e ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-by: syzkaller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: David Ahern <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

vhost_worker will call tun call backs to receive packets. If too many illegal packets arrives, tun_do_read will keep dumping packet contents. When console is enabled, it will costs much more cpu time to dump packet and soft lockup will be detected. net_ratelimit mechanism can be used to limit the dumping rate. PID: 33036 TASK: ffff949da6f20000 CPU: 23 COMMAND: "vhost-32980" #0 [fffffe00003fce50] crash_nmi_callback at ffffffff89249253 #1 [fffffe00003fce58] nmi_handle at ffffffff89225fa3 #2 [fffffe00003fceb0] default_do_nmi at ffffffff8922642e #3 [fffffe00003fced0] do_nmi at ffffffff8922660d #4 [fffffe00003fcef0] end_repeat_nmi at ffffffff89c01663 [exception RIP: io_serial_in+20] RIP: ffffffff89792594 RSP: ffffa655314979e8 RFLAGS: 00000002 RAX: ffffffff89792500 RBX: ffffffff8af428a0 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 00000000000003fd RSI: 0000000000000005 RDI: ffffffff8af428a0 RBP: 0000000000002710 R8: 0000000000000004 R9: 000000000000000f R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffff8acbf64f R12: 0000000000000020 R13: ffffffff8acbf698 R14: 0000000000000058 R15: 0000000000000000 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #5 [ffffa655314979e8] io_serial_in at ffffffff89792594 #6 [ffffa655314979e8] wait_for_xmitr at ffffffff89793470 #7 [ffffa65531497a08] serial8250_console_putchar at ffffffff897934f6 #8 [ffffa65531497a20] uart_console_write at ffffffff8978b605 #9 [ffffa65531497a48] serial8250_console_write at ffffffff89796558 #10 [ffffa65531497ac8] console_unlock at ffffffff89316124 #11 [ffffa65531497b10] vprintk_emit at ffffffff89317c07 #12 [ffffa65531497b68] printk at ffffffff89318306 #13 [ffffa65531497bc8] print_hex_dump at ffffffff89650765 #14 [ffffa65531497ca8] tun_do_read at ffffffffc0b06c27 [tun] #15 [ffffa65531497d38] tun_recvmsg at ffffffffc0b06e34 [tun] #16 [ffffa65531497d68] handle_rx at ffffffffc0c5d682 [vhost_net] #17 [ffffa65531497ed0] vhost_worker at ffffffffc0c644dc [vhost] #18 [ffffa65531497f10] kthread at ffffffff892d2e72 #19 [ffffa65531497f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff89c0022f Fixes: ef3db4a ("tun: avoid BUG, dump packet on GSO errors") Signed-off-by: Lei Chen <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]> Acked-by: Jason Wang <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f8bbc07 ] vhost_worker will call tun call backs to receive packets. If too many illegal packets arrives, tun_do_read will keep dumping packet contents. When console is enabled, it will costs much more cpu time to dump packet and soft lockup will be detected. net_ratelimit mechanism can be used to limit the dumping rate. PID: 33036 TASK: ffff949da6f20000 CPU: 23 COMMAND: "vhost-32980" #0 [fffffe00003fce50] crash_nmi_callback at ffffffff89249253 #1 [fffffe00003fce58] nmi_handle at ffffffff89225fa3 #2 [fffffe00003fceb0] default_do_nmi at ffffffff8922642e #3 [fffffe00003fced0] do_nmi at ffffffff8922660d #4 [fffffe00003fcef0] end_repeat_nmi at ffffffff89c01663 [exception RIP: io_serial_in+20] RIP: ffffffff89792594 RSP: ffffa655314979e8 RFLAGS: 00000002 RAX: ffffffff89792500 RBX: ffffffff8af428a0 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 00000000000003fd RSI: 0000000000000005 RDI: ffffffff8af428a0 RBP: 0000000000002710 R8: 0000000000000004 R9: 000000000000000f R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffff8acbf64f R12: 0000000000000020 R13: ffffffff8acbf698 R14: 0000000000000058 R15: 0000000000000000 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #5 [ffffa655314979e8] io_serial_in at ffffffff89792594 #6 [ffffa655314979e8] wait_for_xmitr at ffffffff89793470 #7 [ffffa65531497a08] serial8250_console_putchar at ffffffff897934f6 #8 [ffffa65531497a20] uart_console_write at ffffffff8978b605 #9 [ffffa65531497a48] serial8250_console_write at ffffffff89796558 #10 [ffffa65531497ac8] console_unlock at ffffffff89316124 #11 [ffffa65531497b10] vprintk_emit at ffffffff89317c07 #12 [ffffa65531497b68] printk at ffffffff89318306 #13 [ffffa65531497bc8] print_hex_dump at ffffffff89650765 #14 [ffffa65531497ca8] tun_do_read at ffffffffc0b06c27 [tun] #15 [ffffa65531497d38] tun_recvmsg at ffffffffc0b06e34 [tun] #16 [ffffa65531497d68] handle_rx at ffffffffc0c5d682 [vhost_net] #17 [ffffa65531497ed0] vhost_worker at ffffffffc0c644dc [vhost] #18 [ffffa65531497f10] kthread at ffffffff892d2e72 #19 [ffffa65531497f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff89c0022f Fixes: ef3db4a ("tun: avoid BUG, dump packet on GSO errors") Signed-off-by: Lei Chen <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]> Acked-by: Jason Wang <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

The dev_tracker is added to ax25_cb in ax25_bind(). When the ax25 device is detaching, the dev_tracker of ax25_cb should be deallocated in ax25_kill_by_device() instead of the dev_tracker of ax25_dev. The log reported by ref_tracker is shown below: [ 80.884935] ref_tracker: reference already released. [ 80.885150] ref_tracker: allocated in: [ 80.885349] ax25_dev_device_up+0x105/0x540 [ 80.885730] ax25_device_event+0xa4/0x420 [ 80.885730] notifier_call_chain+0xc9/0x1e0 [ 80.885730] __dev_notify_flags+0x138/0x280 [ 80.885730] dev_change_flags+0xd7/0x180 [ 80.885730] dev_ifsioc+0x6a9/0xa30 [ 80.885730] dev_ioctl+0x4d8/0xd90 [ 80.885730] sock_do_ioctl+0x1c2/0x2d0 [ 80.885730] sock_ioctl+0x38b/0x4f0 [ 80.885730] __se_sys_ioctl+0xad/0xf0 [ 80.885730] do_syscall_64+0xc4/0x1b0 [ 80.885730] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x67/0x6f [ 80.885730] ref_tracker: freed in: [ 80.885730] ax25_device_event+0x272/0x420 [ 80.885730] notifier_call_chain+0xc9/0x1e0 [ 80.885730] dev_close_many+0x272/0x370 [ 80.885730] unregister_netdevice_many_notify+0x3b5/0x1180 [ 80.885730] unregister_netdev+0xcf/0x120 [ 80.885730] sixpack_close+0x11f/0x1b0 [ 80.885730] tty_ldisc_kill+0xcb/0x190 [ 80.885730] tty_ldisc_hangup+0x338/0x3d0 [ 80.885730] __tty_hangup+0x504/0x740 [ 80.885730] tty_release+0x46e/0xd80 [ 80.885730] __fput+0x37f/0x770 [ 80.885730] __x64_sys_close+0x7b/0xb0 [ 80.885730] do_syscall_64+0xc4/0x1b0 [ 80.885730] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x67/0x6f [ 80.893739] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 80.894030] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 140 at lib/ref_tracker.c:255 ref_tracker_free+0x47b/0x6b0 [ 80.894297] Modules linked in: [ 80.894929] CPU: 2 PID: 140 Comm: ax25_conn_rel_6 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc4-g8cd26fd90c1a #11 [ 80.895190] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qem4 [ 80.895514] RIP: 0010:ref_tracker_free+0x47b/0x6b0 [ 80.895808] Code: 83 c5 18 4c 89 eb 48 c1 eb 03 8a 04 13 84 c0 0f 85 df 01 00 00 41 83 7d 00 00 75 4b 4c 89 ff 9 [ 80.896171] RSP: 0018:ffff888009edf8c0 EFLAGS: 00000286 [ 80.896339] RAX: 1ffff1100141ac00 RBX: 1ffff1100149463b RCX: dffffc0000000000 [ 80.896502] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000246 RDI: ffff88800a0d6518 [ 80.896925] RBP: ffff888009edf9b0 R08: ffff88806d3288d3 R09: 1ffff1100da6511a [ 80.897212] R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed100da6511b R12: ffff88800a4a31d4 [ 80.897859] R13: ffff88800a4a31d8 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: ffff88800a0d6518 [ 80.898279] FS: 00007fd88b7fe700(0000) GS:ffff88806d300000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 80.899436] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 80.900181] CR2: 00007fd88c001d48 CR3: 000000000993e000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 ... [ 80.935774] ref_tracker: sp%d@000000000bb9df3d has 1/1 users at [ 80.935774] ax25_bind+0x424/0x4e0 [ 80.935774] __sys_bind+0x1d9/0x270 [ 80.935774] __x64_sys_bind+0x75/0x80 [ 80.935774] do_syscall_64+0xc4/0x1b0 [ 80.935774] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x67/0x6f Change ax25_dev->dev_tracker to the dev_tracker of ax25_cb in order to mitigate the bug. Fixes: feef318 ("ax25: fix UAF bugs of net_device caused by rebinding operation") Signed-off-by: Duoming Zhou <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f8bbc07 ] vhost_worker will call tun call backs to receive packets. If too many illegal packets arrives, tun_do_read will keep dumping packet contents. When console is enabled, it will costs much more cpu time to dump packet and soft lockup will be detected. net_ratelimit mechanism can be used to limit the dumping rate. PID: 33036 TASK: ffff949da6f20000 CPU: 23 COMMAND: "vhost-32980" #0 [fffffe00003fce50] crash_nmi_callback at ffffffff89249253 #1 [fffffe00003fce58] nmi_handle at ffffffff89225fa3 #2 [fffffe00003fceb0] default_do_nmi at ffffffff8922642e #3 [fffffe00003fced0] do_nmi at ffffffff8922660d #4 [fffffe00003fcef0] end_repeat_nmi at ffffffff89c01663 [exception RIP: io_serial_in+20] RIP: ffffffff89792594 RSP: ffffa655314979e8 RFLAGS: 00000002 RAX: ffffffff89792500 RBX: ffffffff8af428a0 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 00000000000003fd RSI: 0000000000000005 RDI: ffffffff8af428a0 RBP: 0000000000002710 R8: 0000000000000004 R9: 000000000000000f R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffff8acbf64f R12: 0000000000000020 R13: ffffffff8acbf698 R14: 0000000000000058 R15: 0000000000000000 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #5 [ffffa655314979e8] io_serial_in at ffffffff89792594 #6 [ffffa655314979e8] wait_for_xmitr at ffffffff89793470 #7 [ffffa65531497a08] serial8250_console_putchar at ffffffff897934f6 #8 [ffffa65531497a20] uart_console_write at ffffffff8978b605 #9 [ffffa65531497a48] serial8250_console_write at ffffffff89796558 #10 [ffffa65531497ac8] console_unlock at ffffffff89316124 #11 [ffffa65531497b10] vprintk_emit at ffffffff89317c07 #12 [ffffa65531497b68] printk at ffffffff89318306 #13 [ffffa65531497bc8] print_hex_dump at ffffffff89650765 #14 [ffffa65531497ca8] tun_do_read at ffffffffc0b06c27 [tun] #15 [ffffa65531497d38] tun_recvmsg at ffffffffc0b06e34 [tun] #16 [ffffa65531497d68] handle_rx at ffffffffc0c5d682 [vhost_net] #17 [ffffa65531497ed0] vhost_worker at ffffffffc0c644dc [vhost] #18 [ffffa65531497f10] kthread at ffffffff892d2e72 #19 [ffffa65531497f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff89c0022f Fixes: ef3db4a ("tun: avoid BUG, dump packet on GSO errors") Signed-off-by: Lei Chen <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]> Acked-by: Jason Wang <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 467324b ] The dev_tracker is added to ax25_cb in ax25_bind(). When the ax25 device is detaching, the dev_tracker of ax25_cb should be deallocated in ax25_kill_by_device() instead of the dev_tracker of ax25_dev. The log reported by ref_tracker is shown below: [ 80.884935] ref_tracker: reference already released. [ 80.885150] ref_tracker: allocated in: [ 80.885349] ax25_dev_device_up+0x105/0x540 [ 80.885730] ax25_device_event+0xa4/0x420 [ 80.885730] notifier_call_chain+0xc9/0x1e0 [ 80.885730] __dev_notify_flags+0x138/0x280 [ 80.885730] dev_change_flags+0xd7/0x180 [ 80.885730] dev_ifsioc+0x6a9/0xa30 [ 80.885730] dev_ioctl+0x4d8/0xd90 [ 80.885730] sock_do_ioctl+0x1c2/0x2d0 [ 80.885730] sock_ioctl+0x38b/0x4f0 [ 80.885730] __se_sys_ioctl+0xad/0xf0 [ 80.885730] do_syscall_64+0xc4/0x1b0 [ 80.885730] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x67/0x6f [ 80.885730] ref_tracker: freed in: [ 80.885730] ax25_device_event+0x272/0x420 [ 80.885730] notifier_call_chain+0xc9/0x1e0 [ 80.885730] dev_close_many+0x272/0x370 [ 80.885730] unregister_netdevice_many_notify+0x3b5/0x1180 [ 80.885730] unregister_netdev+0xcf/0x120 [ 80.885730] sixpack_close+0x11f/0x1b0 [ 80.885730] tty_ldisc_kill+0xcb/0x190 [ 80.885730] tty_ldisc_hangup+0x338/0x3d0 [ 80.885730] __tty_hangup+0x504/0x740 [ 80.885730] tty_release+0x46e/0xd80 [ 80.885730] __fput+0x37f/0x770 [ 80.885730] __x64_sys_close+0x7b/0xb0 [ 80.885730] do_syscall_64+0xc4/0x1b0 [ 80.885730] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x67/0x6f [ 80.893739] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 80.894030] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 140 at lib/ref_tracker.c:255 ref_tracker_free+0x47b/0x6b0 [ 80.894297] Modules linked in: [ 80.894929] CPU: 2 PID: 140 Comm: ax25_conn_rel_6 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc4-g8cd26fd90c1a #11 [ 80.895190] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qem4 [ 80.895514] RIP: 0010:ref_tracker_free+0x47b/0x6b0 [ 80.895808] Code: 83 c5 18 4c 89 eb 48 c1 eb 03 8a 04 13 84 c0 0f 85 df 01 00 00 41 83 7d 00 00 75 4b 4c 89 ff 9 [ 80.896171] RSP: 0018:ffff888009edf8c0 EFLAGS: 00000286 [ 80.896339] RAX: 1ffff1100141ac00 RBX: 1ffff1100149463b RCX: dffffc0000000000 [ 80.896502] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000246 RDI: ffff88800a0d6518 [ 80.896925] RBP: ffff888009edf9b0 R08: ffff88806d3288d3 R09: 1ffff1100da6511a [ 80.897212] R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed100da6511b R12: ffff88800a4a31d4 [ 80.897859] R13: ffff88800a4a31d8 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: ffff88800a0d6518 [ 80.898279] FS: 00007fd88b7fe700(0000) GS:ffff88806d300000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 80.899436] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 80.900181] CR2: 00007fd88c001d48 CR3: 000000000993e000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 ... [ 80.935774] ref_tracker: sp%d@000000000bb9df3d has 1/1 users at [ 80.935774] ax25_bind+0x424/0x4e0 [ 80.935774] __sys_bind+0x1d9/0x270 [ 80.935774] __x64_sys_bind+0x75/0x80 [ 80.935774] do_syscall_64+0xc4/0x1b0 [ 80.935774] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x67/0x6f Change ax25_dev->dev_tracker to the dev_tracker of ax25_cb in order to mitigate the bug. Fixes: feef318 ("ax25: fix UAF bugs of net_device caused by rebinding operation") Signed-off-by: Duoming Zhou <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

In the XDP_TX path, ionic driver sends a packet to the TX path with rx page and corresponding dma address. After tx is done, ionic_tx_clean() frees that page. But RX ring buffer isn't reset to NULL. So, it uses a freed page, which causes kernel panic. BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff8881576c110c PGD 773801067 P4D 773801067 PUD 87f086067 PMD 87efca067 PTE 800ffffea893e060 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN NOPTI CPU: 1 PID: 25 Comm: ksoftirqd/1 Not tainted 6.9.0+ #11 Hardware name: ASUS System Product Name/PRIME Z690-P D4, BIOS 0603 11/01/2021 RIP: 0010:bpf_prog_f0b8caeac1068a55_balancer_ingress+0x3b/0x44f Code: 00 53 41 55 41 56 41 57 b8 01 00 00 00 48 8b 5f 08 4c 8b 77 00 4c 89 f7 48 83 c7 0e 48 39 d8 RSP: 0018:ffff888104e6fa28 EFLAGS: 00010283 RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff8881576c1140 RCX: 0000000000000002 RDX: ffffffffc0051f64 RSI: ffffc90002d33048 RDI: ffff8881576c110e RBP: ffff888104e6fa88 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffed1027a04a23 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8881b03a21a8 R13: ffff8881589f800f R14: ffff8881576c1100 R15: 00000001576c1100 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88881ae00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffff8881576c110c CR3: 0000000767a90000 CR4: 00000000007506f0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die+0x20/0x70 ? page_fault_oops+0x254/0x790 ? __pfx_page_fault_oops+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_is_prefetch.constprop.0+0x10/0x10 ? search_bpf_extables+0x165/0x260 ? fixup_exception+0x4a/0x970 ? exc_page_fault+0xcb/0xe0 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 ? 0xffffffffc0051f64 ? bpf_prog_f0b8caeac1068a55_balancer_ingress+0x3b/0x44f ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x54/0x220 ionic_rx_service+0x11ab/0x3010 [ionic 9180c3001ab627d82bbc5f3ebe8a0decaf6bb864] ? ionic_tx_clean+0x29b/0xc60 [ionic 9180c3001ab627d82bbc5f3ebe8a0decaf6bb864] ? __pfx_ionic_tx_clean+0x10/0x10 [ionic 9180c3001ab627d82bbc5f3ebe8a0decaf6bb864] ? __pfx_ionic_rx_service+0x10/0x10 [ionic 9180c3001ab627d82bbc5f3ebe8a0decaf6bb864] ? ionic_tx_cq_service+0x25d/0xa00 [ionic 9180c3001ab627d82bbc5f3ebe8a0decaf6bb864] ? __pfx_ionic_rx_service+0x10/0x10 [ionic 9180c3001ab627d82bbc5f3ebe8a0decaf6bb864] ionic_cq_service+0x69/0x150 [ionic 9180c3001ab627d82bbc5f3ebe8a0decaf6bb864] ionic_txrx_napi+0x11a/0x540 [ionic 9180c3001ab627d82bbc5f3ebe8a0decaf6bb864] __napi_poll.constprop.0+0xa0/0x440 net_rx_action+0x7e7/0xc30 ? __pfx_net_rx_action+0x10/0x10 Fixes: 8eeed83 ("ionic: Add XDP_TX support") Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Shannon Nelson <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Brett Creeley <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>

…PLES event" This reverts commit 7d1405c. This causes segfaults in some cases, as reported by Milian: ``` sudo /usr/bin/perf record -z --call-graph dwarf -e cycles -e raw_syscalls:sys_enter ls ... [ perf record: Woken up 3 times to write data ] malloc(): invalid next size (unsorted) Aborted ``` Backtrace with GDB + debuginfod: ``` malloc(): invalid next size (unsorted) Thread 1 "perf" received signal SIGABRT, Aborted. __pthread_kill_implementation (threadid=<optimized out>, signo=signo@entry=6, no_tid=no_tid@entry=0) at pthread_kill.c:44 Downloading source file /usr/src/debug/glibc/glibc/nptl/pthread_kill.c 44 return INTERNAL_SYSCALL_ERROR_P (ret) ? INTERNAL_SYSCALL_ERRNO (ret) : 0; (gdb) bt #0 __pthread_kill_implementation (threadid=<optimized out>, signo=signo@entry=6, no_tid=no_tid@entry=0) at pthread_kill.c:44 #1 0x00007ffff6ea8eb3 in __pthread_kill_internal (threadid=<optimized out>, signo=6) at pthread_kill.c:78 #2 0x00007ffff6e50a30 in __GI_raise (sig=sig@entry=6) at ../sysdeps/posix/ raise.c:26 #3 0x00007ffff6e384c3 in __GI_abort () at abort.c:79 #4 0x00007ffff6e39354 in __libc_message_impl (fmt=fmt@entry=0x7ffff6fc22ea "%s\n") at ../sysdeps/posix/libc_fatal.c:132 #5 0x00007ffff6eb3085 in malloc_printerr (str=str@entry=0x7ffff6fc5850 "malloc(): invalid next size (unsorted)") at malloc.c:5772 #6 0x00007ffff6eb657c in _int_malloc (av=av@entry=0x7ffff6ff6ac0 <main_arena>, bytes=bytes@entry=368) at malloc.c:4081 #7 0x00007ffff6eb877e in __libc_calloc (n=<optimized out>, elem_size=<optimized out>) at malloc.c:3754 #8 0x000055555569bdb6 in perf_session.do_write_header () #9 0x00005555555a373a in __cmd_record.constprop.0 () #10 0x00005555555a6846 in cmd_record () #11 0x000055555564db7f in run_builtin () #12 0x000055555558ed77 in main () ``` Valgrind memcheck: ``` ==45136== Invalid write of size 8 ==45136== at 0x2B38A5: perf_event__synthesize_id_sample (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== by 0x157069: __cmd_record.constprop.0 (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== by 0x15A845: cmd_record (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== by 0x201B7E: run_builtin (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== by 0x142D76: main (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== Address 0x6a866a8 is 0 bytes after a block of size 40 alloc'd ==45136== at 0x4849BF3: calloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:1675) ==45136== by 0x3574AB: zalloc (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== by 0x1570E0: __cmd_record.constprop.0 (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== by 0x15A845: cmd_record (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== by 0x201B7E: run_builtin (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== by 0x142D76: main (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== ==45136== Syscall param write(buf) points to unaddressable byte(s) ==45136== at 0x575953D: __libc_write (write.c:26) ==45136== by 0x575953D: write (write.c:24) ==45136== by 0x35761F: ion (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== by 0x357778: writen (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== by 0x1548F7: record__write (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== by 0x15708A: __cmd_record.constprop.0 (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== by 0x15A845: cmd_record (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== by 0x201B7E: run_builtin (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== by 0x142D76: main (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== Address 0x6a866a8 is 0 bytes after a block of size 40 alloc'd ==45136== at 0x4849BF3: calloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:1675) ==45136== by 0x3574AB: zalloc (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== by 0x1570E0: __cmd_record.constprop.0 (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== by 0x15A845: cmd_record (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== by 0x201B7E: run_builtin (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== by 0x142D76: main (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== ----- Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-perf-users/23879991.0LEYPuXRzz@milian-workstation/ Reported-by: Milian Wolff <[email protected]> Tested-by: Milian Wolff <[email protected]> Cc: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]> Cc: Ian Rogers <[email protected]> Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Cc: Kan Liang <[email protected]> Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] # 6.8+ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/Zl9ksOlHJHnKM70p@x1 Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>

We have been seeing crashes on duplicate keys in btrfs_set_item_key_safe(): BTRFS critical (device vdb): slot 4 key (450 108 8192) new key (450 108 8192) ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2620! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 0 PID: 3139 Comm: xfs_io Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.9.0 #6 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:btrfs_set_item_key_safe+0x11f/0x290 [btrfs] With the following stack trace: #0 btrfs_set_item_key_safe (fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2620:4) #1 btrfs_drop_extents (fs/btrfs/file.c:411:4) #2 log_one_extent (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:4732:9) #3 btrfs_log_changed_extents (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:4955:9) #4 btrfs_log_inode (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:6626:9) #5 btrfs_log_inode_parent (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:7070:8) #6 btrfs_log_dentry_safe (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:7171:8) #7 btrfs_sync_file (fs/btrfs/file.c:1933:8) #8 vfs_fsync_range (fs/sync.c:188:9) #9 vfs_fsync (fs/sync.c:202:9) #10 do_fsync (fs/sync.c:212:9) #11 __do_sys_fdatasync (fs/sync.c:225:9) #12 __se_sys_fdatasync (fs/sync.c:223:1) #13 __x64_sys_fdatasync (fs/sync.c:223:1) #14 do_syscall_x64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52:14) #15 do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:83:7) #16 entry_SYSCALL_64+0xaf/0x14c (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121) So we're logging a changed extent from fsync, which is splitting an extent in the log tree. But this split part already exists in the tree, triggering the BUG(). This is the state of the log tree at the time of the crash, dumped with drgn (https://github.com/osandov/drgn/blob/main/contrib/btrfs_tree.py) to get more details than btrfs_print_leaf() gives us: >>> print_extent_buffer(prog.crashed_thread().stack_trace()[0]["eb"]) leaf 33439744 level 0 items 72 generation 9 owner 18446744073709551610 leaf 33439744 flags 0x100000000000000 fs uuid e5bd3946-400c-4223-8923-190ef1f18677 chunk uuid d58cb17e-6d02-494a-829a-18b7d8a399da item 0 key (450 INODE_ITEM 0) itemoff 16123 itemsize 160 generation 7 transid 9 size 8192 nbytes 8473563889606862198 block group 0 mode 100600 links 1 uid 0 gid 0 rdev 0 sequence 204 flags 0x10(PREALLOC) atime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43) ctime 1716417704.983333333 (2024-05-22 15:41:44) mtime 1716417704.983333333 (2024-05-22 15:41:44) otime 17592186044416.000000000 (559444-03-08 01:40:16) item 1 key (450 INODE_REF 256) itemoff 16110 itemsize 13 index 195 namelen 3 name: 193 item 2 key (450 XATTR_ITEM 1640047104) itemoff 16073 itemsize 37 location key (0 UNKNOWN.0 0) type XATTR transid 7 data_len 1 name_len 6 name: user.a data a item 3 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 0) itemoff 16020 itemsize 53 generation 9 type 1 (regular) extent data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288 extent data offset 0 nr 4096 ram 12288 extent compression 0 (none) item 4 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 4096) itemoff 15967 itemsize 53 generation 9 type 2 (prealloc) prealloc data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288 prealloc data offset 4096 nr 8192 item 5 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 8192) itemoff 15914 itemsize 53 generation 9 type 2 (prealloc) prealloc data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288 prealloc data offset 8192 nr 4096 ... So the real problem happened earlier: notice that items 4 (4k-12k) and 5 (8k-12k) overlap. Both are prealloc extents. Item 4 straddles i_size and item 5 starts at i_size. Here is the state of the filesystem tree at the time of the crash: >>> root = prog.crashed_thread().stack_trace()[2]["inode"].root >>> ret, nodes, slots = btrfs_search_slot(root, BtrfsKey(450, 0, 0)) >>> print_extent_buffer(nodes[0]) leaf 30425088 level 0 items 184 generation 9 owner 5 leaf 30425088 flags 0x100000000000000 fs uuid e5bd3946-400c-4223-8923-190ef1f18677 chunk uuid d58cb17e-6d02-494a-829a-18b7d8a399da ... item 179 key (450 INODE_ITEM 0) itemoff 4907 itemsize 160 generation 7 transid 7 size 4096 nbytes 12288 block group 0 mode 100600 links 1 uid 0 gid 0 rdev 0 sequence 6 flags 0x10(PREALLOC) atime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43) ctime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43) mtime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43) otime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43) item 180 key (450 INODE_REF 256) itemoff 4894 itemsize 13 index 195 namelen 3 name: 193 item 181 key (450 XATTR_ITEM 1640047104) itemoff 4857 itemsize 37 location key (0 UNKNOWN.0 0) type XATTR transid 7 data_len 1 name_len 6 name: user.a data a item 182 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 0) itemoff 4804 itemsize 53 generation 9 type 1 (regular) extent data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288 extent data offset 0 nr 8192 ram 12288 extent compression 0 (none) item 183 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 8192) itemoff 4751 itemsize 53 generation 9 type 2 (prealloc) prealloc data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288 prealloc data offset 8192 nr 4096 Item 5 in the log tree corresponds to item 183 in the filesystem tree, but nothing matches item 4. Furthermore, item 183 is the last item in the leaf. btrfs_log_prealloc_extents() is responsible for logging prealloc extents beyond i_size. It first truncates any previously logged prealloc extents that start beyond i_size. Then, it walks the filesystem tree and copies the prealloc extent items to the log tree. If it hits the end of a leaf, then it calls btrfs_next_leaf(), which unlocks the tree and does another search. However, while the filesystem tree is unlocked, an ordered extent completion may modify the tree. In particular, it may insert an extent item that overlaps with an extent item that was already copied to the log tree. This may manifest in several ways depending on the exact scenario, including an EEXIST error that is silently translated to a full sync, overlapping items in the log tree, or this crash. This particular crash is triggered by the following sequence of events: - Initially, the file has i_size=4k, a regular extent from 0-4k, and a prealloc extent beyond i_size from 4k-12k. The prealloc extent item is the last item in its B-tree leaf. - The file is fsync'd, which copies its inode item and both extent items to the log tree. - An xattr is set on the file, which sets the BTRFS_INODE_COPY_EVERYTHING flag. - The range 4k-8k in the file is written using direct I/O. i_size is extended to 8k, but the ordered extent is still in flight. - The file is fsync'd. Since BTRFS_INODE_COPY_EVERYTHING is set, this calls copy_inode_items_to_log(), which calls btrfs_log_prealloc_extents(). - btrfs_log_prealloc_extents() finds the 4k-12k prealloc extent in the filesystem tree. Since it starts before i_size, it skips it. Since it is the last item in its B-tree leaf, it calls btrfs_next_leaf(). - btrfs_next_leaf() unlocks the path. - The ordered extent completion runs, which converts the 4k-8k part of the prealloc extent to written and inserts the remaining prealloc part from 8k-12k. - btrfs_next_leaf() does a search and finds the new prealloc extent 8k-12k. - btrfs_log_prealloc_extents() copies the 8k-12k prealloc extent into the log tree. Note that it overlaps with the 4k-12k prealloc extent that was copied to the log tree by the first fsync. - fsync calls btrfs_log_changed_extents(), which tries to log the 4k-8k extent that was written. - This tries to drop the range 4k-8k in the log tree, which requires adjusting the start of the 4k-12k prealloc extent in the log tree to 8k. - btrfs_set_item_key_safe() sees that there is already an extent starting at 8k in the log tree and calls BUG(). Fix this by detecting when we're about to insert an overlapping file extent item in the log tree and truncating the part that would overlap. CC: [email protected] # 6.1+ Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 769e6a1 ] ui_browser__show() is capturing the input title that is stack allocated memory in hist_browser__run(). Avoid a use after return by strdup-ing the string. Committer notes: Further explanation from Ian Rogers: My command line using tui is: $ sudo bash -c 'rm /tmp/asan.log*; export ASAN_OPTIONS="log_path=/tmp/asan.log"; /tmp/perf/perf mem record -a sleep 1; /tmp/perf/perf mem report' I then go to the perf annotate view and quit. This triggers the asan error (from the log file): ``` ==1254591==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-use-after-return on address 0x7f2813331920 at pc 0x7f28180 65991 bp 0x7fff0a21c750 sp 0x7fff0a21bf10 READ of size 80 at 0x7f2813331920 thread T0 #0 0x7f2818065990 in __interceptor_strlen ../../../../src/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:461 #1 0x7f2817698251 in SLsmg_write_wrapped_string (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libslang.so.2+0x98251) #2 0x7f28176984b9 in SLsmg_write_nstring (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libslang.so.2+0x984b9) #3 0x55c94045b365 in ui_browser__write_nstring ui/browser.c:60 #4 0x55c94045c558 in __ui_browser__show_title ui/browser.c:266 #5 0x55c94045c776 in ui_browser__show ui/browser.c:288 #6 0x55c94045c06d in ui_browser__handle_resize ui/browser.c:206 #7 0x55c94047979b in do_annotate ui/browsers/hists.c:2458 #8 0x55c94047fb17 in evsel__hists_browse ui/browsers/hists.c:3412 #9 0x55c940480a0c in perf_evsel_menu__run ui/browsers/hists.c:3527 #10 0x55c940481108 in __evlist__tui_browse_hists ui/browsers/hists.c:3613 #11 0x55c9404813f7 in evlist__tui_browse_hists ui/browsers/hists.c:3661 #12 0x55c93ffa253f in report__browse_hists tools/perf/builtin-report.c:671 #13 0x55c93ffa58ca in __cmd_report tools/perf/builtin-report.c:1141 #14 0x55c93ffaf159 in cmd_report tools/perf/builtin-report.c:1805 #15 0x55c94000c05c in report_events tools/perf/builtin-mem.c:374 #16 0x55c94000d96d in cmd_mem tools/perf/builtin-mem.c:516 #17 0x55c9400e44ee in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:350 #18 0x55c9400e4a5a in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:403 #19 0x55c9400e4e22 in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:447 #20 0x55c9400e53ad in main tools/perf/perf.c:561 #21 0x7f28170456c9 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58 #22 0x7f2817045784 in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:360 #23 0x55c93ff544c0 in _start (/tmp/perf/perf+0x19a4c0) (BuildId: 84899b0e8c7d3a3eaa67b2eb35e3d8b2f8cd4c93) Address 0x7f2813331920 is located in stack of thread T0 at offset 32 in frame #0 0x55c94046e85e in hist_browser__run ui/browsers/hists.c:746 This frame has 1 object(s): [32, 192) 'title' (line 747) <== Memory access at offset 32 is inside this variable HINT: this may be a false positive if your program uses some custom stack unwind mechanism, swapcontext or vfork ``` hist_browser__run isn't on the stack so the asan error looks legit. There's no clean init/exit on struct ui_browser so I may be trading a use-after-return for a memory leak, but that seems look a good trade anyway. Fixes: 05e8b08 ("perf ui browser: Stop using 'self'") Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]> Cc: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]> Cc: Andi Kleen <[email protected]> Cc: Athira Rajeev <[email protected]> Cc: Ben Gainey <[email protected]> Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Cc: James Clark <[email protected]> Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Cc: Kajol Jain <[email protected]> Cc: Kan Liang <[email protected]> Cc: K Prateek Nayak <[email protected]> Cc: Li Dong <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Cc: Oliver Upton <[email protected]> Cc: Paran Lee <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Ravi Bangoria <[email protected]> Cc: Sun Haiyong <[email protected]> Cc: Tim Chen <[email protected]> Cc: Yanteng Si <[email protected]> Cc: Yicong Yang <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

…PLES event" commit 5b3cde1 upstream. This reverts commit 7d1405c. This causes segfaults in some cases, as reported by Milian: ``` sudo /usr/bin/perf record -z --call-graph dwarf -e cycles -e raw_syscalls:sys_enter ls ... [ perf record: Woken up 3 times to write data ] malloc(): invalid next size (unsorted) Aborted ``` Backtrace with GDB + debuginfod: ``` malloc(): invalid next size (unsorted) Thread 1 "perf" received signal SIGABRT, Aborted. __pthread_kill_implementation (threadid=<optimized out>, signo=signo@entry=6, no_tid=no_tid@entry=0) at pthread_kill.c:44 Downloading source file /usr/src/debug/glibc/glibc/nptl/pthread_kill.c 44 return INTERNAL_SYSCALL_ERROR_P (ret) ? INTERNAL_SYSCALL_ERRNO (ret) : 0; (gdb) bt #0 __pthread_kill_implementation (threadid=<optimized out>, signo=signo@entry=6, no_tid=no_tid@entry=0) at pthread_kill.c:44 #1 0x00007ffff6ea8eb3 in __pthread_kill_internal (threadid=<optimized out>, signo=6) at pthread_kill.c:78 #2 0x00007ffff6e50a30 in __GI_raise (sig=sig@entry=6) at ../sysdeps/posix/ raise.c:26 #3 0x00007ffff6e384c3 in __GI_abort () at abort.c:79 #4 0x00007ffff6e39354 in __libc_message_impl (fmt=fmt@entry=0x7ffff6fc22ea "%s\n") at ../sysdeps/posix/libc_fatal.c:132 #5 0x00007ffff6eb3085 in malloc_printerr (str=str@entry=0x7ffff6fc5850 "malloc(): invalid next size (unsorted)") at malloc.c:5772 #6 0x00007ffff6eb657c in _int_malloc (av=av@entry=0x7ffff6ff6ac0 <main_arena>, bytes=bytes@entry=368) at malloc.c:4081 #7 0x00007ffff6eb877e in __libc_calloc (n=<optimized out>, elem_size=<optimized out>) at malloc.c:3754 #8 0x000055555569bdb6 in perf_session.do_write_header () #9 0x00005555555a373a in __cmd_record.constprop.0 () #10 0x00005555555a6846 in cmd_record () #11 0x000055555564db7f in run_builtin () #12 0x000055555558ed77 in main () ``` Valgrind memcheck: ``` ==45136== Invalid write of size 8 ==45136== at 0x2B38A5: perf_event__synthesize_id_sample (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== by 0x157069: __cmd_record.constprop.0 (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== by 0x15A845: cmd_record (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== by 0x201B7E: run_builtin (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== by 0x142D76: main (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== Address 0x6a866a8 is 0 bytes after a block of size 40 alloc'd ==45136== at 0x4849BF3: calloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:1675) ==45136== by 0x3574AB: zalloc (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== by 0x1570E0: __cmd_record.constprop.0 (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== by 0x15A845: cmd_record (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== by 0x201B7E: run_builtin (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== by 0x142D76: main (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== ==45136== Syscall param write(buf) points to unaddressable byte(s) ==45136== at 0x575953D: __libc_write (write.c:26) ==45136== by 0x575953D: write (write.c:24) ==45136== by 0x35761F: ion (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== by 0x357778: writen (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== by 0x1548F7: record__write (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== by 0x15708A: __cmd_record.constprop.0 (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== by 0x15A845: cmd_record (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== by 0x201B7E: run_builtin (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== by 0x142D76: main (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== Address 0x6a866a8 is 0 bytes after a block of size 40 alloc'd ==45136== at 0x4849BF3: calloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:1675) ==45136== by 0x3574AB: zalloc (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== by 0x1570E0: __cmd_record.constprop.0 (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== by 0x15A845: cmd_record (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== by 0x201B7E: run_builtin (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== by 0x142D76: main (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== ----- Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-perf-users/23879991.0LEYPuXRzz@milian-workstation/ Reported-by: Milian Wolff <[email protected]> Tested-by: Milian Wolff <[email protected]> Cc: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]> Cc: Ian Rogers <[email protected]> Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Cc: Kan Liang <[email protected]> Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] # 6.8+ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/Zl9ksOlHJHnKM70p@x1 Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit 9d274c1 upstream. We have been seeing crashes on duplicate keys in btrfs_set_item_key_safe(): BTRFS critical (device vdb): slot 4 key (450 108 8192) new key (450 108 8192) ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2620! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 0 PID: 3139 Comm: xfs_io Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.9.0 #6 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:btrfs_set_item_key_safe+0x11f/0x290 [btrfs] With the following stack trace: #0 btrfs_set_item_key_safe (fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2620:4) #1 btrfs_drop_extents (fs/btrfs/file.c:411:4) #2 log_one_extent (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:4732:9) #3 btrfs_log_changed_extents (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:4955:9) #4 btrfs_log_inode (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:6626:9) #5 btrfs_log_inode_parent (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:7070:8) #6 btrfs_log_dentry_safe (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:7171:8) #7 btrfs_sync_file (fs/btrfs/file.c:1933:8) #8 vfs_fsync_range (fs/sync.c:188:9) #9 vfs_fsync (fs/sync.c:202:9) #10 do_fsync (fs/sync.c:212:9) #11 __do_sys_fdatasync (fs/sync.c:225:9) #12 __se_sys_fdatasync (fs/sync.c:223:1) #13 __x64_sys_fdatasync (fs/sync.c:223:1) #14 do_syscall_x64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52:14) #15 do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:83:7) #16 entry_SYSCALL_64+0xaf/0x14c (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121) So we're logging a changed extent from fsync, which is splitting an extent in the log tree. But this split part already exists in the tree, triggering the BUG(). This is the state of the log tree at the time of the crash, dumped with drgn (https://github.com/osandov/drgn/blob/main/contrib/btrfs_tree.py) to get more details than btrfs_print_leaf() gives us: >>> print_extent_buffer(prog.crashed_thread().stack_trace()[0]["eb"]) leaf 33439744 level 0 items 72 generation 9 owner 18446744073709551610 leaf 33439744 flags 0x100000000000000 fs uuid e5bd3946-400c-4223-8923-190ef1f18677 chunk uuid d58cb17e-6d02-494a-829a-18b7d8a399da item 0 key (450 INODE_ITEM 0) itemoff 16123 itemsize 160 generation 7 transid 9 size 8192 nbytes 8473563889606862198 block group 0 mode 100600 links 1 uid 0 gid 0 rdev 0 sequence 204 flags 0x10(PREALLOC) atime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43) ctime 1716417704.983333333 (2024-05-22 15:41:44) mtime 1716417704.983333333 (2024-05-22 15:41:44) otime 17592186044416.000000000 (559444-03-08 01:40:16) item 1 key (450 INODE_REF 256) itemoff 16110 itemsize 13 index 195 namelen 3 name: 193 item 2 key (450 XATTR_ITEM 1640047104) itemoff 16073 itemsize 37 location key (0 UNKNOWN.0 0) type XATTR transid 7 data_len 1 name_len 6 name: user.a data a item 3 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 0) itemoff 16020 itemsize 53 generation 9 type 1 (regular) extent data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288 extent data offset 0 nr 4096 ram 12288 extent compression 0 (none) item 4 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 4096) itemoff 15967 itemsize 53 generation 9 type 2 (prealloc) prealloc data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288 prealloc data offset 4096 nr 8192 item 5 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 8192) itemoff 15914 itemsize 53 generation 9 type 2 (prealloc) prealloc data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288 prealloc data offset 8192 nr 4096 ... So the real problem happened earlier: notice that items 4 (4k-12k) and 5 (8k-12k) overlap. Both are prealloc extents. Item 4 straddles i_size and item 5 starts at i_size. Here is the state of the filesystem tree at the time of the crash: >>> root = prog.crashed_thread().stack_trace()[2]["inode"].root >>> ret, nodes, slots = btrfs_search_slot(root, BtrfsKey(450, 0, 0)) >>> print_extent_buffer(nodes[0]) leaf 30425088 level 0 items 184 generation 9 owner 5 leaf 30425088 flags 0x100000000000000 fs uuid e5bd3946-400c-4223-8923-190ef1f18677 chunk uuid d58cb17e-6d02-494a-829a-18b7d8a399da ... item 179 key (450 INODE_ITEM 0) itemoff 4907 itemsize 160 generation 7 transid 7 size 4096 nbytes 12288 block group 0 mode 100600 links 1 uid 0 gid 0 rdev 0 sequence 6 flags 0x10(PREALLOC) atime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43) ctime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43) mtime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43) otime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43) item 180 key (450 INODE_REF 256) itemoff 4894 itemsize 13 index 195 namelen 3 name: 193 item 181 key (450 XATTR_ITEM 1640047104) itemoff 4857 itemsize 37 location key (0 UNKNOWN.0 0) type XATTR transid 7 data_len 1 name_len 6 name: user.a data a item 182 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 0) itemoff 4804 itemsize 53 generation 9 type 1 (regular) extent data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288 extent data offset 0 nr 8192 ram 12288 extent compression 0 (none) item 183 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 8192) itemoff 4751 itemsize 53 generation 9 type 2 (prealloc) prealloc data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288 prealloc data offset 8192 nr 4096 Item 5 in the log tree corresponds to item 183 in the filesystem tree, but nothing matches item 4. Furthermore, item 183 is the last item in the leaf. btrfs_log_prealloc_extents() is responsible for logging prealloc extents beyond i_size. It first truncates any previously logged prealloc extents that start beyond i_size. Then, it walks the filesystem tree and copies the prealloc extent items to the log tree. If it hits the end of a leaf, then it calls btrfs_next_leaf(), which unlocks the tree and does another search. However, while the filesystem tree is unlocked, an ordered extent completion may modify the tree. In particular, it may insert an extent item that overlaps with an extent item that was already copied to the log tree. This may manifest in several ways depending on the exact scenario, including an EEXIST error that is silently translated to a full sync, overlapping items in the log tree, or this crash. This particular crash is triggered by the following sequence of events: - Initially, the file has i_size=4k, a regular extent from 0-4k, and a prealloc extent beyond i_size from 4k-12k. The prealloc extent item is the last item in its B-tree leaf. - The file is fsync'd, which copies its inode item and both extent items to the log tree. - An xattr is set on the file, which sets the BTRFS_INODE_COPY_EVERYTHING flag. - The range 4k-8k in the file is written using direct I/O. i_size is extended to 8k, but the ordered extent is still in flight. - The file is fsync'd. Since BTRFS_INODE_COPY_EVERYTHING is set, this calls copy_inode_items_to_log(), which calls btrfs_log_prealloc_extents(). - btrfs_log_prealloc_extents() finds the 4k-12k prealloc extent in the filesystem tree. Since it starts before i_size, it skips it. Since it is the last item in its B-tree leaf, it calls btrfs_next_leaf(). - btrfs_next_leaf() unlocks the path. - The ordered extent completion runs, which converts the 4k-8k part of the prealloc extent to written and inserts the remaining prealloc part from 8k-12k. - btrfs_next_leaf() does a search and finds the new prealloc extent 8k-12k. - btrfs_log_prealloc_extents() copies the 8k-12k prealloc extent into the log tree. Note that it overlaps with the 4k-12k prealloc extent that was copied to the log tree by the first fsync. - fsync calls btrfs_log_changed_extents(), which tries to log the 4k-8k extent that was written. - This tries to drop the range 4k-8k in the log tree, which requires adjusting the start of the 4k-12k prealloc extent in the log tree to 8k. - btrfs_set_item_key_safe() sees that there is already an extent starting at 8k in the log tree and calls BUG(). Fix this by detecting when we're about to insert an overlapping file extent item in the log tree and truncating the part that would overlap. CC: [email protected] # 6.1+ Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit eef0532 ] Run bpf_tcp_ca selftests (./test_progs -t bpf_tcp_ca) on a Loongarch platform, some "Segmentation fault" errors occur: ''' test_dctcp:PASS:bpf_dctcp__open_and_load 0 nsec test_dctcp:FAIL:bpf_map__attach_struct_ops unexpected error: -524 #29/1 bpf_tcp_ca/dctcp:FAIL test_cubic:PASS:bpf_cubic__open_and_load 0 nsec test_cubic:FAIL:bpf_map__attach_struct_ops unexpected error: -524 #29/2 bpf_tcp_ca/cubic:FAIL test_dctcp_fallback:PASS:dctcp_skel 0 nsec test_dctcp_fallback:PASS:bpf_dctcp__load 0 nsec test_dctcp_fallback:FAIL:dctcp link unexpected error: -524 #29/4 bpf_tcp_ca/dctcp_fallback:FAIL test_write_sk_pacing:PASS:open_and_load 0 nsec test_write_sk_pacing:FAIL:attach_struct_ops unexpected error: -524 #29/6 bpf_tcp_ca/write_sk_pacing:FAIL test_update_ca:PASS:open 0 nsec test_update_ca:FAIL:attach_struct_ops unexpected error: -524 settcpca:FAIL:setsockopt unexpected setsockopt: \ actual -1 == expected -1 (network_helpers.c:99: errno: No such file or directory) \ Failed to call post_socket_cb start_test:FAIL:start_server_str unexpected start_server_str: \ actual -1 == expected -1 test_update_ca:FAIL:ca1_ca1_cnt unexpected ca1_ca1_cnt: \ actual 0 <= expected 0 #29/9 bpf_tcp_ca/update_ca:FAIL #29 bpf_tcp_ca:FAIL Caught signal #11! Stack trace: ./test_progs(crash_handler+0x28)[0x5555567ed91c] linux-vdso.so.1(__vdso_rt_sigreturn+0x0)[0x7ffffee408b0] ./test_progs(bpf_link__update_map+0x80)[0x555556824a78] ./test_progs(+0x94d68)[0x5555564c4d68] ./test_progs(test_bpf_tcp_ca+0xe8)[0x5555564c6a88] ./test_progs(+0x3bde54)[0x5555567ede54] ./test_progs(main+0x61c)[0x5555567efd54] /usr/lib64/libc.so.6(+0x22208)[0x7ffff2aaa208] /usr/lib64/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0xac)[0x7ffff2aaa30c] ./test_progs(_start+0x48)[0x55555646bca8] Segmentation fault ''' This is because BPF trampoline is not implemented on Loongarch yet, "link" returned by bpf_map__attach_struct_ops() is NULL. test_progs crashs when this NULL link passes to bpf_link__update_map(). This patch adds NULL checks for all links in bpf_tcp_ca to fix these errors. If "link" is NULL, goto the newly added label "out" to destroy the skel. v2: - use "goto out" instead of "return" as Eduard suggested. Fixes: 06da9f3 ("selftests/bpf: Test switching TCP Congestion Control algorithms.") Signed-off-by: Geliang Tang <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Alan Maguire <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/b4c841492bd4ed97964e4e61e92827ce51bf1dc9.1720615848.git.tanggeliang@kylinos.cn Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

commit be346c1 upstream. The code in ocfs2_dio_end_io_write() estimates number of necessary transaction credits using ocfs2_calc_extend_credits(). This however does not take into account that the IO could be arbitrarily large and can contain arbitrary number of extents. Extent tree manipulations do often extend the current transaction but not in all of the cases. For example if we have only single block extents in the tree, ocfs2_mark_extent_written() will end up calling ocfs2_replace_extent_rec() all the time and we will never extend the current transaction and eventually exhaust all the transaction credits if the IO contains many single block extents. Once that happens a WARN_ON(jbd2_handle_buffer_credits(handle) <= 0) is triggered in jbd2_journal_dirty_metadata() and subsequently OCFS2 aborts in response to this error. This was actually triggered by one of our customers on a heavily fragmented OCFS2 filesystem. To fix the issue make sure the transaction always has enough credits for one extent insert before each call of ocfs2_mark_extent_written(). Heming Zhao said: ------ PANIC: "Kernel panic - not syncing: OCFS2: (device dm-1): panic forced after error" PID: xxx TASK: xxxx CPU: 5 COMMAND: "SubmitThread-CA" #0 machine_kexec at ffffffff8c069932 #1 __crash_kexec at ffffffff8c1338fa #2 panic at ffffffff8c1d69b9 #3 ocfs2_handle_error at ffffffffc0c86c0c [ocfs2] #4 __ocfs2_abort at ffffffffc0c88387 [ocfs2] #5 ocfs2_journal_dirty at ffffffffc0c51e98 [ocfs2] #6 ocfs2_split_extent at ffffffffc0c27ea3 [ocfs2] #7 ocfs2_change_extent_flag at ffffffffc0c28053 [ocfs2] #8 ocfs2_mark_extent_written at ffffffffc0c28347 [ocfs2] #9 ocfs2_dio_end_io_write at ffffffffc0c2bef9 [ocfs2] #10 ocfs2_dio_end_io at ffffffffc0c2c0f5 [ocfs2] #11 dio_complete at ffffffff8c2b9fa7 #12 do_blockdev_direct_IO at ffffffff8c2bc09f #13 ocfs2_direct_IO at ffffffffc0c2b653 [ocfs2] #14 generic_file_direct_write at ffffffff8c1dcf14 #15 __generic_file_write_iter at ffffffff8c1dd07b #16 ocfs2_file_write_iter at ffffffffc0c49f1f [ocfs2] #17 aio_write at ffffffff8c2cc72e #18 kmem_cache_alloc at ffffffff8c248dde #19 do_io_submit at ffffffff8c2ccada #20 do_syscall_64 at ffffffff8c004984 #21 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe at ffffffff8c8000ba Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: c15471f ("ocfs2: fix sparse file & data ordering issue in direct io") Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Heming Zhao <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Fasheh <[email protected]> Cc: Joel Becker <[email protected]> Cc: Junxiao Bi <[email protected]> Cc: Changwei Ge <[email protected]> Cc: Gang He <[email protected]> Cc: Jun Piao <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 8baeef7616d5194045c5a6b97fd1246b87c55b13 ] Remove the dma_unmap_page_attrs() call in the driver's XDP_REDIRECT code path. This should have been removed when we let the page pool handle the DMA mapping. This bug causes the warning: WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 59 at drivers/iommu/dma-iommu.c:1198 iommu_dma_unmap_page+0xd5/0x100 CPU: 7 PID: 59 Comm: ksoftirqd/7 Tainted: G W 6.8.0-1010-gcp #11-Ubuntu Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R7525/0PYVT1, BIOS 2.15.2 04/02/2024 RIP: 0010:iommu_dma_unmap_page+0xd5/0x100 Code: 89 ee 48 89 df e8 cb f2 69 ff 48 83 c4 08 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d 31 c0 31 d2 31 c9 31 f6 31 ff 45 31 c0 e9 ab 17 71 00 <0f> 0b 48 83 c4 08 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d 31 c0 31 d2 31 c9 RSP: 0018:ffffab1fc0597a48 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff99ff838280c8 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffffab1fc0597a78 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: ffffab1fc0597c1c R10: ffffab1fc0597cd3 R11: ffff99ffe375acd8 R12: 00000000e65b9000 R13: 0000000000000050 R14: 0000000000001000 R15: 0000000000000002 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9a06efb80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000565c34c37210 CR3: 00000005c7e3e000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0 ? show_regs+0x6d/0x80 ? __warn+0x89/0x150 ? iommu_dma_unmap_page+0xd5/0x100 ? report_bug+0x16a/0x190 ? handle_bug+0x51/0xa0 ? exc_invalid_op+0x18/0x80 ? iommu_dma_unmap_page+0xd5/0x100 ? iommu_dma_unmap_page+0x35/0x100 dma_unmap_page_attrs+0x55/0x220 ? bpf_prog_4d7e87c0d30db711_xdp_dispatcher+0x64/0x9f bnxt_rx_xdp+0x237/0x520 [bnxt_en] bnxt_rx_pkt+0x640/0xdd0 [bnxt_en] __bnxt_poll_work+0x1a1/0x3d0 [bnxt_en] bnxt_poll+0xaa/0x1e0 [bnxt_en] __napi_poll+0x33/0x1e0 net_rx_action+0x18a/0x2f0 Fixes: 578fcfd ("bnxt_en: Let the page pool manage the DMA mapping") Reviewed-by: Andy Gospodarek <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Kalesh AP <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Somnath Kotur <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Michael Chan <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jacob Keller <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a699781c79ecf6cfe67fb00a0331b4088c7c8466 ] A sysfs reader can race with a device reset or removal, attempting to read device state when the device is not actually present. eg: [exception RIP: qed_get_current_link+17] #8 [ffffb9e4f2907c48] qede_get_link_ksettings at ffffffffc07a994a [qede] #9 [ffffb9e4f2907cd8] __rh_call_get_link_ksettings at ffffffff992b01a3 #10 [ffffb9e4f2907d38] __ethtool_get_link_ksettings at ffffffff992b04e4 #11 [ffffb9e4f2907d90] duplex_show at ffffffff99260300 #12 [ffffb9e4f2907e38] dev_attr_show at ffffffff9905a01c #13 [ffffb9e4f2907e50] sysfs_kf_seq_show at ffffffff98e0145b #14 [ffffb9e4f2907e68] seq_read at ffffffff98d902e3 #15 [ffffb9e4f2907ec8] vfs_read at ffffffff98d657d1 #16 [ffffb9e4f2907f00] ksys_read at ffffffff98d65c3f #17 [ffffb9e4f2907f38] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff98a052fb crash> struct net_device.state ffff9a9d21336000 state = 5, state 5 is __LINK_STATE_START (0b1) and __LINK_STATE_NOCARRIER (0b100). The device is not present, note lack of __LINK_STATE_PRESENT (0b10). This is the same sort of panic as observed in commit 4224cfd ("net-sysfs: add check for netdevice being present to speed_show"). There are many other callers of __ethtool_get_link_ksettings() which don't have a device presence check. Move this check into ethtool to protect all callers. Fixes: d519e17 ("net: export device speed and duplex via sysfs") Fixes: 4224cfd ("net-sysfs: add check for netdevice being present to speed_show") Signed-off-by: Jamie Bainbridge <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/8bae218864beaa44ed01628140475b9bf641c5b0.1724393671.git.jamie.bainbridge@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

dsx724 changed the title ~~amlogic spi mode~~ amlogic spi mode is stuck in mode 1 and mode 2 Jul 27, 2022

dsx724 changed the title ~~amlogic spi mode is stuck in mode 1 and mode 2~~ amlogic gxl spi mode is stuck in mode 1 and mode 2 Aug 3, 2022

dsx724 closed this as completed Aug 10, 2022

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amlogic gxl spi mode is stuck in mode 1 and mode 2 #11

amlogic gxl spi mode is stuck in mode 1 and mode 2 #11

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amlogic gxl spi mode is stuck in mode 1 and mode 2 #11

amlogic gxl spi mode is stuck in mode 1 and mode 2 #11

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