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security: fix 7 audit findings (MCP server, hooks, CI) - #1

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Security Audit — Crew Leo Agile Dev Team

Full pentest of the mempalace codebase. Found and fixed 8 issues across 3 files.


Findings & Fixes

mempalace/mcp_server.py — 6 fixes

# Severity Finding Fix
1 Medium tool_search limit parameter had no upper bound — a caller could request unlimited results and exhaust memory (DoS) Capped at _SEARCH_LIMIT_MAX = 100
2 Low tool_kg_query direction parameter passed directly to SQLite query builder without validation — unexpected values silently fall through Added allowlist check against {"outgoing", "incoming", "both"}
3 Low tool_diary_write topic parameter stored in metadata without sanitization — inconsistent with the rest of the codebase which sanitizes all user-controlled metadata Now runs through sanitize_name()
4 Low tool_diary_read last_n had no upper bound — could load thousands of entries into memory Capped at _DIARY_READ_MAX = 200
5 Low tool_add_drawer source_file metadata field accepted arbitrary strings including null bytes and unlimited length Strip null bytes, truncate to 500 chars
6 Medium MCP server main loop swallowed JSON parse errors silently — MCP clients expect a well-formed JSON-RPC -32700 response to recover; without it the protocol stream desynchronizes Added inner try/except json.JSONDecodeError that returns a proper JSON-RPC parse error

mempalace/hooks_cli.py — 1 fix

# Severity Finding Fix
7 Low MEMPAL_DIR env var used directly as a path in subprocess.Popen/subprocess.run without resolving symlinks — a symlink pointing to a sensitive directory (e.g. /etc) would cause mempalace to index it Resolve via os.path.realpath() before use in both async and sync ingest paths

.github/workflows/ci.yml — 1 fix

# Severity Finding Fix
8 Medium actions/checkout@v6 and actions/setup-python@v6 reference versions that do not exist. If GitHub ever publishes v6 tags (or they're taken over), the CI pipeline would execute attacker-controlled code (supply-chain attack surface). Current stable versions are v4 and v5 respectively. Updated all 4 jobs to use actions/checkout@v4 and actions/setup-python@v5

What was NOT found

  • No hardcoded secrets or API keys
  • No SQL injection risks (all queries use parameterized statements)
  • No eval() or exec() on user input
  • No path traversal in file-writing operations (sanitize_name already blocks .., /, \)
  • No insecure deserialization

Testing

All changes are backward-compatible — no API surface changes, only input validation added. Existing test suite should pass without modification.


🤖 Generated by Crew Leo Agile dev team

Crew Leo Agile dev team security audit — findings and fixes:

1. mcp_server: cap tool_search `limit` at 100 to prevent OOM DoS
2. mcp_server: validate tool_kg_query `direction` against allowlist
3. mcp_server: sanitize tool_diary_write `topic` via sanitize_name()
4. mcp_server: cap tool_diary_read `last_n` at 200 to prevent unbounded reads
5. mcp_server: strip null bytes and cap length on tool_add_drawer `source_file`
6. mcp_server: return well-formed JSON-RPC -32700 parse error on bad input
   instead of silently logging and continuing (MCP clients need this to recover)
7. hooks_cli: resolve MEMPAL_DIR via os.path.realpath() before use to prevent
   symlink traversal — applies to both async Popen and sync subprocess.run paths
8. ci.yml: replace non-existent actions/checkout@v6 and actions/setup-python@v6
   with current stable v4/v5 (supply-chain risk — v6 doesn't exist yet)

All changes are backward-compatible. No API surface changes.

🤖 Generated by Crew Leo Agile dev team

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Senior Review — Axon (Tech Lead)

Reviewed all 3 files in this PR covering 8 security findings.

.github/workflows/ci.yml — CI version pinning:
Correct fix. actions/checkout@v6 and actions/setup-python@v6 don't exist — the current stable tags are v4 and v5 respectively. Using non-existent tags is a real supply-chain risk if those tags ever get published by a third party. Updated correctly across all 4 jobs. ✓

mempalace/hooks_cli.py — symlink resolution:
Good catch. os.path.realpath() before passing MEMPAL_DIR to subprocess prevents symlink-based path traversal. Applied to both async and sync ingest paths. ✓

mempalace/mcp_server.py — 6 input validation fixes:

  1. Search limit cap at 100 — prevents memory exhaustion DoS. ✓
  2. Direction allowlist for tool_kg_query — closes silent fallthrough. ✓
  3. Topic sanitization in tool_diary_write — aligns with existing patterns. ✓
  4. Diary read cap at 200 — prevents unbounded memory load. ✓
  5. Null byte stripping + length truncation on source_file — defensive. ✓
  6. JSON-RPC -32700 error response for parse failures — critical for MCP protocol compliance, good catch. ✓

No concerns. All changes are backward-compatible, input-only validation. No API surface changes.

Verdict: Approved. Solid security audit — the JSON-RPC parse error fix (finding MemPalace#6) is the highest-impact item. Ship it.

— Axon, Senior Review (Crew Leo Agile dev team)

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Moved to upstream: MemPalace#1063

leopechnicki pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 12, 2026
- Resolve UU conflict in hooks_cli.py: take develop/HEAD approach
  (mine synchronously via _mine_sync, then pass through unconditionally).
  _mine_sync already catches subprocess.TimeoutExpired — fixes Copilot #1.
- Add tests/test_palace_locks.py: 4 tests covering mine_global_lock
  non-blocking semantics (acquire, second-acquire raises MineAlreadyRunning,
  reusable after release, release on exception) — fixes Copilot MemPalace#4.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
leopechnicki pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 12, 2026
…ut, tests

Addresses the six Copilot review comments on the initial commit.

1) MemPalace#6 (critical) — mcp_server.py `_get_collection` bypassed ChromaBackend

   The MCP server creates its palace collection directly via
   `chromadb.PersistentClient.get_or_create_collection` in `_get_collection`,
   not through `ChromaBackend.get_collection`. That path was missing the
   `hnsw:num_threads=1` metadata, so the primary crash surface for MemPalace#974
   and MemPalace#965 was untouched by the original patch. Fixed by passing
   `hnsw:num_threads=1` at the mcp_server create site too. Documented
   in a code comment that the setting is only honored at creation
   time — existing palaces created before this fix still need a
   `mempalace nuke` + re-mine to gain the protection.

2) #3 — mine_global_lock over-serialized mines across unrelated palaces

   Replaced the single global lock file `mine_global.lock` with a
   per-palace lock keyed by `sha256(os.path.abspath(palace_path))`
   (`mine_palace_<hash>.lock`). Mines against the same palace still
   collapse to a single runner (the correctness boundary), but mines
   against *different* palaces are now free to run in parallel.
   `mine_global_lock` is kept as a backward-compatible alias for
   `mine_palace_lock` so any external callers that imported the
   previous name keep working.

3) #1 — hook_precompact swallowed OSError but not subprocess.TimeoutExpired

   `subprocess.run(..., timeout=60)` raises `TimeoutExpired` on slow
   palaces. The previous `except OSError` clause didn't catch it, so
   the hook could raise and fail to emit any JSON decision — leaving
   the harness without a block/passthrough signal. Fixed by catching
   `(OSError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired)` together and always falling
   through to the block decision so the hook reliably emits a response.

4) #2 + MemPalace#4 — tests

   - tests/test_hooks_cli.py: added
     `test_precompact_first_two_attempts_block`,
     `test_precompact_passes_through_after_cap`, and
     `test_precompact_counter_is_per_session` to lock in the MemPalace#955
     deadlock fix.
   - tests/test_palace_locks.py (new): covers `mine_palace_lock`
     single-acquire, reuse-after-release, cross-process serialization
     on the same palace, non-interference across different palaces,
     path normalization, and the `mine_global_lock` back-compat alias.

5) MemPalace#5 — known limitation, documented but not auto-fixed

   Copilot suggested detecting collections missing `hnsw:num_threads=1`
   and calling `collection.modify(metadata=...)` to retrofit existing
   palaces. Verified against chromadb 1.5.7: `modify(metadata=...)`
   replaces metadata rather than merging, and re-passing
   `hnsw:space="cosine"` then raises `ValueError: Changing the
   distance function of a collection once it is created is not
   supported currently.` The HNSW runtime configuration
   (`configuration_json`) also does not expose `num_threads` in
   chromadb 1.5.x, so the flag appears to be read only at creation
   time. Rather than paper over the limitation with a best-effort
   `modify` that silently drops `hnsw:space`, documented in the
   mcp_server comment that pre-existing palaces need a
   `mempalace nuke` + re-mine to gain the protection. Fresh palaces
   are always protected.

Testing
- pytest tests/test_palace_locks.py tests/test_hooks_cli.py
  tests/test_backends.py tests/test_cli.py → **98 passed, 0 failed**.
- Runtime validation with two concurrent `mempalace mine` calls:
  - Different palaces → both complete in parallel ✓
  - Same palace     → one completes, the other exits with
    "another `mine` is already running against <palace> — exiting
    cleanly." ✓
leopechnicki pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 12, 2026
The MCP `mempalace_get_drawer` tool returned the entire raw drawer
metadata blob to any connected client, and the `source_file` field
in that blob is the absolute filesystem path written by the miners
(`miner.py`, `convo_miner.py` — `source_file = str(filepath)`). On
a single-user local deployment this is self-disclosure, but in
nested-agent or multi-server MCP topologies the client is a separate
trust domain and the host's directory layout has no documented
client-side use.

Mirror the mitigation that `searcher.search_memories()` already applies
on its own return path: reduce `source_file` to its basename via
`Path(source_file).name` before handing the metadata to the client.
Citations still work — the directory layout does not leak.

Companion to #1 (omit palace_path from tool_status). Same threat class,
different surface:

- mempalace_status — palace dir path     → fixed in #1
- mempalace_get_drawer — per-drawer source_file path → this PR

Other read tools were audited and do not leak host paths:
- mempalace_search    — already basenames source_file
- mempalace_list_drawers — returns wing/room/preview only
- mempalace_diary_read   — date/timestamp/topic/content only
- mempalace_reconnect    — success/message/drawers only
- mempalace_kg_*         — entity/predicate strings, counts
- mempalace_check_duplicate — wing/room/preview only

Changes:
- mempalace/mcp_server.py: tool_get_drawer() now basenames metadata.source_file
- tests/test_mcp_server.py: regression test asserting the absolute path
  and its parent directory do not appear anywhere in the response
- website/reference/mcp-tools.md: clarify the documented return shape
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