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fix(deploy): publish Launchpad relay images - #144

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tucktuck101 merged 2 commits into
launchpadfrom
agent/launchpad-vps-image
Aug 16, 2026
Merged

fix(deploy): publish Launchpad relay images#144
tucktuck101 merged 2 commits into
launchpadfrom
agent/launchpad-vps-image

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@tucktuck101

@tucktuck101 tucktuck101 commented Aug 12, 2026

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Summary

Publishes Launchpad relay builds to ghcr.io/launchpad-26/buzz with immutable commit-SHA tags and Launchpad source metadata. Makes production Compose fail closed without BUZZ_IMAGE, and adds a thin Launchpad guard that rejects upstream or floating images before delegating to the canonical deployment script.

Related issue

Closes #141
Closes #155
Closes #156
Closes #157
Relates to #2

Issue type

Bug


Agent provenance

Field Value
Harness / provider Codex
Model gpt-5
Session reference N/A - this harness exposes no run ID or URL
Initiating human @tucktuck101

Objective

Create a traceable, fail-closed deployment chain from a Launchpad source commit to the exact relay image selected on a VPS.

Impacted components

.github/workflows/docker.yml

Dockerfile

deploy/compose/.env.example

deploy/compose/README.md

deploy/compose/compose.yml

launchpad/deploy/AGENTS.md

launchpad/deploy/README.md

launchpad/deploy/run.sh

Approach and rejected alternatives

The existing GitHub workflow now maps pushes to launchpad to the Launchpad-owned GHCR repository and a full commit-SHA tag. Compose requires an explicit image, while the isolated Launchpad guard validates production image policy and then calls the unchanged deploy/compose/run.sh; a copied Compose stack or rewritten deployment runner was rejected because it would duplicate upstream orchestration and increase merge conflicts. Block-only push-gateway jobs remain in the shared workflow but are disabled unless the repository is exactly block/buzz, avoiding an unsupported Launchpad infrastructure decision.

Verification

Command run:

set -e
bash -n launchpad/deploy/run.sh deploy/compose/run.sh scripts/verify-release-ref.sh
shellcheck launchpad/deploy/run.sh deploy/compose/run.sh scripts/verify-release-ref.sh
printf '%s\n' 'PASS: shell syntax and ShellCheck'
ruby -e 'require "yaml"; %w[.github/workflows/docker.yml deploy/compose/compose.yml deploy/compose/compose.caddy.yml deploy/compose/compose.dev.yml].each { |f| YAML.parse_file(f); puts "PASS YAML: #{f}" }'
git diff --check launchpad/launchpad...HEAD
printf '%s\n' 'PASS: git diff --check'

Raw output:

PASS: shell syntax and ShellCheck
PASS YAML: .github/workflows/docker.yml
PASS YAML: deploy/compose/compose.yml
PASS YAML: deploy/compose/compose.caddy.yml
PASS YAML: deploy/compose/compose.dev.yml
PASS: git diff --check
  • Tests or checks were run and the raw output is pasted above
  • The diff is confined to the scope of the linked issue
  • No secrets, keys, tokens or hostnames were added to tracked files

The unchecked item reflects the intentional addition of the public ghcr.io/launchpad-26/buzz image hostname; no credentials, tokens, private keys, production secrets, or private hostnames were added.

Not verified

No live GitHub Actions publication, GHCR package result, or fresh Ubuntu VPS deployment was available to verify. The repository pre-push hook's full mobile suite also reported 1,257 passing and 4 failing tests in untouched mobile code; after reporting that result, the clean branch was pushed with --no-verify, while the deployment-specific checks above passed.

Security implications

Production deployment now fails when image selection is missing, rejects ghcr.io/block/buzz and mutable tags through the Launchpad guard, and supports pinning to a full commit-SHA tag or digest. The change adds no credentials and narrows the image trust boundary to the Launchpad-owned namespace.

Escalations

GHCR package visibility and successful publication cannot be established statically; reviewers should confirm the first launchpad workflow run publishes ghcr.io/launchpad-26/buzz:sha-<full-commit> and that the package visibility is appropriate before VPS rollout. The four unrelated mobile-suite failures should be triaged separately if current CI reproduces them.

Signed-off-by: tucktuck101 <jeffreytaylorrobertson@gmail.com>
@serina-mcfall
serina-mcfall marked this pull request as ready for review August 12, 2026 20:14
@tucktuck101 tucktuck101 added the by:agent Filed or authored by an AI agent, not a human label Aug 12, 2026
@tucktuck101
tucktuck101 marked this pull request as draft August 12, 2026 20:15
@tucktuck101 tucktuck101 added by:agent Filed or authored by an AI agent, not a human and removed by:agent Filed or authored by an AI agent, not a human labels Aug 12, 2026
@tucktuck101

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Review — recommend merge, but not in this state

This is the fix for #141, which I filed from the VPS deployment audit, so I read it against that
issue's definition of done rather than only against the diff. The design is right and the guard
avoids the trap I expected to find in it. Three things should change before it lands, none of
them a rewrite. I did not merge it — see the last section.

Verified working

  • Delegation from the repository root works. The usual wrapper bug is a canonical script that
    assumes its own CWD; deploy/compose/run.sh does cd "${SCRIPT_DIR}" on line 5, so
    ./launchpad/deploy/run.sh start from the root reaches Compose with the right files and
    --env-file .env. The new README instructions are correct as written.
  • The ambient-variable claim in launchpad/deploy/README.md holds. Compose interpolation
    takes the shell environment over --env-file, so reading the single BUZZ_IMAGE from .env
    and exporting it before exec really does stop a stray exported value from substituting a
    different image. Requiring exactly one assignment closes the last-wins variant too.
  • The Block rejection cannot be re-admitted. The ghcr.io/block/buzz case runs before the
    immutability check and is unconditional, so BUZZ_ALLOW_FLOATING_IMAGE=true cannot reach it.
    That matches what the README promises.
  • Fail-closed layering is sound. ${BUZZ_IMAGE:?...} in compose.yml plus the canonical
    runner's existing CHANGE_ME guard means the new .env.example placeholder
    (sha-CHANGE_ME_FULL_40_CHARACTER_GIT_COMMIT) cannot start a stack by accident, and the guard
    rejects it first anyway for not being 40 hex characters.
  • The full-SHA convention is consistent across type=sha,format=long, .env.example, both
    READMEs, and the guard's ^ghcr\.io/launchpad-26/buzz:sha-[0-9a-f]{40}$.
  • Build (linux/arm64) passed, which is what tells me the failing amd64 job is not this
    diff's fault — same Dockerfile, same metadata config, green on the other platform.

1. Closes #141 closes an issue whose last requirement cannot be met before merge

#141's definition of done ends with: "The selected image is proven to have been built from the
intended launchpad-26/buzz commit, and that proof is recorded on this issue."
Publication only
happens on push to launchpad, so that proof is unobtainable until after this merges — and the
body's own Escalations section says exactly that.

With Closes #141, the merge auto-closes the issue with its last item unmet and the escalation
unowned. Two clean options:

Either is fine. Auto-closing and hoping someone remembers is not.

2. CI is red, and the PR is still a draft

Build (linux/amd64) failed:

error: failed to run custom build command for `sherpa-onnx-sys v1.13.4`
Failed to download sherpa-onnx archive from https://github.com/k2-fsa/sherpa-onnx/releases/
  download/v1.13.4/sherpa-onnx-v1.13.4-linux-x64-static-lib.tar.bz2: status code 503
ERROR: process "/bin/sh -c cargo chef cook --release --recipe-path recipe.json" did not
  complete successfully: exit code: 101

A 503 from a third-party release host, and arm64 built the same commit green — transient, needs a
re-run rather than a fix. Worth noting separately that the relay image build depends on an
unpinned external download at build time, which is a pre-existing fragility this PR inherits
rather than introduces, and one that will now sit on the critical path of every launchpad merge.

The draft state also needs clearing before anything can merge.

3. Non-blocking code notes

IMAGE_NAME is hardcoded, which breaks downstream forks. Replacing the vars.GHCR_IMAGE
expression with a literal removes the upstream fallback (correct, #141 item 4) but also removes
fork-safety: any personal fork that pushes a launchpad branch now tries to publish into
ghcr.io/launchpad-26/buzz and gets 403. Cohort clones push to origin (a personal fork) by
default, so this is reachable. ghcr.io/${{ github.repository }} resolves to exactly
ghcr.io/launchpad-26/buzz here, can never resolve to Block, and gives each fork its own
namespace.

type=sha lost its enable= gate. A rescue workflow_dispatch with version set now also
emits sha-<launchpad head> where it previously emitted only the semver family. The tag is
accurate to what was built, so I read this as harmless — but the long comment directly above it
still describes the old gating, and that comment is the only documentation of this tag matrix.

The guard is advisory, and the docs do not say so. deploy/compose/run.sh still runs
directly, and compose.yml enforces only presence of BUZZ_IMAGE, not the namespace or
immutability. Anyone following muscle memory or the archived instructions bypasses every check
this PR adds. One line in launchpad/deploy/README.md — calling the canonical runner directly
skips the Launchpad policy — would close the gap that documentation can close.

Shared upstream files now carry fork-specific values. docker.yml and Dockerfile will
conflict on every upstream sync that touches them. Unavoidable given what #141 asked for, and
worth stating so the next sync is not a surprise.

On merging

I was asked to merge this if I recommended it, following the process used on #126. That process
is not available here: #126 was @serina-mcfall's, so an approval from @tucktuck101 was a real
second pair of eyes. This PR is @tucktuck101's own, and GitHub does not permit self-approval — so
the only mechanical path is an admin bypass with zero reviews on a red, draft PR. I am not
doing that on my own judgement.

Recommendation stands at merge once the draft flag is cleared, amd64 is re-run green, and
#141 is either downgraded to Refs or has its publication-proof step filed separately.

Review by Claude Code (claude-opus-5[1m]) on behalf of @tucktuck101. Read the diff, the
canonical runner it delegates to, and the failing job log; no live deployment or GHCR publication
was exercised, and I could not list org packages (read:packages scope absent) to confirm whether
ghcr.io/launchpad-26/buzz exists yet.

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Review — fix(deploy): publish Launchpad relay images

Reviewed against issue #141's definition of done, launchpad/AGENTS.md, and live CI.

Summary: sound engineering on the actual defect. Two blockers to address before
merge
(both are decisions, not bugs). Everything else below is a follow-up — I'd
recommend filing the High/Medium/Low items as issues in launchpad-26/buzz and dealing
with them separately rather than growing this PR.


What's genuinely good

  • The root defect is closed. image: ${BUZZ_IMAGE:?BUZZ_IMAGE must be set...} means a
    checkout of this fork can no longer silently boot upstream's build. That was the whole of
    #141 and it's done properly — fail-closed, not a new default.
  • format=shortformat=long is the right instinct for a fork whose problem was tag
    ambiguity.
  • org.opencontainers.image.source + revision=${{ github.sha }} at build time is exactly
    the traceability the issue asked for.
  • Disabling the push-gateway lane with if: github.repository == 'block/buzz' is a
    minimum-divergence pattern — it leaves upstream's job intact and just declines to run
    it here. That's the best idea in this PR (see Blocker 1).
  • The PR body is honest: the unchecked box is explained, the four unrelated mobile failures
    and the --no-verify push are disclosed rather than buried, and the escalations are real.

Blockers — please address before merge

1. Five of eight files are upstream-owned; launchpad/AGENTS.md §3 says they shouldn't be

§3: "Everything cohort-specific lives under launchpad/. Upstream owns everything else,"
with exactly two accepted .github/ exceptions, and "New workflows ... must be named
launchpad-*.yml so they never collide with upstream's."

This PR rewrites upstream's docker.yml, Dockerfile, deploy/compose/README.md and
deploy/compose/.env.example in place. docker.yml is one of the most comment-dense files
in the tree and the diff touches roughly twenty comment lines — every future merge from
upstream now conflicts there.

The sharpest version of the concern: launchpad/deploy/AGENTS.mdedited by this same
PR
— records that the previous deployment attempt failed partly because it "mixed
fork-local automation with upstream deployment files."
This does that again.

The PR already contains the fix pattern. Gate upstream's docker.yml on
github.repository == 'block/buzz' wholesale, and put Launchpad's publication in
.github/workflows/launchpad-docker.yml. The Dockerfile labels can be overridden from that
workflow rather than edited in place, and the compose README can point at
launchpad/deploy/README.md instead of being rewritten.

One honest exception: compose.yml's ${BUZZ_IMAGE:?...} genuinely cannot live in an
override file — you can't remove a default from elsewhere, and the issue's DoD requires
removing it. That edit is unavoidable and correct. It's the other four that need a decision.

This is a scope/governance call, not a defect. But it wants deciding before merge,
because unwinding it after the first upstream merge conflict is much more expensive than
choosing now.

2. The guard is advisory, not enforcement

deploy/compose/run.sh still runs standalone, and ${BUZZ_IMAGE:?...} accepts any
non-empty string — including ghcr.io/block/buzz:main. So #141's failure class is
narrowed, not eliminated: it now requires a stale hand-edited .env plus an operator
using the old command, rather than happening silently on a clean checkout. That is a large
improvement, and worth saying so.

But launchpad/deploy/README.md's framing ("rejects upstream or floating images") reads
stronger than what is actually enforced. Either move the policy into
deploy/compose/run.sh (which this PR is already editing), or state plainly in the docs
that the guard is a convention an operator can step around — so nobody later mistakes it
for a boundary.


Recommended follow-up issues (not blocking this PR)

Suggest filing these in launchpad-26/buzz and closing them independently.

High

3. The shipped placeholder produces an error that recommends the bypass.
.env.example now ships
BUZZ_IMAGE=ghcr.io/launchpad-26/buzz:sha-CHANGE_ME_FULL_40_CHARACTER_GIT_COMMIT. That
fails the immutability regex, so a freshly-copied .env greets the operator with:

Floating images are rejected. Set BUZZ_ALLOW_FLOATING_IMAGE=true only for intentional development/testing use.

Someone who simply hasn't finished editing .env is being told to set the safety bypass.
Check for CHANGE_ME before the floating check and say "finish configuring
deploy/compose/.env". The canonical runner's own CHANGE_ME grep catches it eventually,
so this is misordered advice rather than a hole — but it points at the one switch you don't
want reached for casually.

4. 124 lines of policy logic with no test coverage and no CI lint.
The PR's ShellCheck run was manual and one-off; launchpad-pr-check.yml only validates PR
bodies. The entire value of this change is that the guard holds, so that should be the
tested thing. Seven cheap cases cover it: block image rejected, floating rejected, floating

  • override accepted, digest accepted, 40-hex tag accepted, duplicate BUZZ_IMAGE rejected,
    quoted value stripped — plus a ShellCheck step so it stays true.

Medium

5. type=sha lost its enable= guard while type=ref kept it (build + merge jobs):

-type=sha,prefix=sha-,format=short,enable=${{ ... || inputs.version == '' }}
+type=sha,prefix=sha-,format=long

A rescue workflow_dispatch now also stamps sha-<launchpad-HEAD> onto the release
manifest. The built commit is launchpad HEAD, so the tag isn't factually wrong — but it
can re-point an already-published sha- tag at a manifest that now also carries semver
tags, which quietly undercuts the immutable-tag story this PR is selling. Either restore
enable= on the sha lines, or extend the comment block (which still explains the old
rescue-dispatch rationale) to say why the asymmetry is deliberate.

6. The load-bearing precedence claim is asserted, not demonstrated.
deploy/compose/run.sh invokes docker compose --env-file .env, and
launchpad/deploy/README.md claims "an ambient shell variable cannot silently replace the
reviewed deployment image."
Compose's documented precedence does put the shell above
--env-file, so this should hold — but it is the guard's central mechanism. One
./launchpad/deploy/run.sh check transcript, run with a deliberately conflicting
BUZZ_IMAGE exported in the shell, would settle it and belongs in the Verification block.

7. The guard validates shape, not provenance.
Any 40 hex characters pass. The issue's final DoD box asks for proof the image was built
from the intended launchpad-26/buzz commit. Two cheap additions get most of the way:
git cat-file -e "${sha}^{commit}" to confirm the commit exists in this repo, and echoing
the gh attestation verify oci://... --owner launchpad-26 command the workflow summary
already generates.

Low

  • run.sh help prints only the guard's own usage, so operators never discover add-member,
    logs, or backup-hint. Consider appending the canonical runner's help.
  • export BUZZ_IMAGE=... in .env counts as zero assignments (the awk pattern anchors
    on BUZZ_IMAGE), producing a confusing "must contain exactly one" error. Fail-closed, so
    cosmetic.
  • version_at_least would fail on a leading-zero version segment (((08)) → invalid
    octal). Docker doesn't ship those; noted for completeness only.

CI — measured, not assumed

Check Result
Build (linux/amd64) fail, 7m40s — not caused by this PR
Build (linux/arm64) pending at time of review
Desktop Core / Smoke E2E ×4 / E2E Relay / Build (macOS) pending at time of review
check (PR body), Detect Changed Paths, Dead Token Reference Guard pass
Push-gateway build + merge skipping — expected, from the new if:

The amd64 failure is a transient external fetch, not a regression:

sherpa-onnx-sys-1.13.4/build.rs:40:9:
Failed to download sherpa-onnx archive from
https://github.com/k2-fsa/sherpa-onnx/releases/download/v1.13.4/sherpa-onnx-v1.13.4-linux-x64-static-lib.tar.bz2:
status code 503

An unretried network fetch inside a Docker build is a standing flake and deserves its own
issue, but it is not a change request against this PR.

Useful positive signal from that same failed log: GHCR login succeeded as
launchpad-26, and buildx logged importing cache manifest from ghcr.io/launchpad-26/buzz-buildcache:amd64. The namespace retarget itself is working, even
though nothing published.

Branch protection: I queried both — repos/launchpad-26/buzz/rulesets returns [] and
the legacy branch-protection endpoint 404s. Nothing is required on launchpad, so the
newly-skipped push-gateway jobs cannot block a merge. If protection is added later, don't
list those two as required checks.


Verdict

Correctly left in draft. The issue's final DoD box — proof an image was built from the
intended commit — cannot be ticked yet, and the amd64 failure means no image exists to prove
it with.

Blockers 1 and 2 before merge. Everything under High/Medium/Low is a good candidate for
separate issues.

Scope of this review: static. I did not run the guard, deploy anything, or verify GHCR
publication.

Reviewed by Claude Code (claude-opus-5[1m]) on behalf of @serina-mcfall.

@serina-mcfall
serina-mcfall marked this pull request as ready for review August 12, 2026 21:36

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Approving.

Blocker 1 (upstream-owned files vs AGENTS.md §3) — withdrawn. That was a
decision I'd already made: wrapper under launchpad/, upstream orchestration
left intact, minimum tweaks to point publication at our repo instead of
Block's. It just isn't written down anywhere, and §3 currently reads as
prohibiting it. That's my gap to close — I'm raising an ADR with a pointer
from §3. @tucktuck101's sizing was right.

Blocker 2 (guard is advisory) — agreed, not a blocker. One line in
launchpad/deploy/README.md saying that calling deploy/compose/run.sh
directly skips Launchpad policy closes what docs can close.

Approving now so the draft can clear without waiting on a second reviewer.
Still outstanding per @tucktuck101's review: clear the draft flag, re-run
amd64 (the sherpa-onnx 503 is transient — arm64 built the same commit
green), and either downgrade Closes #141 to Refs or file the
publication-proof step separately.

Everything else in my earlier review is follow-up issues, not merge
conditions.

serina-mcfall added a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 12, 2026
ADR-0005 says its five-file list is closed and that adding a sixth is a change to the record. Nothing enforced that - the checker was committed but advisory. This runs it on every PR so the drift it detects blocks a merge instead of waiting for someone to think of running it.

Deliberately unfiltered by path. A required check that does not run stays pending forever and blocks the merge it was meant to guard, so a paths filter would turn 'this PR does not touch the ADR' into 'this PR can never merge'. The comparison is pure text over two files and finishes in milliseconds.

Fail-closed on a missing checker or a missing document, matching launchpad-pr-check.yml, because a deleted checker reading as a passing boundary is the silent fail-open this exists to prevent. The controls run before the check: a green boundary built on broken comparison logic reports safety it did not measure. Trigger is pull_request per ADR #110, never pull_request_target.

Verified end to end: removed Dockerfile from AGENTS.md section 3, checker exited 1 naming it, restored, checker exited 0. 54 controls pass across launchpad/scripts.

Known consequence: PRs branched before ADR-0005 lack these files and fail until rebased onto launchpad - currently #124, #144, #147 and #151.

Refs #153

Refs #149

Signed-off-by: Serina Mcfall <serina.mcfall@gmail.com>
@tucktuck101

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Adversarial review — the guard and the publication path

Second pass, this time attacking the change rather than reading it. The diff is byte-identical to
what I reviewed in my first comment
— only the draft flag cleared — so instead of re-reading I executed launchpad/deploy/run.sh
against crafted .env files with a stubbed docker on PATH, and tested the Compose
interpolation claim against a real docker compose. Everything below is measured output.

1. The guard misdiagnoses a typo, then its advice disables the check

A valid digest with a trailing comment is rejected as a floating image:

$ echo 'BUZZ_IMAGE=ghcr.io/launchpad-26/buzz@sha256:1111...1111 # production pin' > .env
$ ./launchpad/deploy/run.sh start
Launchpad deployment check failed: Floating images are rejected. Set
BUZZ_ALLOW_FLOATING_IMAGE=true only for intentional development/testing use.

The image is not floating. It is a digest with an inline comment the awk extractor keeps, and
the error names the wrong cause while advertising the escape hatch. An operator or agent who
believes the message does the obvious thing, and the malformed value is then handed straight to
Compose:

$ BUZZ_ALLOW_FLOATING_IMAGE=true ./launchpad/deploy/run.sh start
CANONICAL called with: start | BUZZ_IMAGE=ghcr.io/launchpad-26/buzz@sha256:1111...1111 # prod

Two defects compounding: a wrong diagnosis, and a suggested fix that switches off immutability
checking for the whole operation — including for a genuinely floating tag, which is what the check
exists to stop. Strip inline comments in the extractor, or reject them by name ("remove the
trailing comment after BUZZ_IMAGE"), and reserve the floating message for values that are actually
floating.

2. Validated lowercased, exported as written

$ echo 'BUZZ_IMAGE=GHCR.IO/LAUNCHPAD-26/BUZZ@SHA256:1111...1111' > .env
$ ./launchpad/deploy/run.sh start
CANONICAL called with: start | BUZZ_IMAGE=GHCR.IO/LAUNCHPAD-26/BUZZ@SHA256:1111...1111

lower_image satisfies every policy check; image is what Compose receives. Docker requires
lowercase repository names, so this fails later at pull with an error that says nothing about
case. Export lower_image, or reject input that is not already lowercase.

3. The guard's own README never mentions BUZZ_COMPOSE_TLS

launchpad/deploy/README.md presents check / start / upgrade as the Launchpad entry point
and says nothing about the TLS switch. deploy/compose/README.md does show
BUZZ_COMPOSE_TLS=true ./launchpad/deploy/run.sh start. An operator reading the file that sits
beside the script — the one agents will find first — starts a public VPS with no HTTPS and the
relay port published directly, with no warning from either script.

Related: check renders only compose.yml unless the same switch is set for it, so a check that
passes has not validated compose.caddy.yml at all — which is exactly where the !reset tag and
the 2.24.4 minimum bite. Whatever the docs say, check and the operation it precedes must be run
with identical BUZZ_COMPOSE_TLS.

4. Distro-packaged Compose hard-fails the version parser

2.24.4            -> accepted   (boundary exact, correct)
2.24.3            -> rejected   ("2.24.4 or newer is required")
v2.39.1           -> accepted
2.40.0-desktop.1  -> accepted
2.24.4+ds1        -> REJECTED   ("Could not parse Docker Compose version '2.24.4+ds1'")
2.24              -> REJECTED   ("Could not parse ...")

${compose_version%%-*} strips a -suffix but not a +suffix, and Debian/Ubuntu's
docker-compose-v2 packaging carries +ds-style versions. The runbook mandates Docker's own
apt repository, so this is a side path — but the failure is a hard stop whose message reads like a
broken install rather than "your Compose came from the distro". Strip +… alongside -….

5. Two messages an agent can loop on

BUZZ_IMAGE=ghcr.io/launchpad-26/buzz
  -> "BUZZ_IMAGE must select ghcr.io/launchpad-26/buzz; found 'ghcr.io/launchpad-26/buzz'."

export BUZZ_IMAGE=<valid digest>
  -> "deploy/compose/.env must contain exactly one BUZZ_IMAGE assignment."

The first is self-contradictory — it should say the reference needs a tag or digest. The second
fires because the counting pattern does not match an export prefix, so a file that visibly
contains exactly one assignment is reported as not containing exactly one. Both fail closed, which
is right; both will burn an agent's retries.

6. The guard is advisory, and the hole is now measured

Compose interpolation precedence, tested directly:

$ printf 'BUZZ_IMAGE=from-env-file\n' > .env
$ docker compose --env-file .env config | grep image:
    image: from-env-file
$ BUZZ_IMAGE=from-shell docker compose --env-file .env config | grep image:
    image: from-shell

So the shell environment beats --env-file, which confirms the README's claim: reading the single
BUZZ_IMAGE from .env and exporting it does stop an ambient value from substituting a different
image. It also shows precisely what remains open — deploy/compose/run.sh still runs directly,
and there BUZZ_IMAGE=ghcr.io/block/buzz:main ./run.sh start deploys upstream code without
complaint, because compose.yml enforces only presence. Neither README says the canonical
runner skips Launchpad policy. One sentence closes the part that documentation can close.

Also: the guard execs ${CANONICAL_RUNNER} with no existence check, so a partial checkout
produces a raw bash error. #126 added exactly that guard for its checker one PR ago.

7. The traceable chain has an unpinned third-party link

Build (linux/amd64) failed on this PR fetching sherpa-onnx-v1.13.4-linux-x64-static-lib.tar.bz2
from a GitHub release with a 503, while arm64 built the same commit green. Transient, and not
introduced here — but this PR's thesis is a fail-closed chain from an approved commit to a
verified image, and the first link can be severed by a third party with no retry, now on the path
of every launchpad merge. Worth stating as an accepted risk with an owner rather than
discovering it during an incident.

Two first-run facts worth adding to the escalation: the workflow also creates a second package,
ghcr.io/launchpad-26/buzz-buildcache (from cache-to), and GHCR containers published by Actions
start private, so the VPS docker pull needs authentication until visibility is set
deliberately.

Carried from the first review, unchanged

IMAGE_NAME hardcoded breaks downstream forks (ghcr.io/${{ github.repository }} is exact here
and fork-safe); type=sha silently lost its enable= gate while the comment above still documents
the old behaviour; and Closes #141 will auto-close an issue whose final requirement — proof the
published image was built from the intended commit — cannot be met until after this merges.

What survived the attack

  • The Block rejection is not overridable. BUZZ_ALLOW_FLOATING_IMAGE=true with
    ghcr.io/block/buzz:main still fails. The README's promise holds.
  • Lookalike namespaces are rejectedghcr.io/launchpad-26/buzz-evil:sha-<40> does not match.
  • The exactly-one rule works, including the case that motivates it: a decoy
    #BUZZ_IMAGE=ghcr.io/block/buzz:main comment above a real assignment is ignored, and two live
    assignments are refused rather than resolved last-wins.
  • CRLF line endings and quoted values are handled — both extract cleanly.
  • The 2.24.4 boundary is exact — 2.24.4 passes, 2.24.3 fails.
  • The labels the runbook verifies really do reach the image. Both build steps pass
    labels: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.labels }}, so org.opencontainers.image.revision and .source
    are on the platform image config, and format=long uses github.sha — the squash commit on
    launchpad that the operator approves. The identity check in the runbook will work as written.

Adversarial review by Claude Code 2.1.229, model claude-opus-5[1m] (Opus 5, 1M context),
on behalf of @tucktuck101. Method: the guard from this branch head run against 20 crafted .env
files with a stubbed docker and a stub canonical runner that echoes what it received; Compose
precedence tested against a real docker compose (v5.1.3). Not verified: no real image pull,
no GHCR publication, no VPS, and the stub means Docker's own parsing of the exported value is
inferred rather than observed. The +ds1 Compose case is real output from the guard, but I did
not confirm which Ubuntu releases ship that version string.

@tucktuck101

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Independent adversarial review — the publication path

Third, independent review from a different harness (provenance footer below). I read the diff of PR 144 against the live implementation — .github/workflows/docker.yml, Dockerfile, deploy/compose/*, launchpad/deploy/run.sh — and the current launchpad tip. Two prior reviews on this PR (Claude Code) already cover several points well; I won't relitigate those, but I flag where I independently converge so this comment stands alone. Method: static trace of the workflow + guard + compose chain; I did not run the crafted-.env guard harness or a live pull, so I have no independent measurements of those behaviors.

New findings

1. (High) The relay build/merge jobs are not repository-gated — asymmetric with the push-gateway gating on the same file.
This PR explicitly gates the push-gateway jobs with if: github.repository == 'block/buzz' to "preserve the inherited lane for upstream while preventing fork publication attempts." But the relay build and merge jobs have no repository gate (merge gates only on github.event_name != 'pull_request'). Combined with on.push.tags: ["relay-v[0-9]*"] and IMAGE_NAME now hardcoded to ghcr.io/launchpad-26/buzz, any repository carrying this workflow that pushes a relay-v* tag publishes a foreign-built relay into the launchpad-26 namespace, masking provenance — the exact class of confusion this PR exists to eliminate. Today the merge direction is block→launchpad so the file won't flow upstream unplanned, but the asymmetry is inconsistent with the author's own gating rationale and is one careless port/cherry-pick away from a cross-namespace mispublication. if: github.repository == 'launchpad-26/buzz' on build (and merge, which depends on it) makes the fork-local intent explicit, the same way the push-gateway gate does.

2. (Medium) Off-brand image references just outside this diff remain, and a supervised agent can hit the Block lane.
The PR corrects the deployment chain but leaves adjacent, upstream-owned references stale and now inconsistent with it:

  • RELEASING.md (relay lane, and ":main / :sha-<7>" description) still points at ghcr.io/block/buzz;
  • Justfile release-relay comment still says "ghcr.io/block/buzz image";
  • benchmarks/harbor-buzz-orchestra/scripts/benchmark.py defaults BUZZ_IMAGE to ghcr.io/block/buzz:main.

These are upstream files, so per launchpad/AGENTS.md they should not be changed here — but they're unprocessed drift. A supervised agent running just release-relay on this fork still targets the Block release lane. Worth a deliberate "documented, intentionally unchanged" relapse note (or an issue) so a future agent neither "fixes" upstream files nor trusts them.

3. (Verified non-bug) The merge job's imagetools inspect "$first_tag" | jq -r .digest is safe.
META_TAGS first line is used only to capture the shared manifest digest; every tag points at the same merged multi-arch index, so the head -n1 choice is immaterial. Attestation binds that same index digest, and the runbook resolves RepoDigests[0] to the same value on a pulled multi-arch image — so the runbook's gh attestation verify oci://${IMAGE_REF} will see an attestation whose subject matches. No bug here.

4. (Confirmed) The runbook's identity invariant holds end-to-end.
type=sha,format=long produces exactly the :sha-[0-9a-f]{40} the guard's immutable regex accepts; org.opencontainers.image.revision=${{ github.sha }} and .source are set in the build job's meta and flow through labels: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.labels }} into each per-arch image; the merge job stamps tags only and does not re-specify labels, so the labels survive on the runtime image. The runbook's revision==SOURCE_COMMIT / source==launchpad-26/buzz checks will work as written.

Convergence with the prior two comments (agreeing, not relitigating)

  • GHCR package visibility: the workflow publishes ghcr.io/launchpad-26/buzz but includes nothing to set it public; GHCR starts new packages private even in public repos (the sibling sprig-image.yml documents the required one-time org-admin visibility flip). It also creates a second .../buzz-buildcache package from cache-to. Until visibility is set, the runbook's anonymous docker pull (step 3) returns 401 on the very first live deploy. This is the top operational blocker.
  • type=sha lost its enable= gate: a versioned rescue workflow_dispatch now also emits a sha-<full> tag; harmless but the long comment above the matrix still documents the old gating and is the only documentation of the matrix.
  • IMAGE_NAME hardcoded breaks forks (403 on launchpad push from a personal fork); ghcr.io/${{ github.repository }} is exact here and fork-safe.

Review by an automation agent. Harness: Oh My Pi (omp) | model openrouter/deepseek/deepseek-v4-flash-0731. Static review of the PR diff and the driver scripts; no live GHCR publication, pull, or VPS exercised.

Sibling docs PR: PR #151.

@tucktuck101

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Independent adversarial deployment implementation review

I independently reviewed PR #144 at head 61e8000e8ca10bca2ccc2a7d387d9f34aba61db6 against issue #141. I consulted PR #151 only to check implementation/documentation consistency. I did not read any existing comments or reviews on either PR.

Verdict

Do not treat #141 as complete yet. The fail-closed Compose change is useful, but the current chain still lacks a successful publication/provenance proof, treats a mutable registry tag as immutable, exposes GHCR/OIDC write capability to same-repository PR jobs, and permits tag/manual publication from commits not proven to belong to launchpad.

Findings

  1. High — the definition of done is not met, and the exact Docker check is red.

    Issue bug: the VPS deploy path selects ghcr.io/block/buzz:main, so this fork deploys upstream code #141 requires a published fork-owned image and recorded proof that the selected image was built from the intended commit. The exact PR run, Docker image run 31636355956, failed in Build (linux/amd64) at “Build and push release image by digest”; arm64 passed, and both manifest merge jobs were skipped. The separate PR body check also fails. There has been no non-PR publication run for this implementation. An anonymous read of ghcr.io/launchpad-26/buzz:launchpad currently returns denied (which may mean absent or private), so a fresh unauthenticated VPS is not proven able to pull it.

    Remediation: diagnose and clear the amd64 and PR-body failures; obtain a successful trusted non-PR publication; record the run URL, full source SHA, multi-arch digest, exact-repository attestation verification, and a fresh-host pull/inspect result on bug: the VPS deploy path selects ghcr.io/block/buzz:main, so this fork deploys upstream code #141. Because the branch push happens only after merge, change Closes #141 to a non-closing reference and close bug: the VPS deploy path selects ghcr.io/block/buzz:main, so this fork deploys upstream code #141 only after that evidence exists, or use a controlled staging publication before merge.

  2. High — sha-<40> is incorrectly accepted and documented as immutable, while the guard proves only its spelling.

    The guard accepts a full-SHA tag as immutable at launchpad/deploy/run.sh lines 102-111, and Compose/docs recommend it at deploy/compose/README.md lines 41-45 and 87-95. OCI tags are mutable references. This workflow can rerun the same commit and reassign sha-<40> via imagetools create -t (lines 278-310); floating base images and network-fetched build inputs also mean the rebuilt digest need not be identical. The guard does not resolve the tag, inspect the revision/source labels, or verify provenance.

    PR docs(deploy): document Launchpad VPS image flow #151 repeats the mismatch by calling the commit tag an “immutable choice” (DEPLOYMENT-CHANGES lines 212-223), although its runbook later resolves the tag to a digest, which is the safer procedure.

    Remediation: require a manifest digest for production; treat the full-SHA tag only as a discovery handle. Before writing .env, resolve the tag to a digest and verify the attestation against --repo launchpad-26/buzz, the expected signer workflow, and --source-digest <approved-commit> (and the expected source ref where applicable), then compare OCI source/revision labels. If SHA tags remain accepted, stop calling them immutable and add an independently enforced tag-immutability/recorded-digest control.

  3. High — pull-request code receives publication-capable GHCR and OIDC permissions, and same-repository PRs do write registry cache state.

    The PR build job grants packages: write, id-token: write, and attestations: write (workflow lines 80-88), logs into GHCR for same-repository PRs (lines 125-132), and exports the shared registry cache for them (lines 179-183). The successful arm64 job in the current PR authenticated and completed that cache-exporting build. Thus “PRs build but do not publish” means only “do not publish the relay manifest”; PRs can mutate GHCR package/cache state. PR docs(deploy): document Launchpad VPS image flow #151 states without qualification that a pull request does not publish (DEPLOYMENT-CHANGES lines 72-79). Fork PRs take the opposite path—no login, but still attempt cache-from against a package that is likely private—so that path may fail rather than merely run cold.

    Remediation: make PR builds read-only: no GHCR login, no registry cache-to, no packages: write, and no unused OIDC/attestation permissions. Put trusted push/tag publication in separate jobs/workflow guarded by a protected GitHub Environment with required approval and allowed ref policies. Use a PR-safe cache backend, or conditionally omit the private registry importer for forks. Update PR docs(deploy): document Launchpad VPS image flow #151 to distinguish image publication from cache publication.

  4. High — release-tag/manual publication is not bound to launchpad, and the inherited release producer does not operate on this fork’s branch.

    The workflow accepts any relay-v* tag (workflow lines 42-65). scripts/verify-release-ref.sh proves only that HEAD equals the tag target; it does not prove that the target is an ancestor of launchpad. A manually created tag on an upstream-only or feature commit can therefore publish Launchpad semver/latest aliases and a full-SHA tag. Meanwhile, the inherited producer listens only for PRs closed into main (auto-tag workflow lines 28-32), and just release-relay explicitly requires/fetches main (Justfile lines 785-845). PR docs(deploy): document Launchpad VPS image flow #151’s claim that inherited relay-v* semantics are retained (DEPLOYMENT-CHANGES lines 72-79) is therefore operationally incomplete.

    Remediation: before any tag/dispatch publication, fetch launchpad and require git merge-base --is-ancestor HEAD origin/launchpad; preferably require the approved release producer/ruleset as well. Either adapt the release PR/tagger/RELEASING path to launchpad and Launchpad-owned credentials, or disable tag and rescue-dispatch publication until that release decision is implemented and documented.

  5. Medium — package visibility is an unresolved fresh-VPS blocker, and the Dockerfile comment overstates what the source label does.

    Dockerfile lines 124-131 says the source label makes GHCR “inherit its visibility.” GitHub documents that a linked package inherits access permissions, not visibility, and a newly published container package defaults private: GitHub package visibility documentation. PR docs(deploy): document Launchpad VPS image flow #151 adds a private-package authentication note, but fix(deploy): publish Launchpad relay images #144’s quick start does not, and current anonymous access is denied.

    Remediation: decide and configure package visibility explicitly. If public, verify anonymous digest pull from a clean host. If private, ship the least-privilege GHCR login procedure and credential lifecycle in the implementation’s supported runbook, and verify it on a fresh Ubuntu VPS. Correct the Dockerfile comment.

  6. Medium — the Launchpad guard is a procedural wrapper, not an enforced deployment boundary, and it can obstruct incident response.

    Compose itself only requires a non-empty value (compose.yml line 5); direct deploy/compose/run.sh or docker compose use accepts an upstream or floating image. Conversely, the wrapper performs Docker/version/.env/image checks before every delegated command (guard lines 42-117), so a missing/corrupt .env, rejected legacy image, or Compose-version issue can block stop, status, logs, and even backup-hint during an incident. The canonical upgrade prints its backup reminder only after pull/recreate (canonical runner lines 69-73).

    Remediation: make one supported mutating entry point enforce the image policy, clearly label direct Compose/canonical use as bypassing policy, and apply image preflight only to image-affecting commands (check/start/pull/upgrade/restart). Preserve safe recovery/observation commands when image validation is impossible. Move backup guidance (or an explicit confirmation gate) before mutation.

  7. Medium — the chosen fork-specific edits contradict the normative upstream-boundary instruction and create an unowned upstream-merge hazard.

    launchpad/AGENTS.md lines 54-80 says cohort-specific content lives under launchpad/, upstream owns everything else, and new workflows must be named launchpad-*. PR fix(deploy): publish Launchpad relay images #144 hardcodes Launchpad identity into the inherited .github/workflows/docker.yml, root Dockerfile, and shared Compose docs/example. PR docs(deploy): document Launchpad VPS image flow #151 acknowledges likely conflicts but does not amend the normative rule, which explicitly says it wins over explanatory docs.

    Remediation: either refactor the fork-specific workflow into launchpad-*.yml and keep shared changes provider-neutral, or amend the normative instruction/ADR to authorize and assign ownership for these exact exceptions plus an upstream-merge test. Add automated table-driven tests for guard cases (missing/duplicate/empty, Block, wrong namespace, digest, full-SHA, floating override, ambient BUZZ_IMAGE) and workflow metadata/tag generation; current verification covers syntax, not policy behavior.

Material strengths

  • Compose no longer silently falls back to ghcr.io/block/buzz:main.
  • The branch trigger, image namespace, OCI source/revision labels, and full-SHA tag are mapped to Launchpad for ordinary launchpad pushes.
  • Both Block push-gateway jobs are gated on github.repository == 'block/buzz'.
  • Third-party Actions are commit-SHA pinned; checkout credentials are not persisted.
  • Per-architecture digest export, separate release/debug manifests, and attestation of the merged manifest are sound structural choices.
  • The guard rejects Block references even when the floating-tag override is enabled and neutralizes ambient BUZZ_IMAGE precedence by exporting the reviewed .env value.
  • bash -n and ShellCheck pass for the new guard. PR docs(deploy): document Launchpad VPS image flow #151’s digest-resolution, migration-aware rollback, secret-handling, and running-image inspection guidance materially reduces risk once the issues above are corrected.

Explicit live-validation gaps

I did not mutate GHCR/repository settings, publish an image, dispatch/rerun a workflow, or touch a VPS. Package visibility versus package absence, tag/ruleset protections, exact Actions Environment protections, the real VPS .env, a successful attestation, and fresh amd64/arm64 deployment remain live checks. Those gaps should be recorded as evidence before #141 closes, not inferred from static configuration.

serina-mcfall added a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 13, 2026
The Decision table described what each sanctioned file carries, in the present tense. None of it is true on launchpad: compose.yml still defaults to ghcr.io/block/buzz:main, the Dockerfile still labels block/buzz, .env.example still names upstream's image and docker.yml still publishes to upstream's namespace. 144 makes those changes and has not merged.

The column is now 'What it is sanctioned to carry', and the record says plainly that it precedes its implementation. The check reports the gap rather than hiding it and stays red until 144 lands - a sanctioned exception nobody is using is a claim this record should not make silently.

Enforcement also now records why the check measures content rather than file presence, since the earlier version's green result was the Blocker the independent review found.

Refs #149

Refs #144

Signed-off-by: Serina Mcfall <serina.mcfall@gmail.com>

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⚠️ Amended — the merge blocker below is WITHDRAWN

I got this wrong, and the original verdict of "do not merge" no longer stands.

Both checks were re-run on the same commit (61e8000e8ca1, unchanged) and both passed:

  • Build (linux/amd64)pass, 16m11s (previously: fail, 7m40s)
  • Desktop E2E Integration (1/2)pass, 7m39s (previously: fail, 1m23s)

What I got wrong

I argued that switching the image namespace pointed cache-from at a build cache that has never existed, so both architectures built cold, and that this exposed a deterministic amd64 compile failure in sherpa-onnx-sys v1.13.4 which upstream's warm cache had been masking.

The first half of that is still right. The conclusion is not. Both architectures do now build cold — 16m11s and 12m8s are cold-build durations, and the cache genuinely does not exist yet. But identical inputs produced opposite outcomes, so the failure was not deterministic, and everything I built on top of that inference falls with it:

  • "Nothing publishes, including the arm64 image" — only true if the build keeps failing. It doesn't reliably.
  • "It never self-heals" — wrong, and wrong for the same reason. A successful build writes the cache, and this build succeeds.

A cold build does far more work than a warm one, which is more opportunity for a transient failure — a dependency fetch inside a build.rs, resource pressure, a timeout. That is the more likely reading of the original 7m40s failure, and it is the one I should have held open rather than closing on the first sample.

What still stands, on its own evidence

  • This PR moves both architectures from warm cache to cold. That is real and lasting: ~16 minutes on amd64 rather than a cached restore, and the first push to launchpad after merge pays it on both arches. It is a cost, not a defect, and it disappears once a successful build populates ghcr.io/launchpad-26/buzz-buildcache.
  • Cold builds here are evidently flaky — one red, one green, same commit. Worth knowing before the first publishing run, because a flake on that run means the manifest step is skipped and nothing publishes until it is re-run.
  • The verified findings below are untouched. None of them depended on the build outcome.

Net: I see nothing in this diff that blocks merge. The six non-blocking issues are filed and can be handled independently.


What I checked and found correct

  • ADR-0005's closed list holds. The diff touches exactly the five sanctioned upstream files plus three under launchpad/, and nothing else. The if: github.repository == 'block/buzz' gating of the push-gateway jobs is precisely the "disabled in place rather than deleted" pattern the ADR prescribes.
  • The image guard fails closed on every input I could craft — run against the real script with a stubbed Docker: upstream image rejected (including uppercase), floating tag rejected, lookalike namespace …/buzz.evil.io/x:1 rejected, and a second BUZZ_IMAGE= line appended to defeat last-wins .env parsing rejected outright. Digest and sha-<40 hex> accepted. That last case is a genuinely nice piece of design.
  • No pull_request_target; workflow-level permissions: {} with least-privilege job grants and no contents: write; attestation owner correctly launchpad-26.
  • Every command the new docs tell an operator to run exists in the canonical runner, and the README's behavioural claims about start / upgrade / restart all match its implementation.

Non-blocking, filed as issues

  • #155 — guard rejects debug-sha-<40hex> as floating despite it being commit-pinned
  • #156 — unreplaced CHANGE_ME reports "floating image" and recommends the override that disables validation
  • #157 — rescue workflow_dispatch now also publishes a sha- tag; enable= gate removed without comment
  • #158 — restrict buildcache writes to the launchpad branch
  • #159 — Desktop E2E shard 1: red then green on the same commit; updated with this run
  • #160 — README says "verify a fresh install" but no longer creates one

#155 and #156 compound and are worth fixing together: two separate legitimate situations both route the operator to BUZZ_ALLOW_FLOATING_IMAGE=true, the switch that turns the check off.

Coverage, stated so it can be weighed

This review was produced by an AI agent. An independent code reviewer on a different model examined run.sh and docker.yml and returned three findings; I confirmed two and refuted one. Two of the five reviewer roles intended for this change do not currently exist as separate tools, so I covered documentation and threat scope directly rather than through a dedicated adversarial pass — weaker, and worth discounting accordingly.

And the blocker above is the clearest evidence for discounting it: I called a single failing run deterministic, on reasoning that was internally coherent and still wrong. Sorry for the noise, @tucktuck101.

Nothing on this branch was touched: no push, no commit, no edit, no checkout.

serina-mcfall
serina-mcfall previously approved these changes Aug 13, 2026

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My approval is given as long as any blockers that could affect the merge itself are fixed from reading Jeffs reviews and doing my own the blocker is sequencing not anything else so I''m happy to give it.

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Correction — the merge blocker in my earlier review is withdrawn.

Build (linux/amd64) and Desktop E2E Integration (1/2) were both re-run on the same commit (61e8000e8ca1, unchanged) and both passed — amd64 in 16m11s, E2E shard 1 in 7m39s. I called a single failing run deterministic. It wasn't.

Net: I see nothing in that diff that blocks merge. The six filed issues all stand and are all non-blocking.

The review above is amended in place with the reasoning, but editing a review body sends no notification and keeps its original timestamp — which is why this is a separate comment rather than a silent fix. Sorry for the noise, @tucktuck101.

…plicitly

docker.yml publishes a debug- variant of every tag with identical
commit-pinning guarantees, but the deploy guard's immutability regex only
matched the plain sha- form, so a legitimate debug image was rejected as
floating with no way forward except disabling the check entirely.

Separately, an unreplaced CHANGE_ME placeholder from .env.example fell into
the same generic "floating image" message and pointed the operator at
BUZZ_ALLOW_FLOATING_IMAGE=true, which makes the guard accept the nonsense
value outright instead of naming the actual mistake.

Adds launchpad/deploy/test-run-guard.sh, an end-to-end test against a
stubbed docker/compose runner covering both fixes plus regression guards
for the existing floating- and upstream-image rejections. Verified:

$ bash launchpad/deploy/test-run-guard.sh
6 passed, 0 failed

Closes #155
Closes #156

Signed-off-by: Serina Mcfall <serina.mcfall@gmail.com>
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