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bpf: BTF support for ksyms #1
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ksym so that further dereferences on the ksym can use the BTF info to validate accesses. Internally, when seeing a pseudo_btf_id ld insn, the verifier reads the btf_id stored in the insn[0]'s imm field and marks the dst_reg as PTR_TO_BTF_ID. The btf_id points to a VAR_KIND, which is encoded in btf_vminux by pahole. If the VAR is not of a struct type, the dst reg will be marked as PTR_TO_MEM instead of PTR_TO_BTF_ID and the mem_size is resolved to the size of the VAR's type. From the VAR btf_id, the verifier can also read the address of the ksym's corresponding kernel var from kallsyms and use that to fill dst_reg. Therefore, the proper functionality of pseudo_btf_id depends on (1) kallsyms and (2) the encoding of kernel global VARs in pahole, which should be available since pahole v1.18. Signed-off-by: Hao Luo <[email protected]> --- include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 4 ++ include/linux/btf.h | 15 +++++ include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 38 ++++++++--- kernel/bpf/btf.c | 15 ----- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 112 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 38 ++++++++--- 6 files changed, 182 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)
information from kernel btf. If a valid btf entry for the ksym is found, libbpf can pass in the found btf id to the verifier, which validates the ksym's type and value. Typeless ksyms (i.e. those defined as 'void') will not have such btf_id, but it has the symbol's address (read from kallsyms) and its value is treated as a raw pointer. Signed-off-by: Hao Luo <[email protected]> --- tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.c | 116 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 102 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
the other is a plain int. This tests two paths in the kernel. Struct ksyms will be converted into PTR_TO_BTF_ID by the verifier while int typed ksyms will be converted into PTR_TO_MEM. Signed-off-by: Hao Luo <[email protected]> --- .../testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/ksyms.c | 31 +++------ .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/ksyms_btf.c | 63 +++++++++++++++++++ .../selftests/bpf/progs/test_ksyms_btf.c | 23 +++++++ tools/testing/selftests/bpf/trace_helpers.c | 26 ++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/bpf/trace_helpers.h | 4 ++ 5 files changed, 123 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/ksyms_btf.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_ksyms_btf.c
bpf_per_cpu_ptr() has the same semantic as per_cpu_ptr() in the kernel except that it may return NULL. This happens when the cpu parameter is out of range. So the caller must check the returned value. Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Hao Luo <[email protected]> --- include/linux/bpf.h | 3 ++ include/linux/btf.h | 11 ++++++ include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 17 +++++++++ kernel/bpf/btf.c | 10 ------ kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 66 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 18 ++++++++++ tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 17 +++++++++ 7 files changed, 128 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
helper always returns a valid pointer, therefore no need to check returned value for NULL. Also note that all programs run with preemption disabled, which means that the returned pointer is stable during all the execution of the program. Signed-off-by: Hao Luo <[email protected]> --- include/linux/bpf.h | 1 + include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 14 ++++++++++++++ kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 10 +++++++--- kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 14 ++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
kernel. If the base pointer points to a struct, the returned reg is of type PTR_TO_BTF_ID. Direct pointer dereference can be applied on the returned variable. If the base pointer isn't a struct, the returned reg is of type PTR_TO_MEM, which also supports direct pointer dereference. Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Hao Luo <[email protected]> --- .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/ksyms_btf.c | 10 +++++++ .../selftests/bpf/progs/test_ksyms_btf.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 36 insertions(+)
Master branch: 95cec14 patch https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/netdev/patch/[email protected]/ applied successfully |
At least one diff in series https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/netdev/list/?series=199405 expired. Closing PR. |
[ 6525.735488] Unexpected kernel BRK exception at EL1 [ 6525.735502] Internal error: ptrace BRK handler: f2000100 [#1] SMP [ 6525.741609] Modules linked in: nls_utf8 cifs libdes libarc4 dns_resolver fscache binfmt_misc nls_ascii nls_cp437 vfat fat aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce gf128mul efi_pstore sha2_ce sha256_arm64 sha1_ce evdev efivars efivarfs ip_tables x_tables autofs4 btrfs blake2b_generic xor xor_neon zstd_compress raid6_pq libcrc32c crc32c_generic ahci xhci_pci libahci xhci_hcd igb libata i2c_algo_bit nvme realtek usbcore nvme_core scsi_mod t10_pi netsec mdio_devres of_mdio gpio_keys fixed_phy libphy gpio_mb86s7x [ 6525.787760] CPU: 3 PID: 7881 Comm: test_verifier Tainted: G W 5.9.0-rc1+ #47 [ 6525.796111] Hardware name: Socionext SynQuacer E-series DeveloperBox, BIOS build #1 Jun 6 2020 [ 6525.804812] pstate: 20000005 (nzCv daif -PAN -UAO BTYPE=--) [ 6525.810390] pc : bpf_prog_c3d01833289b6311_F+0xc8/0x9f4 [ 6525.815613] lr : bpf_prog_d53bb52e3f4483f9_F+0x38/0xc8c [ 6525.820832] sp : ffff8000130cbb80 [ 6525.824141] x29: ffff8000130cbbb0 x28: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.829451] x27: 000005ef6fcbf39b x26: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.834759] x25: ffff8000130cbb80 x24: ffff800011dc7038 [ 6525.840067] x23: ffff8000130cbd00 x22: ffff0008f624d080 [ 6525.845375] x21: 0000000000000001 x20: ffff800011dc7000 [ 6525.850682] x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.855990] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.861298] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.866606] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.871913] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: ffff8000000a660c [ 6525.877220] x9 : ffff800010951810 x8 : ffff8000130cbc38 [ 6525.882528] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000009864cfa881 [ 6525.887836] x5 : 00ffffffffffffff x4 : 002880ba1a0b3e9f [ 6525.893144] x3 : 0000000000000018 x2 : ffff8000000a4374 [ 6525.898452] x1 : 000000000000000a x0 : 0000000000000009 [ 6525.903760] Call trace: [ 6525.906202] bpf_prog_c3d01833289b6311_F+0xc8/0x9f4 [ 6525.911076] bpf_prog_d53bb52e3f4483f9_F+0x38/0xc8c [ 6525.915957] bpf_dispatcher_xdp_func+0x14/0x20 [ 6525.920398] bpf_test_run+0x70/0x1b0 [ 6525.923969] bpf_prog_test_run_xdp+0xec/0x190 [ 6525.928326] __do_sys_bpf+0xc88/0x1b28 [ 6525.932072] __arm64_sys_bpf+0x24/0x30 [ 6525.935820] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x70/0x168 [ 6525.940607] do_el0_svc+0x28/0x88 [ 6525.943920] el0_sync_handler+0x88/0x190 [ 6525.947838] el0_sync+0x140/0x180 [ 6525.951154] Code: d4202000 d4202000 d4202000 d4202000 (d4202000) [ 6525.957249] ---[ end trace cecc3f93b14927e2 ]--- The reason is the offset[] creation and later usage while building the eBPF body. The code currently omits the first instruction, since build_insn() will increase our ctx->idx before saving it. That was fine up until bounded eBPF loops were introduced. After that introduction, offset[0] must be the offset of the end of prologue which is the start of the 1st insn while, offset[n] holds the offset of the end of n-th insn. When "taken loop with back jump to 1st insn" test runs, it will eventually call bpf2a64_offset(-1, 2, ctx). Since negative indexing is permitted, the current outcome depends on the value stored in ctx->offset[-1], which has nothing to do with our array. If the value happens to be 0 the tests will work. If not this error triggers. 7c2e988 ("bpf: fix x64 JIT code generation for jmp to 1st insn") fixed an indentical bug on x86 when eBPF bounded loops were introduced. So let's fix it by creating the ctx->offset[] correctly in the first place and account for the first instruction while calculating the arm instruction offsets. Fixes: 2589726 ("bpf: introduce bounded loops") Reported-by: Naresh Kamboju <[email protected]> Reported-by: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Co-developed-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]> Co-developed-by: Yauheni Kaliuta <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Yauheni Kaliuta <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ilias Apalodimas <[email protected]> --- Changes since v1: - Added Co-developed-by, Reported-by and Fixes tags correctly - Describe the expected context of ctx->offset[] in comments arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
[ 6525.735488] Unexpected kernel BRK exception at EL1 [ 6525.735502] Internal error: ptrace BRK handler: f2000100 [#1] SMP [ 6525.741609] Modules linked in: nls_utf8 cifs libdes libarc4 dns_resolver fscache binfmt_misc nls_ascii nls_cp437 vfat fat aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce gf128mul efi_pstore sha2_ce sha256_arm64 sha1_ce evdev efivars efivarfs ip_tables x_tables autofs4 btrfs blake2b_generic xor xor_neon zstd_compress raid6_pq libcrc32c crc32c_generic ahci xhci_pci libahci xhci_hcd igb libata i2c_algo_bit nvme realtek usbcore nvme_core scsi_mod t10_pi netsec mdio_devres of_mdio gpio_keys fixed_phy libphy gpio_mb86s7x [ 6525.787760] CPU: 3 PID: 7881 Comm: test_verifier Tainted: G W 5.9.0-rc1+ #47 [ 6525.796111] Hardware name: Socionext SynQuacer E-series DeveloperBox, BIOS build #1 Jun 6 2020 [ 6525.804812] pstate: 20000005 (nzCv daif -PAN -UAO BTYPE=--) [ 6525.810390] pc : bpf_prog_c3d01833289b6311_F+0xc8/0x9f4 [ 6525.815613] lr : bpf_prog_d53bb52e3f4483f9_F+0x38/0xc8c [ 6525.820832] sp : ffff8000130cbb80 [ 6525.824141] x29: ffff8000130cbbb0 x28: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.829451] x27: 000005ef6fcbf39b x26: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.834759] x25: ffff8000130cbb80 x24: ffff800011dc7038 [ 6525.840067] x23: ffff8000130cbd00 x22: ffff0008f624d080 [ 6525.845375] x21: 0000000000000001 x20: ffff800011dc7000 [ 6525.850682] x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.855990] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.861298] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.866606] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.871913] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: ffff8000000a660c [ 6525.877220] x9 : ffff800010951810 x8 : ffff8000130cbc38 [ 6525.882528] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000009864cfa881 [ 6525.887836] x5 : 00ffffffffffffff x4 : 002880ba1a0b3e9f [ 6525.893144] x3 : 0000000000000018 x2 : ffff8000000a4374 [ 6525.898452] x1 : 000000000000000a x0 : 0000000000000009 [ 6525.903760] Call trace: [ 6525.906202] bpf_prog_c3d01833289b6311_F+0xc8/0x9f4 [ 6525.911076] bpf_prog_d53bb52e3f4483f9_F+0x38/0xc8c [ 6525.915957] bpf_dispatcher_xdp_func+0x14/0x20 [ 6525.920398] bpf_test_run+0x70/0x1b0 [ 6525.923969] bpf_prog_test_run_xdp+0xec/0x190 [ 6525.928326] __do_sys_bpf+0xc88/0x1b28 [ 6525.932072] __arm64_sys_bpf+0x24/0x30 [ 6525.935820] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x70/0x168 [ 6525.940607] do_el0_svc+0x28/0x88 [ 6525.943920] el0_sync_handler+0x88/0x190 [ 6525.947838] el0_sync+0x140/0x180 [ 6525.951154] Code: d4202000 d4202000 d4202000 d4202000 (d4202000) [ 6525.957249] ---[ end trace cecc3f93b14927e2 ]--- The reason is the offset[] creation and later usage while building the eBPF body. The code currently omits the first instruction, since build_insn() will increase our ctx->idx before saving it. That was fine up until bounded eBPF loops were introduced. After that introduction, offset[0] must be the offset of the end of prologue which is the start of the 1st insn while, offset[n] holds the offset of the end of n-th insn. When "taken loop with back jump to 1st insn" test runs, it will eventually call bpf2a64_offset(-1, 2, ctx). Since negative indexing is permitted, the current outcome depends on the value stored in ctx->offset[-1], which has nothing to do with our array. If the value happens to be 0 the tests will work. If not this error triggers. 7c2e988 ("bpf: fix x64 JIT code generation for jmp to 1st insn") fixed an indentical bug on x86 when eBPF bounded loops were introduced. So let's fix it by creating the ctx->offset[] correctly in the first place and account for the first instruction while calculating the arm instruction offsets. Fixes: 2589726 ("bpf: introduce bounded loops") Reported-by: Naresh Kamboju <[email protected]> Reported-by: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Co-developed-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]> Co-developed-by: Yauheni Kaliuta <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Yauheni Kaliuta <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ilias Apalodimas <[email protected]> --- Changes since v1: - Added Co-developed-by, Reported-by and Fixes tags correctly - Describe the expected context of ctx->offset[] in comments arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
[ 6525.735488] Unexpected kernel BRK exception at EL1 [ 6525.735502] Internal error: ptrace BRK handler: f2000100 [#1] SMP [ 6525.741609] Modules linked in: nls_utf8 cifs libdes libarc4 dns_resolver fscache binfmt_misc nls_ascii nls_cp437 vfat fat aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce gf128mul efi_pstore sha2_ce sha256_arm64 sha1_ce evdev efivars efivarfs ip_tables x_tables autofs4 btrfs blake2b_generic xor xor_neon zstd_compress raid6_pq libcrc32c crc32c_generic ahci xhci_pci libahci xhci_hcd igb libata i2c_algo_bit nvme realtek usbcore nvme_core scsi_mod t10_pi netsec mdio_devres of_mdio gpio_keys fixed_phy libphy gpio_mb86s7x [ 6525.787760] CPU: 3 PID: 7881 Comm: test_verifier Tainted: G W 5.9.0-rc1+ #47 [ 6525.796111] Hardware name: Socionext SynQuacer E-series DeveloperBox, BIOS build #1 Jun 6 2020 [ 6525.804812] pstate: 20000005 (nzCv daif -PAN -UAO BTYPE=--) [ 6525.810390] pc : bpf_prog_c3d01833289b6311_F+0xc8/0x9f4 [ 6525.815613] lr : bpf_prog_d53bb52e3f4483f9_F+0x38/0xc8c [ 6525.820832] sp : ffff8000130cbb80 [ 6525.824141] x29: ffff8000130cbbb0 x28: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.829451] x27: 000005ef6fcbf39b x26: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.834759] x25: ffff8000130cbb80 x24: ffff800011dc7038 [ 6525.840067] x23: ffff8000130cbd00 x22: ffff0008f624d080 [ 6525.845375] x21: 0000000000000001 x20: ffff800011dc7000 [ 6525.850682] x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.855990] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.861298] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.866606] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.871913] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: ffff8000000a660c [ 6525.877220] x9 : ffff800010951810 x8 : ffff8000130cbc38 [ 6525.882528] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000009864cfa881 [ 6525.887836] x5 : 00ffffffffffffff x4 : 002880ba1a0b3e9f [ 6525.893144] x3 : 0000000000000018 x2 : ffff8000000a4374 [ 6525.898452] x1 : 000000000000000a x0 : 0000000000000009 [ 6525.903760] Call trace: [ 6525.906202] bpf_prog_c3d01833289b6311_F+0xc8/0x9f4 [ 6525.911076] bpf_prog_d53bb52e3f4483f9_F+0x38/0xc8c [ 6525.915957] bpf_dispatcher_xdp_func+0x14/0x20 [ 6525.920398] bpf_test_run+0x70/0x1b0 [ 6525.923969] bpf_prog_test_run_xdp+0xec/0x190 [ 6525.928326] __do_sys_bpf+0xc88/0x1b28 [ 6525.932072] __arm64_sys_bpf+0x24/0x30 [ 6525.935820] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x70/0x168 [ 6525.940607] do_el0_svc+0x28/0x88 [ 6525.943920] el0_sync_handler+0x88/0x190 [ 6525.947838] el0_sync+0x140/0x180 [ 6525.951154] Code: d4202000 d4202000 d4202000 d4202000 (d4202000) [ 6525.957249] ---[ end trace cecc3f93b14927e2 ]--- The reason is the offset[] creation and later usage while building the eBPF body. The code currently omits the first instruction, since build_insn() will increase our ctx->idx before saving it. That was fine up until bounded eBPF loops were introduced. After that introduction, offset[0] must be the offset of the end of prologue which is the start of the 1st insn while, offset[n] holds the offset of the end of n-th insn. When "taken loop with back jump to 1st insn" test runs, it will eventually call bpf2a64_offset(-1, 2, ctx). Since negative indexing is permitted, the current outcome depends on the value stored in ctx->offset[-1], which has nothing to do with our array. If the value happens to be 0 the tests will work. If not this error triggers. 7c2e988 ("bpf: fix x64 JIT code generation for jmp to 1st insn") fixed an indentical bug on x86 when eBPF bounded loops were introduced. So let's fix it by creating the ctx->offset[] correctly in the first place and account for the first instruction while calculating the arm instruction offsets. Fixes: 2589726 ("bpf: introduce bounded loops") Reported-by: Naresh Kamboju <[email protected]> Reported-by: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Co-developed-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]> Co-developed-by: Yauheni Kaliuta <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Yauheni Kaliuta <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ilias Apalodimas <[email protected]> --- Changes since v1: - Added Co-developed-by, Reported-by and Fixes tags correctly - Describe the expected context of ctx->offset[] in comments arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
[ 6525.735488] Unexpected kernel BRK exception at EL1 [ 6525.735502] Internal error: ptrace BRK handler: f2000100 [#1] SMP [ 6525.741609] Modules linked in: nls_utf8 cifs libdes libarc4 dns_resolver fscache binfmt_misc nls_ascii nls_cp437 vfat fat aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce gf128mul efi_pstore sha2_ce sha256_arm64 sha1_ce evdev efivars efivarfs ip_tables x_tables autofs4 btrfs blake2b_generic xor xor_neon zstd_compress raid6_pq libcrc32c crc32c_generic ahci xhci_pci libahci xhci_hcd igb libata i2c_algo_bit nvme realtek usbcore nvme_core scsi_mod t10_pi netsec mdio_devres of_mdio gpio_keys fixed_phy libphy gpio_mb86s7x [ 6525.787760] CPU: 3 PID: 7881 Comm: test_verifier Tainted: G W 5.9.0-rc1+ #47 [ 6525.796111] Hardware name: Socionext SynQuacer E-series DeveloperBox, BIOS build #1 Jun 6 2020 [ 6525.804812] pstate: 20000005 (nzCv daif -PAN -UAO BTYPE=--) [ 6525.810390] pc : bpf_prog_c3d01833289b6311_F+0xc8/0x9f4 [ 6525.815613] lr : bpf_prog_d53bb52e3f4483f9_F+0x38/0xc8c [ 6525.820832] sp : ffff8000130cbb80 [ 6525.824141] x29: ffff8000130cbbb0 x28: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.829451] x27: 000005ef6fcbf39b x26: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.834759] x25: ffff8000130cbb80 x24: ffff800011dc7038 [ 6525.840067] x23: ffff8000130cbd00 x22: ffff0008f624d080 [ 6525.845375] x21: 0000000000000001 x20: ffff800011dc7000 [ 6525.850682] x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.855990] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.861298] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.866606] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.871913] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: ffff8000000a660c [ 6525.877220] x9 : ffff800010951810 x8 : ffff8000130cbc38 [ 6525.882528] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000009864cfa881 [ 6525.887836] x5 : 00ffffffffffffff x4 : 002880ba1a0b3e9f [ 6525.893144] x3 : 0000000000000018 x2 : ffff8000000a4374 [ 6525.898452] x1 : 000000000000000a x0 : 0000000000000009 [ 6525.903760] Call trace: [ 6525.906202] bpf_prog_c3d01833289b6311_F+0xc8/0x9f4 [ 6525.911076] bpf_prog_d53bb52e3f4483f9_F+0x38/0xc8c [ 6525.915957] bpf_dispatcher_xdp_func+0x14/0x20 [ 6525.920398] bpf_test_run+0x70/0x1b0 [ 6525.923969] bpf_prog_test_run_xdp+0xec/0x190 [ 6525.928326] __do_sys_bpf+0xc88/0x1b28 [ 6525.932072] __arm64_sys_bpf+0x24/0x30 [ 6525.935820] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x70/0x168 [ 6525.940607] do_el0_svc+0x28/0x88 [ 6525.943920] el0_sync_handler+0x88/0x190 [ 6525.947838] el0_sync+0x140/0x180 [ 6525.951154] Code: d4202000 d4202000 d4202000 d4202000 (d4202000) [ 6525.957249] ---[ end trace cecc3f93b14927e2 ]--- The reason is the offset[] creation and later usage while building the eBPF body. The code currently omits the first instruction, since build_insn() will increase our ctx->idx before saving it. That was fine up until bounded eBPF loops were introduced. After that introduction, offset[0] must be the offset of the end of prologue which is the start of the 1st insn while, offset[n] holds the offset of the end of n-th insn. When "taken loop with back jump to 1st insn" test runs, it will eventually call bpf2a64_offset(-1, 2, ctx). Since negative indexing is permitted, the current outcome depends on the value stored in ctx->offset[-1], which has nothing to do with our array. If the value happens to be 0 the tests will work. If not this error triggers. 7c2e988 ("bpf: fix x64 JIT code generation for jmp to 1st insn") fixed an indentical bug on x86 when eBPF bounded loops were introduced. So let's fix it by creating the ctx->offset[] correctly in the first place and account for the first instruction while calculating the arm instruction offsets. Fixes: 2589726 ("bpf: introduce bounded loops") Reported-by: Naresh Kamboju <[email protected]> Reported-by: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Co-developed-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]> Co-developed-by: Yauheni Kaliuta <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Yauheni Kaliuta <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ilias Apalodimas <[email protected]> --- Changes since v1: - Added Co-developed-by, Reported-by and Fixes tags correctly - Describe the expected context of ctx->offset[] in comments arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
[ 6525.735488] Unexpected kernel BRK exception at EL1 [ 6525.735502] Internal error: ptrace BRK handler: f2000100 [#1] SMP [ 6525.741609] Modules linked in: nls_utf8 cifs libdes libarc4 dns_resolver fscache binfmt_misc nls_ascii nls_cp437 vfat fat aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce gf128mul efi_pstore sha2_ce sha256_arm64 sha1_ce evdev efivars efivarfs ip_tables x_tables autofs4 btrfs blake2b_generic xor xor_neon zstd_compress raid6_pq libcrc32c crc32c_generic ahci xhci_pci libahci xhci_hcd igb libata i2c_algo_bit nvme realtek usbcore nvme_core scsi_mod t10_pi netsec mdio_devres of_mdio gpio_keys fixed_phy libphy gpio_mb86s7x [ 6525.787760] CPU: 3 PID: 7881 Comm: test_verifier Tainted: G W 5.9.0-rc1+ #47 [ 6525.796111] Hardware name: Socionext SynQuacer E-series DeveloperBox, BIOS build #1 Jun 6 2020 [ 6525.804812] pstate: 20000005 (nzCv daif -PAN -UAO BTYPE=--) [ 6525.810390] pc : bpf_prog_c3d01833289b6311_F+0xc8/0x9f4 [ 6525.815613] lr : bpf_prog_d53bb52e3f4483f9_F+0x38/0xc8c [ 6525.820832] sp : ffff8000130cbb80 [ 6525.824141] x29: ffff8000130cbbb0 x28: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.829451] x27: 000005ef6fcbf39b x26: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.834759] x25: ffff8000130cbb80 x24: ffff800011dc7038 [ 6525.840067] x23: ffff8000130cbd00 x22: ffff0008f624d080 [ 6525.845375] x21: 0000000000000001 x20: ffff800011dc7000 [ 6525.850682] x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.855990] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.861298] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.866606] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.871913] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: ffff8000000a660c [ 6525.877220] x9 : ffff800010951810 x8 : ffff8000130cbc38 [ 6525.882528] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000009864cfa881 [ 6525.887836] x5 : 00ffffffffffffff x4 : 002880ba1a0b3e9f [ 6525.893144] x3 : 0000000000000018 x2 : ffff8000000a4374 [ 6525.898452] x1 : 000000000000000a x0 : 0000000000000009 [ 6525.903760] Call trace: [ 6525.906202] bpf_prog_c3d01833289b6311_F+0xc8/0x9f4 [ 6525.911076] bpf_prog_d53bb52e3f4483f9_F+0x38/0xc8c [ 6525.915957] bpf_dispatcher_xdp_func+0x14/0x20 [ 6525.920398] bpf_test_run+0x70/0x1b0 [ 6525.923969] bpf_prog_test_run_xdp+0xec/0x190 [ 6525.928326] __do_sys_bpf+0xc88/0x1b28 [ 6525.932072] __arm64_sys_bpf+0x24/0x30 [ 6525.935820] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x70/0x168 [ 6525.940607] do_el0_svc+0x28/0x88 [ 6525.943920] el0_sync_handler+0x88/0x190 [ 6525.947838] el0_sync+0x140/0x180 [ 6525.951154] Code: d4202000 d4202000 d4202000 d4202000 (d4202000) [ 6525.957249] ---[ end trace cecc3f93b14927e2 ]--- The reason is the offset[] creation and later usage while building the eBPF body. The code currently omits the first instruction, since build_insn() will increase our ctx->idx before saving it. That was fine up until bounded eBPF loops were introduced. After that introduction, offset[0] must be the offset of the end of prologue which is the start of the 1st insn while, offset[n] holds the offset of the end of n-th insn. When "taken loop with back jump to 1st insn" test runs, it will eventually call bpf2a64_offset(-1, 2, ctx). Since negative indexing is permitted, the current outcome depends on the value stored in ctx->offset[-1], which has nothing to do with our array. If the value happens to be 0 the tests will work. If not this error triggers. 7c2e988 ("bpf: fix x64 JIT code generation for jmp to 1st insn") fixed an indentical bug on x86 when eBPF bounded loops were introduced. So let's fix it by creating the ctx->offset[] correctly in the first place and account for the first instruction while calculating the arm instruction offsets. Fixes: 2589726 ("bpf: introduce bounded loops") Reported-by: Naresh Kamboju <[email protected]> Reported-by: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Co-developed-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]> Co-developed-by: Yauheni Kaliuta <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Yauheni Kaliuta <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ilias Apalodimas <[email protected]> --- Changes since v1: - Added Co-developed-by, Reported-by and Fixes tags correctly - Describe the expected context of ctx->offset[] in comments arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
[ 6525.735488] Unexpected kernel BRK exception at EL1 [ 6525.735502] Internal error: ptrace BRK handler: f2000100 [#1] SMP [ 6525.741609] Modules linked in: nls_utf8 cifs libdes libarc4 dns_resolver fscache binfmt_misc nls_ascii nls_cp437 vfat fat aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce gf128mul efi_pstore sha2_ce sha256_arm64 sha1_ce evdev efivars efivarfs ip_tables x_tables autofs4 btrfs blake2b_generic xor xor_neon zstd_compress raid6_pq libcrc32c crc32c_generic ahci xhci_pci libahci xhci_hcd igb libata i2c_algo_bit nvme realtek usbcore nvme_core scsi_mod t10_pi netsec mdio_devres of_mdio gpio_keys fixed_phy libphy gpio_mb86s7x [ 6525.787760] CPU: 3 PID: 7881 Comm: test_verifier Tainted: G W 5.9.0-rc1+ #47 [ 6525.796111] Hardware name: Socionext SynQuacer E-series DeveloperBox, BIOS build #1 Jun 6 2020 [ 6525.804812] pstate: 20000005 (nzCv daif -PAN -UAO BTYPE=--) [ 6525.810390] pc : bpf_prog_c3d01833289b6311_F+0xc8/0x9f4 [ 6525.815613] lr : bpf_prog_d53bb52e3f4483f9_F+0x38/0xc8c [ 6525.820832] sp : ffff8000130cbb80 [ 6525.824141] x29: ffff8000130cbbb0 x28: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.829451] x27: 000005ef6fcbf39b x26: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.834759] x25: ffff8000130cbb80 x24: ffff800011dc7038 [ 6525.840067] x23: ffff8000130cbd00 x22: ffff0008f624d080 [ 6525.845375] x21: 0000000000000001 x20: ffff800011dc7000 [ 6525.850682] x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.855990] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.861298] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.866606] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.871913] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: ffff8000000a660c [ 6525.877220] x9 : ffff800010951810 x8 : ffff8000130cbc38 [ 6525.882528] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000009864cfa881 [ 6525.887836] x5 : 00ffffffffffffff x4 : 002880ba1a0b3e9f [ 6525.893144] x3 : 0000000000000018 x2 : ffff8000000a4374 [ 6525.898452] x1 : 000000000000000a x0 : 0000000000000009 [ 6525.903760] Call trace: [ 6525.906202] bpf_prog_c3d01833289b6311_F+0xc8/0x9f4 [ 6525.911076] bpf_prog_d53bb52e3f4483f9_F+0x38/0xc8c [ 6525.915957] bpf_dispatcher_xdp_func+0x14/0x20 [ 6525.920398] bpf_test_run+0x70/0x1b0 [ 6525.923969] bpf_prog_test_run_xdp+0xec/0x190 [ 6525.928326] __do_sys_bpf+0xc88/0x1b28 [ 6525.932072] __arm64_sys_bpf+0x24/0x30 [ 6525.935820] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x70/0x168 [ 6525.940607] do_el0_svc+0x28/0x88 [ 6525.943920] el0_sync_handler+0x88/0x190 [ 6525.947838] el0_sync+0x140/0x180 [ 6525.951154] Code: d4202000 d4202000 d4202000 d4202000 (d4202000) [ 6525.957249] ---[ end trace cecc3f93b14927e2 ]--- The reason is the offset[] creation and later usage while building the eBPF body. The code currently omits the first instruction, since build_insn() will increase our ctx->idx before saving it. That was fine up until bounded eBPF loops were introduced. After that introduction, offset[0] must be the offset of the end of prologue which is the start of the 1st insn while, offset[n] holds the offset of the end of n-th insn. When "taken loop with back jump to 1st insn" test runs, it will eventually call bpf2a64_offset(-1, 2, ctx). Since negative indexing is permitted, the current outcome depends on the value stored in ctx->offset[-1], which has nothing to do with our array. If the value happens to be 0 the tests will work. If not this error triggers. 7c2e988 ("bpf: fix x64 JIT code generation for jmp to 1st insn") fixed an indentical bug on x86 when eBPF bounded loops were introduced. So let's fix it by creating the ctx->offset[] correctly in the first place and account for the first instruction while calculating the arm instruction offsets. Fixes: 2589726 ("bpf: introduce bounded loops") Reported-by: Naresh Kamboju <[email protected]> Reported-by: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Co-developed-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]> Co-developed-by: Yauheni Kaliuta <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Yauheni Kaliuta <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ilias Apalodimas <[email protected]> --- Changes since v1: - Added Co-developed-by, Reported-by and Fixes tags correctly - Describe the expected context of ctx->offset[] in comments arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
[ 6525.735488] Unexpected kernel BRK exception at EL1 [ 6525.735502] Internal error: ptrace BRK handler: f2000100 [#1] SMP [ 6525.741609] Modules linked in: nls_utf8 cifs libdes libarc4 dns_resolver fscache binfmt_misc nls_ascii nls_cp437 vfat fat aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce gf128mul efi_pstore sha2_ce sha256_arm64 sha1_ce evdev efivars efivarfs ip_tables x_tables autofs4 btrfs blake2b_generic xor xor_neon zstd_compress raid6_pq libcrc32c crc32c_generic ahci xhci_pci libahci xhci_hcd igb libata i2c_algo_bit nvme realtek usbcore nvme_core scsi_mod t10_pi netsec mdio_devres of_mdio gpio_keys fixed_phy libphy gpio_mb86s7x [ 6525.787760] CPU: 3 PID: 7881 Comm: test_verifier Tainted: G W 5.9.0-rc1+ #47 [ 6525.796111] Hardware name: Socionext SynQuacer E-series DeveloperBox, BIOS build #1 Jun 6 2020 [ 6525.804812] pstate: 20000005 (nzCv daif -PAN -UAO BTYPE=--) [ 6525.810390] pc : bpf_prog_c3d01833289b6311_F+0xc8/0x9f4 [ 6525.815613] lr : bpf_prog_d53bb52e3f4483f9_F+0x38/0xc8c [ 6525.820832] sp : ffff8000130cbb80 [ 6525.824141] x29: ffff8000130cbbb0 x28: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.829451] x27: 000005ef6fcbf39b x26: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.834759] x25: ffff8000130cbb80 x24: ffff800011dc7038 [ 6525.840067] x23: ffff8000130cbd00 x22: ffff0008f624d080 [ 6525.845375] x21: 0000000000000001 x20: ffff800011dc7000 [ 6525.850682] x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.855990] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.861298] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.866606] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.871913] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: ffff8000000a660c [ 6525.877220] x9 : ffff800010951810 x8 : ffff8000130cbc38 [ 6525.882528] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000009864cfa881 [ 6525.887836] x5 : 00ffffffffffffff x4 : 002880ba1a0b3e9f [ 6525.893144] x3 : 0000000000000018 x2 : ffff8000000a4374 [ 6525.898452] x1 : 000000000000000a x0 : 0000000000000009 [ 6525.903760] Call trace: [ 6525.906202] bpf_prog_c3d01833289b6311_F+0xc8/0x9f4 [ 6525.911076] bpf_prog_d53bb52e3f4483f9_F+0x38/0xc8c [ 6525.915957] bpf_dispatcher_xdp_func+0x14/0x20 [ 6525.920398] bpf_test_run+0x70/0x1b0 [ 6525.923969] bpf_prog_test_run_xdp+0xec/0x190 [ 6525.928326] __do_sys_bpf+0xc88/0x1b28 [ 6525.932072] __arm64_sys_bpf+0x24/0x30 [ 6525.935820] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x70/0x168 [ 6525.940607] do_el0_svc+0x28/0x88 [ 6525.943920] el0_sync_handler+0x88/0x190 [ 6525.947838] el0_sync+0x140/0x180 [ 6525.951154] Code: d4202000 d4202000 d4202000 d4202000 (d4202000) [ 6525.957249] ---[ end trace cecc3f93b14927e2 ]--- The reason is the offset[] creation and later usage while building the eBPF body. The code currently omits the first instruction, since build_insn() will increase our ctx->idx before saving it. That was fine up until bounded eBPF loops were introduced. After that introduction, offset[0] must be the offset of the end of prologue which is the start of the 1st insn while, offset[n] holds the offset of the end of n-th insn. When "taken loop with back jump to 1st insn" test runs, it will eventually call bpf2a64_offset(-1, 2, ctx). Since negative indexing is permitted, the current outcome depends on the value stored in ctx->offset[-1], which has nothing to do with our array. If the value happens to be 0 the tests will work. If not this error triggers. 7c2e988 ("bpf: fix x64 JIT code generation for jmp to 1st insn") fixed an indentical bug on x86 when eBPF bounded loops were introduced. So let's fix it by creating the ctx->offset[] correctly in the first place and account for the first instruction while calculating the arm instruction offsets. Fixes: 2589726 ("bpf: introduce bounded loops") Reported-by: Naresh Kamboju <[email protected]> Reported-by: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Co-developed-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]> Co-developed-by: Yauheni Kaliuta <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Yauheni Kaliuta <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ilias Apalodimas <[email protected]> --- Changes since v1: - Added Co-developed-by, Reported-by and Fixes tags correctly - Describe the expected context of ctx->offset[] in comments arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
[ 6525.735488] Unexpected kernel BRK exception at EL1 [ 6525.735502] Internal error: ptrace BRK handler: f2000100 [#1] SMP [ 6525.741609] Modules linked in: nls_utf8 cifs libdes libarc4 dns_resolver fscache binfmt_misc nls_ascii nls_cp437 vfat fat aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce gf128mul efi_pstore sha2_ce sha256_arm64 sha1_ce evdev efivars efivarfs ip_tables x_tables autofs4 btrfs blake2b_generic xor xor_neon zstd_compress raid6_pq libcrc32c crc32c_generic ahci xhci_pci libahci xhci_hcd igb libata i2c_algo_bit nvme realtek usbcore nvme_core scsi_mod t10_pi netsec mdio_devres of_mdio gpio_keys fixed_phy libphy gpio_mb86s7x [ 6525.787760] CPU: 3 PID: 7881 Comm: test_verifier Tainted: G W 5.9.0-rc1+ #47 [ 6525.796111] Hardware name: Socionext SynQuacer E-series DeveloperBox, BIOS build #1 Jun 6 2020 [ 6525.804812] pstate: 20000005 (nzCv daif -PAN -UAO BTYPE=--) [ 6525.810390] pc : bpf_prog_c3d01833289b6311_F+0xc8/0x9f4 [ 6525.815613] lr : bpf_prog_d53bb52e3f4483f9_F+0x38/0xc8c [ 6525.820832] sp : ffff8000130cbb80 [ 6525.824141] x29: ffff8000130cbbb0 x28: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.829451] x27: 000005ef6fcbf39b x26: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.834759] x25: ffff8000130cbb80 x24: ffff800011dc7038 [ 6525.840067] x23: ffff8000130cbd00 x22: ffff0008f624d080 [ 6525.845375] x21: 0000000000000001 x20: ffff800011dc7000 [ 6525.850682] x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.855990] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.861298] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.866606] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.871913] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: ffff8000000a660c [ 6525.877220] x9 : ffff800010951810 x8 : ffff8000130cbc38 [ 6525.882528] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000009864cfa881 [ 6525.887836] x5 : 00ffffffffffffff x4 : 002880ba1a0b3e9f [ 6525.893144] x3 : 0000000000000018 x2 : ffff8000000a4374 [ 6525.898452] x1 : 000000000000000a x0 : 0000000000000009 [ 6525.903760] Call trace: [ 6525.906202] bpf_prog_c3d01833289b6311_F+0xc8/0x9f4 [ 6525.911076] bpf_prog_d53bb52e3f4483f9_F+0x38/0xc8c [ 6525.915957] bpf_dispatcher_xdp_func+0x14/0x20 [ 6525.920398] bpf_test_run+0x70/0x1b0 [ 6525.923969] bpf_prog_test_run_xdp+0xec/0x190 [ 6525.928326] __do_sys_bpf+0xc88/0x1b28 [ 6525.932072] __arm64_sys_bpf+0x24/0x30 [ 6525.935820] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x70/0x168 [ 6525.940607] do_el0_svc+0x28/0x88 [ 6525.943920] el0_sync_handler+0x88/0x190 [ 6525.947838] el0_sync+0x140/0x180 [ 6525.951154] Code: d4202000 d4202000 d4202000 d4202000 (d4202000) [ 6525.957249] ---[ end trace cecc3f93b14927e2 ]--- The reason is the offset[] creation and later usage while building the eBPF body. The code currently omits the first instruction, since build_insn() will increase our ctx->idx before saving it. That was fine up until bounded eBPF loops were introduced. After that introduction, offset[0] must be the offset of the end of prologue which is the start of the 1st insn while, offset[n] holds the offset of the end of n-th insn. When "taken loop with back jump to 1st insn" test runs, it will eventually call bpf2a64_offset(-1, 2, ctx). Since negative indexing is permitted, the current outcome depends on the value stored in ctx->offset[-1], which has nothing to do with our array. If the value happens to be 0 the tests will work. If not this error triggers. 7c2e988 ("bpf: fix x64 JIT code generation for jmp to 1st insn") fixed an indentical bug on x86 when eBPF bounded loops were introduced. So let's fix it by creating the ctx->offset[] correctly in the first place and account for the first instruction while calculating the arm instruction offsets. Fixes: 2589726 ("bpf: introduce bounded loops") Reported-by: Naresh Kamboju <[email protected]> Reported-by: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Co-developed-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]> Co-developed-by: Yauheni Kaliuta <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Yauheni Kaliuta <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ilias Apalodimas <[email protected]> --- Changes since v1: - Added Co-developed-by, Reported-by and Fixes tags correctly - Describe the expected context of ctx->offset[] in comments arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
[ 6525.735488] Unexpected kernel BRK exception at EL1 [ 6525.735502] Internal error: ptrace BRK handler: f2000100 [#1] SMP [ 6525.741609] Modules linked in: nls_utf8 cifs libdes libarc4 dns_resolver fscache binfmt_misc nls_ascii nls_cp437 vfat fat aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce gf128mul efi_pstore sha2_ce sha256_arm64 sha1_ce evdev efivars efivarfs ip_tables x_tables autofs4 btrfs blake2b_generic xor xor_neon zstd_compress raid6_pq libcrc32c crc32c_generic ahci xhci_pci libahci xhci_hcd igb libata i2c_algo_bit nvme realtek usbcore nvme_core scsi_mod t10_pi netsec mdio_devres of_mdio gpio_keys fixed_phy libphy gpio_mb86s7x [ 6525.787760] CPU: 3 PID: 7881 Comm: test_verifier Tainted: G W 5.9.0-rc1+ #47 [ 6525.796111] Hardware name: Socionext SynQuacer E-series DeveloperBox, BIOS build #1 Jun 6 2020 [ 6525.804812] pstate: 20000005 (nzCv daif -PAN -UAO BTYPE=--) [ 6525.810390] pc : bpf_prog_c3d01833289b6311_F+0xc8/0x9f4 [ 6525.815613] lr : bpf_prog_d53bb52e3f4483f9_F+0x38/0xc8c [ 6525.820832] sp : ffff8000130cbb80 [ 6525.824141] x29: ffff8000130cbbb0 x28: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.829451] x27: 000005ef6fcbf39b x26: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.834759] x25: ffff8000130cbb80 x24: ffff800011dc7038 [ 6525.840067] x23: ffff8000130cbd00 x22: ffff0008f624d080 [ 6525.845375] x21: 0000000000000001 x20: ffff800011dc7000 [ 6525.850682] x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.855990] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.861298] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.866606] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.871913] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: ffff8000000a660c [ 6525.877220] x9 : ffff800010951810 x8 : ffff8000130cbc38 [ 6525.882528] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000009864cfa881 [ 6525.887836] x5 : 00ffffffffffffff x4 : 002880ba1a0b3e9f [ 6525.893144] x3 : 0000000000000018 x2 : ffff8000000a4374 [ 6525.898452] x1 : 000000000000000a x0 : 0000000000000009 [ 6525.903760] Call trace: [ 6525.906202] bpf_prog_c3d01833289b6311_F+0xc8/0x9f4 [ 6525.911076] bpf_prog_d53bb52e3f4483f9_F+0x38/0xc8c [ 6525.915957] bpf_dispatcher_xdp_func+0x14/0x20 [ 6525.920398] bpf_test_run+0x70/0x1b0 [ 6525.923969] bpf_prog_test_run_xdp+0xec/0x190 [ 6525.928326] __do_sys_bpf+0xc88/0x1b28 [ 6525.932072] __arm64_sys_bpf+0x24/0x30 [ 6525.935820] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x70/0x168 [ 6525.940607] do_el0_svc+0x28/0x88 [ 6525.943920] el0_sync_handler+0x88/0x190 [ 6525.947838] el0_sync+0x140/0x180 [ 6525.951154] Code: d4202000 d4202000 d4202000 d4202000 (d4202000) [ 6525.957249] ---[ end trace cecc3f93b14927e2 ]--- The reason is the offset[] creation and later usage while building the eBPF body. The code currently omits the first instruction, since build_insn() will increase our ctx->idx before saving it. That was fine up until bounded eBPF loops were introduced. After that introduction, offset[0] must be the offset of the end of prologue which is the start of the 1st insn while, offset[n] holds the offset of the end of n-th insn. When "taken loop with back jump to 1st insn" test runs, it will eventually call bpf2a64_offset(-1, 2, ctx). Since negative indexing is permitted, the current outcome depends on the value stored in ctx->offset[-1], which has nothing to do with our array. If the value happens to be 0 the tests will work. If not this error triggers. 7c2e988 ("bpf: fix x64 JIT code generation for jmp to 1st insn") fixed an indentical bug on x86 when eBPF bounded loops were introduced. So let's fix it by creating the ctx->offset[] correctly in the first place and account for the first instruction while calculating the arm instruction offsets. Fixes: 2589726 ("bpf: introduce bounded loops") Reported-by: Naresh Kamboju <[email protected]> Reported-by: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Co-developed-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]> Co-developed-by: Yauheni Kaliuta <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Yauheni Kaliuta <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ilias Apalodimas <[email protected]> --- Changes since v1: - Added Co-developed-by, Reported-by and Fixes tags correctly - Describe the expected context of ctx->offset[] in comments arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
[ 6525.735488] Unexpected kernel BRK exception at EL1 [ 6525.735502] Internal error: ptrace BRK handler: f2000100 [#1] SMP [ 6525.741609] Modules linked in: nls_utf8 cifs libdes libarc4 dns_resolver fscache binfmt_misc nls_ascii nls_cp437 vfat fat aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce gf128mul efi_pstore sha2_ce sha256_arm64 sha1_ce evdev efivars efivarfs ip_tables x_tables autofs4 btrfs blake2b_generic xor xor_neon zstd_compress raid6_pq libcrc32c crc32c_generic ahci xhci_pci libahci xhci_hcd igb libata i2c_algo_bit nvme realtek usbcore nvme_core scsi_mod t10_pi netsec mdio_devres of_mdio gpio_keys fixed_phy libphy gpio_mb86s7x [ 6525.787760] CPU: 3 PID: 7881 Comm: test_verifier Tainted: G W 5.9.0-rc1+ #47 [ 6525.796111] Hardware name: Socionext SynQuacer E-series DeveloperBox, BIOS build #1 Jun 6 2020 [ 6525.804812] pstate: 20000005 (nzCv daif -PAN -UAO BTYPE=--) [ 6525.810390] pc : bpf_prog_c3d01833289b6311_F+0xc8/0x9f4 [ 6525.815613] lr : bpf_prog_d53bb52e3f4483f9_F+0x38/0xc8c [ 6525.820832] sp : ffff8000130cbb80 [ 6525.824141] x29: ffff8000130cbbb0 x28: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.829451] x27: 000005ef6fcbf39b x26: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.834759] x25: ffff8000130cbb80 x24: ffff800011dc7038 [ 6525.840067] x23: ffff8000130cbd00 x22: ffff0008f624d080 [ 6525.845375] x21: 0000000000000001 x20: ffff800011dc7000 [ 6525.850682] x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.855990] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.861298] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.866606] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.871913] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: ffff8000000a660c [ 6525.877220] x9 : ffff800010951810 x8 : ffff8000130cbc38 [ 6525.882528] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000009864cfa881 [ 6525.887836] x5 : 00ffffffffffffff x4 : 002880ba1a0b3e9f [ 6525.893144] x3 : 0000000000000018 x2 : ffff8000000a4374 [ 6525.898452] x1 : 000000000000000a x0 : 0000000000000009 [ 6525.903760] Call trace: [ 6525.906202] bpf_prog_c3d01833289b6311_F+0xc8/0x9f4 [ 6525.911076] bpf_prog_d53bb52e3f4483f9_F+0x38/0xc8c [ 6525.915957] bpf_dispatcher_xdp_func+0x14/0x20 [ 6525.920398] bpf_test_run+0x70/0x1b0 [ 6525.923969] bpf_prog_test_run_xdp+0xec/0x190 [ 6525.928326] __do_sys_bpf+0xc88/0x1b28 [ 6525.932072] __arm64_sys_bpf+0x24/0x30 [ 6525.935820] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x70/0x168 [ 6525.940607] do_el0_svc+0x28/0x88 [ 6525.943920] el0_sync_handler+0x88/0x190 [ 6525.947838] el0_sync+0x140/0x180 [ 6525.951154] Code: d4202000 d4202000 d4202000 d4202000 (d4202000) [ 6525.957249] ---[ end trace cecc3f93b14927e2 ]--- The reason is the offset[] creation and later usage while building the eBPF body. The code currently omits the first instruction, since build_insn() will increase our ctx->idx before saving it. That was fine up until bounded eBPF loops were introduced. After that introduction, offset[0] must be the offset of the end of prologue which is the start of the 1st insn while, offset[n] holds the offset of the end of n-th insn. When "taken loop with back jump to 1st insn" test runs, it will eventually call bpf2a64_offset(-1, 2, ctx). Since negative indexing is permitted, the current outcome depends on the value stored in ctx->offset[-1], which has nothing to do with our array. If the value happens to be 0 the tests will work. If not this error triggers. 7c2e988 ("bpf: fix x64 JIT code generation for jmp to 1st insn") fixed an indentical bug on x86 when eBPF bounded loops were introduced. So let's fix it by creating the ctx->offset[] correctly in the first place and account for the first instruction while calculating the arm instruction offsets. Fixes: 2589726 ("bpf: introduce bounded loops") Reported-by: Naresh Kamboju <[email protected]> Reported-by: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Co-developed-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]> Co-developed-by: Yauheni Kaliuta <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Yauheni Kaliuta <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ilias Apalodimas <[email protected]> --- Changes since v1: - Added Co-developed-by, Reported-by and Fixes tags correctly - Describe the expected context of ctx->offset[] in comments arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
[ 6525.735488] Unexpected kernel BRK exception at EL1 [ 6525.735502] Internal error: ptrace BRK handler: f2000100 [#1] SMP [ 6525.741609] Modules linked in: nls_utf8 cifs libdes libarc4 dns_resolver fscache binfmt_misc nls_ascii nls_cp437 vfat fat aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce gf128mul efi_pstore sha2_ce sha256_arm64 sha1_ce evdev efivars efivarfs ip_tables x_tables autofs4 btrfs blake2b_generic xor xor_neon zstd_compress raid6_pq libcrc32c crc32c_generic ahci xhci_pci libahci xhci_hcd igb libata i2c_algo_bit nvme realtek usbcore nvme_core scsi_mod t10_pi netsec mdio_devres of_mdio gpio_keys fixed_phy libphy gpio_mb86s7x [ 6525.787760] CPU: 3 PID: 7881 Comm: test_verifier Tainted: G W 5.9.0-rc1+ #47 [ 6525.796111] Hardware name: Socionext SynQuacer E-series DeveloperBox, BIOS build #1 Jun 6 2020 [ 6525.804812] pstate: 20000005 (nzCv daif -PAN -UAO BTYPE=--) [ 6525.810390] pc : bpf_prog_c3d01833289b6311_F+0xc8/0x9f4 [ 6525.815613] lr : bpf_prog_d53bb52e3f4483f9_F+0x38/0xc8c [ 6525.820832] sp : ffff8000130cbb80 [ 6525.824141] x29: ffff8000130cbbb0 x28: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.829451] x27: 000005ef6fcbf39b x26: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.834759] x25: ffff8000130cbb80 x24: ffff800011dc7038 [ 6525.840067] x23: ffff8000130cbd00 x22: ffff0008f624d080 [ 6525.845375] x21: 0000000000000001 x20: ffff800011dc7000 [ 6525.850682] x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.855990] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.861298] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.866606] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.871913] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: ffff8000000a660c [ 6525.877220] x9 : ffff800010951810 x8 : ffff8000130cbc38 [ 6525.882528] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000009864cfa881 [ 6525.887836] x5 : 00ffffffffffffff x4 : 002880ba1a0b3e9f [ 6525.893144] x3 : 0000000000000018 x2 : ffff8000000a4374 [ 6525.898452] x1 : 000000000000000a x0 : 0000000000000009 [ 6525.903760] Call trace: [ 6525.906202] bpf_prog_c3d01833289b6311_F+0xc8/0x9f4 [ 6525.911076] bpf_prog_d53bb52e3f4483f9_F+0x38/0xc8c [ 6525.915957] bpf_dispatcher_xdp_func+0x14/0x20 [ 6525.920398] bpf_test_run+0x70/0x1b0 [ 6525.923969] bpf_prog_test_run_xdp+0xec/0x190 [ 6525.928326] __do_sys_bpf+0xc88/0x1b28 [ 6525.932072] __arm64_sys_bpf+0x24/0x30 [ 6525.935820] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x70/0x168 [ 6525.940607] do_el0_svc+0x28/0x88 [ 6525.943920] el0_sync_handler+0x88/0x190 [ 6525.947838] el0_sync+0x140/0x180 [ 6525.951154] Code: d4202000 d4202000 d4202000 d4202000 (d4202000) [ 6525.957249] ---[ end trace cecc3f93b14927e2 ]--- The reason is the offset[] creation and later usage while building the eBPF body. The code currently omits the first instruction, since build_insn() will increase our ctx->idx before saving it. That was fine up until bounded eBPF loops were introduced. After that introduction, offset[0] must be the offset of the end of prologue which is the start of the 1st insn while, offset[n] holds the offset of the end of n-th insn. When "taken loop with back jump to 1st insn" test runs, it will eventually call bpf2a64_offset(-1, 2, ctx). Since negative indexing is permitted, the current outcome depends on the value stored in ctx->offset[-1], which has nothing to do with our array. If the value happens to be 0 the tests will work. If not this error triggers. 7c2e988 ("bpf: fix x64 JIT code generation for jmp to 1st insn") fixed an indentical bug on x86 when eBPF bounded loops were introduced. So let's fix it by creating the ctx->offset[] correctly in the first place and account for the first instruction while calculating the arm instruction offsets. Fixes: 2589726 ("bpf: introduce bounded loops") Reported-by: Naresh Kamboju <[email protected]> Reported-by: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Co-developed-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]> Co-developed-by: Yauheni Kaliuta <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Yauheni Kaliuta <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ilias Apalodimas <[email protected]> --- Changes since v1: - Added Co-developed-by, Reported-by and Fixes tags correctly - Describe the expected context of ctx->offset[] in comments arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
[ 6525.735488] Unexpected kernel BRK exception at EL1 [ 6525.735502] Internal error: ptrace BRK handler: f2000100 [#1] SMP [ 6525.741609] Modules linked in: nls_utf8 cifs libdes libarc4 dns_resolver fscache binfmt_misc nls_ascii nls_cp437 vfat fat aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce gf128mul efi_pstore sha2_ce sha256_arm64 sha1_ce evdev efivars efivarfs ip_tables x_tables autofs4 btrfs blake2b_generic xor xor_neon zstd_compress raid6_pq libcrc32c crc32c_generic ahci xhci_pci libahci xhci_hcd igb libata i2c_algo_bit nvme realtek usbcore nvme_core scsi_mod t10_pi netsec mdio_devres of_mdio gpio_keys fixed_phy libphy gpio_mb86s7x [ 6525.787760] CPU: 3 PID: 7881 Comm: test_verifier Tainted: G W 5.9.0-rc1+ #47 [ 6525.796111] Hardware name: Socionext SynQuacer E-series DeveloperBox, BIOS build #1 Jun 6 2020 [ 6525.804812] pstate: 20000005 (nzCv daif -PAN -UAO BTYPE=--) [ 6525.810390] pc : bpf_prog_c3d01833289b6311_F+0xc8/0x9f4 [ 6525.815613] lr : bpf_prog_d53bb52e3f4483f9_F+0x38/0xc8c [ 6525.820832] sp : ffff8000130cbb80 [ 6525.824141] x29: ffff8000130cbbb0 x28: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.829451] x27: 000005ef6fcbf39b x26: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.834759] x25: ffff8000130cbb80 x24: ffff800011dc7038 [ 6525.840067] x23: ffff8000130cbd00 x22: ffff0008f624d080 [ 6525.845375] x21: 0000000000000001 x20: ffff800011dc7000 [ 6525.850682] x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.855990] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.861298] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.866606] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.871913] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: ffff8000000a660c [ 6525.877220] x9 : ffff800010951810 x8 : ffff8000130cbc38 [ 6525.882528] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000009864cfa881 [ 6525.887836] x5 : 00ffffffffffffff x4 : 002880ba1a0b3e9f [ 6525.893144] x3 : 0000000000000018 x2 : ffff8000000a4374 [ 6525.898452] x1 : 000000000000000a x0 : 0000000000000009 [ 6525.903760] Call trace: [ 6525.906202] bpf_prog_c3d01833289b6311_F+0xc8/0x9f4 [ 6525.911076] bpf_prog_d53bb52e3f4483f9_F+0x38/0xc8c [ 6525.915957] bpf_dispatcher_xdp_func+0x14/0x20 [ 6525.920398] bpf_test_run+0x70/0x1b0 [ 6525.923969] bpf_prog_test_run_xdp+0xec/0x190 [ 6525.928326] __do_sys_bpf+0xc88/0x1b28 [ 6525.932072] __arm64_sys_bpf+0x24/0x30 [ 6525.935820] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x70/0x168 [ 6525.940607] do_el0_svc+0x28/0x88 [ 6525.943920] el0_sync_handler+0x88/0x190 [ 6525.947838] el0_sync+0x140/0x180 [ 6525.951154] Code: d4202000 d4202000 d4202000 d4202000 (d4202000) [ 6525.957249] ---[ end trace cecc3f93b14927e2 ]--- The reason is the offset[] creation and later usage while building the eBPF body. The code currently omits the first instruction, since build_insn() will increase our ctx->idx before saving it. That was fine up until bounded eBPF loops were introduced. After that introduction, offset[0] must be the offset of the end of prologue which is the start of the 1st insn while, offset[n] holds the offset of the end of n-th insn. When "taken loop with back jump to 1st insn" test runs, it will eventually call bpf2a64_offset(-1, 2, ctx). Since negative indexing is permitted, the current outcome depends on the value stored in ctx->offset[-1], which has nothing to do with our array. If the value happens to be 0 the tests will work. If not this error triggers. 7c2e988 ("bpf: fix x64 JIT code generation for jmp to 1st insn") fixed an indentical bug on x86 when eBPF bounded loops were introduced. So let's fix it by creating the ctx->offset[] correctly in the first place and account for the first instruction while calculating the arm instruction offsets. Fixes: 2589726 ("bpf: introduce bounded loops") Reported-by: Naresh Kamboju <[email protected]> Reported-by: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Co-developed-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]> Co-developed-by: Yauheni Kaliuta <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Yauheni Kaliuta <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ilias Apalodimas <[email protected]> --- Changes since v1: - Added Co-developed-by, Reported-by and Fixes tags correctly - Describe the expected context of ctx->offset[] in comments arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
[ 6525.735488] Unexpected kernel BRK exception at EL1 [ 6525.735502] Internal error: ptrace BRK handler: f2000100 [#1] SMP [ 6525.741609] Modules linked in: nls_utf8 cifs libdes libarc4 dns_resolver fscache binfmt_misc nls_ascii nls_cp437 vfat fat aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce gf128mul efi_pstore sha2_ce sha256_arm64 sha1_ce evdev efivars efivarfs ip_tables x_tables autofs4 btrfs blake2b_generic xor xor_neon zstd_compress raid6_pq libcrc32c crc32c_generic ahci xhci_pci libahci xhci_hcd igb libata i2c_algo_bit nvme realtek usbcore nvme_core scsi_mod t10_pi netsec mdio_devres of_mdio gpio_keys fixed_phy libphy gpio_mb86s7x [ 6525.787760] CPU: 3 PID: 7881 Comm: test_verifier Tainted: G W 5.9.0-rc1+ #47 [ 6525.796111] Hardware name: Socionext SynQuacer E-series DeveloperBox, BIOS build #1 Jun 6 2020 [ 6525.804812] pstate: 20000005 (nzCv daif -PAN -UAO BTYPE=--) [ 6525.810390] pc : bpf_prog_c3d01833289b6311_F+0xc8/0x9f4 [ 6525.815613] lr : bpf_prog_d53bb52e3f4483f9_F+0x38/0xc8c [ 6525.820832] sp : ffff8000130cbb80 [ 6525.824141] x29: ffff8000130cbbb0 x28: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.829451] x27: 000005ef6fcbf39b x26: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.834759] x25: ffff8000130cbb80 x24: ffff800011dc7038 [ 6525.840067] x23: ffff8000130cbd00 x22: ffff0008f624d080 [ 6525.845375] x21: 0000000000000001 x20: ffff800011dc7000 [ 6525.850682] x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.855990] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.861298] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.866606] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.871913] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: ffff8000000a660c [ 6525.877220] x9 : ffff800010951810 x8 : ffff8000130cbc38 [ 6525.882528] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000009864cfa881 [ 6525.887836] x5 : 00ffffffffffffff x4 : 002880ba1a0b3e9f [ 6525.893144] x3 : 0000000000000018 x2 : ffff8000000a4374 [ 6525.898452] x1 : 000000000000000a x0 : 0000000000000009 [ 6525.903760] Call trace: [ 6525.906202] bpf_prog_c3d01833289b6311_F+0xc8/0x9f4 [ 6525.911076] bpf_prog_d53bb52e3f4483f9_F+0x38/0xc8c [ 6525.915957] bpf_dispatcher_xdp_func+0x14/0x20 [ 6525.920398] bpf_test_run+0x70/0x1b0 [ 6525.923969] bpf_prog_test_run_xdp+0xec/0x190 [ 6525.928326] __do_sys_bpf+0xc88/0x1b28 [ 6525.932072] __arm64_sys_bpf+0x24/0x30 [ 6525.935820] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x70/0x168 [ 6525.940607] do_el0_svc+0x28/0x88 [ 6525.943920] el0_sync_handler+0x88/0x190 [ 6525.947838] el0_sync+0x140/0x180 [ 6525.951154] Code: d4202000 d4202000 d4202000 d4202000 (d4202000) [ 6525.957249] ---[ end trace cecc3f93b14927e2 ]--- The reason is the offset[] creation and later usage while building the eBPF body. The code currently omits the first instruction, since build_insn() will increase our ctx->idx before saving it. That was fine up until bounded eBPF loops were introduced. After that introduction, offset[0] must be the offset of the end of prologue which is the start of the 1st insn while, offset[n] holds the offset of the end of n-th insn. When "taken loop with back jump to 1st insn" test runs, it will eventually call bpf2a64_offset(-1, 2, ctx). Since negative indexing is permitted, the current outcome depends on the value stored in ctx->offset[-1], which has nothing to do with our array. If the value happens to be 0 the tests will work. If not this error triggers. 7c2e988 ("bpf: fix x64 JIT code generation for jmp to 1st insn") fixed an indentical bug on x86 when eBPF bounded loops were introduced. So let's fix it by creating the ctx->offset[] correctly in the first place and account for the first instruction while calculating the arm instruction offsets. Fixes: 2589726 ("bpf: introduce bounded loops") Reported-by: Naresh Kamboju <[email protected]> Reported-by: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Co-developed-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]> Co-developed-by: Yauheni Kaliuta <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Yauheni Kaliuta <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ilias Apalodimas <[email protected]> --- Changes since v1: - Added Co-developed-by, Reported-by and Fixes tags correctly - Describe the expected context of ctx->offset[] in comments arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
[ 6525.735488] Unexpected kernel BRK exception at EL1 [ 6525.735502] Internal error: ptrace BRK handler: f2000100 [#1] SMP [ 6525.741609] Modules linked in: nls_utf8 cifs libdes libarc4 dns_resolver fscache binfmt_misc nls_ascii nls_cp437 vfat fat aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce gf128mul efi_pstore sha2_ce sha256_arm64 sha1_ce evdev efivars efivarfs ip_tables x_tables autofs4 btrfs blake2b_generic xor xor_neon zstd_compress raid6_pq libcrc32c crc32c_generic ahci xhci_pci libahci xhci_hcd igb libata i2c_algo_bit nvme realtek usbcore nvme_core scsi_mod t10_pi netsec mdio_devres of_mdio gpio_keys fixed_phy libphy gpio_mb86s7x [ 6525.787760] CPU: 3 PID: 7881 Comm: test_verifier Tainted: G W 5.9.0-rc1+ #47 [ 6525.796111] Hardware name: Socionext SynQuacer E-series DeveloperBox, BIOS build #1 Jun 6 2020 [ 6525.804812] pstate: 20000005 (nzCv daif -PAN -UAO BTYPE=--) [ 6525.810390] pc : bpf_prog_c3d01833289b6311_F+0xc8/0x9f4 [ 6525.815613] lr : bpf_prog_d53bb52e3f4483f9_F+0x38/0xc8c [ 6525.820832] sp : ffff8000130cbb80 [ 6525.824141] x29: ffff8000130cbbb0 x28: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.829451] x27: 000005ef6fcbf39b x26: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.834759] x25: ffff8000130cbb80 x24: ffff800011dc7038 [ 6525.840067] x23: ffff8000130cbd00 x22: ffff0008f624d080 [ 6525.845375] x21: 0000000000000001 x20: ffff800011dc7000 [ 6525.850682] x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.855990] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.861298] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.866606] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.871913] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: ffff8000000a660c [ 6525.877220] x9 : ffff800010951810 x8 : ffff8000130cbc38 [ 6525.882528] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000009864cfa881 [ 6525.887836] x5 : 00ffffffffffffff x4 : 002880ba1a0b3e9f [ 6525.893144] x3 : 0000000000000018 x2 : ffff8000000a4374 [ 6525.898452] x1 : 000000000000000a x0 : 0000000000000009 [ 6525.903760] Call trace: [ 6525.906202] bpf_prog_c3d01833289b6311_F+0xc8/0x9f4 [ 6525.911076] bpf_prog_d53bb52e3f4483f9_F+0x38/0xc8c [ 6525.915957] bpf_dispatcher_xdp_func+0x14/0x20 [ 6525.920398] bpf_test_run+0x70/0x1b0 [ 6525.923969] bpf_prog_test_run_xdp+0xec/0x190 [ 6525.928326] __do_sys_bpf+0xc88/0x1b28 [ 6525.932072] __arm64_sys_bpf+0x24/0x30 [ 6525.935820] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x70/0x168 [ 6525.940607] do_el0_svc+0x28/0x88 [ 6525.943920] el0_sync_handler+0x88/0x190 [ 6525.947838] el0_sync+0x140/0x180 [ 6525.951154] Code: d4202000 d4202000 d4202000 d4202000 (d4202000) [ 6525.957249] ---[ end trace cecc3f93b14927e2 ]--- The reason is the offset[] creation and later usage while building the eBPF body. The code currently omits the first instruction, since build_insn() will increase our ctx->idx before saving it. That was fine up until bounded eBPF loops were introduced. After that introduction, offset[0] must be the offset of the end of prologue which is the start of the 1st insn while, offset[n] holds the offset of the end of n-th insn. When "taken loop with back jump to 1st insn" test runs, it will eventually call bpf2a64_offset(-1, 2, ctx). Since negative indexing is permitted, the current outcome depends on the value stored in ctx->offset[-1], which has nothing to do with our array. If the value happens to be 0 the tests will work. If not this error triggers. 7c2e988 ("bpf: fix x64 JIT code generation for jmp to 1st insn") fixed an indentical bug on x86 when eBPF bounded loops were introduced. So let's fix it by creating the ctx->offset[] correctly in the first place and account for the first instruction while calculating the arm instruction offsets. Fixes: 2589726 ("bpf: introduce bounded loops") Reported-by: Naresh Kamboju <[email protected]> Reported-by: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Co-developed-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]> Co-developed-by: Yauheni Kaliuta <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Yauheni Kaliuta <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ilias Apalodimas <[email protected]> --- Changes since v1: - Added Co-developed-by, Reported-by and Fixes tags correctly - Describe the expected context of ctx->offset[] in comments arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
[ 6525.735488] Unexpected kernel BRK exception at EL1 [ 6525.735502] Internal error: ptrace BRK handler: f2000100 [#1] SMP [ 6525.741609] Modules linked in: nls_utf8 cifs libdes libarc4 dns_resolver fscache binfmt_misc nls_ascii nls_cp437 vfat fat aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce gf128mul efi_pstore sha2_ce sha256_arm64 sha1_ce evdev efivars efivarfs ip_tables x_tables autofs4 btrfs blake2b_generic xor xor_neon zstd_compress raid6_pq libcrc32c crc32c_generic ahci xhci_pci libahci xhci_hcd igb libata i2c_algo_bit nvme realtek usbcore nvme_core scsi_mod t10_pi netsec mdio_devres of_mdio gpio_keys fixed_phy libphy gpio_mb86s7x [ 6525.787760] CPU: 3 PID: 7881 Comm: test_verifier Tainted: G W 5.9.0-rc1+ #47 [ 6525.796111] Hardware name: Socionext SynQuacer E-series DeveloperBox, BIOS build #1 Jun 6 2020 [ 6525.804812] pstate: 20000005 (nzCv daif -PAN -UAO BTYPE=--) [ 6525.810390] pc : bpf_prog_c3d01833289b6311_F+0xc8/0x9f4 [ 6525.815613] lr : bpf_prog_d53bb52e3f4483f9_F+0x38/0xc8c [ 6525.820832] sp : ffff8000130cbb80 [ 6525.824141] x29: ffff8000130cbbb0 x28: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.829451] x27: 000005ef6fcbf39b x26: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.834759] x25: ffff8000130cbb80 x24: ffff800011dc7038 [ 6525.840067] x23: ffff8000130cbd00 x22: ffff0008f624d080 [ 6525.845375] x21: 0000000000000001 x20: ffff800011dc7000 [ 6525.850682] x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.855990] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.861298] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.866606] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 [ 6525.871913] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: ffff8000000a660c [ 6525.877220] x9 : ffff800010951810 x8 : ffff8000130cbc38 [ 6525.882528] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000009864cfa881 [ 6525.887836] x5 : 00ffffffffffffff x4 : 002880ba1a0b3e9f [ 6525.893144] x3 : 0000000000000018 x2 : ffff8000000a4374 [ 6525.898452] x1 : 000000000000000a x0 : 0000000000000009 [ 6525.903760] Call trace: [ 6525.906202] bpf_prog_c3d01833289b6311_F+0xc8/0x9f4 [ 6525.911076] bpf_prog_d53bb52e3f4483f9_F+0x38/0xc8c [ 6525.915957] bpf_dispatcher_xdp_func+0x14/0x20 [ 6525.920398] bpf_test_run+0x70/0x1b0 [ 6525.923969] bpf_prog_test_run_xdp+0xec/0x190 [ 6525.928326] __do_sys_bpf+0xc88/0x1b28 [ 6525.932072] __arm64_sys_bpf+0x24/0x30 [ 6525.935820] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x70/0x168 [ 6525.940607] do_el0_svc+0x28/0x88 [ 6525.943920] el0_sync_handler+0x88/0x190 [ 6525.947838] el0_sync+0x140/0x180 [ 6525.951154] Code: d4202000 d4202000 d4202000 d4202000 (d4202000) [ 6525.957249] ---[ end trace cecc3f93b14927e2 ]--- The reason is the offset[] creation and later usage while building the eBPF body. The code currently omits the first instruction, since build_insn() will increase our ctx->idx before saving it. That was fine up until bounded eBPF loops were introduced. After that introduction, offset[0] must be the offset of the end of prologue which is the start of the 1st insn while, offset[n] holds the offset of the end of n-th insn. When "taken loop with back jump to 1st insn" test runs, it will eventually call bpf2a64_offset(-1, 2, ctx). Since negative indexing is permitted, the current outcome depends on the value stored in ctx->offset[-1], which has nothing to do with our array. If the value happens to be 0 the tests will work. If not this error triggers. 7c2e988 ("bpf: fix x64 JIT code generation for jmp to 1st insn") fixed an indentical bug on x86 when eBPF bounded loops were introduced. So let's fix it by creating the ctx->offset[] correctly in the first place and account for the first instruction while calculating the arm instruction offsets. Fixes: 2589726 ("bpf: introduce bounded loops") Reported-by: Naresh Kamboju <[email protected]> Reported-by: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Co-developed-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]> Co-developed-by: Yauheni Kaliuta <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Yauheni Kaliuta <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ilias Apalodimas <[email protected]> --- Changes since v1: - Added Co-developed-by, Reported-by and Fixes tags correctly - Describe the expected context of ctx->offset[] in comments arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
When IPV6_MROUTE_MULTIPLE_TABLES is enabled, calls to ip6mr_get_table() must be done under RCU or RTNL lock. Detected by Lockdep-RCU: [ 10.247131] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage [ 10.247133] 6.1.103-49518b10de-nokia_sm_x86 kernel-patches#1 Not tainted [ 10.247135] ----------------------------- [ 10.247137] /net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:131 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!! [ 10.247140] other info that might help us debug this: [ 10.247142] rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 [ 10.247144] 1 lock held by swapper/0/1: [ 10.247147] #0: ffffffff82b374d0 (pernet_ops_rwsem){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: register_pernet_subsys+0x15/0x40 [ 10.247164] stack backtrace: [ 10.247166] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.1.103-49518b10de-nokia_sm_x86 kernel-patches#1 [ 10.247170] Hardware name: Nokia Asil/Default string, BIOS 0ACNA114 07/18/2024 [ 10.247175] Call Trace: [ 10.247178] <TASK> [ 10.247181] dump_stack_lvl+0xb7/0xe9 [ 10.247189] lockdep_rcu_suspicious.cold+0x2d/0x64 [ 10.247198] ip6mr_get_table+0x8a/0x90 [ 10.247203] ip6mr_net_init+0x7c/0x200 [ 10.247209] ops_init+0x37/0x1f0 [ 10.247215] register_pernet_operations+0x129/0x230 [ 10.247221] ? af_unix_init+0xca/0xca [ 10.247227] register_pernet_subsys+0x24/0x40 [ 10.247231] ip6_mr_init+0x42/0xf2 [ 10.247235] inet6_init+0x133/0x3b9 [ 10.247238] do_one_initcall+0x74/0x290 [ 10.247247] kernel_init_freeable+0x251/0x294 [ 10.247253] ? rest_init+0x174/0x174 [ 10.247257] kernel_init+0x16/0x12c [ 10.247260] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [ 10.247271] </TASK> Signed-off-by: Stefan Wiehler <[email protected]> Fixes: d1db275 ("ipv6: ip6mr: support multiple tables") Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
Martin KaFai Lau reported use-after-free [0] in reqsk_timer_handler(). """ We are seeing a use-after-free from a bpf prog attached to trace_tcp_retransmit_synack. The program passes the req->sk to the bpf_sk_storage_get_tracing kernel helper which does check for null before using it. """ The commit 83fccfc ("inet: fix potential deadlock in reqsk_queue_unlink()") added timer_pending() in reqsk_queue_unlink() not to call del_timer_sync() from reqsk_timer_handler(), but it introduced a small race window. Before the timer is called, expire_timers() calls detach_timer(timer, true) to clear timer->entry.pprev and marks it as not pending. If reqsk_queue_unlink() checks timer_pending() just after expire_timers() calls detach_timer(), TCP will miss del_timer_sync(); the reqsk timer will continue running and send multiple SYN+ACKs until it expires. The reported UAF could happen if req->sk is close()d earlier than the timer expiration, which is 63s by default. The scenario would be 1. inet_csk_complete_hashdance() calls inet_csk_reqsk_queue_drop(), but del_timer_sync() is missed 2. reqsk timer is executed and scheduled again 3. req->sk is accept()ed and reqsk_put() decrements rsk_refcnt, but reqsk timer still has another one, and inet_csk_accept() does not clear req->sk for non-TFO sockets 4. sk is close()d 5. reqsk timer is executed again, and BPF touches req->sk Let's not use timer_pending() by passing the caller context to __inet_csk_reqsk_queue_drop(). Note that reqsk timer is pinned, so the issue does not happen in most use cases. [1] [0] BUG: KFENCE: use-after-free read in bpf_sk_storage_get_tracing+0x2e/0x1b0 Use-after-free read at 0x00000000a891fb3a (in kfence-kernel-patches#1): bpf_sk_storage_get_tracing+0x2e/0x1b0 bpf_prog_5ea3e95db6da0438_tcp_retransmit_synack+0x1d20/0x1dda bpf_trace_run2+0x4c/0xc0 tcp_rtx_synack+0xf9/0x100 reqsk_timer_handler+0xda/0x3d0 run_timer_softirq+0x292/0x8a0 irq_exit_rcu+0xf5/0x320 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6d/0x80 asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x16/0x20 intel_idle_irq+0x5a/0xa0 cpuidle_enter_state+0x94/0x273 cpu_startup_entry+0x15e/0x260 start_secondary+0x8a/0x90 secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xfa/0xfb kfence-kernel-patches#1: 0x00000000a72cc7b6-0x00000000d97616d9, size=2376, cache=TCPv6 allocated by task 0 on cpu 9 at 260507.901592s: sk_prot_alloc+0x35/0x140 sk_clone_lock+0x1f/0x3f0 inet_csk_clone_lock+0x15/0x160 tcp_create_openreq_child+0x1f/0x410 tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock+0x1da/0x700 tcp_check_req+0x1fb/0x510 tcp_v6_rcv+0x98b/0x1420 ipv6_list_rcv+0x2258/0x26e0 napi_complete_done+0x5b1/0x2990 mlx5e_napi_poll+0x2ae/0x8d0 net_rx_action+0x13e/0x590 irq_exit_rcu+0xf5/0x320 common_interrupt+0x80/0x90 asm_common_interrupt+0x22/0x40 cpuidle_enter_state+0xfb/0x273 cpu_startup_entry+0x15e/0x260 start_secondary+0x8a/0x90 secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xfa/0xfb freed by task 0 on cpu 9 at 260507.927527s: rcu_core_si+0x4ff/0xf10 irq_exit_rcu+0xf5/0x320 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6d/0x80 asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x16/0x20 cpuidle_enter_state+0xfb/0x273 cpu_startup_entry+0x15e/0x260 start_secondary+0x8a/0x90 secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xfa/0xfb Fixes: 83fccfc ("inet: fix potential deadlock in reqsk_queue_unlink()") Reported-by: Martin KaFai Lau <[email protected]> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/[email protected]/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/[email protected]/ [1] Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Martin KaFai Lau <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
The variable wwan_rtnl_link_ops assign a *bigger* maxtype which leads to a global out-of-bounds read when parsing the netlink attributes. Exactly same bug cause as the oob fixed in commit b33fb5b ("net: qualcomm: rmnet: fix global oob in rmnet_policy"). ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in validate_nla lib/nlattr.c:388 [inline] BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in __nla_validate_parse+0x19d7/0x29a0 lib/nlattr.c:603 Read of size 1 at addr ffffffff8b09cb60 by task syz.1.66276/323862 CPU: 0 PID: 323862 Comm: syz.1.66276 Not tainted 6.1.70 kernel-patches#1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x177/0x231 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:284 [inline] print_report+0x14f/0x750 mm/kasan/report.c:395 kasan_report+0x139/0x170 mm/kasan/report.c:495 validate_nla lib/nlattr.c:388 [inline] __nla_validate_parse+0x19d7/0x29a0 lib/nlattr.c:603 __nla_parse+0x3c/0x50 lib/nlattr.c:700 nla_parse_nested_deprecated include/net/netlink.h:1269 [inline] __rtnl_newlink net/core/rtnetlink.c:3514 [inline] rtnl_newlink+0x7bc/0x1fd0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3623 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x794/0xef0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6122 netlink_rcv_skb+0x1de/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2508 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1326 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x74b/0x8c0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1352 netlink_sendmsg+0x882/0xb90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1874 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:716 [inline] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:728 [inline] ____sys_sendmsg+0x5cc/0x8f0 net/socket.c:2499 ___sys_sendmsg+0x21c/0x290 net/socket.c:2553 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2582 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2591 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg+0x19e/0x270 net/socket.c:2589 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x45/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd RIP: 0033:0x7f67b19a24ad RSP: 002b:00007f67b17febb8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f67b1b45f80 RCX: 00007f67b19a24ad RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020005e40 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00007f67b1a1e01d R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007ffd2513764f R14: 00007ffd251376e0 R15: 00007f67b17fed40 </TASK> The buggy address belongs to the variable: wwan_rtnl_policy+0x20/0x40 The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:ffffea00002c2700 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0xb09c flags: 0xfff00000001000(reserved|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff) raw: 00fff00000001000 ffffea00002c2708 ffffea00002c2708 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected page_owner info is not present (never set?) Memory state around the buggy address: ffffffff8b09ca00: 05 f9 f9 f9 05 f9 f9 f9 00 01 f9 f9 00 01 f9 f9 ffffffff8b09ca80: 00 00 00 05 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 03 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 >ffffffff8b09cb00: 00 00 00 00 05 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 ^ ffffffff8b09cb80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ================================================================== According to the comment of `nla_parse_nested_deprecated`, use correct size `IFLA_WWAN_MAX` here to fix this issue. Fixes: 88b7105 ("wwan: add interface creation support") Signed-off-by: Lin Ma <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Loic Poulain <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
While running net selftests with CONFIG_PROVE_RCU_LIST=y I saw one lockdep splat [1]. genlmsg_mcast() uses for_each_net_rcu(), and must therefore hold RCU. Instead of letting all callers guard genlmsg_multicast_allns() with a rcu_read_lock()/rcu_read_unlock() pair, do it in genlmsg_mcast(). This also means the @flags parameter is useless, we need to always use GFP_ATOMIC. [1] [10882.424136] ============================= [10882.424166] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage [10882.424309] 6.12.0-rc2-virtme kernel-patches#1156 Not tainted [10882.424400] ----------------------------- [10882.424423] net/netlink/genetlink.c:1940 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!! [10882.424469] other info that might help us debug this: [10882.424500] rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 [10882.424744] 2 locks held by ip/15677: [10882.424791] #0: ffffffffb6b491b0 (cb_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: genl_rcv (net/netlink/genetlink.c:1219) [10882.426334] kernel-patches#1: ffffffffb6b49248 (genl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: genl_rcv_msg (net/netlink/genetlink.c:61 net/netlink/genetlink.c:57 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1209) [10882.426465] stack backtrace: [10882.426805] CPU: 14 UID: 0 PID: 15677 Comm: ip Not tainted 6.12.0-rc2-virtme kernel-patches#1156 [10882.426919] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 [10882.427046] Call Trace: [10882.427131] <TASK> [10882.427244] dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:123) [10882.427335] lockdep_rcu_suspicious (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:6822) [10882.427387] genlmsg_multicast_allns (net/netlink/genetlink.c:1940 (discriminator 7) net/netlink/genetlink.c:1977 (discriminator 7)) [10882.427436] l2tp_tunnel_notify.constprop.0 (net/l2tp/l2tp_netlink.c:119) l2tp_netlink [10882.427683] l2tp_nl_cmd_tunnel_create (net/l2tp/l2tp_netlink.c:253) l2tp_netlink [10882.427748] genl_family_rcv_msg_doit (net/netlink/genetlink.c:1115) [10882.427834] genl_rcv_msg (net/netlink/genetlink.c:1195 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1210) [10882.427877] ? __pfx_l2tp_nl_cmd_tunnel_create (net/l2tp/l2tp_netlink.c:186) l2tp_netlink [10882.427927] ? __pfx_genl_rcv_msg (net/netlink/genetlink.c:1201) [10882.427959] netlink_rcv_skb (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2551) [10882.428069] genl_rcv (net/netlink/genetlink.c:1220) [10882.428095] netlink_unicast (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1332 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1357) [10882.428140] netlink_sendmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1901) [10882.428210] ____sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:729 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:744 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:2607 (discriminator 1)) Fixes: 33f72e6 ("l2tp : multicast notification to the registered listeners") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Cc: James Chapman <[email protected]> Cc: Tom Parkin <[email protected]> Cc: Johannes Berg <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
When IPV6_MROUTE_MULTIPLE_TABLES is enabled, calls to ip6mr_get_table() must be done under RCU or RTNL lock. Detected by Lockdep-RCU: [ 48.834645] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage [ 48.834647] 6.1.103-584209f6d5-nokia_sm_x86 kernel-patches#1 Tainted: G S O [ 48.834649] ----------------------------- [ 48.834651] /net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:132 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!! [ 48.834654] other info that might help us debug this: [ 48.834656] rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 [ 48.834658] no locks held by radvd/5777. [ 48.834660] stack backtrace: [ 48.834663] CPU: 0 PID: 5777 Comm: radvd Tainted: G S O 6.1.103-584209f6d5-nokia_sm_x86 kernel-patches#1 [ 48.834666] Hardware name: Nokia Asil/Default string, BIOS 0ACNA113 06/07/2024 [ 48.834673] Call Trace: [ 48.834674] <TASK> [ 48.834677] dump_stack_lvl+0xb7/0xe9 [ 48.834687] lockdep_rcu_suspicious.cold+0x2d/0x64 [ 48.834697] ip6mr_get_table+0x9f/0xb0 [ 48.834704] ip6mr_ioctl+0x50/0x360 [ 48.834713] ? sk_ioctl+0x5f/0x1c0 [ 48.834719] sk_ioctl+0x5f/0x1c0 [ 48.834723] ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80 [ 48.834731] sock_do_ioctl+0x7b/0x140 [ 48.834737] ? proc_nr_files+0x30/0x30 [ 48.834744] sock_ioctl+0x1f5/0x360 [ 48.834754] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x8d/0xd0 [ 48.834760] do_syscall_64+0x3c/0x90 [ 48.834765] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 [ 48.834769] RIP: 0033:0x7fda5f56e2ac [ 48.834773] Code: 1e fa 48 8d 44 24 08 48 89 54 24 e0 48 89 44 24 c0 48 8d 44 24 d0 48 89 44 24 c8 b8 1 0 00 00 00 c7 44 24 b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 <3d> 00 f0 ff ff 89 c2 77 0b 89 d0 c3 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 8b [ 48.834776] RSP: 002b:00007fff52d4bda8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 [ 48.834782] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000171cd80 RCX: 00007fda5f56e2ac [ 48.834784] RDX: 00007fff52d4bdb0 RSI: 0000000000008913 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 48.834787] RBP: 000000000171cd30 R08: 0000000000000007 R09: 000000000000003c [ 48.834789] R10: 0000000000000004 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000003 [ 48.834791] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000004 R15: 000000000040d43c [ 48.834802] </TASK> Signed-off-by: Stefan Wiehler <[email protected]> Fixes: d1db275 ("ipv6: ip6mr: support multiple tables") Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
When IPV6_MROUTE_MULTIPLE_TABLES is enabled, calls to ip6mr_get_table() must be done under RCU or RTNL lock. Detected by Lockdep-RCU: [ 10.247131] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage [ 10.247133] 6.1.103-49518b10de-nokia_sm_x86 kernel-patches#1 Not tainted [ 10.247135] ----------------------------- [ 10.247137] /net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:131 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!! [ 10.247140] other info that might help us debug this: [ 10.247142] rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 [ 10.247144] 1 lock held by swapper/0/1: [ 10.247147] #0: ffffffff82b374d0 (pernet_ops_rwsem){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: register_pernet_subsys+0x15/0x40 [ 10.247164] stack backtrace: [ 10.247166] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.1.103-49518b10de-nokia_sm_x86 kernel-patches#1 [ 10.247170] Hardware name: Nokia Asil/Default string, BIOS 0ACNA114 07/18/2024 [ 10.247175] Call Trace: [ 10.247178] <TASK> [ 10.247181] dump_stack_lvl+0xb7/0xe9 [ 10.247189] lockdep_rcu_suspicious.cold+0x2d/0x64 [ 10.247198] ip6mr_get_table+0x8a/0x90 [ 10.247203] ip6mr_net_init+0x7c/0x200 [ 10.247209] ops_init+0x37/0x1f0 [ 10.247215] register_pernet_operations+0x129/0x230 [ 10.247221] ? af_unix_init+0xca/0xca [ 10.247227] register_pernet_subsys+0x24/0x40 [ 10.247231] ip6_mr_init+0x42/0xf2 [ 10.247235] inet6_init+0x133/0x3b9 [ 10.247238] do_one_initcall+0x74/0x290 [ 10.247247] kernel_init_freeable+0x251/0x294 [ 10.247253] ? rest_init+0x174/0x174 [ 10.247257] kernel_init+0x16/0x12c [ 10.247260] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [ 10.247271] </TASK> Signed-off-by: Stefan Wiehler <[email protected]> Fixes: d1db275 ("ipv6: ip6mr: support multiple tables") Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
Martin KaFai Lau reported use-after-free [0] in reqsk_timer_handler(). """ We are seeing a use-after-free from a bpf prog attached to trace_tcp_retransmit_synack. The program passes the req->sk to the bpf_sk_storage_get_tracing kernel helper which does check for null before using it. """ The commit 83fccfc ("inet: fix potential deadlock in reqsk_queue_unlink()") added timer_pending() in reqsk_queue_unlink() not to call del_timer_sync() from reqsk_timer_handler(), but it introduced a small race window. Before the timer is called, expire_timers() calls detach_timer(timer, true) to clear timer->entry.pprev and marks it as not pending. If reqsk_queue_unlink() checks timer_pending() just after expire_timers() calls detach_timer(), TCP will miss del_timer_sync(); the reqsk timer will continue running and send multiple SYN+ACKs until it expires. The reported UAF could happen if req->sk is close()d earlier than the timer expiration, which is 63s by default. The scenario would be 1. inet_csk_complete_hashdance() calls inet_csk_reqsk_queue_drop(), but del_timer_sync() is missed 2. reqsk timer is executed and scheduled again 3. req->sk is accept()ed and reqsk_put() decrements rsk_refcnt, but reqsk timer still has another one, and inet_csk_accept() does not clear req->sk for non-TFO sockets 4. sk is close()d 5. reqsk timer is executed again, and BPF touches req->sk Let's not use timer_pending() by passing the caller context to __inet_csk_reqsk_queue_drop(). Note that reqsk timer is pinned, so the issue does not happen in most use cases. [1] [0] BUG: KFENCE: use-after-free read in bpf_sk_storage_get_tracing+0x2e/0x1b0 Use-after-free read at 0x00000000a891fb3a (in kfence-kernel-patches#1): bpf_sk_storage_get_tracing+0x2e/0x1b0 bpf_prog_5ea3e95db6da0438_tcp_retransmit_synack+0x1d20/0x1dda bpf_trace_run2+0x4c/0xc0 tcp_rtx_synack+0xf9/0x100 reqsk_timer_handler+0xda/0x3d0 run_timer_softirq+0x292/0x8a0 irq_exit_rcu+0xf5/0x320 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6d/0x80 asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x16/0x20 intel_idle_irq+0x5a/0xa0 cpuidle_enter_state+0x94/0x273 cpu_startup_entry+0x15e/0x260 start_secondary+0x8a/0x90 secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xfa/0xfb kfence-kernel-patches#1: 0x00000000a72cc7b6-0x00000000d97616d9, size=2376, cache=TCPv6 allocated by task 0 on cpu 9 at 260507.901592s: sk_prot_alloc+0x35/0x140 sk_clone_lock+0x1f/0x3f0 inet_csk_clone_lock+0x15/0x160 tcp_create_openreq_child+0x1f/0x410 tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock+0x1da/0x700 tcp_check_req+0x1fb/0x510 tcp_v6_rcv+0x98b/0x1420 ipv6_list_rcv+0x2258/0x26e0 napi_complete_done+0x5b1/0x2990 mlx5e_napi_poll+0x2ae/0x8d0 net_rx_action+0x13e/0x590 irq_exit_rcu+0xf5/0x320 common_interrupt+0x80/0x90 asm_common_interrupt+0x22/0x40 cpuidle_enter_state+0xfb/0x273 cpu_startup_entry+0x15e/0x260 start_secondary+0x8a/0x90 secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xfa/0xfb freed by task 0 on cpu 9 at 260507.927527s: rcu_core_si+0x4ff/0xf10 irq_exit_rcu+0xf5/0x320 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6d/0x80 asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x16/0x20 cpuidle_enter_state+0xfb/0x273 cpu_startup_entry+0x15e/0x260 start_secondary+0x8a/0x90 secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xfa/0xfb Fixes: 83fccfc ("inet: fix potential deadlock in reqsk_queue_unlink()") Reported-by: Martin KaFai Lau <[email protected]> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/[email protected]/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/[email protected]/ [1] Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Martin KaFai Lau <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
The variable wwan_rtnl_link_ops assign a *bigger* maxtype which leads to a global out-of-bounds read when parsing the netlink attributes. Exactly same bug cause as the oob fixed in commit b33fb5b ("net: qualcomm: rmnet: fix global oob in rmnet_policy"). ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in validate_nla lib/nlattr.c:388 [inline] BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in __nla_validate_parse+0x19d7/0x29a0 lib/nlattr.c:603 Read of size 1 at addr ffffffff8b09cb60 by task syz.1.66276/323862 CPU: 0 PID: 323862 Comm: syz.1.66276 Not tainted 6.1.70 kernel-patches#1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x177/0x231 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:284 [inline] print_report+0x14f/0x750 mm/kasan/report.c:395 kasan_report+0x139/0x170 mm/kasan/report.c:495 validate_nla lib/nlattr.c:388 [inline] __nla_validate_parse+0x19d7/0x29a0 lib/nlattr.c:603 __nla_parse+0x3c/0x50 lib/nlattr.c:700 nla_parse_nested_deprecated include/net/netlink.h:1269 [inline] __rtnl_newlink net/core/rtnetlink.c:3514 [inline] rtnl_newlink+0x7bc/0x1fd0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3623 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x794/0xef0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6122 netlink_rcv_skb+0x1de/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2508 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1326 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x74b/0x8c0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1352 netlink_sendmsg+0x882/0xb90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1874 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:716 [inline] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:728 [inline] ____sys_sendmsg+0x5cc/0x8f0 net/socket.c:2499 ___sys_sendmsg+0x21c/0x290 net/socket.c:2553 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2582 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2591 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg+0x19e/0x270 net/socket.c:2589 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x45/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd RIP: 0033:0x7f67b19a24ad RSP: 002b:00007f67b17febb8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f67b1b45f80 RCX: 00007f67b19a24ad RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020005e40 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00007f67b1a1e01d R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007ffd2513764f R14: 00007ffd251376e0 R15: 00007f67b17fed40 </TASK> The buggy address belongs to the variable: wwan_rtnl_policy+0x20/0x40 The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:ffffea00002c2700 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0xb09c flags: 0xfff00000001000(reserved|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff) raw: 00fff00000001000 ffffea00002c2708 ffffea00002c2708 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected page_owner info is not present (never set?) Memory state around the buggy address: ffffffff8b09ca00: 05 f9 f9 f9 05 f9 f9 f9 00 01 f9 f9 00 01 f9 f9 ffffffff8b09ca80: 00 00 00 05 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 03 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 >ffffffff8b09cb00: 00 00 00 00 05 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 ^ ffffffff8b09cb80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ================================================================== According to the comment of `nla_parse_nested_deprecated`, use correct size `IFLA_WWAN_MAX` here to fix this issue. Fixes: 88b7105 ("wwan: add interface creation support") Signed-off-by: Lin Ma <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Loic Poulain <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
While running net selftests with CONFIG_PROVE_RCU_LIST=y I saw one lockdep splat [1]. genlmsg_mcast() uses for_each_net_rcu(), and must therefore hold RCU. Instead of letting all callers guard genlmsg_multicast_allns() with a rcu_read_lock()/rcu_read_unlock() pair, do it in genlmsg_mcast(). This also means the @flags parameter is useless, we need to always use GFP_ATOMIC. [1] [10882.424136] ============================= [10882.424166] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage [10882.424309] 6.12.0-rc2-virtme kernel-patches#1156 Not tainted [10882.424400] ----------------------------- [10882.424423] net/netlink/genetlink.c:1940 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!! [10882.424469] other info that might help us debug this: [10882.424500] rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 [10882.424744] 2 locks held by ip/15677: [10882.424791] #0: ffffffffb6b491b0 (cb_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: genl_rcv (net/netlink/genetlink.c:1219) [10882.426334] kernel-patches#1: ffffffffb6b49248 (genl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: genl_rcv_msg (net/netlink/genetlink.c:61 net/netlink/genetlink.c:57 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1209) [10882.426465] stack backtrace: [10882.426805] CPU: 14 UID: 0 PID: 15677 Comm: ip Not tainted 6.12.0-rc2-virtme kernel-patches#1156 [10882.426919] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 [10882.427046] Call Trace: [10882.427131] <TASK> [10882.427244] dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:123) [10882.427335] lockdep_rcu_suspicious (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:6822) [10882.427387] genlmsg_multicast_allns (net/netlink/genetlink.c:1940 (discriminator 7) net/netlink/genetlink.c:1977 (discriminator 7)) [10882.427436] l2tp_tunnel_notify.constprop.0 (net/l2tp/l2tp_netlink.c:119) l2tp_netlink [10882.427683] l2tp_nl_cmd_tunnel_create (net/l2tp/l2tp_netlink.c:253) l2tp_netlink [10882.427748] genl_family_rcv_msg_doit (net/netlink/genetlink.c:1115) [10882.427834] genl_rcv_msg (net/netlink/genetlink.c:1195 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1210) [10882.427877] ? __pfx_l2tp_nl_cmd_tunnel_create (net/l2tp/l2tp_netlink.c:186) l2tp_netlink [10882.427927] ? __pfx_genl_rcv_msg (net/netlink/genetlink.c:1201) [10882.427959] netlink_rcv_skb (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2551) [10882.428069] genl_rcv (net/netlink/genetlink.c:1220) [10882.428095] netlink_unicast (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1332 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1357) [10882.428140] netlink_sendmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1901) [10882.428210] ____sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:729 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:744 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:2607 (discriminator 1)) Fixes: 33f72e6 ("l2tp : multicast notification to the registered listeners") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Cc: James Chapman <[email protected]> Cc: Tom Parkin <[email protected]> Cc: Johannes Berg <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
When IPV6_MROUTE_MULTIPLE_TABLES is enabled, calls to ip6mr_get_table() must be done under RCU or RTNL lock. Detected by Lockdep-RCU: [ 48.834645] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage [ 48.834647] 6.1.103-584209f6d5-nokia_sm_x86 kernel-patches#1 Tainted: G S O [ 48.834649] ----------------------------- [ 48.834651] /net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:132 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!! [ 48.834654] other info that might help us debug this: [ 48.834656] rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 [ 48.834658] no locks held by radvd/5777. [ 48.834660] stack backtrace: [ 48.834663] CPU: 0 PID: 5777 Comm: radvd Tainted: G S O 6.1.103-584209f6d5-nokia_sm_x86 kernel-patches#1 [ 48.834666] Hardware name: Nokia Asil/Default string, BIOS 0ACNA113 06/07/2024 [ 48.834673] Call Trace: [ 48.834674] <TASK> [ 48.834677] dump_stack_lvl+0xb7/0xe9 [ 48.834687] lockdep_rcu_suspicious.cold+0x2d/0x64 [ 48.834697] ip6mr_get_table+0x9f/0xb0 [ 48.834704] ip6mr_ioctl+0x50/0x360 [ 48.834713] ? sk_ioctl+0x5f/0x1c0 [ 48.834719] sk_ioctl+0x5f/0x1c0 [ 48.834723] ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80 [ 48.834731] sock_do_ioctl+0x7b/0x140 [ 48.834737] ? proc_nr_files+0x30/0x30 [ 48.834744] sock_ioctl+0x1f5/0x360 [ 48.834754] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x8d/0xd0 [ 48.834760] do_syscall_64+0x3c/0x90 [ 48.834765] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 [ 48.834769] RIP: 0033:0x7fda5f56e2ac [ 48.834773] Code: 1e fa 48 8d 44 24 08 48 89 54 24 e0 48 89 44 24 c0 48 8d 44 24 d0 48 89 44 24 c8 b8 1 0 00 00 00 c7 44 24 b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 <3d> 00 f0 ff ff 89 c2 77 0b 89 d0 c3 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 8b [ 48.834776] RSP: 002b:00007fff52d4bda8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 [ 48.834782] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000171cd80 RCX: 00007fda5f56e2ac [ 48.834784] RDX: 00007fff52d4bdb0 RSI: 0000000000008913 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 48.834787] RBP: 000000000171cd30 R08: 0000000000000007 R09: 000000000000003c [ 48.834789] R10: 0000000000000004 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000003 [ 48.834791] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000004 R15: 000000000040d43c [ 48.834802] </TASK> Signed-off-by: Stefan Wiehler <[email protected]> Fixes: d1db275 ("ipv6: ip6mr: support multiple tables") Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
When IPV6_MROUTE_MULTIPLE_TABLES is enabled, calls to ip6mr_get_table() must be done under RCU or RTNL lock. Detected by Lockdep-RCU: [ 10.247131] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage [ 10.247133] 6.1.103-49518b10de-nokia_sm_x86 kernel-patches#1 Not tainted [ 10.247135] ----------------------------- [ 10.247137] /net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:131 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!! [ 10.247140] other info that might help us debug this: [ 10.247142] rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 [ 10.247144] 1 lock held by swapper/0/1: [ 10.247147] #0: ffffffff82b374d0 (pernet_ops_rwsem){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: register_pernet_subsys+0x15/0x40 [ 10.247164] stack backtrace: [ 10.247166] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.1.103-49518b10de-nokia_sm_x86 kernel-patches#1 [ 10.247170] Hardware name: Nokia Asil/Default string, BIOS 0ACNA114 07/18/2024 [ 10.247175] Call Trace: [ 10.247178] <TASK> [ 10.247181] dump_stack_lvl+0xb7/0xe9 [ 10.247189] lockdep_rcu_suspicious.cold+0x2d/0x64 [ 10.247198] ip6mr_get_table+0x8a/0x90 [ 10.247203] ip6mr_net_init+0x7c/0x200 [ 10.247209] ops_init+0x37/0x1f0 [ 10.247215] register_pernet_operations+0x129/0x230 [ 10.247221] ? af_unix_init+0xca/0xca [ 10.247227] register_pernet_subsys+0x24/0x40 [ 10.247231] ip6_mr_init+0x42/0xf2 [ 10.247235] inet6_init+0x133/0x3b9 [ 10.247238] do_one_initcall+0x74/0x290 [ 10.247247] kernel_init_freeable+0x251/0x294 [ 10.247253] ? rest_init+0x174/0x174 [ 10.247257] kernel_init+0x16/0x12c [ 10.247260] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [ 10.247271] </TASK> Signed-off-by: Stefan Wiehler <[email protected]> Fixes: d1db275 ("ipv6: ip6mr: support multiple tables") Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
Martin KaFai Lau reported use-after-free [0] in reqsk_timer_handler(). """ We are seeing a use-after-free from a bpf prog attached to trace_tcp_retransmit_synack. The program passes the req->sk to the bpf_sk_storage_get_tracing kernel helper which does check for null before using it. """ The commit 83fccfc ("inet: fix potential deadlock in reqsk_queue_unlink()") added timer_pending() in reqsk_queue_unlink() not to call del_timer_sync() from reqsk_timer_handler(), but it introduced a small race window. Before the timer is called, expire_timers() calls detach_timer(timer, true) to clear timer->entry.pprev and marks it as not pending. If reqsk_queue_unlink() checks timer_pending() just after expire_timers() calls detach_timer(), TCP will miss del_timer_sync(); the reqsk timer will continue running and send multiple SYN+ACKs until it expires. The reported UAF could happen if req->sk is close()d earlier than the timer expiration, which is 63s by default. The scenario would be 1. inet_csk_complete_hashdance() calls inet_csk_reqsk_queue_drop(), but del_timer_sync() is missed 2. reqsk timer is executed and scheduled again 3. req->sk is accept()ed and reqsk_put() decrements rsk_refcnt, but reqsk timer still has another one, and inet_csk_accept() does not clear req->sk for non-TFO sockets 4. sk is close()d 5. reqsk timer is executed again, and BPF touches req->sk Let's not use timer_pending() by passing the caller context to __inet_csk_reqsk_queue_drop(). Note that reqsk timer is pinned, so the issue does not happen in most use cases. [1] [0] BUG: KFENCE: use-after-free read in bpf_sk_storage_get_tracing+0x2e/0x1b0 Use-after-free read at 0x00000000a891fb3a (in kfence-kernel-patches#1): bpf_sk_storage_get_tracing+0x2e/0x1b0 bpf_prog_5ea3e95db6da0438_tcp_retransmit_synack+0x1d20/0x1dda bpf_trace_run2+0x4c/0xc0 tcp_rtx_synack+0xf9/0x100 reqsk_timer_handler+0xda/0x3d0 run_timer_softirq+0x292/0x8a0 irq_exit_rcu+0xf5/0x320 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6d/0x80 asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x16/0x20 intel_idle_irq+0x5a/0xa0 cpuidle_enter_state+0x94/0x273 cpu_startup_entry+0x15e/0x260 start_secondary+0x8a/0x90 secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xfa/0xfb kfence-kernel-patches#1: 0x00000000a72cc7b6-0x00000000d97616d9, size=2376, cache=TCPv6 allocated by task 0 on cpu 9 at 260507.901592s: sk_prot_alloc+0x35/0x140 sk_clone_lock+0x1f/0x3f0 inet_csk_clone_lock+0x15/0x160 tcp_create_openreq_child+0x1f/0x410 tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock+0x1da/0x700 tcp_check_req+0x1fb/0x510 tcp_v6_rcv+0x98b/0x1420 ipv6_list_rcv+0x2258/0x26e0 napi_complete_done+0x5b1/0x2990 mlx5e_napi_poll+0x2ae/0x8d0 net_rx_action+0x13e/0x590 irq_exit_rcu+0xf5/0x320 common_interrupt+0x80/0x90 asm_common_interrupt+0x22/0x40 cpuidle_enter_state+0xfb/0x273 cpu_startup_entry+0x15e/0x260 start_secondary+0x8a/0x90 secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xfa/0xfb freed by task 0 on cpu 9 at 260507.927527s: rcu_core_si+0x4ff/0xf10 irq_exit_rcu+0xf5/0x320 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6d/0x80 asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x16/0x20 cpuidle_enter_state+0xfb/0x273 cpu_startup_entry+0x15e/0x260 start_secondary+0x8a/0x90 secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xfa/0xfb Fixes: 83fccfc ("inet: fix potential deadlock in reqsk_queue_unlink()") Reported-by: Martin KaFai Lau <[email protected]> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/[email protected]/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/[email protected]/ [1] Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Martin KaFai Lau <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
The variable wwan_rtnl_link_ops assign a *bigger* maxtype which leads to a global out-of-bounds read when parsing the netlink attributes. Exactly same bug cause as the oob fixed in commit b33fb5b ("net: qualcomm: rmnet: fix global oob in rmnet_policy"). ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in validate_nla lib/nlattr.c:388 [inline] BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in __nla_validate_parse+0x19d7/0x29a0 lib/nlattr.c:603 Read of size 1 at addr ffffffff8b09cb60 by task syz.1.66276/323862 CPU: 0 PID: 323862 Comm: syz.1.66276 Not tainted 6.1.70 kernel-patches#1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x177/0x231 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:284 [inline] print_report+0x14f/0x750 mm/kasan/report.c:395 kasan_report+0x139/0x170 mm/kasan/report.c:495 validate_nla lib/nlattr.c:388 [inline] __nla_validate_parse+0x19d7/0x29a0 lib/nlattr.c:603 __nla_parse+0x3c/0x50 lib/nlattr.c:700 nla_parse_nested_deprecated include/net/netlink.h:1269 [inline] __rtnl_newlink net/core/rtnetlink.c:3514 [inline] rtnl_newlink+0x7bc/0x1fd0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3623 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x794/0xef0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6122 netlink_rcv_skb+0x1de/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2508 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1326 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x74b/0x8c0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1352 netlink_sendmsg+0x882/0xb90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1874 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:716 [inline] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:728 [inline] ____sys_sendmsg+0x5cc/0x8f0 net/socket.c:2499 ___sys_sendmsg+0x21c/0x290 net/socket.c:2553 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2582 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2591 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg+0x19e/0x270 net/socket.c:2589 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x45/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd RIP: 0033:0x7f67b19a24ad RSP: 002b:00007f67b17febb8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f67b1b45f80 RCX: 00007f67b19a24ad RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020005e40 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00007f67b1a1e01d R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007ffd2513764f R14: 00007ffd251376e0 R15: 00007f67b17fed40 </TASK> The buggy address belongs to the variable: wwan_rtnl_policy+0x20/0x40 The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:ffffea00002c2700 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0xb09c flags: 0xfff00000001000(reserved|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff) raw: 00fff00000001000 ffffea00002c2708 ffffea00002c2708 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected page_owner info is not present (never set?) Memory state around the buggy address: ffffffff8b09ca00: 05 f9 f9 f9 05 f9 f9 f9 00 01 f9 f9 00 01 f9 f9 ffffffff8b09ca80: 00 00 00 05 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 03 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 >ffffffff8b09cb00: 00 00 00 00 05 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 ^ ffffffff8b09cb80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ================================================================== According to the comment of `nla_parse_nested_deprecated`, use correct size `IFLA_WWAN_MAX` here to fix this issue. Fixes: 88b7105 ("wwan: add interface creation support") Signed-off-by: Lin Ma <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Loic Poulain <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
Martin KaFai Lau reported use-after-free [0] in reqsk_timer_handler(). """ We are seeing a use-after-free from a bpf prog attached to trace_tcp_retransmit_synack. The program passes the req->sk to the bpf_sk_storage_get_tracing kernel helper which does check for null before using it. """ The commit 83fccfc ("inet: fix potential deadlock in reqsk_queue_unlink()") added timer_pending() in reqsk_queue_unlink() not to call del_timer_sync() from reqsk_timer_handler(), but it introduced a small race window. Before the timer is called, expire_timers() calls detach_timer(timer, true) to clear timer->entry.pprev and marks it as not pending. If reqsk_queue_unlink() checks timer_pending() just after expire_timers() calls detach_timer(), TCP will miss del_timer_sync(); the reqsk timer will continue running and send multiple SYN+ACKs until it expires. The reported UAF could happen if req->sk is close()d earlier than the timer expiration, which is 63s by default. The scenario would be 1. inet_csk_complete_hashdance() calls inet_csk_reqsk_queue_drop(), but del_timer_sync() is missed 2. reqsk timer is executed and scheduled again 3. req->sk is accept()ed and reqsk_put() decrements rsk_refcnt, but reqsk timer still has another one, and inet_csk_accept() does not clear req->sk for non-TFO sockets 4. sk is close()d 5. reqsk timer is executed again, and BPF touches req->sk Let's not use timer_pending() by passing the caller context to __inet_csk_reqsk_queue_drop(). Note that reqsk timer is pinned, so the issue does not happen in most use cases. [1] [0] BUG: KFENCE: use-after-free read in bpf_sk_storage_get_tracing+0x2e/0x1b0 Use-after-free read at 0x00000000a891fb3a (in kfence-kernel-patches#1): bpf_sk_storage_get_tracing+0x2e/0x1b0 bpf_prog_5ea3e95db6da0438_tcp_retransmit_synack+0x1d20/0x1dda bpf_trace_run2+0x4c/0xc0 tcp_rtx_synack+0xf9/0x100 reqsk_timer_handler+0xda/0x3d0 run_timer_softirq+0x292/0x8a0 irq_exit_rcu+0xf5/0x320 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6d/0x80 asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x16/0x20 intel_idle_irq+0x5a/0xa0 cpuidle_enter_state+0x94/0x273 cpu_startup_entry+0x15e/0x260 start_secondary+0x8a/0x90 secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xfa/0xfb kfence-kernel-patches#1: 0x00000000a72cc7b6-0x00000000d97616d9, size=2376, cache=TCPv6 allocated by task 0 on cpu 9 at 260507.901592s: sk_prot_alloc+0x35/0x140 sk_clone_lock+0x1f/0x3f0 inet_csk_clone_lock+0x15/0x160 tcp_create_openreq_child+0x1f/0x410 tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock+0x1da/0x700 tcp_check_req+0x1fb/0x510 tcp_v6_rcv+0x98b/0x1420 ipv6_list_rcv+0x2258/0x26e0 napi_complete_done+0x5b1/0x2990 mlx5e_napi_poll+0x2ae/0x8d0 net_rx_action+0x13e/0x590 irq_exit_rcu+0xf5/0x320 common_interrupt+0x80/0x90 asm_common_interrupt+0x22/0x40 cpuidle_enter_state+0xfb/0x273 cpu_startup_entry+0x15e/0x260 start_secondary+0x8a/0x90 secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xfa/0xfb freed by task 0 on cpu 9 at 260507.927527s: rcu_core_si+0x4ff/0xf10 irq_exit_rcu+0xf5/0x320 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6d/0x80 asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x16/0x20 cpuidle_enter_state+0xfb/0x273 cpu_startup_entry+0x15e/0x260 start_secondary+0x8a/0x90 secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xfa/0xfb Fixes: 83fccfc ("inet: fix potential deadlock in reqsk_queue_unlink()") Reported-by: Martin KaFai Lau <[email protected]> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/[email protected]/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/[email protected]/ [1] Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Martin KaFai Lau <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
While running net selftests with CONFIG_PROVE_RCU_LIST=y I saw one lockdep splat [1]. genlmsg_mcast() uses for_each_net_rcu(), and must therefore hold RCU. Instead of letting all callers guard genlmsg_multicast_allns() with a rcu_read_lock()/rcu_read_unlock() pair, do it in genlmsg_mcast(). This also means the @flags parameter is useless, we need to always use GFP_ATOMIC. [1] [10882.424136] ============================= [10882.424166] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage [10882.424309] 6.12.0-rc2-virtme kernel-patches#1156 Not tainted [10882.424400] ----------------------------- [10882.424423] net/netlink/genetlink.c:1940 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!! [10882.424469] other info that might help us debug this: [10882.424500] rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 [10882.424744] 2 locks held by ip/15677: [10882.424791] #0: ffffffffb6b491b0 (cb_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: genl_rcv (net/netlink/genetlink.c:1219) [10882.426334] kernel-patches#1: ffffffffb6b49248 (genl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: genl_rcv_msg (net/netlink/genetlink.c:61 net/netlink/genetlink.c:57 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1209) [10882.426465] stack backtrace: [10882.426805] CPU: 14 UID: 0 PID: 15677 Comm: ip Not tainted 6.12.0-rc2-virtme kernel-patches#1156 [10882.426919] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 [10882.427046] Call Trace: [10882.427131] <TASK> [10882.427244] dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:123) [10882.427335] lockdep_rcu_suspicious (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:6822) [10882.427387] genlmsg_multicast_allns (net/netlink/genetlink.c:1940 (discriminator 7) net/netlink/genetlink.c:1977 (discriminator 7)) [10882.427436] l2tp_tunnel_notify.constprop.0 (net/l2tp/l2tp_netlink.c:119) l2tp_netlink [10882.427683] l2tp_nl_cmd_tunnel_create (net/l2tp/l2tp_netlink.c:253) l2tp_netlink [10882.427748] genl_family_rcv_msg_doit (net/netlink/genetlink.c:1115) [10882.427834] genl_rcv_msg (net/netlink/genetlink.c:1195 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1210) [10882.427877] ? __pfx_l2tp_nl_cmd_tunnel_create (net/l2tp/l2tp_netlink.c:186) l2tp_netlink [10882.427927] ? __pfx_genl_rcv_msg (net/netlink/genetlink.c:1201) [10882.427959] netlink_rcv_skb (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2551) [10882.428069] genl_rcv (net/netlink/genetlink.c:1220) [10882.428095] netlink_unicast (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1332 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1357) [10882.428140] netlink_sendmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1901) [10882.428210] ____sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:729 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:744 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:2607 (discriminator 1)) Fixes: 33f72e6 ("l2tp : multicast notification to the registered listeners") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Cc: James Chapman <[email protected]> Cc: Tom Parkin <[email protected]> Cc: Johannes Berg <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
The variable wwan_rtnl_link_ops assign a *bigger* maxtype which leads to a global out-of-bounds read when parsing the netlink attributes. Exactly same bug cause as the oob fixed in commit b33fb5b ("net: qualcomm: rmnet: fix global oob in rmnet_policy"). ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in validate_nla lib/nlattr.c:388 [inline] BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in __nla_validate_parse+0x19d7/0x29a0 lib/nlattr.c:603 Read of size 1 at addr ffffffff8b09cb60 by task syz.1.66276/323862 CPU: 0 PID: 323862 Comm: syz.1.66276 Not tainted 6.1.70 kernel-patches#1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x177/0x231 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:284 [inline] print_report+0x14f/0x750 mm/kasan/report.c:395 kasan_report+0x139/0x170 mm/kasan/report.c:495 validate_nla lib/nlattr.c:388 [inline] __nla_validate_parse+0x19d7/0x29a0 lib/nlattr.c:603 __nla_parse+0x3c/0x50 lib/nlattr.c:700 nla_parse_nested_deprecated include/net/netlink.h:1269 [inline] __rtnl_newlink net/core/rtnetlink.c:3514 [inline] rtnl_newlink+0x7bc/0x1fd0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3623 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x794/0xef0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6122 netlink_rcv_skb+0x1de/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2508 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1326 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x74b/0x8c0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1352 netlink_sendmsg+0x882/0xb90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1874 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:716 [inline] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:728 [inline] ____sys_sendmsg+0x5cc/0x8f0 net/socket.c:2499 ___sys_sendmsg+0x21c/0x290 net/socket.c:2553 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2582 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2591 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg+0x19e/0x270 net/socket.c:2589 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x45/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd RIP: 0033:0x7f67b19a24ad RSP: 002b:00007f67b17febb8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f67b1b45f80 RCX: 00007f67b19a24ad RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020005e40 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00007f67b1a1e01d R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007ffd2513764f R14: 00007ffd251376e0 R15: 00007f67b17fed40 </TASK> The buggy address belongs to the variable: wwan_rtnl_policy+0x20/0x40 The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:ffffea00002c2700 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0xb09c flags: 0xfff00000001000(reserved|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff) raw: 00fff00000001000 ffffea00002c2708 ffffea00002c2708 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected page_owner info is not present (never set?) Memory state around the buggy address: ffffffff8b09ca00: 05 f9 f9 f9 05 f9 f9 f9 00 01 f9 f9 00 01 f9 f9 ffffffff8b09ca80: 00 00 00 05 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 03 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 >ffffffff8b09cb00: 00 00 00 00 05 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 ^ ffffffff8b09cb80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ================================================================== According to the comment of `nla_parse_nested_deprecated`, use correct size `IFLA_WWAN_MAX` here to fix this issue. Fixes: 88b7105 ("wwan: add interface creation support") Signed-off-by: Lin Ma <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Loic Poulain <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
The variable wwan_rtnl_link_ops assign a *bigger* maxtype which leads to a global out-of-bounds read when parsing the netlink attributes. Exactly same bug cause as the oob fixed in commit b33fb5b ("net: qualcomm: rmnet: fix global oob in rmnet_policy"). ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in validate_nla lib/nlattr.c:388 [inline] BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in __nla_validate_parse+0x19d7/0x29a0 lib/nlattr.c:603 Read of size 1 at addr ffffffff8b09cb60 by task syz.1.66276/323862 CPU: 0 PID: 323862 Comm: syz.1.66276 Not tainted 6.1.70 kernel-patches#1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x177/0x231 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:284 [inline] print_report+0x14f/0x750 mm/kasan/report.c:395 kasan_report+0x139/0x170 mm/kasan/report.c:495 validate_nla lib/nlattr.c:388 [inline] __nla_validate_parse+0x19d7/0x29a0 lib/nlattr.c:603 __nla_parse+0x3c/0x50 lib/nlattr.c:700 nla_parse_nested_deprecated include/net/netlink.h:1269 [inline] __rtnl_newlink net/core/rtnetlink.c:3514 [inline] rtnl_newlink+0x7bc/0x1fd0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3623 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x794/0xef0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6122 netlink_rcv_skb+0x1de/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2508 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1326 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x74b/0x8c0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1352 netlink_sendmsg+0x882/0xb90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1874 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:716 [inline] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:728 [inline] ____sys_sendmsg+0x5cc/0x8f0 net/socket.c:2499 ___sys_sendmsg+0x21c/0x290 net/socket.c:2553 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2582 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2591 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg+0x19e/0x270 net/socket.c:2589 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x45/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd RIP: 0033:0x7f67b19a24ad RSP: 002b:00007f67b17febb8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f67b1b45f80 RCX: 00007f67b19a24ad RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020005e40 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00007f67b1a1e01d R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007ffd2513764f R14: 00007ffd251376e0 R15: 00007f67b17fed40 </TASK> The buggy address belongs to the variable: wwan_rtnl_policy+0x20/0x40 The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:ffffea00002c2700 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0xb09c flags: 0xfff00000001000(reserved|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff) raw: 00fff00000001000 ffffea00002c2708 ffffea00002c2708 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected page_owner info is not present (never set?) Memory state around the buggy address: ffffffff8b09ca00: 05 f9 f9 f9 05 f9 f9 f9 00 01 f9 f9 00 01 f9 f9 ffffffff8b09ca80: 00 00 00 05 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 03 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 >ffffffff8b09cb00: 00 00 00 00 05 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 ^ ffffffff8b09cb80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ================================================================== According to the comment of `nla_parse_nested_deprecated`, use correct size `IFLA_WWAN_MAX` here to fix this issue. Fixes: 88b7105 ("wwan: add interface creation support") Signed-off-by: Lin Ma <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Loic Poulain <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
The variable wwan_rtnl_link_ops assign a *bigger* maxtype which leads to a global out-of-bounds read when parsing the netlink attributes. Exactly same bug cause as the oob fixed in commit b33fb5b ("net: qualcomm: rmnet: fix global oob in rmnet_policy"). ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in validate_nla lib/nlattr.c:388 [inline] BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in __nla_validate_parse+0x19d7/0x29a0 lib/nlattr.c:603 Read of size 1 at addr ffffffff8b09cb60 by task syz.1.66276/323862 CPU: 0 PID: 323862 Comm: syz.1.66276 Not tainted 6.1.70 kernel-patches#1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x177/0x231 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:284 [inline] print_report+0x14f/0x750 mm/kasan/report.c:395 kasan_report+0x139/0x170 mm/kasan/report.c:495 validate_nla lib/nlattr.c:388 [inline] __nla_validate_parse+0x19d7/0x29a0 lib/nlattr.c:603 __nla_parse+0x3c/0x50 lib/nlattr.c:700 nla_parse_nested_deprecated include/net/netlink.h:1269 [inline] __rtnl_newlink net/core/rtnetlink.c:3514 [inline] rtnl_newlink+0x7bc/0x1fd0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3623 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x794/0xef0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6122 netlink_rcv_skb+0x1de/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2508 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1326 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x74b/0x8c0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1352 netlink_sendmsg+0x882/0xb90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1874 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:716 [inline] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:728 [inline] ____sys_sendmsg+0x5cc/0x8f0 net/socket.c:2499 ___sys_sendmsg+0x21c/0x290 net/socket.c:2553 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2582 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2591 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg+0x19e/0x270 net/socket.c:2589 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x45/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd RIP: 0033:0x7f67b19a24ad RSP: 002b:00007f67b17febb8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f67b1b45f80 RCX: 00007f67b19a24ad RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020005e40 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00007f67b1a1e01d R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007ffd2513764f R14: 00007ffd251376e0 R15: 00007f67b17fed40 </TASK> The buggy address belongs to the variable: wwan_rtnl_policy+0x20/0x40 The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:ffffea00002c2700 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0xb09c flags: 0xfff00000001000(reserved|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff) raw: 00fff00000001000 ffffea00002c2708 ffffea00002c2708 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected page_owner info is not present (never set?) Memory state around the buggy address: ffffffff8b09ca00: 05 f9 f9 f9 05 f9 f9 f9 00 01 f9 f9 00 01 f9 f9 ffffffff8b09ca80: 00 00 00 05 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 03 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 >ffffffff8b09cb00: 00 00 00 00 05 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 ^ ffffffff8b09cb80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ================================================================== According to the comment of `nla_parse_nested_deprecated`, use correct size `IFLA_WWAN_MAX` here to fix this issue. Fixes: 88b7105 ("wwan: add interface creation support") Signed-off-by: Lin Ma <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Loic Poulain <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
The variable wwan_rtnl_link_ops assign a *bigger* maxtype which leads to a global out-of-bounds read when parsing the netlink attributes. Exactly same bug cause as the oob fixed in commit b33fb5b ("net: qualcomm: rmnet: fix global oob in rmnet_policy"). ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in validate_nla lib/nlattr.c:388 [inline] BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in __nla_validate_parse+0x19d7/0x29a0 lib/nlattr.c:603 Read of size 1 at addr ffffffff8b09cb60 by task syz.1.66276/323862 CPU: 0 PID: 323862 Comm: syz.1.66276 Not tainted 6.1.70 kernel-patches#1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x177/0x231 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:284 [inline] print_report+0x14f/0x750 mm/kasan/report.c:395 kasan_report+0x139/0x170 mm/kasan/report.c:495 validate_nla lib/nlattr.c:388 [inline] __nla_validate_parse+0x19d7/0x29a0 lib/nlattr.c:603 __nla_parse+0x3c/0x50 lib/nlattr.c:700 nla_parse_nested_deprecated include/net/netlink.h:1269 [inline] __rtnl_newlink net/core/rtnetlink.c:3514 [inline] rtnl_newlink+0x7bc/0x1fd0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3623 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x794/0xef0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6122 netlink_rcv_skb+0x1de/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2508 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1326 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x74b/0x8c0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1352 netlink_sendmsg+0x882/0xb90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1874 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:716 [inline] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:728 [inline] ____sys_sendmsg+0x5cc/0x8f0 net/socket.c:2499 ___sys_sendmsg+0x21c/0x290 net/socket.c:2553 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2582 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2591 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg+0x19e/0x270 net/socket.c:2589 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x45/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd RIP: 0033:0x7f67b19a24ad RSP: 002b:00007f67b17febb8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f67b1b45f80 RCX: 00007f67b19a24ad RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020005e40 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00007f67b1a1e01d R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007ffd2513764f R14: 00007ffd251376e0 R15: 00007f67b17fed40 </TASK> The buggy address belongs to the variable: wwan_rtnl_policy+0x20/0x40 The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:ffffea00002c2700 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0xb09c flags: 0xfff00000001000(reserved|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff) raw: 00fff00000001000 ffffea00002c2708 ffffea00002c2708 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected page_owner info is not present (never set?) Memory state around the buggy address: ffffffff8b09ca00: 05 f9 f9 f9 05 f9 f9 f9 00 01 f9 f9 00 01 f9 f9 ffffffff8b09ca80: 00 00 00 05 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 03 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 >ffffffff8b09cb00: 00 00 00 00 05 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 ^ ffffffff8b09cb80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ================================================================== According to the comment of `nla_parse_nested_deprecated`, use correct size `IFLA_WWAN_MAX` here to fix this issue. Fixes: 88b7105 ("wwan: add interface creation support") Signed-off-by: Lin Ma <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Loic Poulain <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
The variable wwan_rtnl_link_ops assign a *bigger* maxtype which leads to a global out-of-bounds read when parsing the netlink attributes. Exactly same bug cause as the oob fixed in commit b33fb5b ("net: qualcomm: rmnet: fix global oob in rmnet_policy"). ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in validate_nla lib/nlattr.c:388 [inline] BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in __nla_validate_parse+0x19d7/0x29a0 lib/nlattr.c:603 Read of size 1 at addr ffffffff8b09cb60 by task syz.1.66276/323862 CPU: 0 PID: 323862 Comm: syz.1.66276 Not tainted 6.1.70 kernel-patches#1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x177/0x231 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:284 [inline] print_report+0x14f/0x750 mm/kasan/report.c:395 kasan_report+0x139/0x170 mm/kasan/report.c:495 validate_nla lib/nlattr.c:388 [inline] __nla_validate_parse+0x19d7/0x29a0 lib/nlattr.c:603 __nla_parse+0x3c/0x50 lib/nlattr.c:700 nla_parse_nested_deprecated include/net/netlink.h:1269 [inline] __rtnl_newlink net/core/rtnetlink.c:3514 [inline] rtnl_newlink+0x7bc/0x1fd0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3623 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x794/0xef0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6122 netlink_rcv_skb+0x1de/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2508 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1326 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x74b/0x8c0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1352 netlink_sendmsg+0x882/0xb90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1874 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:716 [inline] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:728 [inline] ____sys_sendmsg+0x5cc/0x8f0 net/socket.c:2499 ___sys_sendmsg+0x21c/0x290 net/socket.c:2553 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2582 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2591 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg+0x19e/0x270 net/socket.c:2589 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x45/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd RIP: 0033:0x7f67b19a24ad RSP: 002b:00007f67b17febb8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f67b1b45f80 RCX: 00007f67b19a24ad RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020005e40 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00007f67b1a1e01d R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007ffd2513764f R14: 00007ffd251376e0 R15: 00007f67b17fed40 </TASK> The buggy address belongs to the variable: wwan_rtnl_policy+0x20/0x40 The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:ffffea00002c2700 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0xb09c flags: 0xfff00000001000(reserved|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff) raw: 00fff00000001000 ffffea00002c2708 ffffea00002c2708 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected page_owner info is not present (never set?) Memory state around the buggy address: ffffffff8b09ca00: 05 f9 f9 f9 05 f9 f9 f9 00 01 f9 f9 00 01 f9 f9 ffffffff8b09ca80: 00 00 00 05 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 03 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 >ffffffff8b09cb00: 00 00 00 00 05 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 ^ ffffffff8b09cb80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ================================================================== According to the comment of `nla_parse_nested_deprecated`, use correct size `IFLA_WWAN_MAX` here to fix this issue. Fixes: 88b7105 ("wwan: add interface creation support") Signed-off-by: Lin Ma <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Loic Poulain <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
The variable wwan_rtnl_link_ops assign a *bigger* maxtype which leads to a global out-of-bounds read when parsing the netlink attributes. Exactly same bug cause as the oob fixed in commit b33fb5b ("net: qualcomm: rmnet: fix global oob in rmnet_policy"). ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in validate_nla lib/nlattr.c:388 [inline] BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in __nla_validate_parse+0x19d7/0x29a0 lib/nlattr.c:603 Read of size 1 at addr ffffffff8b09cb60 by task syz.1.66276/323862 CPU: 0 PID: 323862 Comm: syz.1.66276 Not tainted 6.1.70 kernel-patches#1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x177/0x231 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:284 [inline] print_report+0x14f/0x750 mm/kasan/report.c:395 kasan_report+0x139/0x170 mm/kasan/report.c:495 validate_nla lib/nlattr.c:388 [inline] __nla_validate_parse+0x19d7/0x29a0 lib/nlattr.c:603 __nla_parse+0x3c/0x50 lib/nlattr.c:700 nla_parse_nested_deprecated include/net/netlink.h:1269 [inline] __rtnl_newlink net/core/rtnetlink.c:3514 [inline] rtnl_newlink+0x7bc/0x1fd0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3623 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x794/0xef0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6122 netlink_rcv_skb+0x1de/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2508 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1326 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x74b/0x8c0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1352 netlink_sendmsg+0x882/0xb90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1874 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:716 [inline] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:728 [inline] ____sys_sendmsg+0x5cc/0x8f0 net/socket.c:2499 ___sys_sendmsg+0x21c/0x290 net/socket.c:2553 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2582 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2591 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg+0x19e/0x270 net/socket.c:2589 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x45/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd RIP: 0033:0x7f67b19a24ad RSP: 002b:00007f67b17febb8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f67b1b45f80 RCX: 00007f67b19a24ad RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020005e40 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00007f67b1a1e01d R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007ffd2513764f R14: 00007ffd251376e0 R15: 00007f67b17fed40 </TASK> The buggy address belongs to the variable: wwan_rtnl_policy+0x20/0x40 The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:ffffea00002c2700 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0xb09c flags: 0xfff00000001000(reserved|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff) raw: 00fff00000001000 ffffea00002c2708 ffffea00002c2708 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected page_owner info is not present (never set?) Memory state around the buggy address: ffffffff8b09ca00: 05 f9 f9 f9 05 f9 f9 f9 00 01 f9 f9 00 01 f9 f9 ffffffff8b09ca80: 00 00 00 05 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 03 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 >ffffffff8b09cb00: 00 00 00 00 05 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 ^ ffffffff8b09cb80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ================================================================== According to the comment of `nla_parse_nested_deprecated`, use correct size `IFLA_WWAN_MAX` here to fix this issue. Fixes: 88b7105 ("wwan: add interface creation support") Signed-off-by: Lin Ma <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Loic Poulain <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
If bt_debugfs is not created successfully, which happens if either CONFIG_DEBUG_FS or CONFIG_DEBUG_FS_ALLOW_ALL is unset, then iso_init() returns early and does not set iso_inited to true. This means that a subsequent call to iso_init() will result in duplicate calls to proto_register(), bt_sock_register(), etc. With CONFIG_LIST_HARDENED and CONFIG_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION enabled, the duplicate call to proto_register() triggers this BUG(): list_add double add: new=ffffffffc0b280d0, prev=ffffffffbab56250, next=ffffffffc0b280d0. ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:35! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [kernel-patches#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 2 PID: 887 Comm: bluetoothd Not tainted 6.10.11-1-ao-desktop kernel-patches#1 RIP: 0010:__list_add_valid_or_report+0x9a/0xa0 ... __list_add_valid_or_report+0x9a/0xa0 proto_register+0x2b5/0x340 iso_init+0x23/0x150 [bluetooth] set_iso_socket_func+0x68/0x1b0 [bluetooth] kmem_cache_free+0x308/0x330 hci_sock_sendmsg+0x990/0x9e0 [bluetooth] __sock_sendmsg+0x7b/0x80 sock_write_iter+0x9a/0x110 do_iter_readv_writev+0x11d/0x220 vfs_writev+0x180/0x3e0 do_writev+0xca/0x100 ... This change removes the early return. The check for iso_debugfs being NULL was unnecessary, it is always NULL when iso_inited is false. Cc: [email protected] Fixes: ccf74f2 ("Bluetooth: Add BTPROTO_ISO socket type") Signed-off-by: Aaron Thompson <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>
If iso_init() has been called, iso_exit() must be called on module unload. Without that, the struct proto that iso_init() registered with proto_register() becomes invalid, which could cause unpredictable problems later. In my case, with CONFIG_LIST_HARDENED and CONFIG_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION enabled, loading the module again usually triggers this BUG(): list_add corruption. next->prev should be prev (ffffffffb5355fd0), but was 0000000000000068. (next=ffffffffc0a010d0). ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:29! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [kernel-patches#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 1 PID: 4159 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 6.10.11-4+bt2-ao-desktop kernel-patches#1 RIP: 0010:__list_add_valid_or_report+0x61/0xa0 ... __list_add_valid_or_report+0x61/0xa0 proto_register+0x299/0x320 hci_sock_init+0x16/0xc0 [bluetooth] bt_init+0x68/0xd0 [bluetooth] __pfx_bt_init+0x10/0x10 [bluetooth] do_one_initcall+0x80/0x2f0 do_init_module+0x8b/0x230 __do_sys_init_module+0x15f/0x190 do_syscall_64+0x68/0x110 ... Cc: [email protected] Fixes: ccf74f2 ("Bluetooth: Add BTPROTO_ISO socket type") Signed-off-by: Aaron Thompson <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>
The variable wwan_rtnl_link_ops assign a *bigger* maxtype which leads to a global out-of-bounds read when parsing the netlink attributes. Exactly same bug cause as the oob fixed in commit b33fb5b ("net: qualcomm: rmnet: fix global oob in rmnet_policy"). ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in validate_nla lib/nlattr.c:388 [inline] BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in __nla_validate_parse+0x19d7/0x29a0 lib/nlattr.c:603 Read of size 1 at addr ffffffff8b09cb60 by task syz.1.66276/323862 CPU: 0 PID: 323862 Comm: syz.1.66276 Not tainted 6.1.70 kernel-patches#1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x177/0x231 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:284 [inline] print_report+0x14f/0x750 mm/kasan/report.c:395 kasan_report+0x139/0x170 mm/kasan/report.c:495 validate_nla lib/nlattr.c:388 [inline] __nla_validate_parse+0x19d7/0x29a0 lib/nlattr.c:603 __nla_parse+0x3c/0x50 lib/nlattr.c:700 nla_parse_nested_deprecated include/net/netlink.h:1269 [inline] __rtnl_newlink net/core/rtnetlink.c:3514 [inline] rtnl_newlink+0x7bc/0x1fd0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3623 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x794/0xef0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6122 netlink_rcv_skb+0x1de/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2508 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1326 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x74b/0x8c0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1352 netlink_sendmsg+0x882/0xb90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1874 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:716 [inline] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:728 [inline] ____sys_sendmsg+0x5cc/0x8f0 net/socket.c:2499 ___sys_sendmsg+0x21c/0x290 net/socket.c:2553 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2582 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2591 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg+0x19e/0x270 net/socket.c:2589 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x45/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd RIP: 0033:0x7f67b19a24ad RSP: 002b:00007f67b17febb8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f67b1b45f80 RCX: 00007f67b19a24ad RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020005e40 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00007f67b1a1e01d R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007ffd2513764f R14: 00007ffd251376e0 R15: 00007f67b17fed40 </TASK> The buggy address belongs to the variable: wwan_rtnl_policy+0x20/0x40 The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:ffffea00002c2700 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0xb09c flags: 0xfff00000001000(reserved|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff) raw: 00fff00000001000 ffffea00002c2708 ffffea00002c2708 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected page_owner info is not present (never set?) Memory state around the buggy address: ffffffff8b09ca00: 05 f9 f9 f9 05 f9 f9 f9 00 01 f9 f9 00 01 f9 f9 ffffffff8b09ca80: 00 00 00 05 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 03 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 >ffffffff8b09cb00: 00 00 00 00 05 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 ^ ffffffff8b09cb80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ================================================================== According to the comment of `nla_parse_nested_deprecated`, use correct size `IFLA_WWAN_MAX` here to fix this issue. Fixes: 88b7105 ("wwan: add interface creation support") Signed-off-by: Lin Ma <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Loic Poulain <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
The variable wwan_rtnl_link_ops assign a *bigger* maxtype which leads to a global out-of-bounds read when parsing the netlink attributes. Exactly same bug cause as the oob fixed in commit b33fb5b ("net: qualcomm: rmnet: fix global oob in rmnet_policy"). ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in validate_nla lib/nlattr.c:388 [inline] BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in __nla_validate_parse+0x19d7/0x29a0 lib/nlattr.c:603 Read of size 1 at addr ffffffff8b09cb60 by task syz.1.66276/323862 CPU: 0 PID: 323862 Comm: syz.1.66276 Not tainted 6.1.70 kernel-patches#1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x177/0x231 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:284 [inline] print_report+0x14f/0x750 mm/kasan/report.c:395 kasan_report+0x139/0x170 mm/kasan/report.c:495 validate_nla lib/nlattr.c:388 [inline] __nla_validate_parse+0x19d7/0x29a0 lib/nlattr.c:603 __nla_parse+0x3c/0x50 lib/nlattr.c:700 nla_parse_nested_deprecated include/net/netlink.h:1269 [inline] __rtnl_newlink net/core/rtnetlink.c:3514 [inline] rtnl_newlink+0x7bc/0x1fd0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3623 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x794/0xef0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6122 netlink_rcv_skb+0x1de/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2508 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1326 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x74b/0x8c0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1352 netlink_sendmsg+0x882/0xb90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1874 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:716 [inline] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:728 [inline] ____sys_sendmsg+0x5cc/0x8f0 net/socket.c:2499 ___sys_sendmsg+0x21c/0x290 net/socket.c:2553 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2582 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2591 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg+0x19e/0x270 net/socket.c:2589 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x45/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd RIP: 0033:0x7f67b19a24ad RSP: 002b:00007f67b17febb8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f67b1b45f80 RCX: 00007f67b19a24ad RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020005e40 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00007f67b1a1e01d R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007ffd2513764f R14: 00007ffd251376e0 R15: 00007f67b17fed40 </TASK> The buggy address belongs to the variable: wwan_rtnl_policy+0x20/0x40 The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:ffffea00002c2700 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0xb09c flags: 0xfff00000001000(reserved|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff) raw: 00fff00000001000 ffffea00002c2708 ffffea00002c2708 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected page_owner info is not present (never set?) Memory state around the buggy address: ffffffff8b09ca00: 05 f9 f9 f9 05 f9 f9 f9 00 01 f9 f9 00 01 f9 f9 ffffffff8b09ca80: 00 00 00 05 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 03 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 >ffffffff8b09cb00: 00 00 00 00 05 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 ^ ffffffff8b09cb80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ================================================================== According to the comment of `nla_parse_nested_deprecated`, use correct size `IFLA_WWAN_MAX` here to fix this issue. Fixes: 88b7105 ("wwan: add interface creation support") Signed-off-by: Lin Ma <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Loic Poulain <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
The variable wwan_rtnl_link_ops assign a *bigger* maxtype which leads to a global out-of-bounds read when parsing the netlink attributes. Exactly same bug cause as the oob fixed in commit b33fb5b ("net: qualcomm: rmnet: fix global oob in rmnet_policy"). ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in validate_nla lib/nlattr.c:388 [inline] BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in __nla_validate_parse+0x19d7/0x29a0 lib/nlattr.c:603 Read of size 1 at addr ffffffff8b09cb60 by task syz.1.66276/323862 CPU: 0 PID: 323862 Comm: syz.1.66276 Not tainted 6.1.70 kernel-patches#1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x177/0x231 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:284 [inline] print_report+0x14f/0x750 mm/kasan/report.c:395 kasan_report+0x139/0x170 mm/kasan/report.c:495 validate_nla lib/nlattr.c:388 [inline] __nla_validate_parse+0x19d7/0x29a0 lib/nlattr.c:603 __nla_parse+0x3c/0x50 lib/nlattr.c:700 nla_parse_nested_deprecated include/net/netlink.h:1269 [inline] __rtnl_newlink net/core/rtnetlink.c:3514 [inline] rtnl_newlink+0x7bc/0x1fd0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3623 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x794/0xef0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6122 netlink_rcv_skb+0x1de/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2508 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1326 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x74b/0x8c0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1352 netlink_sendmsg+0x882/0xb90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1874 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:716 [inline] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:728 [inline] ____sys_sendmsg+0x5cc/0x8f0 net/socket.c:2499 ___sys_sendmsg+0x21c/0x290 net/socket.c:2553 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2582 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2591 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg+0x19e/0x270 net/socket.c:2589 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x45/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd RIP: 0033:0x7f67b19a24ad RSP: 002b:00007f67b17febb8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f67b1b45f80 RCX: 00007f67b19a24ad RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020005e40 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00007f67b1a1e01d R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007ffd2513764f R14: 00007ffd251376e0 R15: 00007f67b17fed40 </TASK> The buggy address belongs to the variable: wwan_rtnl_policy+0x20/0x40 The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:ffffea00002c2700 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0xb09c flags: 0xfff00000001000(reserved|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff) raw: 00fff00000001000 ffffea00002c2708 ffffea00002c2708 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected page_owner info is not present (never set?) Memory state around the buggy address: ffffffff8b09ca00: 05 f9 f9 f9 05 f9 f9 f9 00 01 f9 f9 00 01 f9 f9 ffffffff8b09ca80: 00 00 00 05 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 03 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 >ffffffff8b09cb00: 00 00 00 00 05 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 ^ ffffffff8b09cb80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ================================================================== According to the comment of `nla_parse_nested_deprecated`, use correct size `IFLA_WWAN_MAX` here to fix this issue. Fixes: 88b7105 ("wwan: add interface creation support") Signed-off-by: Lin Ma <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Loic Poulain <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
The variable wwan_rtnl_link_ops assign a *bigger* maxtype which leads to a global out-of-bounds read when parsing the netlink attributes. Exactly same bug cause as the oob fixed in commit b33fb5b ("net: qualcomm: rmnet: fix global oob in rmnet_policy"). ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in validate_nla lib/nlattr.c:388 [inline] BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in __nla_validate_parse+0x19d7/0x29a0 lib/nlattr.c:603 Read of size 1 at addr ffffffff8b09cb60 by task syz.1.66276/323862 CPU: 0 PID: 323862 Comm: syz.1.66276 Not tainted 6.1.70 kernel-patches#1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x177/0x231 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:284 [inline] print_report+0x14f/0x750 mm/kasan/report.c:395 kasan_report+0x139/0x170 mm/kasan/report.c:495 validate_nla lib/nlattr.c:388 [inline] __nla_validate_parse+0x19d7/0x29a0 lib/nlattr.c:603 __nla_parse+0x3c/0x50 lib/nlattr.c:700 nla_parse_nested_deprecated include/net/netlink.h:1269 [inline] __rtnl_newlink net/core/rtnetlink.c:3514 [inline] rtnl_newlink+0x7bc/0x1fd0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3623 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x794/0xef0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6122 netlink_rcv_skb+0x1de/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2508 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1326 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x74b/0x8c0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1352 netlink_sendmsg+0x882/0xb90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1874 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:716 [inline] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:728 [inline] ____sys_sendmsg+0x5cc/0x8f0 net/socket.c:2499 ___sys_sendmsg+0x21c/0x290 net/socket.c:2553 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2582 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2591 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg+0x19e/0x270 net/socket.c:2589 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x45/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd RIP: 0033:0x7f67b19a24ad RSP: 002b:00007f67b17febb8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f67b1b45f80 RCX: 00007f67b19a24ad RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020005e40 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00007f67b1a1e01d R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007ffd2513764f R14: 00007ffd251376e0 R15: 00007f67b17fed40 </TASK> The buggy address belongs to the variable: wwan_rtnl_policy+0x20/0x40 The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:ffffea00002c2700 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0xb09c flags: 0xfff00000001000(reserved|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff) raw: 00fff00000001000 ffffea00002c2708 ffffea00002c2708 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected page_owner info is not present (never set?) Memory state around the buggy address: ffffffff8b09ca00: 05 f9 f9 f9 05 f9 f9 f9 00 01 f9 f9 00 01 f9 f9 ffffffff8b09ca80: 00 00 00 05 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 03 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 >ffffffff8b09cb00: 00 00 00 00 05 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 ^ ffffffff8b09cb80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ================================================================== According to the comment of `nla_parse_nested_deprecated`, use correct size `IFLA_WWAN_MAX` here to fix this issue. Fixes: 88b7105 ("wwan: add interface creation support") Signed-off-by: Lin Ma <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Loic Poulain <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
The variable wwan_rtnl_link_ops assign a *bigger* maxtype which leads to a global out-of-bounds read when parsing the netlink attributes. Exactly same bug cause as the oob fixed in commit b33fb5b ("net: qualcomm: rmnet: fix global oob in rmnet_policy"). ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in validate_nla lib/nlattr.c:388 [inline] BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in __nla_validate_parse+0x19d7/0x29a0 lib/nlattr.c:603 Read of size 1 at addr ffffffff8b09cb60 by task syz.1.66276/323862 CPU: 0 PID: 323862 Comm: syz.1.66276 Not tainted 6.1.70 kernel-patches#1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x177/0x231 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:284 [inline] print_report+0x14f/0x750 mm/kasan/report.c:395 kasan_report+0x139/0x170 mm/kasan/report.c:495 validate_nla lib/nlattr.c:388 [inline] __nla_validate_parse+0x19d7/0x29a0 lib/nlattr.c:603 __nla_parse+0x3c/0x50 lib/nlattr.c:700 nla_parse_nested_deprecated include/net/netlink.h:1269 [inline] __rtnl_newlink net/core/rtnetlink.c:3514 [inline] rtnl_newlink+0x7bc/0x1fd0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3623 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x794/0xef0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6122 netlink_rcv_skb+0x1de/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2508 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1326 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x74b/0x8c0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1352 netlink_sendmsg+0x882/0xb90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1874 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:716 [inline] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:728 [inline] ____sys_sendmsg+0x5cc/0x8f0 net/socket.c:2499 ___sys_sendmsg+0x21c/0x290 net/socket.c:2553 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2582 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2591 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg+0x19e/0x270 net/socket.c:2589 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x45/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd RIP: 0033:0x7f67b19a24ad RSP: 002b:00007f67b17febb8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f67b1b45f80 RCX: 00007f67b19a24ad RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020005e40 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00007f67b1a1e01d R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007ffd2513764f R14: 00007ffd251376e0 R15: 00007f67b17fed40 </TASK> The buggy address belongs to the variable: wwan_rtnl_policy+0x20/0x40 The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:ffffea00002c2700 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0xb09c flags: 0xfff00000001000(reserved|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff) raw: 00fff00000001000 ffffea00002c2708 ffffea00002c2708 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected page_owner info is not present (never set?) Memory state around the buggy address: ffffffff8b09ca00: 05 f9 f9 f9 05 f9 f9 f9 00 01 f9 f9 00 01 f9 f9 ffffffff8b09ca80: 00 00 00 05 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 03 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 >ffffffff8b09cb00: 00 00 00 00 05 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 ^ ffffffff8b09cb80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ================================================================== According to the comment of `nla_parse_nested_deprecated`, use correct size `IFLA_WWAN_MAX` here to fix this issue. Fixes: 88b7105 ("wwan: add interface creation support") Signed-off-by: Lin Ma <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Loic Poulain <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
The variable wwan_rtnl_link_ops assign a *bigger* maxtype which leads to a global out-of-bounds read when parsing the netlink attributes. Exactly same bug cause as the oob fixed in commit b33fb5b ("net: qualcomm: rmnet: fix global oob in rmnet_policy"). ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in validate_nla lib/nlattr.c:388 [inline] BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in __nla_validate_parse+0x19d7/0x29a0 lib/nlattr.c:603 Read of size 1 at addr ffffffff8b09cb60 by task syz.1.66276/323862 CPU: 0 PID: 323862 Comm: syz.1.66276 Not tainted 6.1.70 kernel-patches#1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x177/0x231 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:284 [inline] print_report+0x14f/0x750 mm/kasan/report.c:395 kasan_report+0x139/0x170 mm/kasan/report.c:495 validate_nla lib/nlattr.c:388 [inline] __nla_validate_parse+0x19d7/0x29a0 lib/nlattr.c:603 __nla_parse+0x3c/0x50 lib/nlattr.c:700 nla_parse_nested_deprecated include/net/netlink.h:1269 [inline] __rtnl_newlink net/core/rtnetlink.c:3514 [inline] rtnl_newlink+0x7bc/0x1fd0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3623 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x794/0xef0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6122 netlink_rcv_skb+0x1de/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2508 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1326 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x74b/0x8c0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1352 netlink_sendmsg+0x882/0xb90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1874 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:716 [inline] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:728 [inline] ____sys_sendmsg+0x5cc/0x8f0 net/socket.c:2499 ___sys_sendmsg+0x21c/0x290 net/socket.c:2553 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2582 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2591 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg+0x19e/0x270 net/socket.c:2589 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x45/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd RIP: 0033:0x7f67b19a24ad RSP: 002b:00007f67b17febb8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f67b1b45f80 RCX: 00007f67b19a24ad RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020005e40 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00007f67b1a1e01d R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007ffd2513764f R14: 00007ffd251376e0 R15: 00007f67b17fed40 </TASK> The buggy address belongs to the variable: wwan_rtnl_policy+0x20/0x40 The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:ffffea00002c2700 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0xb09c flags: 0xfff00000001000(reserved|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff) raw: 00fff00000001000 ffffea00002c2708 ffffea00002c2708 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected page_owner info is not present (never set?) Memory state around the buggy address: ffffffff8b09ca00: 05 f9 f9 f9 05 f9 f9 f9 00 01 f9 f9 00 01 f9 f9 ffffffff8b09ca80: 00 00 00 05 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 03 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 >ffffffff8b09cb00: 00 00 00 00 05 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 ^ ffffffff8b09cb80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ================================================================== According to the comment of `nla_parse_nested_deprecated`, use correct size `IFLA_WWAN_MAX` here to fix this issue. Fixes: 88b7105 ("wwan: add interface creation support") Signed-off-by: Lin Ma <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Loic Poulain <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
The variable wwan_rtnl_link_ops assign a *bigger* maxtype which leads to a global out-of-bounds read when parsing the netlink attributes. Exactly same bug cause as the oob fixed in commit b33fb5b ("net: qualcomm: rmnet: fix global oob in rmnet_policy"). ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in validate_nla lib/nlattr.c:388 [inline] BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in __nla_validate_parse+0x19d7/0x29a0 lib/nlattr.c:603 Read of size 1 at addr ffffffff8b09cb60 by task syz.1.66276/323862 CPU: 0 PID: 323862 Comm: syz.1.66276 Not tainted 6.1.70 kernel-patches#1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x177/0x231 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:284 [inline] print_report+0x14f/0x750 mm/kasan/report.c:395 kasan_report+0x139/0x170 mm/kasan/report.c:495 validate_nla lib/nlattr.c:388 [inline] __nla_validate_parse+0x19d7/0x29a0 lib/nlattr.c:603 __nla_parse+0x3c/0x50 lib/nlattr.c:700 nla_parse_nested_deprecated include/net/netlink.h:1269 [inline] __rtnl_newlink net/core/rtnetlink.c:3514 [inline] rtnl_newlink+0x7bc/0x1fd0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3623 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x794/0xef0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6122 netlink_rcv_skb+0x1de/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2508 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1326 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x74b/0x8c0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1352 netlink_sendmsg+0x882/0xb90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1874 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:716 [inline] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:728 [inline] ____sys_sendmsg+0x5cc/0x8f0 net/socket.c:2499 ___sys_sendmsg+0x21c/0x290 net/socket.c:2553 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2582 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2591 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg+0x19e/0x270 net/socket.c:2589 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x45/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd RIP: 0033:0x7f67b19a24ad RSP: 002b:00007f67b17febb8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f67b1b45f80 RCX: 00007f67b19a24ad RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020005e40 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00007f67b1a1e01d R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007ffd2513764f R14: 00007ffd251376e0 R15: 00007f67b17fed40 </TASK> The buggy address belongs to the variable: wwan_rtnl_policy+0x20/0x40 The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:ffffea00002c2700 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0xb09c flags: 0xfff00000001000(reserved|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff) raw: 00fff00000001000 ffffea00002c2708 ffffea00002c2708 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected page_owner info is not present (never set?) Memory state around the buggy address: ffffffff8b09ca00: 05 f9 f9 f9 05 f9 f9 f9 00 01 f9 f9 00 01 f9 f9 ffffffff8b09ca80: 00 00 00 05 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 03 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 >ffffffff8b09cb00: 00 00 00 00 05 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 ^ ffffffff8b09cb80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ================================================================== According to the comment of `nla_parse_nested_deprecated`, use correct size `IFLA_WWAN_MAX` here to fix this issue. Fixes: 88b7105 ("wwan: add interface creation support") Signed-off-by: Lin Ma <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Loic Poulain <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
Pull request for series with
subject: bpf: BTF support for ksyms
version: 2
url: https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/netdev/list/?series=199405