fix(hooks): bound remaining dangerous-command flag wildcards (FP class) #795
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| Original file line number | Diff line number | Diff line change |
|---|---|---|
| @@ -0,0 +1,166 @@ | ||
| 'use strict'; | ||
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| const fs = require('fs'); | ||
| const path = require('path'); | ||
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| const hooksDir = path.join(__dirname, '../.claude/hooks'); | ||
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| describe('Claude Code command-safety hooks', () => { | ||
| describe('block_dangerous_commands.py — defense-in-depth', () => { | ||
| let content; | ||
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| beforeAll(() => { | ||
| content = fs.readFileSync(path.join(hooksDir, 'block_dangerous_commands.py'), 'utf8'); | ||
| }); | ||
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| test('should have shebang line', () => { | ||
| expect(content.startsWith('#!/usr/bin/env python3')).toBe(true); | ||
| }); | ||
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| test('should define DANGEROUS_PATTERNS list', () => { | ||
| expect(content).toContain('DANGEROUS_PATTERNS'); | ||
| }); | ||
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| test('should block git force push (--force)', () => { | ||
| expect(content).toContain('git\\s+push\\s+[^|&;<>]*--force'); | ||
| }); | ||
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| test('should block git force push (-f)', () => { | ||
| expect(content).toContain('git\\s+push\\s+[^|&;<>]*-f\\b'); | ||
| }); | ||
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| test('should bound force-push wildcard to avoid chained-command false positives', () => { | ||
| // [^|&;<>]* stops at a pipe/redirect/separator so a later -f in a chained | ||
| // command or flattened heredoc body does not trigger a false positive. | ||
| expect(content).not.toContain('git\\s+push\\s+.*-f\\b'); | ||
| }); | ||
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| test('should block git reset --hard', () => { | ||
| expect(content).toContain('git\\s+reset\\s+--hard'); | ||
| }); | ||
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| test('should block rm -rf', () => { | ||
| // Pattern covers rm -rf, rm -fr, rm -r -f combinations | ||
| expect(content).toContain('rm\\s+-rf'); | ||
| }); | ||
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| test('should block docker system prune', () => { | ||
| expect(content).toContain('docker\\s+system\\s+prune'); | ||
| }); | ||
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| test('should block terraform destroy', () => { | ||
| expect(content).toContain('terraform\\s+destroy'); | ||
| }); | ||
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| test('should block kubectl delete deployments', () => { | ||
| expect(content).toContain('kubectl\\s+delete'); | ||
| }); | ||
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| test('should block AWS EC2 terminate', () => { | ||
| expect(content).toContain('aws\\s+ec2\\s+terminate-instances'); | ||
| }); | ||
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| test('should block AWS S3 recursive delete', () => { | ||
| expect(content).toContain('aws\\s+s3\\s+rm\\s+[^|&;<>]*--recursive'); | ||
| }); | ||
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| test('should block gcloud project deletion', () => { | ||
| expect(content).toContain('gcloud\\s+projects\\s+delete'); | ||
| }); | ||
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| test('should block Azure resource group deletion', () => { | ||
| expect(content).toContain('az\\s+group\\s+delete'); | ||
| }); | ||
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| test('should block npm publish', () => { | ||
| expect(content).toContain('npm\\s+publish\\b'); | ||
| }); | ||
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| test('should block SQL DROP statements', () => { | ||
| expect(content).toContain('drop\\s+(database|table|schema'); | ||
| }); | ||
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| test('should block Helm uninstall', () => { | ||
| expect(content).toContain('helm\\s+(uninstall|delete)'); | ||
| }); | ||
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| test('should block Vercel production deploy', () => { | ||
| expect(content).toContain('vercel\\s+--prod\\b'); | ||
| }); | ||
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| test('should bound all flag wildcards to a single command (no greedy \\s+.*)', () => { | ||
| // Flag patterns must use [^|&;<>]* instead of .* so a match cannot reach a | ||
| // flag-like token in a chained command, pipe, redirect or heredoc body | ||
| // (normalize() flattens newlines to spaces). See #794 and follow-up. | ||
| expect(content).not.toContain('\\s+.*'); | ||
| }); | ||
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| test('should strip quoted string content to prevent quoted-separator bypass (Codex P1)', () => { | ||
| // Without this, --name 'a;b' would have ';' treated as a real boundary, | ||
| // allowing docker run --name 'a;b' --privileged ubuntu to bypass the check. | ||
| expect(content).toContain("re.sub(r\"'[^']*'\""); | ||
| expect(content).toContain('re.sub(r\'"[^"]*"\''); | ||
| }); | ||
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Comment on lines
+98
to
+103
There was a problem hiding this comment. This test only validates source text, not hook behavior. Line 98-103 passes even when Suggested behavioral regression test pattern+const { spawnSync } = require('child_process');
+
+function runDangerousHook(command) {
+ const hook = path.join(hooksDir, 'block_dangerous_commands.py');
+ const input = JSON.stringify({ tool_input: { command } });
+ return spawnSync('python3', [hook], { input, encoding: 'utf8' });
+}
+
+test('blocks dangerous command inside quoted -c payload', () => {
+ const res = runDangerousHook('bash -c "rm -rf /tmp/demo"');
+ expect(res.status).toBe(2);
+});
+
+test('does not treat quoted separators as command boundaries', () => {
+ const res = runDangerousHook("docker run --name 'a;b' ubuntu:latest");
+ expect(res.status).toBe(0);
+});As per coding guidelines, 🤖 Prompt for AI Agents |
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| test('should exit 2 when dangerous command detected', () => { | ||
| expect(content).toContain('sys.exit(2)'); | ||
| }); | ||
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| test('should exit 0 for safe commands', () => { | ||
| expect(content).toContain('sys.exit(0)'); | ||
| }); | ||
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| test('should normalize command for matching (lowercase)', () => { | ||
| expect(content).toContain('.lower()'); | ||
| }); | ||
| }); | ||
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| describe('block_inline_secrets.py — inline credential protection', () => { | ||
| let content; | ||
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| beforeAll(() => { | ||
| content = fs.readFileSync(path.join(hooksDir, 'block_inline_secrets.py'), 'utf8'); | ||
| }); | ||
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| test('should have shebang line', () => { | ||
| expect(content.startsWith('#!/usr/bin/env python3')).toBe(true); | ||
| }); | ||
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| test('should define SECRET_PATTERNS list', () => { | ||
| expect(content).toContain('SECRET_PATTERNS'); | ||
| }); | ||
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| test('should detect AWS access key ids (AKIA/ASIA)', () => { | ||
| expect(content).toContain('(AKIA|ASIA)[0-9A-Z]{16}'); | ||
| }); | ||
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| test('should detect GitHub personal access tokens', () => { | ||
| expect(content).toContain('ghp_'); | ||
| }); | ||
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| test('should detect Anthropic API keys', () => { | ||
| expect(content).toContain('sk-ant-'); | ||
| }); | ||
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| test('should detect private key blocks', () => { | ||
| expect(content).toContain('PRIVATE KEY'); | ||
| }); | ||
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| test('should whitelist the public Supabase demo JWT', () => { | ||
| expect(content).toContain('SUPABASE_DEMO_MARKER'); | ||
| }); | ||
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| test('should exit 2 when an inline secret is detected', () => { | ||
| expect(content).toContain('sys.exit(2)'); | ||
| }); | ||
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| test('should exit 0 for commands without inline secrets', () => { | ||
| expect(content).toContain('sys.exit(0)'); | ||
| }); | ||
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| test('should reuse get_command from common', () => { | ||
| expect(content).toContain('from common import'); | ||
| expect(content).toContain('get_command'); | ||
| }); | ||
| }); | ||
| }); | ||
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Quoted-content stripping introduces a dangerous-command bypass.
At Line 25-26, full quoted payloads are removed before matching.
bash -c "rm -rf /"is normalized to essentiallybash -c, so destructive commands inside-care no longer detectable.Suggested fix
As per coding guidelines,
**/*.{js,ts,jsx,tsx,py,java,go,rb,php,json,lock,txt,yaml,yml}must fail on critical security vulnerabilities during Security Code Analysis.🤖 Prompt for AI Agents