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fix(hooks): bound force-push patterns to avoid chained-command false positives #794

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Merged
keito4 merged 1 commit into from
Jun 4, 2026
Merged

fix(hooks): bound force-push patterns to avoid chained-command false positives #794

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9 changes: 6 additions & 3 deletions .claude/hooks/block_dangerous_commands.py
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -21,9 +21,12 @@
# ── Dangerous patterns (regex) ──────────────────────────────────
DANGEROUS_PATTERNS = [
# === Git destructive operations ===
(r"git\s+push\s+.*--force", "git push --force (force push)"),
(r"git\s+push\s+.*-f\b", "git push -f (force push)"),
(r"git\s+push\s+.*--force-with-lease", "git push --force-with-lease"),
# Bound the wildcard to the push invocation's own args: [^|&;<>]* stops at a
# pipe/redirect/separator so a later `-f` in a chained command or a flattened
# heredoc body (newlines collapse to spaces) cannot trigger a false positive.
(r"git\s+push\s+[^|&;<>]*--force", "git push --force (force push)"),
(r"git\s+push\s+[^|&;<>]*-f\b", "git push -f (force push)"),
(r"git\s+push\s+[^|&;<>]*--force-with-lease", "git push --force-with-lease"),
Comment on lines +27 to +29

@chatgpt-codex-connector chatgpt-codex-connector Bot Jun 4, 2026

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P1 Badge Block force pushes with inline redirections

When a redirection appears before the force option in the same simple command, this negated class stops scanning at >/< and misses the later force flag. Bash still treats later words as arguments after a redirection (e.g. f 2>/dev/null --force origin main passes --force), and the hook now exits 0 for git push 2>/dev/null --force origin main, allowing the force-push policy to be bypassed while still executing a real force push.

Useful? React with 👍 / 👎.

(r"git\s+push\s+\S+\s+\+", "git push origin +branch (force push)"),
(r"git\s+clean\s+.*-f", "git clean -f (delete untracked files)"),
(r"git\s+reflog\s+expire", "git reflog expire (destroy recovery data)"),
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10 changes: 8 additions & 2 deletions test/hooks-integrity.test.js
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Expand Up @@ -106,11 +106,17 @@ describe('Claude Code Hooks integrity', () => {
});

test('should block git force push (--force)', () => {
expect(content).toContain('git\\s+push\\s+.*--force');
expect(content).toContain('git\\s+push\\s+[^|&;<>]*--force');
});

test('should block git force push (-f)', () => {
expect(content).toContain('git\\s+push\\s+.*-f\\b');
expect(content).toContain('git\\s+push\\s+[^|&;<>]*-f\\b');
});

test('should bound force-push wildcard to avoid chained-command false positives', () => {
// [^|&;<>]* stops at a pipe/redirect/separator so a later -f in a chained
// command or flattened heredoc body does not trigger a false positive.
expect(content).not.toContain('git\\s+push\\s+.*-f\\b');
});

test('should block git reset --hard', () => {
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