fix: セキュリティ設定を強化（curl/wget deny、機密ファイル保護、危険パーミッション ブロック） - #639
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- curl/wget を allow から deny に移動（プロンプトインジェクション対策） - .env, .pem, .key ファイルへの Read deny ルール追加 - 危険なパーミッション設定（777）を deny ルールと hooks に追加 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughAdds a regex to block Changes
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Actionable comments posted: 3
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
Inline comments:
In @.claude/hooks/block_dangerous_commands.py:
- Around line 32-34: The current rule tuple (r"chmod\s+777\b", "chmod 777
(world-writable permissions)") misses variations like an octal prefix and
intervening flags; update the chmod detection to match optional leading 0 and
any flag/options before the mode (e.g. allow flags like -R or -v anywhere
between "chmod" and the mode), and apply the same improved regex to the deny
list in settings.json so commands such as "chmod 0777 file" and "chmod -R 777
dir" are caught; locate the tuple in .claude/hooks/block_dangerous_commands.py
and the corresponding entry in settings.json and replace the pattern with one
that matches optional "0" before 777 and permits zero or more option tokens
between the command and the mode.
In @.claude/settings.json:
- Around line 146-147: The current Read(./.env) and Read(./.env.*) entries only
block root .env files; update those entries to use recursive glob patterns
(e.g., Read(**/.env) and Read(**/.env.*) or equivalent) so .env files in any
directory (like src/.env, config/.env.local, apps/api/.env) are also
protected—modify the entries in .claude/settings.json where the strings
"Read(./.env)" and "Read(./.env.*)" appear to the globbed forms to match the
existing **/*.pem and **/*.key style.
- Around line 146-150: The devcontainer's Claude settings are missing the deny
rules that block reading credential files; update the devcontainer Claude
settings JSON to include the same deny entries as the main settings by adding
the four deny patterns "Read(./.env)", "Read(./.env.*)", "Read(**/*.pem)", and
"Read(**/*.key)" into the deny list so devcontainer users cannot read those
sensitive files; ensure these exact strings are added to the JSON array where
other deny rules (e.g., "Bash(chmod 777:*)") are defined.
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Configuration used: defaults
Review profile: CHILL
Plan: Pro
Run ID: 9d89a213-f7fa-4b90-ad96-d44a2609b779
📒 Files selected for processing (2)
.claude/hooks/block_dangerous_commands.py.claude/settings.json
| # === chmod dangerous operations === | ||
| (r"chmod\s+777\b", "chmod 777 (world-writable permissions)"), | ||
|
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🧩 Analysis chain
🏁 Script executed:
#!/bin/bash
# Test the regex patterns against various chmod command variations
echo "Testing current pattern:"
echo "chmod 777 file" | grep -P 'chmod\s+777\b' && echo "✓ Matched" || echo "✗ Not matched"
echo "chmod 0777 file" | grep -P 'chmod\s+777\b' && echo "✓ Matched" || echo "✗ Not matched"
echo "chmod -R 777 dir" | grep -P 'chmod\s+777\b' && echo "✓ Matched" || echo "✗ Not matched"
echo "chmod a=rwx file" | grep -P 'chmod\s+777\b' && echo "✓ Matched" || echo "✗ Not matched"
echo ""
echo "Testing improved pattern:"
echo "chmod 777 file" | grep -P 'chmod\s+(-[rwxXstugo,+=-]+\s+)*0?777\b' && echo "✓ Matched" || echo "✗ Not matched"
echo "chmod 0777 file" | grep -P 'chmod\s+(-[rwxXstugo,+=-]+\s+)*0?777\b' && echo "✓ Matched" || echo "✗ Not matched"
echo "chmod -R 777 dir" | grep -P 'chmod\s+(-[rwxXstugo,+=-]+\s+)*0?777\b' && echo "✓ Matched" || echo "✗ Not matched"Repository: keito4/config
Length of output: 240
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cat -n .claude/hooks/block_dangerous_commands.py | head -50Repository: keito4/config
Length of output: 2605
🏁 Script executed:
# Check if there's documentation about how this hook system works
if [ -f "README.md" ]; then head -100 README.md; fi
if [ -f ".claude/README.md" ]; then head -100 .claude/README.md; fi
if [ -f ".claude/hooks/README.md" ]; then cat .claude/hooks/README.md; fiRepository: keito4/config
Length of output: 12151
🏁 Script executed:
# Check the full context of the block_dangerous_commands.py file to understand the hook purpose
wc -l .claude/hooks/block_dangerous_commands.pyRepository: keito4/config
Length of output: 102
chmod 777 pattern can be bypassed with octal prefix or certain flags.
The regex pattern chmod\s+777\b does not catch common variations that produce the same dangerous permissions:
chmod 0777 file(octal prefix)chmod -R 777 dir(some flag placements)
This represents a gap in this defense-in-depth layer, especially given the hook's purpose to catch dangerous patterns in full command strings. The accompanying deny list in settings.json has the same limitation.
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In @.claude/hooks/block_dangerous_commands.py around lines 32 - 34, The current
rule tuple (r"chmod\s+777\b", "chmod 777 (world-writable permissions)") misses
variations like an octal prefix and intervening flags; update the chmod
detection to match optional leading 0 and any flag/options before the mode (e.g.
allow flags like -R or -v anywhere between "chmod" and the mode), and apply the
same improved regex to the deny list in settings.json so commands such as "chmod
0777 file" and "chmod -R 777 dir" are caught; locate the tuple in
.claude/hooks/block_dangerous_commands.py and the corresponding entry in
settings.json and replace the pattern with one that matches optional "0" before
777 and permits zero or more option tokens between the command and the mode.
| "Read(./.env)", | ||
| "Read(./.env.*)", |
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.env read protections limited to repository root directory.
The patterns Read(./.env) and Read(./.env.*) only protect .env files at the repository root. Files like src/.env, config/.env.local, or apps/api/.env would not be blocked.
This is inconsistent with the **/*.pem and **/*.key patterns on lines 148-149, which use glob patterns to protect files in any directory.
🛡️ Proposed fix for consistent glob patterns
- "Read(./.env)",
- "Read(./.env.*)",
+ "Read(**/.env)",
+ "Read(**/.env.*)",🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In @.claude/settings.json around lines 146 - 147, The current Read(./.env) and
Read(./.env.*) entries only block root .env files; update those entries to use
recursive glob patterns (e.g., Read(**/.env) and Read(**/.env.*) or equivalent)
so .env files in any directory (like src/.env, config/.env.local, apps/api/.env)
are also protected—modify the entries in .claude/settings.json where the strings
"Read(./.env)" and "Read(./.env.*)" appear to the globbed forms to match the
existing **/*.pem and **/*.key style.
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| (r"git\s+reset\s+--hard", "git reset --hard (discard all changes)"), | ||
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| # === chmod dangerous operations === | ||
| (r"chmod\s+777\b", "chmod 777 (world-writable permissions)"), |
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The new chmod block only matches commands where 777 is the first argument after chmod, so dangerous forms like chmod -R 777 dir are still allowed. Because this hook is described as defense-in-depth for full command strings, this gap leaves an easy bypass for the exact permission escalation this change is trying to prevent.
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| "Read(./.env)", | ||
| "Read(./.env.*)", |
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The new .env deny entries only cover ./.env and ./.env.* at the current repository root, so secrets stored in common subdirectory files (for example apps/api/.env or packages/web/.env.local) are still readable. This undermines the stated goal of blocking sensitive .env file access and leaves a straightforward exfiltration path in monorepos.
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完全ブロックではなく確認付き実行に変更し、利便性とセキュリティのバランスを改善 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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🎉 This PR is included in version 1.106.6 🎉 The release is available on GitHub release Your semantic-release bot 📦🚀 |
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Summary
curl/wgetを allow から deny に移動し、プロンプトインジェクション経由のデータ外部送信リスクを防止.env,.pem,.keyファイルへの Read deny ルールを追加し、機密ファイルの読み取りをブロックblock_dangerous_commands.pyhooks に追加Test plan
block_dangerous_commands.pyが危険パーミッション設定を検出することを確認🤖 Generated with Claude Code
Summary by CodeRabbit
chmod 777commands.curl,wget, andchmodoperations to require explicit approval rather than being implicitly allowed.