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srojk34 and others added 16 commits July 4, 2026 16:32
…t .env

_is_sensitive_filename() only blocked .env / .env.<suffix>, but the
dashboard Files tab's managed root is operator-configurable and, per the
docker-mount scenario #57505 was filed against, can point directly at
HERMES_HOME — where the canonical credential stores enforced elsewhere
in the codebase (gateway.platforms.base._ROOT_CREDENTIAL_FILES,
agent.file_safety.get_read_block_error) all live: auth.json, OAuth
token stores, webhook HMAC secrets, the Bitwarden disk cache. None of
those basenames were blocked, so the Files tab could still list, read,
and download them. .envrc (direnv) also slipped past the old check
since it doesn't equal ".env" or start with ".env.".

Widen the basename set to mirror both existing guards so the dashboard
doesn't lag behind them.
…anaged-files guard

Follow-up to @srojk34's basename-denylist widening. Two gaps the
basename-only guard left, both covered by the two canonical guards it
mirrors:

- Directory-tree stores mcp-tokens/ (live MCP OAuth tokens) and pairing/
  are denied as whole trees by gateway.platforms.base._ROOT_CREDENTIAL_DIRS
  and agent.file_safety, but the dashboard files API descends into subdirs,
  so mcp-tokens/<server>.json (non-canonical basename) stayed
  listable/readable/downloadable. Add _is_sensitive_path(), a path-aware
  check that blocks any path with a credential-directory component, and
  route all three call sites (list/read/download) through it.
- Add .git-credentials to the basename set (agent.file_safety blocks it too).
- Correct the docstring: it now says it mirrors the credential-FILE basenames
  of the canonical guards, with the directory trees handled by the new
  path-aware helper (the prior wording overstated parity).

Scope stays on the read/list/download exfil surface (#57505); the write
endpoints (upload/mkdir/delete) are a separate threat and out of scope.

Tests: dir-tree descent blocked (mcp-tokens/pairing per-server files),
.git-credentials blocked, plus a positive control that a benign subdir file
stays browsable. Mutation-checked (neuter _is_sensitive_path -> new tests
fail). 39 web_server_files + fs tests pass, ruff clean.
…tial-guard

security(dashboard): widen managed-files credential guard past .env + close dir-tree gap
…deadline helper

Follow-up to @msh01's wall-deadline init-timeout fix.

- Resource leak: on timeout the initialize() task is abandoned without
  awaiting its (shielded, possibly-never-completing) cancellation, so the
  half-built PTB app's httpx client / connection pool was never closed —
  up to 8x across the retry ladder. Add an optional on_abandon cleanup to
  _await_with_thread_deadline that best-effort app.shutdown()s the abandoned
  app, run detached + exception-swallowed so it can never re-block or re-hang
  the ladder (mirrors _close_client_on_timeout in agent/auxiliary_client.py).
- Cover the helper itself: the salvaged test monkeypatched out the real
  _await_with_thread_deadline, so its abandonment/cleanup path was untested.
  Add direct tests for happy-path return, prompt-timeout-with-cleanup, and
  cleanup-error-swallowed; the wedged coroutines swallow cancellation for a
  bounded window (proving the helper returns before cancellation completes,
  the #58236 shielded-scope behavior) without leaving an immortal task that
  would wedge pytest teardown. Widen the salvaged stub to accept on_abandon.
- Attribution: add yingwaizhiying@gmail.com -> msh01 to AUTHOR_MAP (bare
  gmail does not auto-resolve the check-attribution gate).

Known follow-up (not addressed here): the retry ladder reuses the same
self._app across all 8 attempts; a fresh app per attempt would fully close
the coherence risk if an abandoned initialize() completes in the background.
That is a larger restructure of the ~130-line builder+handler setup, left
for a separate change.
…adline

fix(telegram): wall-deadline init timeout + shut down abandoned init app
…t synthesis call

22c5048 restored Anthropic-style cache_control for two of MoA's three
call paths: the acting aggregator (MoAChatCompletions.create, the
persistent `provider: moa` model) and the advisor fan-out (_run_reference).
aggregate_moa_context() -- the /moa <prompt> one-shot command's synthesis
call -- is the third, independent call path and was never covered: its
call_llm(task="moa_aggregator", ...) sent a single undecorated user message
containing the full joined reference output, re-billing the entire input on
every invocation even when the resolved aggregator slot is a cache-honoring
route (Claude on OpenRouter/native Anthropic, MiniMax, Qwen/DashScope).

- Generalize _maybe_apply_advisor_cache_control to
  _maybe_apply_moa_cache_control (it never had advisor-specific logic --
  same policy function, same breakpoint layout as the main loop, judged
  purely on the passed-in runtime) and reuse it in aggregate_moa_context
  the same way _run_reference already does.
- Compute _slot_runtime(aggregator) once and reuse it for both the
  decoration call and the call_llm kwargs, instead of calling it twice.

Mutation-verified: reverting the moa_loop.py change makes the new
regression test fail by asserting a plain string aggregator-message
content where the cache-honoring case expects native cache_control
content blocks.
…urn guard

Replace the inline dict-copy + _db_persisted pop in
_ensure_compressed_has_user_turn with the canonical
_fresh_compaction_message_copy helper (the same primitive the compressor's
own protected-head/tail assembly uses), so the persistence-marker strip
stays consistent across all compaction copy sites (#57491). Expand the
docstring to record the alternation-safety and end-placement rationale.
Contributor of the salvaged PR #58276 fix commit. Required so the
contributor attribution CI check passes on the rebase-merge that
preserves their authorship.
…58327)

Strict providers (DeepSeek) reject a payload where the same tool_call_id
appears more than once with HTTP 400 'Duplicate value for tool_call_id'.
The issue was filed as an 'orphaned tool message' compression bug, but the
pasted error is a DUPLICATE tool_call_id — orphans are already handled on
main; duplicates were not. Reproduced live on main: both shapes leaked
through repair_message_sequence and sanitize_api_messages.

Two chokepoints, two shapes:
- repair_message_sequence: consume the id from known_tool_ids on first
  match so a SECOND tool result reusing it falls into the drop branch
  (duplicate tool-result shape). This is @Robinlovelace's kernel from
  #55436 (applied manually — that PR was ~800 commits stale and bundled
  an unrelated duplicate-DB-write change for #860, which is dropped here).
- sanitize_api_messages (final pre-API pass): add a dedup pass covering
  BOTH (a) duplicate tool_calls sharing an id WITHIN one assistant message
  (the message[6] shape) and (b) later tool result messages reusing an
  already-seen id. #55436 covered neither of these at this chokepoint.

Tests: duplicate-tool-result dedup at both functions, duplicate-assistant-
tool_call-id collapse, and a negative control proving distinct ids are
never dropped (no over-dedup).

Credit: @Robinlovelace (#55436) for the repair_message_sequence dedup kernel.
Closes #58327.
…T reconnect hang

When the TCP connection enters CLOSE-WAIT the PTB polling task is blocked
on epoll on a dead socket and never wakes.  updater.stop() awaits that task
and therefore hangs indefinitely.

Consequence: _polling_error_task stays alive-but-blocked forever; every
subsequent heartbeat probe sees it as "in-flight" and skips triggering a
new reconnect; the gateway silently drops messages for hours until a manual
restart.  Field incident: 11-hour outage on 2026-07-04 UTC despite the
heartbeat loop firing a reconnect at 01:11 — stop() blocked the entire
ladder.

Fix: wrap the updater.stop() call inside asyncio.wait_for(timeout=15).
On TimeoutError log a warning and continue to _drain_polling_connections()
+ start_polling() — same recovery path, just unblocked.

The heartbeat loop (PR #48496) correctly detects the dead socket and fires
_handle_polling_network_error.  This commit is the missing second half:
ensuring the reconnect itself always completes.

Test: test_handle_polling_network_error_updater_stop_timeout() simulates
a hang by making stop() sleep forever and verifies that drain + start_polling
are still reached after the timeout.

Fixes #58270
… CLOSE-WAIT timeout

The salvaged fix (#58272) guarded the primary network-error reconnect path.
Issue #58270's Scope section names three more unguarded await updater.stop()
sites that can hang identically on a CLOSE-WAIT socket:

- conflict handler (before the retry back-off sleep)
- conflict-retries-exhausted teardown (before the fatal notify)
- disconnect() teardown (would hang gateway shutdown/restart)

Each is now wrapped in asyncio.wait_for(..., _UPDATER_STOP_TIMEOUT) with a
warning on timeout, matching the primary path, so no reconnect/teardown ladder
can wedge on a dead socket.

Also hoist the shared 15.0s bound to a single module constant
_UPDATER_STOP_TIMEOUT (self-documenting + DRY across all 4 sites), and update
the CLOSE-WAIT regression test to patch that constant instead of monkeypatching
asyncio.wait_for process-wide.

Fatal-notify idempotency: bounding the conflict-exhausted teardown stop() adds
an await AFTER _set_fatal_error, which yields the loop and lets a concurrent
retry task (scheduled by an earlier conflict, already suspended past the entry
guard) reach the fatal branch too — double-firing the fatal handler (surfaced
as a Python 3.11 CI failure in test_polling_conflict_becomes_fatal_after_retries).
Snapshot the pre-transition fatal state and only notify on the first transition.
The conflict-retry ladder schedules a background recovery task via
loop.create_task(self._handle_polling_conflict(...)) on each failed
start_polling. test_polling_conflict_becomes_fatal_after_retries never
cancelled the last one, so under a loaded scheduler a leaked task could
get a turn, re-drive the counter into the fatal branch, and fire
_notify_fatal_error a second time — breaking assert_awaited_once()
non-deterministically. The bounded updater.stop() guard added in this
salvage introduced an extra await/scheduling yield that surfaced the
latent leak in CI slice 3. Cancel the leaked task before the fatal
assertions so the test is deterministic regardless of scheduler timing.
fix(agent): deduplicate tool_call_id across pre-API sanitizers (#58327)
@pull pull Bot locked and limited conversation to collaborators Jul 4, 2026
@pull pull Bot added the ⤵️ pull label Jul 4, 2026
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pull Bot merged commit 7203898 into jw5812018:main Jul 4, 2026
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5 participants