Added support for RSASSA-PSS algorithms (PS256, PS384, PS512) #132
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Oh snap, this is great! As far as I know none of the other libraries do implement these. |
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Most of the thanks goes to |
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Added support for RSASSA-PSS algorithms (PS256, PS384, PS512)
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Added support for RSASSA-PSS algorithms (PS256, PS384, PS512)
The JWT spec also mentions optional support for RSASSA-PSS using and MGF1. This is superior to PKCS #1 v1.5 (RS256, RS384, RS512) because it essentially uses a salt to randomize the padding instead of using a completely deterministic algorithm. No good attacks against PKCS #1 v1.5 padding currently exist, but PSS is recommended in new applications since it makes the signature even more random.
More info here: http://www.emc.com/emc-plus/rsa-labs/historical/raising-standard-rsa-signatures-rsa-pss.htm
Also added a test to cover our only uncovered line in
jwt.api