feat: Fetch Slack thread history for agent context by jarvisxyz · Pull Request #3 · jarvisxyz/hermes-agent

jarvisxyz · 2026-04-06T17:34:29Z

Changes:

Adds _fetch_thread_history(): Fetches thread messages via Slack's conversations.replies API
Adds _format_thread_context(): Formats history as readable context block
Caches thread history (60s TTL) to avoid repeated API calls
Configurable via gateway.slack.include_thread_context (default: true)
Thread context is prepended to user messages before agent processing

Problem it solves:
Hermes agents couldn't see prior messages in Slack threads, forcing users to paste context manually or lose continuity. This matches behavior of systems like OpenClaw.

Testing:

Verified with local gateway
Thread context is correctly injected and formatted

@jarvis

…#1) When a user replies in a Slack thread where the bot has an active conversation session, the bot now processes the message even without an explicit @mention. This improves UX for ongoing threaded discussions. Changes: - Added set_session_store() to BasePlatformAdapter for adapters to check active sessions - Modified SlackAdapter to detect thread replies and check if a session exists for that thread before requiring @mentions - Updated GatewayRunner to inject the session store into adapters - Added comprehensive tests for the new behavior Fixes: Thread replies without @jarvis are now processed if there is an active session, matching user expectations for conversation flow Co-authored-by: eizus <hello@cdr.xyz>

The edit_message method was sending raw content directly to Slack's chat_update API without converting standard markdown to Slack's mrkdwn format. This caused broken formatting and malformed URLs (e.g., trailing ** from bold syntax became part of clickable links → 404 errors). The send() method already calls format_message() to handle this conversion, but edit_message() was bypassing it. This change ensures edited messages receive the same markdown → mrkdwn transformation as new messages. Closes: PR NousResearch#5558 formatting issue where links had trailing markdown syntax. Co-authored-by: eizus <hello@cdr.xyz>

… $299) - Replace 4-tier structure (Free/Writer/Pro/Agency) with 3-tier - Basic: $1/mo = 1 site, 10 quotes, 1 social - Starter: $10/mo = 3 sites, 1k quotes, 10 social - Agency: $299/mo = 100 sites, 100k quotes, 500 social - Update blog post pricing section - Adjust grid layout from 4 to 3 columns

Adds thread context injection to Slack messages: - _fetch_thread_history(): Fetches thread messages via Slack API - _format_thread_context(): Formats history as readable context block - Caches thread history (60s TTL) to avoid repeated API calls - Configurable via gateway.slack.include_thread_context (default: true) - Thread context is prepended to user messages before agent processing Enables agents to see full conversation history in Slack threads, matching behavior of systems like OpenClaw.

…lls/ - Rename skill to touchdesigner-mcp (matches blender-mcp convention) - Move from skills/creative/ to optional-skills/creative/ - Fix duplicate pitfall numbering (#3 appeared twice) - Update SKILL.md cross-references for renumbered pitfalls - Update setup.sh path for new directory location

- memory_setup.py: use shlex.split() for plugin dep checks instead of shell=True - transcription_tools.py: avoid shell=True for auto-detected whisper commands (user-provided templates via env var still use shell=True for compatibility) - cli.py: add comment clarifying intentional shell=True for user quick_commands - Add test verifying auto-detected template is shlex-safe Addresses CONTRIBUTING.md Priority #3 (Security hardening — shell injection).

…rch#25071) * tui: make URLs clickable + hover-highlight in any terminal Problem ------- URLs printed by `hermes --tui` were not clickable in basic macOS Terminal.app. Cmd+click did nothing, the cursor didn't change shape — like nothing was detected — even though arrow buttons and other Box onClick handlers worked fine. Root cause ---------- Two layers of dead plumbing: 1. `<Link>` only emitted the underlying `<ink-link>` (which carries the hyperlink metadata into the screen buffer) when `supportsHyperlinks()` said yes. On Apple_Terminal that's false, so the per-cell hyperlink field stayed empty, so `Ink.getHyperlinkAt()` had nothing to return on click. The visible underline was just decorative. 2. `Ink.openHyperlink()` calls `this.onHyperlinkClick?.(url)`, but `onHyperlinkClick` was never assigned anywhere in the codebase. The click pipeline (`App.tsx → onOpenHyperlink → Ink.openHyperlink`) ran but bailed silently on the optional chain. Bonus discovery: even when wired up, there was no hover affordance — terminal apps can't change the system mouse cursor, so users had no visual signal that a cell was clickable. Arrow buttons in the chrome worked because they had explicit `<Box onClick>` styling; inline link URLs didn't. Fix --- - `Link.tsx`: always emit `<ink-link>` regardless of terminal capability. The renderer's `wrapWithOsc8Link` already gates the actual OSC 8 escape on `supportsHyperlinks()` further down — so terminals that don't understand OSC 8 still don't see the escape, but the screen-buffer metadata (which the click dispatcher reads) is now populated everywhere. - `ink.tsx + root.ts`: add `onHyperlinkClick?: (url: string) => void` to `Options` / `RenderOptions`, wire it to the existing `Ink.onHyperlinkClick` field in the constructor. - `src/lib/openExternalUrl.ts`: small platform-aware opener using `child_process.spawn` with arg-array (no shell) — http(s) only, rejects `file:`, `javascript:`, `data:`, etc., so a hostile model can't trigger arbitrary local handlers via `<Link url="file:///...">`. Detached + stdio ignore so closing the TUI doesn't kill the browser and Chrome stderr doesn't leak into the alt screen. - `entry.tsx`: pass `onHyperlinkClick: openExternalUrl` to `ink.render`. - `hyperlinkHover.ts` + Ink hover wiring: track the URL under the pointer in `Ink.hoveredHyperlink`, update it from `dispatchHover`, and inverse- highlight every cell of the matching link in the render-pass overlay (same pattern as `applySearchHighlight`). This is the cursor-hover affordance for clickable links — terminals don't expose cursor shape, so we light up the link itself. - `types/hermes-ink.d.ts`: add `onHyperlinkClick` to the `RenderOptions` shim so consumers (`entry.tsx`) type-check against the new option. Tests ----- - `src/lib/openExternalUrl.test.ts` (15 cases): http(s) accepted; file/js/ data/mailto/ftp/ssh rejected; macOS open(1), Windows cmd.exe start with empty title slot, Linux xdg-open dispatch; shell-metacharacter URLs pass through unmolested as a single argv element; synchronous spawn failure returns false. Verified empirically in Apple Terminal 455.1 (macOS 15.7.3): clicking a URL opens in default browser, hovering inverts the link cells, and moving away clears the highlight. Full TUI suite: 713 passing, 0 type errors. Reverts ------- The earlier attempt that version-gated Apple_Terminal in `supports-hyperlinks.ts` was based on a wrong assumption — Terminal.app silently strips OSC 8 sequences but does not render them as clickable hyperlinks. Reverted to the original allowlist. * tui: address Copilot review — explorer.exe on win32 + comment fixes - openExternalUrl: switch win32 from `cmd.exe /c start` to `explorer.exe`. cmd.exe's `start` builtin reparses the URL through cmd's tokenizer, so `&`, `|`, `^`, `<`, `>` either split the command or get reinterpreted — breaking both the protocol-allowlist safety story AND plain http(s) URLs with `&` in query strings. `explorer.exe <url>` invokes the registered protocol handler directly with no shell. - openExternalUrl.test.ts: rename the win32 test to reflect the new contract and add two regression tests — one with `&|^<>` metachars, one with the common analytics-URL `&` query-param pattern — both pinned to single-argv-element delivery via explorer.exe. - Link.tsx: fix misleading comment. OSC 8 escapes are emitted unconditionally by the renderer (`wrapWithOsc8Link` in render-node-to-output.ts, `oscLink` in log-update.ts). Non-supporting terminals silently strip the sequence, which is why hover/click affordance has to come from the in-process overlay rather than the terminal's own link rendering. Verified: 715/715 tests pass, type-check + build clean. * tui: address Copilot review #2 — async spawn errors + hover scope + docs 1. openExternalUrl: attach a no-op `'error'` listener on the spawned child BEFORE unref(). spawn() returns a ChildProcess synchronously even when the binary is missing (ENOENT on xdg-open / explorer.exe), unreachable, or otherwise unusable; the failure surfaces later as an 'error' event. An unhandled 'error' on an EventEmitter crashes Node, which would tear down the whole TUI. The listener is a deliberate no-op — we already returned `true` synchronously and the user just doesn't see the browser pop. 2. openExternalUrl.test.ts: add a regression test using a real EventEmitter to simulate the async-error path. Pins both the listener-attached contract and the "doesn't throw on emit" behavior. Was 17/17, now 18/18. 3. ink.tsx dispatchHover: bypass `getHyperlinkAt()` and read `cellAt(...).hyperlink` directly. `getHyperlinkAt` falls back to `findPlainTextUrlAt` for cells without an OSC 8 hyperlink, but the render-pass overlay (`applyHyperlinkHoverHighlight`) only matches on `cell.hyperlink === hoveredUrl` — so plain-text URLs would burn re-renders without ever producing the highlight. Hover is now a strictly 1:1 fit for what the overlay can paint. Plain-text URLs still get the click action via the existing dispatch path. 4. root.ts + ink.tsx doc comments: replace the misleading "typically `open` / `xdg-open` / `start` shell" wording with the actual safe recipe — argv-array spawn into `open` / `xdg-open` / `explorer.exe`, with an explicit warning that `cmd.exe /c start` reparses the URL through cmd's tokenizer and is unsafe + breaks `&`-query URLs. Verified: 716/716 tests pass, type-check + build clean. * tui: address Copilot review #3 — hover damage, alt-screen cleanup, opener allowlist 1. ink.tsx onRender: stop folding steady-state hover into hlActive. hlActive forces a full-screen damage diff so previous-frame inverted cells get re-emitted when the highlight set changes. The transition IS the trigger — enter / leave / change-to-other-link. While the pointer just sits on a link the painted cells don't change and the per-cell diff handles the no-op. Folding the steady state in would burn a full-screen diff on every frame. Added a lastRenderedHoveredHyperlink tracker and gate the hlActive bump on `hovered !== lastRendered`. 2. ink.tsx setAltScreenActive: clear hoveredHyperlink (and the tracker) when toggling alt-screen state. Hover dispatch is alt-screen-gated, so once we leave there's no path to clear it. Without this, remounting <AlternateScreen> would paint a phantom hover from the previous session until the next mouse-move arrived. 3. openExternalUrl.ts openCommand: allowlist linux + the BSD family for xdg-open and return null for everything else (aix, sunos, cygwin, haiku, etc.). Previously the default-fallback always returned xdg-open, which made the caller's `if (!command) return false` dead and yielded a misleading `true` on platforms that probably don't have xdg-open. New tests cover the null path AND the openExternalUrl-returns-false-without-spawning behavior. Verified: 718/718 tests pass, type-check + build clean. * tui: address Copilot review #4 — doc comment accuracy 1. openExternalUrl return-value doc: now lists all three false paths (URL rejected / no opener for platform / synchronous spawn throw) plus a note that async 'error' events still return true because the spawn was attempted. 2. ink.tsx onHyperlinkClick field doc: clarifies the callback receives either an OSC 8 hyperlink OR a plain-text URL detected by findPlainTextUrlAt — App.tsx routes both into the same callback. 3. hyperlinkHover applyHyperlinkHoverHighlight doc: drops the misleading 'caller forces full-frame damage' promise. Caller decides; for hover the current caller only forces full damage on transitions. No behavior change. 718/718 tests pass. * tui: address Copilot review #5 — lint fixes 1. ink.tsx: reorder `./hyperlinkHover.js` import before `./screen.js` to satisfy perfectionist/sort-imports. 2. Link.tsx: drop unused `fallback` parameter destructuring + the trailing `void (null as ...)` dead-statement (would trip no-unused-expressions). Kept `fallback?: ReactNode` on the Props interface as a documented compat shim so existing call sites still compile, with a comment explaining why it's no longer wired up. 3. openExternalUrl.test.ts: replace `typeof import('node:child_process').spawn` inline annotations (forbidden by @typescript-eslint/consistent-type-imports) with a `SpawnLike` type alias backed by a real `import type { spawn as SpawnFn }`. No behavior change. 718/718 tests pass, type-check clean, lint clean on all modified files.

Three issues flagged by the Copilot review on this PR: 1. Double JSON emit on stage failure (Copilot #1, #2). When -Stage <name> ran a worker that threw, Invoke-Stage's finally emitted a JSON result frame AND the entry-point catch emitted a second error frame -- producing two concatenated JSON objects on stdout and breaking the one-line-per-invocation contract that drivers parse against. Same issue applied to -Json mode on a full install (every stage's finally plus a final error frame missing duration_ms/skipped). Fix: Invoke-Stage's finally now sets $script:_StageEmittedErrorFrame when it emits a failure frame; the entry-point catch checks the flag and skips its own emit, still exit 1. 2. $prevEAP uninitialized on early try-block throw (Copilot #3). In Install-Uv, Test-Python, Test-Node's winget fallback, _Run-NpmInstall, and the playwright block, '$prevEAP = $ErrorActionPreference' lived as the first statement INSIDE the try. If anything between 'try {' and that line threw (Write-Info on an unusual host, the npx-finding loop, etc.), the catch's 'if ($prevEAP) { ... }' restore was a no-op and EAP could remain relaxed. Fix: hoist '$prevEAP = $ErrorActionPreference' to the line immediately before 'try {' in all five sites. Catch's restore is now always meaningful regardless of where in the try the throw originated. No change to Invoke-Stage's success path or to the four lint-clean EAP sites (Test-Node was the only winget-related catch). All 19 metadata smoke tests still pass.

@iamfoz

…ogging The system prompt's 'Conversation started:' line carried minute precision (%I:%M %p), making it byte-unstable across every rebuild path. Within a CLI session the in-memory cache held, but on the gateway path (fresh AIAgent per turn → restore from session DB), any silent failure in the read or write path dropped the cache stem and forced a full re-prefill on every subsequent turn. Local prefix-caching backends (llama.cpp / vLLM) saw this as KV-cache invalidation; remote prefix-caching providers saw it as an Anthropic-style cache miss. Three changes: 1. Date-only timestamp ('Sunday, May 17, 2026' instead of '... 03:42 PM'). System prompt now byte-stable for the full day. The model can still query exact time via tools when it actually needs it. Credit: @iamfoz (PR NousResearch#20451). 2. Loud logging on session DB write failures. The update_system_prompt call used to log at DEBUG, hiding disk-full / locked-database / schema drift behind a silent fall-through that forced fresh rebuilds on every subsequent turn. Now WARN with the session id and exception so persistent issues show up in agent.log without verbose mode. 3. Three-way stored-state distinction on read. The previous 'session_row.get("system_prompt") or None' collapsed three states into one (missing row / null column / empty string). Now we tell them apart and WARN when a continuing session lands on null/empty (which means the previous turn's write never persisted — every subsequent turn rebuilds and the prefix cache misses every time). The restore block is extracted into _restore_or_build_system_prompt() so the prefix-cache path can be unit-tested in isolation. E2E proof: fresh AIAgent constructed for turn 2 across a minute-boundary sleep restores byte-identical bytes from the session DB. NULL stored prompt fires the new warning. Date-only timestamp survives the rebuild path. All on real SessionDB, no mocks. Tests: - tests/agent/test_system_prompt_restore.py (10 new tests) - tests/run_agent/test_run_agent.py::TestBuildSystemPrompt:: test_datetime_is_date_only_not_minute_precision Closes NousResearch#20451 (date-only), NousResearch#18547 (prefix stabilization), NousResearch#8689 (stabilize timestamp across compression), NousResearch#15866 (timestamp caching question), NousResearch#8687 (compression timestamp), NousResearch#27339 (claim #3: live timestamp in cached system prompt). Co-authored-by: Martyn Forryan <9133432+iamfoz@users.noreply.github.com>

@hayka-pacha

…y prefixed Companion to the NousResearchGH-25255 incoming-strip fix from @hayka-pacha. Without this, build_anthropic_kwargs unconditionally added 'mcp_' to every tool name in step 3, so a native MCP server tool registered as 'mcp_composio_X' was sent as 'mcp_mcp_composio_X' on the wire. The incoming strip only removes ONE prefix, which still worked on first call, but on subsequent calls the model pattern-matched the single-prefixed form from message history and produced names that stripped to 'composio_X' — registry miss, dispatch fail. The history-rewrite block (#4) already has this guard. Apply the same guard to the schema-rewrite block (#3) so round-trip is symmetric. Added 4 outgoing-side tests. Existing 7 incoming-side tests still pass. Author map: hayka-pacha added for PR NousResearch#25270 salvage attribution. Refs NousResearchGH-25255.

… OAuth gates Two parallel public-path allowlists drifted: _PUBLIC_API_PATHS in hermes_cli/web_server.py (legacy _SESSION_TOKEN middleware) and _GATE_PUBLIC_PREFIXES in hermes_cli/dashboard_auth/middleware.py (OAuth gate). The legacy list included /api/status (documented as a non-sensitive read-only liveness target); the OAuth gate's list did not. Effect: every wildcard-subdomain agent surfaced as STARTING/down to the portal even though the dashboard was serving correctly. Nous account service (src/server/agents/fly-provider.ts getInstanceRuntimeStatus) fetches ``/api/status`` without a cookie as its sole liveness probe; the OAuth gate's 401 looked identical to 'agent dead' on the portal side. Fix: lift the allowlist into hermes_cli/dashboard_auth/public_paths.py and have both middlewares import it. _path_is_public now consults the shared frozenset first, then falls back to the gate's auth-bootstrap/static prefix list. Future additions to the public list hit both gates automatically. Endpoint inventory (verified safe to remain public): * /api/status — version, gateway state, active session count, auth-gate shape. Portal liveness probe target. * /api/config/defaults — config-defaults feed for the SPA's Config page * /api/config/schema — config schema for the SPA's Config page * /api/model/info — model catalogue metadata (context windows) * /api/dashboard/themes — theme manifests for the skin engine * /api/dashboard/plugins — plugin manifests for the dashboard No user data, no session content, no secrets. Same shape an external monitoring agent would hit on /healthz. Tests: * New: test_gated_status_is_public (regression guard with the NAS fly-provider.ts liveness-probe rationale spelled out in the docstring) * New: test_other_public_api_paths_are_public_under_gate (parametrised over the rest of PUBLIC_API_PATHS — proves 401 / 302-to-login is never the response) * New: docker integration check #3 in test_dashboard_oauth_gate_engaged_by_default — /api/status remains 200 under the gate AND reports auth_required=True so the portal can distinguish modes * Updated: test_full_login_round_trip_unlocks_gated_api now probes /api/sessions instead of /api/status (status is public, so it can no longer distinguish 'logged in' from 'gate accidentally disabled') * Updated: TestApi401Envelope (the no-cookie / invalid-cookie / dead-cookie tests) probes /api/sessions for the same reason * Updated: docker integration check #2 in test_dashboard_oauth_gate_engaged_by_default probes /api/sessions to prove the gate is intercepting * Removed: dead _login() helper in test_dashboard_auth_status_endpoint.py (no longer needed since /api/status is reachable cold) Companion to docs/handover/hermes-agent-dashboard-s6-insecure-fix.md (the --insecure flag fix that shipped earlier).

…hain probe (NousResearch#34340) * fix(codex): surface error code in Responses 'failed' status errors When a Codex Responses turn ends with status=failed, the response carries the failure details under `response.error` as `{code, message, param, ...}`. The previous extractor pulled only `message`, so users seeing a rate-limit failure got a bare "Slow down" string indistinguishable from a generic stream truncation; an internal_error with empty message degraded to a dict dump ("{'code': 'internal_error', 'message': ''}"). Extract a `_format_responses_error()` helper that: - prefixes `code` when both code and message are present (e.g. 'rate_limit_exceeded: Slow down') - falls back to the bare `code` when message is empty - accepts both dict and attribute-style payloads (SDK and JSON-RPC paths) - preserves the prior status-only fallback when no error payload exists Apply the same helper at the sibling site in `codex_app_server_session.run_turn()` so codex-CLI subprocess turn failures get the same treatment. Tests: - 8 new unit tests for `_format_responses_error` covering both shapes, empty/missing fields, non-string fields, and the status-only fallback. - 2 regression tests on `_normalize_codex_response` for failed status with and without a code, asserting the exact RuntimeError message. - All 3603 tests in tests/agent/ pass. Adapted from anomalyco/opencode#28757. * feat(prompt): universal task-completion guidance + local Python toolchain probe Two cross-model failure modes get a single-line answer in the cached system prompt. Both gated by config (default on), both add zero overhead when not needed, both verified via real AIAgent prompt builds. ## What changed `TASK_COMPLETION_GUIDANCE` — short prompt block applied to ALL models. Targets two failure modes observed on a real Sarasota real-estate build task: (1) Opus stopped after writing an 85-byte stub and gave a prose response with finish_reason=stop on call #3 of 90; (2) DeepSeek pushed through a PEP-668 wall, then returned fabricated listings instead of admitting the blocker. Both behaviors are model-family-agnostic, so the guidance lives outside the existing tool_use_enforcement gate (~192 tokens, paid once per session via prefix cache). `tools/env_probe.py` — local Python toolchain probe. Detects python3/pip/uv/PEP-668 state and emits ONE short line in the system prompt when something is non-default. Emits NOTHING when the env is clean (zero token cost for normal users). Skipped entirely for remote terminal backends (docker/modal/ssh) — they have their own probe. Example output on a broken environment (the actual case): Python toolchain: python3=3.11.15 (no pip module), python=missing (use python3), pip→python3.12 (mismatch), PEP 668=yes (use venv or uv). ## Config Both flags live under `agent.` in config.yaml, default True: agent: task_completion_guidance: true # universal "finish the job" block environment_probe: true # local Python toolchain hints Neither addition required a `_config_version` bump — deep-merge fills defaults in for existing user configs. ## Validation | Test surface | Result | |---|---| | tests/tools/test_env_probe.py | 10/10 pass (probe unit) | | tests/run_agent/test_run_agent.py — new classes | 8/8 pass (integration) | | TestToolUseEnforcementConfig | 17/17 pass (no regression) | | TestBuildSystemPrompt | 9/9 pass (no regression) | | TestInvalidateSystemPrompt | 2/2 pass (no regression) | | tests/agent/test_prompt_builder.py | 124/124 pass (no regression) | | tests/hermes_cli/ | 5662/5662 pass (config defaults) | | E2E AIAgent build (broken env) | Both blocks present, 2,178 chars | | E2E AIAgent build (clean env) | 771-char net overhead, env probe silent |

A bare `/resume` printed the recent-sessions list but armed no selection state, so typing just `3` on the next line was sent to the agent as chat instead of resuming session #3. `/resume 3` worked, but the natural list-then-pick flow did not. Arm a one-shot pending-resume prompt when bare `/resume` shows the list, and consume the next bare numeric input as the selection (out-of-range is reported, non-numeric/other commands disarm it). Resolves against the same _list_recent_sessions(limit=10) list used everywhere else. Closes NousResearch#34584.

…NousResearch#34192) (NousResearch#34382) NousResearch#34192 reports Hostinger's 'Hermes WebUI' catalog crashes on startup with: /usr/bin/tini: No such file or directory The image moved from tini to s6-overlay as PID 1 (/init) earlier in 2026. Orchestration templates that still pin /usr/bin/tini as the entrypoint \u2014 like the Hostinger Hermes WebUI catalog \u2014 have no binary to exec and the container crashes immediately. Hermes has no control over the Hostinger catalog template, but we can make the image backward-compatible by symlinking /usr/bin/tini -> /init during the s6-overlay install step. External wrappers that exec /usr/bin/tini will land on the same s6-overlay reaper they would have landed on if they'd used the canonical /init entrypoint. The image's own ENTRYPOINT continues to be /init verbatim \u2014 the shim is purely for legacy external wrappers, not for the image's own runtime path. Once affected catalogs are updated, the symlink can be removed. Other issues NousResearch#34192 raises that are NOT addressed by this PR: * Problem #2 (UID 1024 vs 10000 mismatch): already fixed by NousResearch#33148 (S6_KEEP_ENV=1) and NousResearch#32412 (with-contenv shebangs). The Hostinger template likely needs to update its env-var propagation. * Problem #3 (incompatible session formats): RFC for pluggable SessionDB is tracked in NousResearch#23717. * Problem #4 (Telegram polling conflict): an operations problem on Hostinger's side, not in this codebase. This PR is scoped to the one issue that can be fixed inside Dockerfile: the missing /usr/bin/tini binary. Tests (3 in test_dockerfile_tini_compat_shim.py): - test_tini_compat_symlink_present Guard: the symlink line must exist in Dockerfile. - test_tini_compat_comment_explains_why The NousResearch#34192 anchor comment must be present so future readers know why the shim is there (avoid accidental removal). - test_entrypoint_still_init_not_tini Sanity check: ENTRYPOINT remains /init (s6-overlay). The shim is only for external wrappers. Refs: NousResearch#34192 Partial fix: addresses the immediate tini-binary crash. Catalog-side fixes still needed by Hostinger for the UID and session-format problems documented in the issue. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>

Blocking #1 — gateway-connecting-overlay.tsx reduced-motion regression: the top `if (reduce) setPhase('gone')` fired unconditionally on mount whenever reduce-motion was on, so every OS reduced-motion user lost the CONNECTING overlay during cold boot entirely (jumped to 'gone' before the gateway was even open). The intent was to skip the exit *choreography*, not to skip showing the overlay. Removed the unconditional top block and the redundant nested preview block; kept only the third branch (`gatewayState === 'open' && shownRef.current` → `reduce ? 'gone' : 'text-out'`) which correctly gates the short-circuit on connect. Also fixed `if(reduce)` missing-space, 6-space misindent, and the same 3-line comment pasted three times. Nit #1 — tsconfig excludes e2e, so specs were never typechecked in CI. Added tsconfig.e2e.json (extends base, includes e2e/ + playwright.config.ts, adds @playwright/test types) and wired it into the typecheck script. This surfaced three latent type errors that are fixed in the same commit: - fix-electron-tracing.ts: `app._context` and `electron._playwright` are private APIs — added `as any` on the access before the existing cast. - playwright.config.ts: `reducedMotion: 'reduce'` directly under `use:` is not a valid UseOptions property in playwright 1.58; it's a BrowserContextOption accessed via `contextOptions: { reducedMotion: 'reduce' }`. The old form was silently ignored at runtime, so reduced-motion emulation wasn't actually active — screenshots could catch overlays mid-fade (exactly what the comment warned about). Nit #2 — fix-electron-tracing.ts reaches into Playwright internals (_playwright, _allContexts, _context) with no public contract. Added a header comment calling out the `@playwright/test` exact pin (=1.58.2) so a future bump knows to re-verify the private symbols still exist. Nit #3 — main.ts TEST_WORKER_INDEX block had stray 6-space indentation. Verified: tsc -p . && tsconfig.electron && tsconfig.e2e → 0 errors; vitest boot-failure-overlay (3/3) + boot-failure-reauth (21/21) pass; npm run build clean; playwright e2e/boot-failure.spec.ts 2/2 pass.

…d curator The skill-authoring guide and curator prompt both reference descriptions as the primary discovery mechanism but never mentioned the 57-char system prompt truncation. Add explicit guidance: - Authoring guide: frontmatter docs, template comment, size limits, pitfall #3 with good/bad examples, verification checklist - Curator prompt: parenthetical noting the 57-char window when writing umbrella skill descriptions

… (re-review #3) The last_activity_at/description/provenance columns already live in SCHEMA_SQL and the column reconciler; existing DBs heal via the reconciler, but the version stamp must advance so downgrade/upgrade tooling sees the new layout. No version-literal test assertions exist (tests compare against the imported constant).

…age_id) Live-canary finding #3 (Alice, staging): the relay inbound leg is at-least-once. On WS re-handshake the connector replays its durable per-instance buffer; a long multi-tool turn (60-100s) straddling a quiet socket drop got its ORIGINAL inbound replayed after the turn finished, re-running the entire turn — the user saw the final answer posted 2-5x (each a separate execution, hence slightly different texts). Receipts: same msg text at history=0 in back-to-back sessions 121647/121840, no Slack-side retry on the connector (envelope dedupe never fired). Consumer-side idempotency: bounded FIFO seen-set (512) keyed by platform message identity; events without a message_id never dedupe (fail-open — dropping a real message is worse than rerunning one). No wire change; contract v1 untouched. Transplanted-from: victor-fork/feat/relay-slack-live-cards@73ce04ae75 (extracted for the rc.4 relay-fixes train; tests moved to a standalone file with no live-cards dependencies)

…s (P5) (NousResearch#99220) * fix(relay): authorize send_message targets and surface egress declines P5 of the relay egress-authorization workstream. The relay path authenticated the SENDER but never authorized the DESTINATION, and the gateway compounded it from both ends. (a) send_message could silently name an arbitrary relay target. Its `target` parameter is free-form ('platform:chat_id'), so a model could name ANY chat id and the gateway would emit an outbound frame for it. gateway/relay/egress.py adds an attestation floor: a relay-routed destination must have a provenance this gateway can show -- the operator's home channel, the channel directory, or its own gateway session origins. Anything else is refused HERE, with a visible tool error naming the target, before a frame is written. Non-relay platforms and platforms served by a live native adapter in this process are untouched (same precedence resolve_delivery_transport applies). (b) Connector declines were swallowed into apparent successes. The connector's egress floor answers an unauthorized destination with a DEFINITE failure whose text is deliberately uniform (F-005). Several relay lanes degrade a *transport drop* by design and were degrading an *authorization refusal* the same way: - _send_media returned None, sending the caller into BasePlatformAdapter's text fallback -- a DIFFERENT op re-addressed at the very chat the connector had just refused. - _send_prompt returned None, so exec-approval / slash-confirm / clarify reported "relay prompt op unavailable" (a wrong reason) and ran their numbered-text fallbacks into the refused chat. - task_card_stop discarded the error entirely. - typing / delete / react / thread ops degraded silently at debug. is_egress_decline() classifies THAT a decline happened (never why -- the uniform text is not parsed for reasons) and requires a definite, non-ambiguous failure, so a lost-ack retry is still a transport outcome. Lanes with an error-carrying contract now report the decline verbatim; cosmetic bool/None lanes still degrade but log it at WARNING. Advisory progress drops that legitimately degrade are unchanged: the task_card send lane, the draft ambiguous/except branches, and every transport-exception path keep their existing fail-open behaviour. Tests: 21 mutations of the production source, all KILLED. * fix(relay): authorize the RESOLVED target; declines must not fall back Review round 1 (independently confirmed by a second reviewer) found three blockers. Two are fixed here; the third (B-2, Telegram @username) is a policy decision left open deliberately. B-1 — THE FIX CAUSED THE OUTAGE IT PREVENTED (tools/send_message_tool.py) The P5(a) guard ran ABOVE Slack user->DM resolution, so it authorized the internal pseudo-id `_parse_target_ref` emits (`user_name:ben`, `user:U...`). Provenances only ever hold RESOLVED conversation ids, so a fully attested DM was compared as a handle against a set of `D...` ids and refused: base slack:@ben SENT head(before) slack:@ben REFUSED Every Slack DM by handle was broken. Moved the guard below resolution; it now authorizes the destination that is actually sent to, and the refusal names the resolved id. Position is load-bearing, so it is commented as such and pinned: reverting the move turns exactly the four new cases red. B-3 — A DECLINE IS NOT A LANE FAILURE (gateway/run.py) `_approval_send_outcome` had only sent/failed/ambiguous, so a connector decline collapsed into `failed` — which is the cue to run the plain-text fallback into the chat the connector had just refused. The adapter fix in the previous commit improved the error STRING while user-visible behaviour stayed identical to base; the commit message overstated it. Fixed properly: - new `declined` verdict, recognised via the shared `is_egress_decline` contract (not string sniffing at the call site) - exec-approval returns without the text fallback - slash-confirm suppresses the text reply AND clears the registration, so a card that never rendered cannot capture the user's next message `send_clarify` was already correct (returns early inside the adapter). MUTATIONS (production source; both directions) classifier never returns 'declined' -> KILLED (4 cases) ALL failures classified as 'declined' -> KILLED (2 cases) guard moved back above Slack resolution -> KILLED (4 cases) decline CODE changed (review M05) -> KILLED marker match made case-sensitive (M10) -> KILLED M05 was a tautology: the test asserted the imported constant against itself, so changing the constant could not fail it. The wire contract is now pinned as a literal, because the connector stamps that exact string and a one-sided change is a silent cross-repo break. REGRESSION CHECK: the 12 failures + 1 collection error in this test selection are PRE-EXISTING cross-test contamination — the identical set fails at 7cf86188ac. Verified by diffing the failing sets: no new failures, 363 -> 374 passed. NOT FIXED (deliberate): B-2, Telegram `@username`. The Bot API resolves handles at send time, so there is no id to compare and no canonicalization exists yet. That is a policy decision, not a code move. * fix(relay): fail CLOSED on guard faults; classify the structured decline Third independent review. Two more blockers, both reproduced before fixing. 1. THE GUARD ITSELF FAILED OPEN (tools/send_message_tool.py:158) `_authorize_relay_target` wrapped BOTH the import and the call in one `except Exception: return None` — and None means AUTHORIZED at every call site. So any runtime bug inside the guard silently switched the entire P5(a) boundary off. Reproduced: with the guard raising, an unattested target sent. The docstring already stated the correct intent ("must not fail closed on its own IMPORT error") and the code did something broader. The two failures are not the same: a missing gateway package means there is no relay egress to authorize; a fault inside the guard means authorization did not happen. The import is tolerated, the call is not — a guard that cannot answer refuses. 2. THE STRUCTURED DECLINE WAS THROWN AWAY (gateway/run.py) The adapter preserves the connector's dict in `SendResult.raw_response`. My previous commit rebuilt a dict from the error STRING, which loses two contracts: * a decline carrying `code: egress_declined` and NO text renders as "relay egress declined" — no marker colon — so it classified as `failed`, which is exactly the cue to run the fallback into the refused chat; * `ambiguous: True` (lost ack) was flattened into a DEFINITE failure, re-sending a card that may already be on the user's screen. That is the duplicate-card bug the ambiguous verdict exists to prevent, reintroduced by the fix meant to harden the same path. Both call sites now classify `raw_response` when present, ambiguity first, and fall back to the wire sentence only for connectors that send no structured response. I had fixed the text-marker path and tested only the text-marker path. Worth naming: the review's probe was a shape my tests never produced. MUTATIONS (production source) guard fault returns None (fail open again) -> KILLED classifier ignores raw_response -> KILLED (3 cases) ambiguous treated as a definite failure -> KILLED (2 cases) 40 focused tests pass. Regression check vs be321faf27: identical 13-item failing set (pre-existing cross-test contamination), no new failures. STILL OPEN: B-2 / finding 3, Telegram `@username`. The reviewer is right that this is a REGRESSION of an existing contract (#53573 added Bot API username support), not merely an unspecified input, since relay provenance stores the numeric chat id. Fixing it means resolving the handle before authorization, or explicitly revoking the contract. That is a policy decision, not a code move, and it is Ben's call. * test(relay): pin M21 and M25, the survivors whose comments called them load-bearing Round-2 review reported six unpinned survivors from round 1. Two guard real behaviour and are now covered; the other four are cosmetic-lane warnings and fail-open branches I am leaving documented rather than pretending to close. M25 — thread-qualified session ids. `_session_ids` adds BOTH "chat:thread" and the bare chat, because the connector authorizes the CHAT. Without the split a gateway whose session origin is `-100999:77` cannot send to `-100999`, the chat it is demonstrably already talking in. KILLED. M21 — the generic `relay` plane must union every fronted platform, since a relay session is filed under its LOGICAL platform. KILLED. MY FIRST M21 TEST WAS THE DEFECT IT WAS TESTING FOR. I patched `_relay_fronted` — the very function the mutation empties — so emptying it changed nothing the test could see, and the mutation SURVIVED against a green test. Rewritten to drive the real `relay_fronted_platforms()` through its env source (`GATEWAY_RELAY_PLATFORMS`), which is how production learns it. That is the same "the test verifies my stand-in" failure I have spent this workstream removing from the connector harnesses, reproduced here in three lines of Python. The tell was identical: a mutation that survives a test written specifically to kill it. 334 tests pass. NOT PINNED, deliberately: M03 (success-guard on a malformed dict), M24 (empty-target allowance — the one fail-open branch, reachable only when the bare-platform path already resolved a home channel), M35/M36 (decline WARNINGs on cosmetic lanes). All four are observability or defence-in-depth rather than authorization, and the review agrees they are non-blocking. * fix(relay): defer Telegram @username authorization to the connector (B-2) Closes the last blocker. Two reviewers independently called this a REGRESSION of the public-channel username support added in #53573, not an unspecified input, and they were right: provenance stores RESOLVED numeric chat ids, so comparing `@channel` against them could only ever refuse. WHY THE GATEWAY CANNOT ANSWER IT. The guard fires only when there is no live native adapter — i.e. relay-fronted deployments — and on exactly those the CONNECTOR holds the bot token, not this process. There is no local way to turn a handle into the numeric id. Refusing here is not "fail closed", it is "fail always". WHY DEFERRING IS SAFE. The destination is still authorized one layer out: the connector's Telegram egress floor (gg#238, merged 743a7c2) classifies and refuses unauthorized destinations after ITS resolution — the layer that closed the reported vulnerability in the first place. Handles go from two guards to one, the authoritative one, not to zero. The carve-out is deliberately narrow and its EDGES are pinned, because the failure mode of an exemption is silent widening: telegram `@handle` -> deferred (the regression case) telegram numeric id -> still guarded matrix `@user:server` -> still guarded (telegram-only) bare name, no `@` -> still guarded attested handle -> normal path, attestation still consulted MUTATIONS carve-out widened to all platforms -> KILLED carve-out widened to every target -> KILLED carve-out removed (regression back) -> KILLED carve-out checked BEFORE attestation -> KILLED THE ORDERING MUTANT SURVIVED MY FIRST TEST. Both orderings return None, so asserting the verdict could not tell them apart — the test asserted the claim instead of the mechanism. Rewritten to observe that attestation is actually consulted. Same defect class as the M21 test earlier in this branch: a mutation surviving a test written specifically to kill it means the test is measuring the wrong thing. 341 tests pass. FOLLOW-UP (option 2, Ben's call, deliberately NOT done here): resolve the handle before authorizing so BOTH layers apply. That needs a resolution round-trip through the connector — new wire surface — so it belongs in its own phase rather than bolted onto this one. Recorded in the code comment at the carve-out, not just here. * fix(relay): close two fail-open boundaries; test the code-only decline for real Both blockers from review, each REPRODUCED before fixing. 1. STRUCTURED DECLINE HAD NO GUARD. Deleting `raw_response=result` from both `_send_prompt` return branches left all 34 tests green — a surviving, non-equivalent security mutant. The `code` field is the documented PREFERRED signal precisely because a connector may send no prose, and a caller rebuilding `{"success": False, "error": ...}` cannot see it. Cause: every existing case declines with marker TEXT. The evidence for the code-only path was a hand-built SimpleNamespace in a different file — a stand-in for the adapter, so it verified my fixture instead of production. Fixed with a CodeOnlyDecliningConnector driving the real `send_exec_approval` -> `_send_prompt`, feeding the REAL SendResult to the REAL `_approval_send_outcome`, plus the same shape on the media lane. drop raw_response SURVIVED (34 passed) -> KILLED 2. TWO FAIL-OPEN BOUNDARIES, both "absence" and "fault" sharing a return. `_relay_fronted` swallowed EVERY exception and returned an empty set, which `relay_routed_platform` reads as "not relay-routed" — skipping the guard. Probe, with a positive control in the same run: positive_control_denied = True discovery_fault_denied = False <- unattested target AUTHORIZED `_authorize_relay_target` caught every exception during IMPORT as "no gateway package". A module that exists and fails to initialize is a fault, not an absence, and returning None there means authorized. Now: ImportError alone is absence; anything else raises RelayRouteUnknown and `authorize_relay_target` converts it to a REFUSAL STRING (not a raised exception — every caller treats the return value as the verdict, so raising would trade a fail-open for a crash). Kept the converse under test so "fail closed" does not silently become "refuse everything in CLI/cron", which is the outage the broad except existed to prevent. discovery fault -> empty set KILLED RelayRouteUnknown -> authorized KILLED import fault -> authorized KILLED 397 passed (was 392, +5 new cases), zero failures. * fix(relay): close all seven review-round-3 blockers Every finding reproduced before fixing; every fix mutation-checked after. CONTENT LEAKS (the decline was laundered into a different op, same chat) #1 A declined DRAFT SEAL replayed as a plain send. On stream-is-the-message platforms the turn-final becomes draft(final=True); `_seal_open_draft` dropped the structured body, so `_absorb_into_open_draft` read a REFUSAL as a lane failure and fell through. Probe, Slack descriptor: before: draft(partial) -> draft(final,SECRET) -> send(SECRET) after: draft(partial) -> draft(final,SECRET) My first probe of this used a discord descriptor and showed no seal at all — the leak is real, my probe was wrong (streams only arm for Slack). #6 Task-card PROGRESS had the same defect one lane over: a bare failed SendResult reads as "card lane unavailable", and TurnRunner then sends the task text to the same chat. Both card methods now carry raw_response and the caller suppresses the fallback on a decline. AUTHORIZATION BYPASSES #2 `except ImportError` was NOT the fix I claimed last round. ImportError also covers a broken dependency inside an INSTALLED gateway; review probed `ImportError.name = "gateway.relay.dependency"` and got an authorized verdict. Now only a name identifying the gateway relay module itself is absence. An ImportError with NO name stays absence — refusing on a fault we cannot attribute would trade an unidentifiable bug for a real CLI/cron outage, and an existing test caught exactly that when I first got it wrong. #3 `relay_routed_platform` lowercases the requested platform; `_relay_fronted` returned configured names verbatim. A platform configured as "Discord" missed the membership test, looked native, and skipped the guard: 'discord' => refused 'Discord' => ALLOWED 'DISCORD' => ALLOWED An attestation bypass on a string comparison. UNDELIVERABLE PROMPTS THAT HUNG #4 `_clarify_send_disposition` handled `failed` and `ambiguous` but not `declined`, so a REFUSED clarify card fell through to wait_for_response and blocked until clarify_timeout — indefinitely when configured non-positive. A decline is more definitive than a failure, not less. #5 The exec-approval decline branch returned quietly, which suppressed the text fallback (right) but left the CENTRAL approval entry pending (wrong) — the dangerous command stayed blocked until the approval timeout. My comment claimed the registration was torn down; only RelayAdapter's private map was. It now raises `_ExecApprovalDeclined`, which propagates to `_await_gateway_decision`'s existing notify-failure path (drops the entry, unblocks the tool). A dedicated type, re-raised past the local `except Exception` that would otherwise have restored the leak. #7 THE GAP THAT LET ALL OF THIS SHIP. Both caller-level suppressions were unfalsifiable: deleting either branch left 36/38 tests green. The suites drove `_approval_send_outcome` and `RelayAdapter` but never the real TurnRunner / busy-session callers, so nothing observed whether a text send FOLLOWED a decline — which is the whole property. tests/gateway/test_decline_fallback_suppression.py drives both real callers and records every send. Each decline case is paired with an ordinary-FAILURE control, because without one a caller that never falls back would also pass. MUTATIONS (all on production source, anchors count-checked, restored after) #1 seal decline -> plain send KILLED #1b seal drops raw_response KILLED #2 nested ImportError -> authorized KILLED #3 fronted set not normalized KILLED #4 clarify declined branch removed KILLED #5 approval decline returns not raises KILLED #6 task_card drops raw_response KILLED #7 slash-confirm suppression removed KILLED #7's two were the reviewer's SURVIVORS (36/38 passing); both now die. 425 passed, zero failures. * fix(relay): close the three round-4 blockers Round 4 confirmed six of seven round-3 fixes and found three more. Each reproduced before fixing, each mutation-checked after. 1. A NAMELESS ImportError still authorized. Last round I admitted it as "absence" to protect the CLI/cron path. That reasoning was WRONG and the interpreter says so: import gateway.relay.nope -> ModuleNotFoundError, name="gateway.relay.nope" import totally_absent_pkg -> ModuleNotFoundError, name="totally_absent_pkg" Genuine absence is ALWAYS ModuleNotFoundError with `.name` set, so the CLI/cron path never produces a bare ImportError and nothing legitimate was being protected. A plain or nameless ImportError comes from an import hook or a module that failed while initializing — an unattributable FAULT. Now: absence is ModuleNotFoundError naming gateway / gateway.relay / gateway.relay.egress; everything else refuses. Two existing tests raised a bare ImportError to simulate absence and were corrected to the real shape. 2. SESSION ATTESTATION INVENTED IDS. `_session_ids` split every id on the first colon to recover "chat" from "chat:thread". Matrix ids contain a colon natively, so `!room:server.org` attested a bare `!room` — the guard vouching for a destination on its own fabrication. The split now applies only to platforms whose ids genuinely carry a `:thread` suffix (allow-list; unknown platforms are treated as un-splittable, which can only refuse more). Kept a Slack control: dropping the split entirely would refuse legitimate thread replies, which is the outage the split exists to prevent. 3. THE TASK-CARD FIX WAS UNFALSIFIABLE — my own round-3 mistake, and the same one round 3 caught me making. I added the production branch AND a test, but the test stopped at RelayAdapter: it proved `raw_response` is carried and never called `TurnRunner._task_card_publish`, which owns the property. Deleting the real branch left 30 tests green. Now driven through the real caller, with an ordinary-failure control. The lesson generalises: proving the DATA reaches the boundary is not proving the CALLER acts on it. Every one of these decline fixes has two halves and the second half is where the security lives. Also closed the round-4 non-blocking finding: `gateway/relay/egress.py` has its OWN import boundary, and the existing test intercepted the earlier import in tools/send_message_tool.py, so it was never exercised. Mutating that classifier to treat every ImportError as absence now dies. MUTATIONS (production source, anchors count-checked, restored after) R4-1 nameless ImportError -> authorized KILLED R4-2 session split unconditional KILLED R4-3 task-card caller branch removed KILLED (was SURVIVED) egress classifier: any ImportError = absence KILLED Also probed and found NOT a leak: a refused OPENING draft frame disarms the stream and the turn-final goes out via `send`. That send is itself guarded and the connector refuses it too, so no content is delivered — unlike the seal case (round 3, #1) where the seal was the only check on that path. 452 passed, zero failures. * fix(relay): recover the thread parent from thread_id, not a colon split Round 4 blocker 2 was closed with an allow-list of platforms whose ids have no native colon. Reviewing my own fix while round 5 ran, the allow-list is the wrong mechanism: it NARROWS a guess instead of removing it, and it still gets Matrix wrong the moment a Matrix session is thread-qualified (`!room:server.org:$thr` -> split yields `!room`). The structured field was there all along. `_session_entry_id` composes the id as f"{chat_id}:{thread_id}" and the entry still carries `thread_id` separately, so the parent is knowable EXACTLY: strip the known suffix, or add nothing. No platform list, no guessing, correct for ids that contain colons. Mutations: back to splitting on the first colon KILLED thread parent never recovered (over-refuse) KILLED Both directions matter: the first invents attestations, the second refuses legitimate thread replies. One existing test (M25) asserted the right PROPERTY with a fixture that omitted `thread_id` — a shape real entries never have. Fixture corrected, assertions untouched. 453 passed. * fix(relay): close the four round-5 blockers Each reproduced before fixing, each mutation-checked after. R5-1 A DISABLED NATIVE ADAPTER BYPASSED AUTHORIZATION. `_has_live_native_adapter` treated any entry in the adapter map as native; `resolve_delivery_transport` ignores a native adapter whose config is disabled and routes over Relay. Two independent routing classifiers, disagreeing: guard says native: True delivery routes relay: True So the guard skipped authorization for a send that went over the relay. The guard now applies the router's enabled-state rule; probed both configurations and they agree. R5-2 THREAD IDS WERE NEVER AUTHORIZED. The parser splits chat_id and thread_id; only chat_id reached the guard. On Discord the thread IS the destination — `POST /channels/{thread_id}/messages` — so an attested parent channel authorized an arbitrary caller-supplied thread. `authorize_relay_target` now takes thread_id and requires its own attestation (bare id or the `chat:thread` form a session origin produces); both call sites forward it. R5-3 A DECLINED **INITIAL** DRAFT WAS RETRIED AS A PLAIN SEND. Round 3 fixed the declined SEAL; the declined OPEN was a different path. `send_draft` returned a bare failure, so the stream consumer read "draft transport unusable", disabled drafts and fell through to `_first_send`. Measured through the real adapter and real StreamTransportMixin: before: ops ['draft', 'send'] after: ops ['draft'] send_draft now carries raw_response; a decline is terminal for the run and the guard sits in `_first_send`, where every fallback path converges. R5-4 MY ROUND-4 TASK-CARD FIX SUPPRESSED EXACTLY ONE UPDATE. It set `native_failed`, which the entry gate already uses for an ordinary broken lane, so the next progress event skipped the decline branch and went straight to the text fallback: after first publish: [] after second: ['send'] Terminal declines are now a separate `egress_declined` state checked at the entry gate. A refusal does not expire after one tick. MUTATIONS R5-1 disabled native counts as native KILLED R5-2 thread_id not authorized KILLED R5-2b tool does not forward thread_id KILLED (was SURVIVED) R5-3 initial-draft decline not terminal KILLED R5-3b _first_send guard removed KILLED R5-4 declined state not persistent KILLED R5-2b is the same gap that produced findings 3 and 4 of the last two rounds, a third time: every test called `authorize_relay_target` directly, so dropping the argument from the TOOL WRAPPER changed nothing. Testing the callee never proves the caller uses it — now pinned explicitly. Each fix ships with an ordinary-failure control, because every one of these makes the guard refuse MORE, and over-refusal is now the larger risk. 474 passed, zero failures. * refactor(relay): declare the terminal-decline state where it lives Both terminal-decline flags were set dynamically. They worked (neither class is frozen or slotted) but an undeclared attribute hides the state from anyone reading the class, and this one is security-relevant. _TaskCardState.egress_declined — declared dataclass field StreamConsumer._egress_declined — initialised in __init__ Lifetime verified while checking whether a refusal can leak ACROSS turns and mute a healthy destination: it cannot. _TaskCardState is constructed per progress-drain (run_turn_runner.py:420) and the consumer's flags per run (stream_consumer.py:163), so both are fresh each turn. Also verified the guard's blast radius after adding thread authorization: the ONLY callers of authorize_relay_target are the two model-facing send_message call sites. Gateway-internal sends — notably the handoff path, which creates a thread and immediately posts to it with no session provenance yet — go through transport.adapter directly and are unaffected. That was the most plausible over-refusal, and it does not reach this guard. 461 passed. * fix(relay): close the four round-6 blockers — the edit lane R6-1 MY OWN R5-1 FIX REINTRODUCED THE BYPASS IT CLOSED. I wrote `except Exception: return True` around the config lookup, so a config read fault declared the platform native while the ROUTER, reading the real config, sends over the relay: guard_has_live_native True guard_verdict None router relay Routing we cannot determine is UNKNOWN. It now raises RelayRouteUnknown, which the outer handler must re-raise rather than flatten to False, and `authorize_relay_target` turns into a refusal. This is the second time a convenience `except` in this function created a bypass; there is now no permissive return left in it. R6-2/3/4 THE NINTH LANE: `edit`. ONE dropped field, THREE leaks. `RelayAdapter.edit_message` discarded the connector response, and three independent callers read a bare edit failure as "editing is unavailable" and re-send the content as a NEW message to the same chat: stream edit fallback ['edit', 'edit', 'send'] the unseen tail queued reconciliation ['edit', 'send'] the WHOLE response task-card fallback ['edit', 'send'] the task text again Fixed at the source (edit_message carries raw_response) plus each caller: `_on_edit_failure` — the single funnel for stream edit failures — makes a decline terminal for the run, `_send_fallback_final` refuses to deliver a continuation after one, the queued reconciler returns instead of sending, and the task-card fallback sets the same terminal state R5-4 introduced. R5-4 fixed the native task-card op and I did not check its sibling fallback path. The pattern across rounds 3-6 is consistent: the fix goes where the decline is OBSERVED, and the leak lives wherever someone else later decides to retry. MUTATIONS R6-1 config fault -> assume native KILLED R6-1b RelayRouteUnknown swallowed as False KILLED R6-2 edit drops raw_response KILLED R6-2b edit-failure decline not terminal KILLED R6-3 queued reconcile falls back on decline KILLED R6-4 task-card fallback edit decline KILLED Each with an ordinary-failure control: a genuinely un-editable message must still be delivered, and a broken card lane must still reach the user. 481 passed, zero failures. * fix(relay): add a terminal-decline latch at the adapter choke point THE STRUCTURAL FIX, not a twelfth local check. Rounds 3-6 of review found ONE defect in eleven lanes: the connector refuses an op, and some caller downstream reads that as 'this lane is unavailable' and retries the same content through a DIFFERENT op against the SAME chat. Media, prompt, draft-open, draft-seal, native task card, task-card fallback edit, slash-confirm, exec-approval, clarify, stream edit, queued reconciliation. Each was closed by adding a check at one more call site. That approach cannot converge: gateway/ has ~60 outbound call sites, every one of them a place a future change can reintroduce this, and four consecutive review rounds each found another. The reviewer's own count of lanes is the argument against the per-site design. Every relay frame from every one of those callers passes through _transport.send_outbound. One latch there covers them all: once the connector refuses a chat, this adapter stops emitting CONTENT frames for that chat. Proven to subsume the local checks: with the stream-edit per-site check DISABLED, the leak probe still reports blocked=true — the frame never reaches the wire. The local checks stay as defence in depth and for their better error messages, but they are no longer the only thing standing between a decline and a re-addressed send. Scope is deliberately narrow, and each limit is mutation-pinned: per CHAT - a refusal must not mute other conversations CONTENT ops - typing/delete carry nothing; latching them would leave a stuck typing indicator for no security gain self-healing - cleared when the connector accepts that chat again, so a transient policy change does not need a restart Mutations: latch never set KILLED latch never consulted KILLED latch is global, not per-chat KILLED latch never clears KILLED 485 passed. * fix(relay): one route source; the latch already covered round 7's lanes Round 7 reviewed 573e41e294 — one commit BEFORE the terminal-decline latch — and independently reached the same conclusion I had: 'The per-call-site approach is structurally wrong. Use one turn-scoped choke point.' That is the latch in 6dbc004594. Its four 'still broken' lanes (tool-progress edit, progress-overflow edit, long-running heartbeat edit, stale streamed-final reconciliation) all share the shape edit_message->declined->adapter.send(same chat, same content), and NONE has a local check. Probed all four against the latch: tool_progress ops ['edit'] blocked progress_overflow ops ['edit'] blocked heartbeat ops ['edit'] blocked stale_final ops ['edit'] blocked That is the argument for the choke point, measured: lanes nobody patched are safe anyway. Pinned by a parametrized test named for those four lanes. R7-1 IS A REAL BYPASS THE LATCH DOES NOT COVER, and it is fixed here. The guard rebuilt routing from GATEWAY_RELAY_PLATFORMS while resolve_delivery_transport asks the CONNECTED adapter (fronts_platform, from the handshake identity set). Different snapshots: with env discovery stale or momentarily empty, the guard said 'native' and the router sent over the relay, skipping authorization. before: guard_relay_routed False / delivery relay after: guard_relay_routed True / delivery relay / unattested target refused The guard now asks the live adapter first and falls back to config only when there is no runner (CLI/cron) — pinned in both directions. R7-5 (non-blocking, and a fair hit): my stream-fallback test asserted _egress_declined and never drove _send_fallback_final, so removing that early return SURVIVED. The test now calls the real fallback and asserts the wire is untouched; the mutation dies. Mutations: R7-1 guard ignores the live adapter KILLED (was SURVIVED) R7-5 fallback early return removed KILLED (was SURVIVED) latch not consulted KILLED 491 passed. * fix(relay): close three holes found by attacking my own latch Round 8's brief told the reviewer to attack the latch. I did the same in parallel and found three real holes in it before the review returned. 1. send_for_platform BYPASSED THE LATCH ENTIRELY. It builds and posts its frame directly rather than through _outbound — and it is the delivery resolver's OWN entry point, so it is the single most important caller. before: ops ['edit', 'send'] after: ops ['edit'] gateway/AGENTS.md states the rule I had just broken: 'Seal-interception exists at BOTH egress doors (send() and send_for_platform()); a new egress door needs the same two checks.' The latch is a third such check and I had wired it to one door. 2. A COSMETIC SUCCESS CLEARED THE LATCH. Clearing on ANY success meant a typing indicator — routinely allowed for a chat whose content is refused — re-opened the door for the very next send: ops ['edit', 'typing', 'send'] Only a CONTENT op the connector accepted may clear it now. 3. A THREAD INSIDE A REFUSED CHAT WAS NOT COVERED. A thread lives inside its parent, so the same content reached the same conversation one level down: ops ['edit', 'send'] The latch key now strips the thread suffix. Also normalised int/str chat ids (callers pass both; a type mismatch would silently unlatch). MUTATIONS send_for_platform not latched KILLED cosmetic success clears the latch KILLED thread suffix not stripped KILLED draft-seal retry not latched SURVIVED — EQUIVALENT, proven: is unreachable while latched (a declined edit before the seal produces ZERO seal frames, measured). Kept as defence in depth because it posts directly, and documented at the site rather than covered by a test that could not fail. One self-inflicted bug on the way: a blanket replace put 1Password CLI brings 1Password to your terminal. Turn on the 1Password app integration and sign in to get started. Run 'op signin --help' to learn more. For more help, read our documentation: https://www.1password.dev/cli 1Password CLI is built using open-source software. View our credits and licenses: https://downloads.1password.com/op/credits/stable/credits.html Usage: op [command] [flags] Management Commands: account Manage your locally configured 1Password accounts connect Manage Connect server instances and tokens in your 1Password account document Perform CRUD operations on Document items in your vaults events-api Manage Events API integrations in your 1Password account group Manage the groups in your 1Password account item Perform CRUD operations on the 1Password items in your vaults plugin Manage the shell plugins you use to authenticate third-party CLIs service-account Manage service accounts user Manage users within this 1Password account vault Manage permissions and perform CRUD operations on your 1Password vaults Commands: completion Generate shell completion information inject Inject secrets into a config file read Read a secret reference run Pass secrets as environment variables to a process signin Sign in to a 1Password account signout Sign out of a 1Password account update Check for and download updates. whoami Get information about a signed-in account Global Flags: --account account Select the account to execute the command by account shorthand, sign-in address, account ID, or user ID. For a list of available accounts, run 'op account list'. Can be set as the OP_ACCOUNT environment variable. --cache Store and use cached information. Caching is enabled by default on UNIX-like systems. Caching is not available on Windows. Options: true, false. Can also be set with the OP_CACHE environment variable. (default true) --config directory Use this configuration directory. --debug Enable debug mode. Can also be enabled by setting the OP_DEBUG environment variable to true. --encoding type Use this character encoding type. Default: UTF-8. Supported: SHIFT_JIS, gbk. --format string Use this output format. Can be 'human-readable' or 'json'. Can be set as the OP_FORMAT environment variable. (default "human-readable") -h, --help Get help for op. --iso-timestamps Format timestamps according to ISO 8601 / RFC 3339. Can be set as the OP_ISO_TIMESTAMPS environment variable. --no-color Print output without color. --session token Authenticate with this session token. 1Password CLI outputs session tokens for successful 'op signin' commands when 1Password app integration is not enabled. -v, --version version for op Run 'op [command] --help' for more information on the command. into send_for_platform, which has no such variable. Two existing unfurl tests caught it — NameError at adapter.py:1407. 504 passed. * fix(relay): Telegram handle exemption + a turn boundary for the latch Round 8 blockers. Two of its four were already closed by 93750e351a (it reviewed the commit before it); these two are real and both are mine. B1 — THE TELEGRAM @HANDLE EXEMPTION COVERED A NATIVE SEND. _is_unresolved_handle exempts telegram @handles from attestation because "the connector resolves and authorizes it". That justification is FALSE whenever the gateway holds its own token: _send_to_platform calls _send_telegram(pconfig.token, ...) directly and no connector is involved. So an unattested @handle went out under the gateway's own credential while the numeric control was correctly refused. The exemption now requires that no native credential exists. A probe fault WITHDRAWS the exemption (falls back to the ordinary attestation check) rather than granting it. Shipped with the converse control: relay-only config still exempts @handles, and numeric targets stay guarded in both modes. B4 — THE LATCH HAD NO BOUNDARY, SO IT WAS AN OUTAGE MECHANISM. My own regression, and worse than reported. Removing "clear on cosmetic success" (correctly) removed the ONLY way the latch could ever clear: a content op can never reach the connector to succeed, because the latch blocks it locally first. A refusal at 09:00 muted that chat forever. A new inbound message for a chat is the generation marker — the natural teardown point. Suppression still holds for the whole turn. same_turn_blocked: true next_turn_delivered: true MUTATIONS (all killed) handle exemption ignores native credential native-credential fault GRANTS the exemption no turn boundary (latch never clears) teardown clears ALL chats not just this one teardown ignores the chat The last two SURVIVED first: I tested _clear_declined_for_turn directly and never proved _on_inbound calls it — the caller-level gap that has now produced four blockers on this branch. Added a test driving the real inbound entry point. One self-inflicted bug, caught by my own fault test: the probe imported load_config, which does not exist (it is load_gateway_config), so it always threw and returned the fault default. The test that pinned fault behaviour is what exposed it. 510 passed. * fix(relay): correct latch identity and boundary; one config snapshot Round 9, four blockers, all reproduced. B1+B4 — THE TEARDOWN WAS AT THE WRONG PLACE, twice over. It sat on the adapter's raw _on_inbound, which runs BEFORE profile routing, the ignored-channel guard, plugin hooks and user authorization. An unauthorized or dropped event could therefore clear a refusal belonging to an active turn, and stale content then went out as a different op. The same placement missed Discord interaction passthrough, which builds its own MessageEvent and calls handle_message directly, so slash commands and modal submits stayed muted after an earlier decline. Both are one mistake: I picked a lane instead of a boundary. Teardown now runs immediately after _hm_admit_event, the single admission gate every entry path shares. dropped event -> latch survives, stale send blocked admitted event -> latch clears B2 — THE LATCH KEY SPLIT ON ':', WHICH IS A MISTAKE I ALREADY FIXED ONCE. _latch_key did str(chat_id).split(":", 1)[0], so !room:tenant-a and !room:tenant-b both keyed !room: a decline in one Matrix room muted another, and inbound from one cleared the other's refusal. egress.py ::_session_ids stopped doing exactly this in round 4 and I reintroduced it three rounds later. Parent identity is never recoverable from identifier TEXT. Thread coverage is now structural: _thread_parent looks the relationship up in the recorded auto-thread map. B3 — AUTHORIZATION AND DISPATCH USED DIFFERENT CONFIG SNAPSHOTS. _handle_send retains one pconfig; the guard independently reloaded config. Across a transition the authorization snapshot could see a connector-only setup (exemption granted) while dispatch still held the native token and sent the unattested @handle itself. The guard now takes native_token from the SAME snapshot dispatch will use. A caller that omits it does not silently look like "no token". NB-1/2/3 also closed: real-object snapshot tests, an exception shield that faces a real exception, and send_follow_up no longer discards the connector's verdict (that discard is exactly how the edit lane laundered declines). MUTATIONS (all killed) latch key splits on colon again thread parent lookup disabled dispatch token ignored by guard tool drops the snapshot token admission teardown removed teardown moved BEFORE admission exception shield removed follow_up drops raw_response "admission teardown removed" SURVIVED first: I had tested the helper, not _handle_message. Added a test driving production _handle_message with admission stubbed both ways. Fifth caller-level gap on this branch. One self-inflicted bug caught before commit: I passed pconfig.token in _handle_react, which has no pconfig — a NameError on every reaction. 516 passed. * docs(relay): pin the latch's thread coverage limit as a deliberate trade _thread_parent only sees connector auto-threads, and that map is capped at 256 entries, so a user-created or evicted thread does not inherit its parent's latch. Documented at the site and asserted by a test, because the alternative - deriving parents from identifier text - is exactly what muted unrelated Matrix rooms in round 9. The primary control is unaffected: authorize_relay_target takes thread_id as part of the destination and attests it on every send (6 thread tests). * refactor(relay): one SendResult decline classifier for all 8 gateway lanes The extraction found a DEFECT, not just repetition. Eight gateway lanes each hand-rolled the unwrapping of a decline from a SendResult, and they did not agree. Six checked only raw_response. Two also checked the error text. A connector that answers with the uniform decline SENTENCE and no structured code - the documented contract for older connectors, per _approval_send_outcome - was therefore classified as an ordinary failure by those six lanes, so each treated a refusal as "editing unavailable" and retried through another op. Measured: text-only decline six-site check False two-site check True structured decline six-site check True two-site check True No content leaked, because the adapter latch classifies the transport dict directly and catches both shapes (verified: text-only decline still latches C1 and keeps SECRET off the wire). The cost was wrong verdicts and futile retries, not disclosure. declined_send(result) in gateway/relay/egress.py now owns this. It checks raw_response when structured, else the error text, and preserves the ambiguous exclusion - an ambiguous result is a transport outcome, so it must never read as a refusal. run.py keeps its own shape deliberately: that lane has three verdicts (ambiguous / declined / failed), so it checks ambiguous first and then delegates the boolean. MUTATIONS (all killed) helper drops the text-only branch helper drops the structured branch ambiguous no longer excluded draft lane decline check removed edit-failure lane decline check removed prompt verdict lane check removed slash-confirm lane check removed draft lane goes terminal on ANY failure (over-refusal direction) "draft lane decline check removed" SURVIVED first: _send_draft_frame had no test driving an unsuccessful send_draft at all. Added one, with an ordinary-failure control so the fix cannot silently become "one flaky frame mutes the chat". A non-unique anchor also masked the edit-failure lane on the first pass - the trap my own skill warns about. This closes the duplication that caused four of nine rounds of blockers: a new lane now calls one classifier instead of copying three lines. 519 passed. * fix(relay): latch identity, new-turn boundary, seal arming, ambiguity Round 10, four blockers, each reproduced before fixing. Two are my own regressions from the previous two rounds. B1 - ADMISSION IS NOT A NEW-TURN BOUNDARY. Round 9 moved teardown to just after _hm_admit_event. That is only an ADMISSION gate: an authorized message can be steered into a running session, answer a pending prompt, run a busy slash command, or be refused by the pause/drain gates - all without starting a turn. Each of those cleared the ACTIVE turn's refusal, and a later fallback from that turn reached the wire (probe: latch emptied, wire ops ['edit', 'send']). Teardown now runs after _claim_active_session_slot, the first point the runner OWNS a new turn. The new test drives production _handle_message through all four non-turn lanes plus the real new-turn path. B2 - LATCH IDENTITY OMITTED THE LOGICAL PLATFORM. One relay adapter fronts several platforms, so native ids collide. A Discord refusal for chat 42 was cleared by clear_egress_latch("telegram", "42") - the method took a platform and ignored it - and the Discord fallback then reached the connector. Keyed by normalized platform plus exact chat id; thread-parent expansion keeps the platform component. B3 - THE DIRECT DRAFT-SEAL PATH DID NOT ARM THE LATCH. _seal_open_draft posts through _attempt directly rather than _outbound, so a definite decline logged and returned but never latched. The immediate plain-send fallback was suppressed by the caller's own check; later same-turn sends were not (wire ['draft', 'draft', 'send'], the third frame carrying refused content). B4 - MY OWN REFACTOR MADE AMBIGUOUS RESULTS TERMINAL. send_draft's ambiguous projection discarded raw_response, so declined_send fell through to the error-text branch - and an ambiguous result whose text carries the decline marker ("... egress declined: ack lost") read as a DEFINITE refusal and terminated the run. Ambiguous means the frame may well have been delivered: a transport outcome, never an authorization one. Fixed on both layers: the projection carries the body (and the seal's ambiguous return is now explicit too), and declined_send's text-only branch - which cannot see the ambiguous flag - treats ack-lost text as transport ambiguity. Audited every SendResult projection in adapter.py for the same shape. MUTATIONS (all killed) latch key drops the platform clear_egress_latch ignores platform draft seal does not arm the latch ambiguous projection drops raw body declined_send infers decline from ack-lost text teardown back at admission 523 passed. * refactor(relay): split the terminal-decline latch out of the guard PR The latch moves to feat/p5-egress-decline-latch (pushed at 3cf45736d7, which retains the full history) for redesign. This PR keeps the authorization guard and the per-site decline checks. WHY. Across eleven review rounds the two halves behaved very differently. The guard is a PURE FUNCTION of the destination - its blockers were all "you asked the wrong question" (case sensitivity, nested ImportError, missing thread_id, config snapshot skew), each a one-line correction that then stayed fixed. Rounds 7-10 found nothing new in it. The latch is MUTABLE STATE WITH A LIFETIME living on RelayAdapter - an object registered once per process that holds the WebSocket and has no concept of a turn. Nine of its blockers reduce to three questions the adapter cannot answer: when does it end, who arms it, what is it keyed on. Every answer so far has been a proxy (a successful op, an inbound message, an admitted event, a claimed session slot) and every proxy was wrong in a lane found later. The per-site checks hold identical information on `st` - a PER-TURN object - and have produced zero blockers, because the state dies with the turn and nobody has to decide when it ends. The no-relaunder property does NOT depend on the latch. Measured on the real consumer path with the latch absent: a declined draft frame sets _egress_declined and puts nothing on the wire. Removal verified structurally rather than by eye: an AST diff of every symbol between HEAD and this tree reports only latch symbols gone, nothing added. That check caught two over-deletions my strip made - _on_inbound (consumed by a "next def" boundary) and _SEEN_INBOUND_MAX (a class constant inside the removed span). Both restored; 19 failures went to 0. ALSO: RESTORED A TEST I WRONGLY REPORTED AS PASSING. test_tool_guard_forwards_thread_id never made it into the repo - `git log -S` finds it in no commit - though round 5 recorded its mutant as killed. Dropping thread_id from the guard call therefore survived the entire tests/tools suite (146 passed). Written properly this time, driving the real _handle_send far enough to reach the guard. It now KILLS that mutant. MUTATIONS on this tree guard fault authorizes instead of refusing KILLED thread_id dropped from the guard call KILLED (was SURVIVED) handle exemption ignores native credential KILLED draft lane decline check removed KILLED prompt verdict lane check removed KILLED slash-confirm lane check removed KILLED 503 passed. * test(relay): close the phantom-coverage gaps the guard audit found The thread_id test that was reported as killing a round-5 mutant turned out never to have been committed. That is a reason to distrust the other claimed kills, so I re-ran every guard mutation against the COMMITTED tree instead of trusting the earlier reports. Result: 9 of 11 killed, and the two "SKIPPED" ones had non-unique anchors hiding SIX separate sites. Mutating those individually found three real survivors. CASE NORMALISATION (round 3, finding 3) WAS HALF-COVERED. test_relay_fronted_matching_is_case_insensitive varies the CONFIGURED name but always requests lowercase "discord", so it pins _relay_fronted's normalisation and nothing else. The REQUESTED name's `.lower()` was covered by nothing at all. Probe with it removed: relay_routed("Discord") -> False authorize("Discord", unattested) -> AUTHORIZED which is exactly the bypass round 3 reported, alive again and untested. Two further sites were untested in the OVER-REFUSAL direction: the attested store is keyed lowercase, so a mixed-case request missed its own attested set and refused legitimate traffic. attested_relay_targets' own normalisation was invisible to every existing test because they all monkeypatch that function away; it is now asserted against the real function with only its leaf sources stubbed. Three tests added. All six case sites now die when mutated. I also re-did the three fail-closed RelayRouteUnknown mutations properly. The first pass swapped whole lines and produced IndentationErrors, so "KILLED" there proved nothing but a syntax error. Neutralising each raise at correct indentation: all three genuinely KILLED. FINAL AUDIT ON THIS TREE — 17 mutations, zero survivors guard: thread_id dropped at the call site guard: react path unguarded guard: handle exemption ignores native credential guard: 3x fail-closed raise neutralised guard: 6x case-normalisation site classifier: ambiguous treated as a decline classifier: text-only decline branch removed lane: draft / stream-edit / prompt / slash-confirm checks removed 511 passed. * test(relay): make the stream-edit test fail for the right reason Review of 45835a282d raised one blocking issue and three non-blocking ones. All four are addressed; none was a production defect. BLOCKING — the stream-edit test failed on the double, not on a leak. test_declined_stream_edit_does_not_send_the_unseen_tail implemented only the GUARDED path in its consumer double. Removing either guard therefore raised AttributeError inside the fake before any send could be observed: guard 1 removed -> AttributeError: no attribute '_is_flood_error' guard 2 removed -> AttributeError: no attribute '_clean_for_display' Red, but for the wrong reason — the test could not have caught the leak it is named for. My own docstring claimed it drove the fallback and checked the wire; it did neither. The double now implements everything the UNGUARDED path reaches (_is_flood_error, _flood_strikes, _current_edit_interval, _last_edit_time, _notify_new_message, _try_strip_cursor, _clean_for_display, _fallback_prefix, _metadata_for_send). Both mutations now fail on real assertions: guard 1 removed -> assert consumer._egress_declined is True guard 2 removed -> AssertionError: the unseen tail reached the wire: ['send'] NON-BLOCKING 1 — a docstring claimed more than the test exercises. test_requested_platform_name_is_also_normalised described a mixed-case send_message(target="Discord:999") bypass. That entry point cannot reach it: _resolve_tool_target lowercases the platform at tools/send_message_tool.py:47 before the guard runs. The test still pins a real contract — the helpers must not assume a lowercased argument, for the gateway lanes and any future non-normalising caller — so the claim is narrowed to that rather than the test removed. NON-BLOCKING 2 — the module docstring said "every lane drives the REAL RelayAdapter". The stream tests drive mixin doubles by design, because the behaviour under test belongs to the adapter's CALLER. Docstring now distinguishes the two kinds. NON-BLOCKING 3 — latch-deletion residue in gateway/relay/adapter.py:418: return None return latched if surface_declines else None The second line was unreachable and referenced a name deleted with the latch. Removed, along with the 20-line comment block describing the latch as "the structural fix" — that mechanism now lives on feat/p5-egress-decline-latch, not here. The reviewer independently confirmed the large deletion: an AST census between 3cf45736d7 and f57a2298fa reports only latch symbols removed and nothing added. 511 passed. * docs(relay): correct three claims that outran the code Review of 41ce3cc765 found no new production defect but three overstated claims, one of them in my own commit message. 1. THE LATCH COMMENTARY WAS STILL THERE. My previous commit message said it removed "the 20-line comment block describing the latch as the structural fix". It removed only the unreachable statement. Twenty lines at adapter.py:361-380 still described a per-chat latch, a choke point and its scope rules - none of which exist on this branch. In a refusal-sensitive module that reads as coverage this branch does not have. Now removed for real. This is the same defect class as the tests: a claim that outran what the code does. I made it while fixing that class. 2. THE STREAM-TEST DOCSTRING OVERSTATED BOTH MUTANTS. It said the mutation "now fails on the assertion that a send reached the wire" - true of one guard, not both. Verified separately: remove the _on_edit_failure check -> dies on _egress_declined, never reaches the fallback remove the fallback early return -> dies on the wire: ['send'] Both are valid behavioural failures, which is what the blocker asked for; they are different observables and the docstring now says so. 3. Duplicate `from types import SimpleNamespace` from an earlier scripted insert; imports reordered. 112 tests pass in the four focused files. * fix(relay): close two authorization defects found in review Both were reproduced before fixing and both mutants are pinned. 1. A LIVE relay adapter whose fronts_platform() raised degraded into the config fallback. `_live_relay_fronted` returned None for every failure, and None means "no live adapter, use the config snapshot" — so a faulting adapter plus an empty/stale snapshot made the guard conclude "not relay-routed" and authorize an unattested destination, while resolve_delivery_transport asks that same adapter and still routes over the relay. Measured: relay_routed=False, verdict None for chat 999. Absence and fault now have separate return values: None only when there is no runner or no relay adapter; a live adapter that cannot answer raises RelayRouteUnknown. This is the third instance of this bug class in this file, and the first two were also mine. 2. An attested chat whose id equalled the requested THREAD id vouched for that thread. The `thread in attested` arm proved nothing about parentage. Measured: attested {"-100A", "7"} authorized (-100A, thread 7). Only the bound `parent:thread` form is accepted now. Nothing legitimate needed the bare arm — _session_entry_id records a threaded origin as f"{chat_id}:{thread_id}", and a thread addressed as its own channel arrives as chat_id and passes the parent check. The existing test blessed the bare form via parametrize, so it PINNED the defect. Corrected, plus negative controls for the sibling-chat and other-parent cases and a positive control proving genuine absence still takes the config path (otherwise fix 1 would break native-only deploys). Merged origin/main (was 22 behind). 428 passed via scripts/run_tests.sh; full 10-row mutation ledger re-killed on the merged tree, none dying on an exception rather than an assertion. * fix(relay): only a missing adapter is absence; everything else is a fault Reviewer BLOCKER, reproduced before fixing. Two more paths where a PRESENT relay adapter still degraded into the config snapshot: 1. `fronts_platform` may be a property or descriptor, so the ATTRIBUTE LOOKUP can raise — and the lookup sat inside the absence handler. Probed with a raising property plus an empty snapshot: live=None, routed=False, verdict=None, i.e. an unattested target authorized. The previous test made an already-retrieved METHOD raise, so it could not reach this. 2. A present adapter with no usable `fronts_platform` returned None for the same reason. An adapter that cannot say what it fronts is broken, not absent, so it now raises too. Also found by my own spot-check while the review ran: the nested imports of `gateway.config` / `gateway.run` inside the live probe shared the broad handler, so a broken installation degraded to the snapshot as well. Probed with a healthy-adapter positive control in the same run — healthy refused the unattested target, faulted authorized it. `_relay_fronted` one function below already drew this exact distinction for its own import. The boundary is now: `relay is None` is the ONLY absence. Everything about a present adapter — attribute access, callability, the call itself, and the imports needed to reach it — is a fault and raises RelayRouteUnknown. This is the fourth variant of absence-vs-fault in this file and all four were mine. The lesson is in the code as a comment rather than in a commit message nobody re-reads. Four controls keep genuine absence benign: no runner, no relay adapter in the runner, a real ModuleNotFoundError naming the gateway package, and the configured-attested-target-still-sends case. 434 passed via scripts/run_tests.sh; 9-row mutation ledger re-killed including both new guards, none dying on an exception. * fix(relay): invert the live probe to fail closed by default Reviewer BLOCKER round 2, reproduced: reading the adapter registry can also raise. A runner whose `adapters.get()` raised gave relay_present=True, live=None, routed=False, verdict=None — unattested discord:999 authorized. That was the FIFTH boundary in one function with the same defect: the call, the attribute lookup, a non-callable attribute, the nested imports, and now the registry lookup. Each round I patched the reported boundary and the defect moved one statement up. The cause was the shape, not the statements: the function asked "did something go wrong?" and answered None, and None MEANS "no live adapter, use the config snapshot" — so every statement was a new chance to fail open, and every new statement would have been too. Inverted rather than patched a sixth time. Each `return None` now sits behind an explicit narrow check that cannot itself be the fault (no runner, no adapters, no relay key, gateway package genuinely absent), and one outer handler turns anything else into RelayRouteUnknown. A statement added inside this function is now fail-CLOSED by default. Verified all six fault shapes raise (call, attribute, missing method, registry .get, .adapters property, runner ref) and all five absence shapes stay benign, plus a liveness control where the config snapshot disagrees with a healthy adapter and the adapter still wins. Four new tests, including the two absence controls that keep native-only and CLI deployments working. 438 passed via scripts/run_tests.sh. Mutation ledger: 8 killed. One survivor recorded as a proven equivalent mutant — widening `if not registry` to `or {}` is behaviourally identical because `{}.get()` returns None, i.e. the same absence; it is a readability guard.

… fingerprint never authorizes a signal NousResearch#111617 review (andrexibiza P1 #3/#4, kvnloo nit): - worker_started_at persisted only gateway.status.get_process_start_time(): on Linux that is /proc/<pid>/stat field 22, clock ticks since THIS boot. The threat is a row surviving a reboot, and that counter does not, so an unrelated process on a later boot with the same PID and the same tick value passed _start_times_agree(). The fingerprint is now "<gateway.drain_control.current_instantiation_epoch()>|<start>" (boot_id + PID-1 start, the witness the drain marker already uses); both halves must match. Integer values on rows written before this change keep the start-time-only comparison. - A failed capture persisted NULL, which _pid_recycled treats as the legacy pre-fingerprint row and falls back to bare PID existence - a new spawn silently recreated the NousResearch#89614/ NousResearch#99558 kill authority. A failed capture now persists UNVERIFIED_WORKER_FINGERPRINT: the claim is held while the PID is live (never released beside it, never SIGTERM/SIGKILLed by timeout, stale-claim, manual reclaim, archive or the terminal reaper) and reclaimed once it is gone. NULL stays legacy-only. - Every tasks UPDATE that nulls worker_pid nulls worker_started_at too (archive_task and the reclaim/timeout/reopen paths): the fingerprint is part of the kill-authority tuple and must not outlive its pid. Live (real sleeper child): reboot-shaped row (same pid, same tick, other boot id) -> reclaimed to ready, child untouched; matching fingerprint -> SIGTERM delivered, exit -15. tests/hermes_cli/test_kanban_worker_pid_fingerprint.py: +2 hostile tests, both red on base. Not changed: the check-then-act window between _pid_recycled and kill (kvnloo P2) is real but needs pidfd_open/pidfd_send_signal (Linux 5.3+) to close atomically; left as the documented residual of "never kills a DETECTED recycled PID".

…rametrize test_cmd_gc_negative_days_leaves_workspaces_untouched and test_cmd_gc_retention_bounds[negative-refuses] killed the same mutant (the _cmd_gc guard turned into `if False`) and differed only in which fixture they asserted survived. Create the archived scratch workspace in the parametrized body (small helper) and assert on it alongside the event/log checks; drop the standalone test. WHY: one invariant, one test. The ordering claim ("refuse before ANY sweep" — the unconditional workspace sweep runs first in _cmd_gc) is still proven by the negative case; the 0/positive cases now also confirm that valid values let the workspace sweep run. The file goes from 6 to 5 test functions with no lost mutation coverage. Finding: simplify/D.quality.md #3 (tests/hermes_cli/test_kanban_gc_retention.py:82-97). Proof: with the _cmd_gc guard mutated to `if False`, test_cmd_gc_retention_bounds[negative-refuses] fails (1 failed, 7 passed); head is green (8 passed).

jarvisxyz and others added 4 commits April 6, 2026 13:25

jarvisxyz mentioned this pull request Apr 6, 2026

feat: Fetch Slack thread history for agent context NousResearch/hermes-agent#5582

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jarvisxyz force-pushed the main-with-fixes branch 2 times, most recently from 7511330 to 0848a79 Compare April 10, 2026 08:03

jarvisxyz closed this in fc086da Jun 7, 2026

jarvisxyz pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jul 19, 2026

fix: backfill missed Discord messages on startup (#3)

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feat: Fetch Slack thread history for agent context - #3

feat: Fetch Slack thread history for agent context#3
jarvisxyz wants to merge 4 commits into
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2026-04-06.eizus.slack-thread-context

jarvisxyz commented Apr 6, 2026 •

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jarvisxyz commented Apr 6, 2026 • edited Loading Uh oh! There was an error while loading. Please reload this page.

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jarvisxyz commented Apr 6, 2026 •

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