feat(inbox): add Hermes Inbox API surface E.1 - #2
Conversation
run_tests_parallel.py:
- --slice I/N flag (also HERMES_TEST_SLICE env var) runs only the
I-th slice of N, distributing files across slices by cached
duration using LPT (Longest Processing Time first) greedy
algorithm so each slice gets roughly equal wall time
- Duration cache (test_durations.json): maps relative file paths to
last-observed subprocess wall time. _save_durations merges with
existing cache so entries from other slices are preserved.
- Per-file subprocess timing in progress output + end-of-run
distribution summary (percentiles, top-10 slowest, <1s/<2s counts)
- Unknown files default to 2.0s estimate (~P50), spread evenly by LPT
.github/workflows/tests.yml:
- Matrix strategy: slice [1, 2, 3, 4] with fail-fast: false
- Each slice restores duration cache from main (stable key, no SHA),
runs its portion, uploads per-slice durations as artifacts
- save-durations job (main only, if: always()) downloads all 4
artifacts, merges into single cache entry for future PRs
- Timeout reduced from 60min to 30min per slice (~1/4 the work)
Cache design:
- Stable key (test-durations) not keyed by commit SHA — durations
are about files, not commits, and SHA-keyed caches miss on every
new commit and on PR merge commits
- actions/cache scoping: main's cache is visible to all PRs targeting
main; feature branches without a cache still work (default 2.0s)
- No dotfile prefix (upload-artifact v7 skips hidden files)
- test_browser_secret_exfil: mock _run_browser_command instead of launching real Chrome (secret check is pre-launch, browser is irrelevant to the assertion) - test_web_server: add time.sleep(0.05) after pub.send_text() to yield the event loop before receive_text(). TestClient's sync mode can race the broadcast handler otherwise, hanging the test.
Benchmarked 4/5/6/7/8 slices with LPT duration-balanced distribution: - 4 slices: 4.8m wall, 135s spread - 5 slices: 3.4m wall, 46s spread - 6 slices: 3.3m wall, 26s spread ← optimal - 7 slices: 3.9m wall, 109s spread - 8 slices: 3.7m wall, 96s spread 6 slices is the sweet spot: lowest wall time, tightest spread. 7+ gets slower due to per-slice startup overhead dominating. Also removes benchmark branch markers from save-durations condition.
Removes the global `uppercase` + `font-mondwest` from the App.tsx root
that forced every page to opt-out, replaces stacked-alpha text colors
with semantic tokens for WCAG-AA contrast across all 7 themes, and
applies the new `text-display` utility from @nous-research/ui@0.16.0
on intentional brand chrome (page titles, sidebar headings, segmented
filters) only. Bumps every sub-12px arbitrary text size to text-xs.
Also widens the dashboard plugin routes (/api/dashboard/agent-plugins/
{name:path}/...) so category-namespaced plugins like observability/
langfuse and image_gen/openai can be enable/disabled from the dashboard
— previously the FE encodeURIComponent-ed the slash and the backend
{name} route rejected it. _validate_plugin_name still blocks .. and
backslash, and strips leading/trailing slash.
Touches sessions/env/keys page chrome and adds two new i18n keys
(`overview`, `showMore`/`showLess`) across all 18 locales.
Squashes 19 commits from PR NousResearch#28832.
Co-authored-by: Hermes <noreply@nousresearch.com>
Follow-up to PR NousResearch#28832 — the dashboard plugin routes now accept slashed names like `observability/langfuse` and `image_gen/openai`, but `_sanitize_plugin_name` still rejected forward slash and so dashboard update + remove on those plugins fell through to '404 not found' even though they exist on disk. Adds an opt-in `allow_subdir=True` flag that: - Permits internal forward slashes (category-namespaced plugin keys emitted by `_discover_all_plugins`). - Strips leading and trailing slashes. - Still rejects `..` and backslash, and still asserts the resolved target lives inside `plugins_dir`. Opted in at the two read-paths that operate on installed plugins: `_require_installed_plugin` (CLI update/remove) and `_user_installed_plugin_dir` (dashboard update/remove). The install path keeps the default (`allow_subdir=False`) because freshly-cloned plugins always land top-level under `~/.hermes/plugins/<name>/`. Adds 6 targeted unit tests covering the new flag's allow/reject matrix.
…ding, hash file paths - skills_hub: validate that uninstall_skill's install_path resolves inside SKILLS_DIR before calling shutil.rmtree, preventing recursive deletion of arbitrary directories via poisoned lock.json entries - skills_hub: include file paths (not just contents) in bundle_content_hash so swapping filenames between files changes the hash, strengthening update-detection integrity - pairing: wrap list_pending() in self._lock so _cleanup_expired() file writes don't race with concurrent generate_code()/approve_code() calls Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
… bundle_content_hash) PR NousResearch#6656 added rel_path + \x00 prefixing to ``bundle_content_hash`` so a filename swap between two files in a bundle changes the digest. But it only patched the in-memory side — ``content_hash`` in ``tools/skills_guard.py`` (the on-disk equivalent) still hashed file contents only. These two functions need to stay symmetric: ``check_for_skill_updates`` compares the disk hash of an installed skill against the bundle hash of the upstream copy. With the asymmetric fix, every clean install showed as drifted because the digests no longer matched (2 existing tests in ``test_skills_hub.py`` started failing as soon as the contributor's change landed). Apply the same ``rel_path + \x00 + content`` shape to the disk-side function. Both functions now produce the same digest for the same skill content laid out two ways. Documented the symmetry invariant in the docstring so a future change to either function knows to touch both. Also adds tests/tools/test_pr_6656_regressions.py with 10 regression tests covering all three fixes salvaged in PR NousResearch#6656: - uninstall_skill path traversal (4 cases: parent segments, absolute paths, symlink escape, legitimate skill) - bundle_content_hash filename swap detection (4 cases: in-memory swap, identity, disk-side swap, bundle↔disk symmetry) - list_pending lock contract (2 cases: source-grep contract, smoke) Also fixes AUTHOR_MAP entry for @aaronlab — their commit email (1115117931@qq.com) maps to "aaronagent" which isn't a real GitHub login, so changelog @mentions would 404.
…ousResearch#17656) `get_read_block_error` previously only denied reads inside `${HERMES_HOME}/skills/.hub`, which left `auth.json` (provider OAuth state + plaintext API keys) and `.anthropic_oauth.json` (Anthropic PKCE tokens) directly readable by the agent. A prompt-injection reaching `read_file` could exfiltrate active provider credentials in plaintext. Mode-0600 file permissions only protect against *other Unix users* — the agent runs as the file's owner, so `read_file` is unaffected. Extend the existing deny list with the three credential paths identified in NousResearch#17656 (`auth.json`, `auth.lock`, `.anthropic_oauth.json`). The check uses the same `Path.resolve()` pattern as `skills/.hub`, so symlink/path-traversal indirection is caught too. The agent doesn't need to read these directly — `auxiliary_client` and `credential_pool` consume them through process env / OAuth flows that bypass `read_file`. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
read_file_tool resolves relative paths against TERMINAL_CWD (or the task's live terminal cwd), but the prior call passed the original unresolved string to get_read_block_error. That function's own resolve() is anchored at the Python process cwd, so when a task's TERMINAL_CWD pointed at HERMES_HOME and the agent issued read_file on the relative path "auth.json", the credential-store denylist was never reached and the file was read normally. Pass the already-resolved absolute path string at the file_tools call site, document the contract on get_read_block_error, and add a read_file_tool-level regression test that pins the relative-path case under TERMINAL_CWD == HERMES_HOME. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…ts, root Extends @briandevans's PR NousResearch#17659 from {auth.json, auth.lock, .anthropic_oauth.json} to also cover: - HERMES_HOME/.env (provider API keys) - HERMES_HOME/webhook_subscriptions.json (per-route HMAC secrets) - HERMES_HOME/mcp-tokens/ (OAuth token directory; dir + everything inside) …AND iterates over both _hermes_home_path() AND _hermes_root_path() so profile-mode runs (HERMES_HOME = <root>/profiles/<name>) also block <root>/{auth.json, .env, mcp-tokens/, ...}. Same widening shape as the write-deny side already does (NousResearch#15981, NousResearch#14157). Explicitly NOT a security boundary. Per the personal-assistant trust model, the terminal tool runs as the same OS user and can `cat auth.json` directly. This read-deny exists as defense-in-depth: - Models that respect tool denials empirically tend to stop rather than reach for the shell. - The denial surfaces an audit trail when something tries to read credentials — easier to spot in logs than a generic `cat`. Docstring + error message both flag this as defense-in-depth so future contributors don't mistake it for a real security boundary and don't re-decline reports that propose the same fix shape. Absorbs the .env and mcp-tokens/ coverage from @tomqiaozc's parallel PR NousResearch#8055 (closed-as-duplicate, credited). Co-authored-by: Tom Qiao <zqiao@microsoft.com>
🔎 Lint report:
|
| Rule | Count |
|---|---|
unresolved-import |
6 |
First entries
tests/test_inbox_routes.py:8: [unresolved-import] unresolved-import: Cannot resolve imported module `pytest`
tests/tools/test_pr_6656_regressions.py:27: [unresolved-import] unresolved-import: Cannot resolve imported module `pytest`
tests/test_inbox_routes.py:10: [unresolved-import] unresolved-import: Cannot resolve imported module `fastapi.testclient`
hermes_cli/inbox_routes.py:21: [unresolved-import] unresolved-import: Cannot resolve imported module `fastapi`
tests/test_inbox_routes.py:64: [unresolved-import] unresolved-import: Cannot resolve imported module `fastapi`
tests/agent/test_file_safety_credentials.py:19: [unresolved-import] unresolved-import: Cannot resolve imported module `pytest`
✅ Fixed issues: none
Unchanged: 4770 pre-existing issues carried over.
Diagnostics are surfaced as warnings — this check never fails the build.
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| page_messages = all_messages[:limit] | ||
| next_cursor: str | None = None | ||
| if len(all_messages) > limit: | ||
| next_cursor = str(offset + limit) # skip all items on this page on next call |
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Fix cursor math so paginated list doesn't skip messages
list_inbox_messages() computes next_cursor as offset + limit while the read path treats cursor as “index of last item from previous page” and advances by +1, so page 2 starts one item too far. For example with 5 messages and limit=2, page 1 returns cursor 2, page 2 starts at offset 3, and index 2 is never returned; clients permanently miss messages and pagination ends early.
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| for mid in message_ids: | ||
| try: | ||
| results.append(mark_inbox_message_read(inbox_dir=inbox_dir, message_id=mid)) | ||
| except HermesInboxError as exc: |
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Validate mark-read IDs before calling path checks
inbox_mark_read() accepts arbitrary JSON values in message_ids and passes each element directly to mark_inbox_message_read(). If a client sends a non-string ID (e.g. 123), _message_path() evaluates "/" in message_id and raises TypeError, which is not caught by the except HermesInboxError block, causing a 500 instead of a client error/structured per-item error.
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| def inbox_get(message_id: str) -> dict[str, Any]: | ||
| """Get a single inbox message by id.""" | ||
| inbox_dir = _get_inbox_dir() | ||
| message = get_inbox_message(inbox_dir=inbox_dir, message_id=message_id) |
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Handle invalid message IDs in GET endpoint
inbox_get() calls get_inbox_message() without handling HermesInboxError, so malformed IDs rejected by _message_path() (e.g. traversal-like ..) bubble up as unhandled exceptions and return 500. This should be translated to a 4xx response so invalid user input does not look like a server fault.
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…id (NousResearch#38763) Context compression today rewrites the message list AND rotates the session id — it ends the session, forks a parent_session_id child, and renumbers the title (name -> name #2). That moving identity key is the root cause of a whole bug cluster: /goal lost (NousResearch#33618), pending response lost at the split (NousResearch#14238), orphan sessions (NousResearch#33907), TUI sid desync (NousResearch#36777), FTS search gaps + duplicate sidebar entries (NousResearch#45117), null continuation cwd (NousResearch#42228), and title-rename dead-ends (NousResearch#48989). It also forced a large defensive apparatus (compression lock, contextvar/env/ logging triple-sync, orphan finalization, gateway SessionEntry re-propagation, tip projection) whose only job is surviving a mid-conversation id change. Add a compression.in_place config flag (default False during rollout). When True, compaction rewrites the transcript and rebuilds the system prompt but keeps the SAME session_id: no end_session, no child row, no title renumber, no contextvar/logging re-sync, no memory/context-engine session-switch. The conversation keeps one durable id for life, like Claude Code / Codex. Compaction is lossy by design — the pre-compaction transcript is summarized away, not archived. The rotation path is unchanged when the flag is off (moved verbatim into an else branch). Staged rollout: this PR ships the option behind a default-off flag for live validation; a follow-up flips the default and deletes the now-redundant rotation machinery, superseding the 14 open band-aid PRs in this area. - hermes_cli/config.py: add compression.in_place (default False), documented - agent/agent_init.py: resolve the flag -> agent.compression_in_place - agent/conversation_compression.py: branch compress_context() on the flag - tests/run_agent/test_in_place_compaction.py: in-place invariants + rotation regression guard + config default The pre-flush of current-turn messages (NousResearch#47202) runs in BOTH modes, so no boundary data loss. Prompt-cache invariant preserved: the system-prompt rebuild is the same single sanctioned invalidation that already happens during compaction — no NEW invalidation. Message alternation preserved.
…eation snapshot (NousResearch#44585) An unpinned cron job follows the global default provider (config.yaml model.default + resolve_runtime_provider). If that global state is changed after the job is created — e.g. a temporary switch to a paid provider like nous/claude-fable-5 — the job silently inherits it on its next tick and spends real money. This is the reported $7.73 incident: a job created under a free/default provider later inherited a temporary paid switch. Fix (ask #1 only) preserves the legitimate "unpinned job should follow model.default" use case by detecting *drift* rather than freezing the model: - create_job (cron/jobs.py): for UNPINNED, agent-backed jobs (no explicit provider, not no_agent), snapshot the provider that resolution WOULD pick right now into a new optional `provider_snapshot` field, resolved via the same resolve_runtime_provider() path the ticker uses. Fail-open to None on any resolution error so job creation never breaks. - run_job (cron/scheduler.py): right after runtime resolution, if the job has a provider_snapshot AND is unpinned AND the currently-resolved provider DIFFERS from the snapshot, fail closed for that run — make no paid call and deliver a loud, actionable alert naming both providers and telling the user to pin explicitly (`cronjob action=update job_id=.. provider=..`). Back-compat: jobs with no snapshot (pre-existing jobs, no_agent jobs, or any job whose creation-time resolution failed) behave exactly as before — the guard only engages when a snapshot exists. Explicitly-pinned jobs (job.provider set) are unaffected since they don't drift with global state. Tests: tests/cron/test_cron_provider_pin.py covers snapshot-matches (runs), snapshot-differs (fail closed, no agent constructed), no-snapshot back-compat, None-snapshot back-compat, explicitly-pinned (runs regardless), plus create_job snapshot capture/skip/fail-open. The fail-closed case is load-bearing (fails without the guard). Issue NousResearch#44585 asks #2-4 (hard-stop a running job, gateway-stop containment, fail-closed on provider mutation) are out of scope for this change.
…_id signature churn Two independent bugs evicted the cached gateway AIAgent on every turn, preventing the prompt cache from ever warming: 1. Model normalization mismatch: the post-run fallback-eviction check compared _agent.model (stripped in AIAgent.__init__) against the raw _resolve_gateway_model() config string. For vendor-prefixed config on native providers (e.g. 'deepseek/deepseek-v4-pro' vs 'deepseek-v4-pro') this was always unequal, so the agent was evicted after every successful run. Normalize _cfg_model the same way (skip aggregators). 2. Discord triggering message_id leaked into the cached system prompt via build_session_context_prompt()'s Discord IDs block. message_id changes every turn, so the agent-cache signature (computed from the ephemeral prompt) changed every Discord turn -> rebuild every message. The id is now injected per-turn into the user message (where per-turn content belongs and does not touch the cache signature); the cached IDs block carries a static pointer to it, preserving reply/react/pin via the discord tools. Adapted from NousResearch#28846. Bug #1 fix is the contributor's; bug #2 reworked to be non-destructive (keeps the triggering-id capability instead of deleting it). Redundant auto-reset eviction (already on main via NousResearch#9893/NousResearch#48031) and the wrong-premise reset_context_note plumbing from the original PR were dropped. Co-authored-by: Hermes Agent <hermes@nousresearch.com>
… fail on '(empty)' sentinel Two related bugs caused subagent delegation to silently return empty summaries with 0 tokens when the user configured delegation.provider=bedrock alongside delegation.base_url=https://bedrock-runtime.<region>.amazonaws.com. Root cause #1 — misrouting in _resolve_delegation_credentials(): The configured_base_url branch unconditionally forced provider='custom' and api_mode='chat_completions', only specializing for chatgpt.com, anthropic, and kimi hosts. Bedrock (and other native-SDK providers) fell through as 'custom' + chat_completions, which then POSTed OpenAI-shaped JSON at Bedrock's native API. Bedrock rejected the payload and returned nothing, which looked like an empty LLM response to the child agent. Fix: when provider is one of {bedrock, vertex, google, google-genai}, skip the base_url short-circuit and fall through to resolve_runtime_provider(), which knows how to construct the proper SDK client. base_url can still be forwarded through that path for regional overrides. Root cause #2 — '(empty)' sentinel accepted as success: After N retries of empty LLM responses, run_agent.py emits the literal string '(empty)' as final_response. _run_single_child then hit `elif summary:` — '(empty)' is truthy, so status became 'completed' and the parent surfaced a blank result with no error. Users saw api_calls=4, tokens=0, duration~0.4s, status=completed. Fix: treat final_response.strip() == '(empty)' as a failure so the parent surfaces it instead of silently accepting zero-content 'success'. Both paths were reproduced in a live Hermes TUI session on us-west-2 Bedrock (provider=bedrock, model=us.anthropic.claude-sonnet-4-6) and are covered by new tests in tests/tools/test_delegate.py.
…ch#67140) The background write guard decided ownership from `isinstance(usage_rec, dict)`, so a local skill with NO usage record passed. That successful write called bump_patch(), which created a `created_by: null` record — and the identical write was refused from then on. "Allowed exactly once, then never" is a race with our own bookkeeping, not a policy. Reproduced on main: patch #1 succeeds, patch #2 with the same arguments is refused. Option B from the issue. Option A (split `session_review` from `scheduled_curator` and let the session fork patch user-owned skills it consulted) would widen autonomous write permission onto skills the user owns with no user present to consent — wrong direction for a no-user-present actor. - skill_manager_tool: missing and explicit-null records now resolve IDENTICALLY, both fail closed. The refusal names the reason and points at `hermes curator adopt <name>`. - background_review: both review prompts told the reviewer to patch any skill consulted in the session and claimed pinned skills could be improved, while enforcement refused both. Prompts now list pinned, external, and user-owned skills as protected, and tell the reviewer to RECOMMEND adoption instead of attempting a write that will be refused. - skill_usage: document that `created_by` is a curator-management policy flag, not a provenance claim, and add `is_curator_managed()` so call sites read as the question they ask. Field name retained — it is on disk in every `.usage.json` and renaming would strand those records. - curator CLI: `hermes curator list-unmanaged` itemizes unmanaged skills with the reason each is unmanaged (completes the NousResearch#67139 spec). Foreground writes are untouched: a user-directed edit to a user-owned skill still works, including on pinned skills. Sibling tests: 9 failures in test_skill_manager_tool.py were fixtures that created record-less skills to exercise OTHER guards (consolidation-delete, read-before-write) and relied on ownership falling through. Fixed at the fixture, since the real curator only ever operates on managed sediment. One test asserted the old "manually authored" wording; rewritten to assert the behavior contract instead of the string. Validation: 274 targeted tests + all 7 background-review files (60 tests) pass. E2E on a temp HERMES_HOME (30 checks) covers the flip, foreground writes, adoption unblocking, pin semantics, prompt/enforcement parity, and the new verb. Each new test sabotage-verified: revert the fix, confirm it goes red. Fixes NousResearch#67140
…hat tile (NousResearch#71969) * fix: Branch button is a dead no-op inside a branched chat tile session-tile.tsx wired onBranchInNewChat to () => undefined for tiled/branched sessions (nested branching isn't supported there), but the button in AssistantMessage's action bar rendered unconditionally regardless of whether a real handler was supplied. The button looked clickable but silently did nothing, with no visual feedback. - AssistantMessage now only renders the Branch button when onBranchInNewChat is actually provided, matching the existing pattern used for onDismissError/onRestoreToMessage. - session-tile.tsx no longer passes a no-op handler; the prop is simply omitted so the button doesn't render in tiles. - onBranchInNewChat is now optional on ChatViewProps, and the latestChatActions passthrough wrapper uses the existing latestOptional helper instead of an unconditional call. * test: assert Branch button visibility matches handler presence Adds coverage for the bug #2 fix: renders Thread with and without an onBranchInNewChat handler and asserts the Branch in new chat button is shown only when a real handler is supplied, hidden otherwise - covering both the normal open-chat case and the session-tile (branched chat) case that used to leave a dead, clickable button.
… a broken chat A completely unconfigured install previously booted into a working-looking chat (banner showed model 'unknown'), accepted a message, spun ~30s, then failed with 'Set OPENROUTER_API_KEY' — a provider the user never chose — and never offered setup. - HermesCLI.run() now probes provider readiness at startup (TTY only) and offers the shared provider picker (hermes model flow, which fronts Quick Setup / Nous Portal OAuth) when nothing is configured. Decline is respected; picker state re-syncs into the live CLI so the next turn works without a restart. - New silent probe _runtime_credentials_ready(): no printing, no state mutation; handles keyless local endpoints and callable bearer providers. - The empty-api-key error is provider-aware: names the actual resolved provider and points at 'hermes model' / 'hermes setup' instead of hardcoding OPENROUTER_API_KEY. - Banner: unconfigured installs render 'no model configured — run /model' in red instead of the silent 'unknown' model slug. Consumer-onboarding audit finding #2 (sev 5), Aug 2026.
A wedged adapter transport (network hang, dead websocket) previously blocked _check_session_stalls forever: sibling candidates in the same pass were never evaluated and the watcher stopped ticking. Wrap the send in asyncio.wait_for (15s); on timeout log a WARNING and do NOT latch, so the next tick retries. Regression uses a never-resolving fake adapter and proves the pass completes, a healthy sibling candidate is still notified in the same pass, and the watcher ticks again (sabotage-verified against the unbounded send).
…on delegation callbacks (NousResearch#82592) * fix(gateway): stop frozen-preview finals and dropped idle-session delegation callbacks Two relay-plane delivery losses from the 2026-08-09 staging incident: 1. stream_consumer: the skip-redundant-finalize branch recorded _accumulated as the delivered turn-final payload even when the last ACKED edit was an earlier throttled preview snapshot, so delivered_final_matches reconciled True and the gateway suppressed the corrective final send — the user was left with a cut-off message ending in the streaming cursor. Extracted _mark_skip_redundant_finalize(): records the last acked wire payload (cursor-stripped), so a preview/final mismatch now returns False and the normal final send fires. 2. run.py: _classify_completion_target classified every ended parent session terminal unless it ended by compression. Idle/timeout session ends are the norm on scale-to-zero relay deployments and the chat route remains valid; completed async delegation results were terminally dropped. Ended parents now classify deliver unless the end was an explicit user boundary (session_reset / user_exit / session_switch). * fix(relay): drain in-flight outbound frames before transport teardown disconnect() failed every pending outbound future immediately with 'relay transport closed', so a trailing finalize edit racing turn teardown was lost even though the connector socket could still serve it. Bounded drain grace (5s) lets in-flight requests resolve; silent connectors still tear down promptly. asyncio.wait (not gather+wait_for) so a timeout doesn't cancel futures owned by the fail-remaining loop. * fix(gateway): route completion injection through the alias-aware transport resolver Third relay-plane delivery loss from the 2026-08-09 staging incidents: a delegation batch completed while the gateway was up, the watcher drained the event, and delivery vanished with no log line. _inject_watch_notification resolved its adapter with a literal p.value == platform_name scan of self.adapters — a relay-fronted gateway registers ONE adapter under Platform.RELAY fronting N logical platforms, so 'slack' never matched and the injection returned None ('no gateway route'), silently dropping the completion. The handoff path already documents this exact trap and uses resolve_delivery_transport; the injection path now does the same (native wins; relay eligible only when it fronts the logical platform), with the literal scan kept as fallback for stub runners and exotic platforms. * fix(relay): clamp disconnect drain grace to the runner's adapter-disconnect budget Review finding (JoaoMarcos44, NousResearch#82592): a fixed 5.0s drain in front of the three 1.0s sequential teardown awaits gives an 8.0s worst case inside the runner's 5.0s asyncio.wait_for(adapter.disconnect()) — tripping it cancels teardown mid-drain, skips the fail-pending loop, and leaves outbound callers blocked until _OUTBOUND_TIMEOUT_S (30s). The effective grace is now budget - 3*TEARDOWN - margin (env-aware via the same HERMES_GATEWAY_ADAPTER_DISCONNECT_TIMEOUT the runner reads), so the drain can never push teardown past its caller's budget; a budget too small for any drain disables it cleanly. * test(gateway): pin the final-send suppression contract across a behaviour matrix The gateway skips its own final send when the stream consumer claims the turn final already reached the user. Every incident in that family — NousResearch#71643 (stale finalize snapshot), NousResearch#78541 (payload-less multi-message split), NousResearch#82656 (frozen preview left with a visible cursor) — is the same failure: the consumer claimed delivery for text the platform never rendered, so the corrective send was suppressed and the answer was lost with no retry. Each was fixed with a scenario test pinned to one branch of GatewayStreamConsumer.run(). The got_done handler now has five sibling branches that each set the suppression flags and record a turn-final payload, and nothing checks them as a group: a new branch, or a new early `return True` in _send_or_edit, can reintroduce the class without failing a test. Pin the invariant instead of the branch — if the consumer offers the gateway any signal it would trust, the complete final text must have reached the wire — and assert it across {edit always / dies / never / lies} x {send always / never} x {fresh-final on / off} x {clean / interrupted stream}. The adapter records only frames that actually rendered, so an ACK the platform drops does not count as delivery. 24 honest-transport scenarios hold the invariant as a hard assertion. The 16 lying-transport scenarios are checked too; the single combination that still violates it is reported as an expected failure documenting the open exposure rather than asserting it away. Refs NousResearch#82656 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(gateway,relay): prime relay egress routing for synthetic injections + cap stale completion replay Defect #4 from the 2026-08-09 staging incidents (upgrade-robustness): after every gateway restart the durable async-delegation replay injected completions correctly (post-741663cf1) but their replies bounced at the connector — 'slack egress declined: target not routed to an onboarded tenant'. The relay adapter re-attaches tenant discriminators (metadata.scope_id / metadata.user_id) from per-chat caches warmed ONLY by inbound traffic; synthetic turns race those cold caches on every deploy, scale-to-zero wake, and crash recovery. - relay adapter: prime_routing_cache() — feeds a synthetic event's session-store origin through the same _capture_scope used for real inbound (never raises). - run.py injection path: prime the resolved adapter before handle_message (duck-typed; native adapters unaffected). - async_delegation: 48h staleness cap in restore_undelivered_completions — a pending completion older than the cap is terminally dropped (payload stays queryable) instead of re-run as a fresh full-context turn; the post-restart replay of a July session burned a 102K-token context. Also carried: JoaoMarcos44's suppression behaviour-matrix harness (cherry-picked from NousResearch#82676, authorship preserved) — 39 passed + 1 xfail (the documented ACK-then-drop transport-honesty residue). * test: use recent timestamps in restored-ownership fixtures test_restore_stamps_restored_flag persisted its completion with epoch-era toy timestamps (dispatched_at=1.0), which the new 48h replay staleness cap correctly classifies as stale — the fixture then exercised the cap instead of the restored-flag contract (CI slice 4 failure). Timestamps are now now-relative; the staleness behavior itself is pinned separately in test_relay_injection_egress_priming.py. * fix(gateway,relay): close four review findings on the relay delivery fixes Review follow-ups on this branch (NousResearch#82592): 1. HIGH — classifier/resolver mismatch (falsely-acknowledged loss). _classify_completion_target now returns "deliver" for idle-ended parents, but _resolve_async_delegation_session still dropped every non-compression-ended pin: the durable row was acked at adapter acceptance, then the injection died inside the pipeline with no retry — strictly worse than the honest terminal drop on main, and the delivery leg defect #2's fix depends on did not exist. The resolver now retargets non-user-boundary ends (idle/timeout/ lifecycle) to the chat's current session — session_entry already IS the routing key's current session for the same chat — while user boundaries (session_reset / new_session / user_exit / session_switch) stay fail-closed. Both sides share one module-level _USER_BOUNDARY_END_REASONS so the verdict and the routing decision cannot drift again; a coherence test asserts deliver-verdicts resolve non-None across representative end reasons. 2. HIGH — drain clamp missed adapter-level spend. The effective drain grace budgeted drain + 3x teardown, but RelayAdapter.disconnect spends revocation-monitor teardown + go_idle time BEFORE the transport drain inside the same runner wait_for; worst case still blew the budget and cancelled teardown mid-drain (skipping the fail-pending loop). The adapter now measures its own elapsed time and threads the REMAINING budget into transport.disconnect(budget_s=...); legacy/stub transports without the keyword fall back to the no-arg signature. 3. P1 — _request_response racing disconnect() could register a future after the fail-pending loop already ran, stranding the caller for the full _OUTBOUND_TIMEOUT_S (30s). Fail fast with the same "relay transport closed" error once _closing is set. 4. P1 — _build_process_event_source's last-resort reconstruction dropped scope_id, so a scoped relay completion whose session-store origin was unavailable primed no tenant discriminator and could still bounce off the connector's fail-closed egress guard. scope_id now threads through the reconstructed SessionSource, with a warning when a scoped chat reconstructs without one. All four: RED reproduced with the fix reverted, GREEN after; relay/ delegation delivery families pass (43 + 71 + 179 across the touched suites); full tests/gateway run shows only failures already failing identically on merge base 2446c8b (env/dep issues). * fix(gateway,relay): make pending-frame failure cancellation-safe; persist completion routing origin Two remaining review findings on this branch (NousResearch#82592): 1. Cancellation could strand outbound waiters past the fail-pending loop. transport.disconnect() failed pending futures only at the END of the drain + three teardown awaits; a cancellation landing mid-drain (the runner's wait_for budget, an outer cleanup deadline) skipped the loop entirely and left registered futures unresolved — their callers blocked until _OUTBOUND_TIMEOUT_S (30s). The budget threading added earlier shrinks the window but is not a hard guarantee. The fail-pending loop (and the going_idle ack failure) now run in a `finally`, so no exit path — normal, error, or cancelled — can leave a registered future unresolved. Idempotent: done futures are skipped, a second disconnect() pass is a no-op. 2. Durable completions did not persist their routing origin, so the scope_id threading in the fallback SessionSource reconstruction had nothing to carry on the exact path it exists for (restart replay with session store + source cache gone): the async-delegation event producers never populated scope_id and the durable rows never stored it. Dispatch now snapshots the originating turn's scope_id/user_id/user_name from the session context (_capture_routing_origin — a new HERMES_SESSION_SCOPE_ID contextvar bound by the gateway at session-bind time alongside the existing vars), stores them in the existing task_json payload (no schema migration), and re-attaches them to all three completion-event shapes (live single, live batch, crash-recovery rebuild). The gateway's fallback reconstruction then primes both discriminators after a restart. Tests: cancellation mid-drain -> every pending future resolves with "relay transport closed" (mutation: moving the loop out of the finally goes RED); second-pass disconnect idempotence; end-to-end dispatch -> owner-death recovery -> event carries scope_id -> fallback SessionSource primes it (mutations: dropping the dispatch capture or the task_json persistence both go RED); live completion event carries the origin. 94 passed + 1 xfailed across the delivery/delegation suites; tests/tools delegation family 73 passed (2 collection errors pre-existing on merge base 2446c8b). --------- Co-authored-by: joaomarcos <joaomarcosdias444@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Ben Barclay <ben@nousresearch.com>
Summary
Add Hermes Inbox HTTP API Surface (Stage E.1).
Endpoints:
Features:
Tests
Safety