Add mfa_weakest_device to UserStatusV2#46957
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| user.SetLocalAuth(auth) | ||
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| if auth != nil { |
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Suggestion: I would split the new definitions (and more mundane code changes) and new code additions into separate PRs. That would make 2 smaller, more focused PRs, which should make for easier reviews. (It would hopefully touch less files at once too.)
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(No need to split it now, but consider that for future PRs.)
| // MFA device is known to be configured using TOTP as the weakest form of MFA. | ||
| MFA_STATE_TOTP = 2; | ||
| // MFA device is known to be configured using U2F as the weakest form of MFA. | ||
| MFA_STATE_U2F = 3; |
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Do we need to distinguish between U2F and WEBAUTHN? Why not call both WEBAUTHN?
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I wanted to distinguish when a user has a webauthn only configured vs when he has a u2f given that U2F can't be used to passwordless login to teleport.
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WEBAUTHN doesn't necessarily mean passkey either, so I think the distinction is moot. All we would detect here are users with relatively old devices / clusters. I would still combine U2F and WEBAUTHN and only re-introduce U2F if we really cared about it specifically.
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rosstimothy
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You might want to update the title/description and commit message to replace mfa_device_state with mfa_weakest_device
This PR introduces the `mfa_weakest_device` value which is used to specify the weakest MFA device for the account. When a user has no MFA device, it's set to `MFA_DEVICE_KIND_UNSET`. When a user has at least one TOTP device, it's set to `MFA_DEVICE_KIND_TOTP`. When a user ONLY has webauthn or U2F devices, it's set to `MFA_DEVICE_KIND_WEBAUTHN`. This newly introduced field will be utilized by Access Graph to identify insecure patterns that could be potential phishing attack targets, particularly for users without MFA devices or those using TOTP devices.
mfa_device_state to UserStatusV2mfa_weakest_device to UserStatusV2
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This PR introduces the `mfa_weakest_device` value which is used to specify the weakest MFA device for the account. When a user has no MFA device, it's set to `MFA_DEVICE_KIND_UNSET`. When a user has at least one TOTP device, it's set to `MFA_DEVICE_KIND_TOTP`. When a user ONLY has webauthn or U2F devices, it's set to `MFA_DEVICE_KIND_WEBAUTHN`. This newly introduced field will be utilized by Access Graph to identify insecure patterns that could be potential phishing attack targets, particularly for users without MFA devices or those using TOTP devices.
This PR introduces the `mfa_weakest_device` value which is used to specify the weakest MFA device for the account. When a user has no MFA device, it's set to `MFA_DEVICE_KIND_UNSET`. When a user has at least one TOTP device, it's set to `MFA_DEVICE_KIND_TOTP`. When a user ONLY has webauthn or U2F devices, it's set to `MFA_DEVICE_KIND_WEBAUTHN`. This newly introduced field will be utilized by Access Graph to identify insecure patterns that could be potential phishing attack targets, particularly for users without MFA devices or those using TOTP devices.
This PR introduces the `mfa_weakest_device` value which is used to specify the weakest MFA device for the account. When a user has no MFA device, it's set to `MFA_DEVICE_KIND_UNSET`. When a user has at least one TOTP device, it's set to `MFA_DEVICE_KIND_TOTP`. When a user ONLY has webauthn or U2F devices, it's set to `MFA_DEVICE_KIND_WEBAUTHN`. This newly introduced field will be utilized by Access Graph to identify insecure patterns that could be potential phishing attack targets, particularly for users without MFA devices or those using TOTP devices.
This PR introduces the `mfa_weakest_device` value which is used to specify the weakest MFA device for the account. When a user has no MFA device, it's set to `MFA_DEVICE_KIND_UNSET`. When a user has at least one TOTP device, it's set to `MFA_DEVICE_KIND_TOTP`. When a user ONLY has webauthn or U2F devices, it's set to `MFA_DEVICE_KIND_WEBAUTHN`. This newly introduced field will be utilized by Access Graph to identify insecure patterns that could be potential phishing attack targets, particularly for users without MFA devices or those using TOTP devices.
This PR introduces the `mfa_weakest_device` value which is used to specify the weakest MFA device for the account. When a user has no MFA device, it's set to `MFA_DEVICE_KIND_UNSET`. When a user has at least one TOTP device, it's set to `MFA_DEVICE_KIND_TOTP`. When a user ONLY has webauthn or U2F devices, it's set to `MFA_DEVICE_KIND_WEBAUTHN`. This newly introduced field will be utilized by Access Graph to identify insecure patterns that could be potential phishing attack targets, particularly for users without MFA devices or those using TOTP devices.
This PR introduces the
mfa_weakest_devicevalue which is used to specify the weakest MFA device for the account.When a user has no MFA device, it's set to
MFA_DEVICE_KIND_UNSET.When a user has at least one TOTP device, it's set to
MFA_DEVICE_KIND_TOTP.When a user ONLY has webauthn or U2F devices, it's set to
MFA_DEVICE_KIND_WEBAUTHN.This newly introduced field will be utilized by Access Graph to identify insecure patterns that could be potential phishing attack targets, particularly for users without MFA devices or those using TOTP devices.