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fix(core): prevent path traversal in custome command file injection #27234

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Merged
ompatel-aiml merged 6 commits into from
May 19, 2026
Merged

fix(core): prevent path traversal in custome command file injection #27234

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2858ab7
fix(core): prevent path traversal in custom command file injection
ompatel-aiml May 18, 2026
7bcadec
feat(core): add defense-in-depth workspace validation for directory e…
ompatel-aiml May 18, 2026
fa2af98
test(core): add regression tests for symlink escapes and recursive tr…
ompatel-aiml May 19, 2026
baefe05
feat(core): add explicit skip message for out-of-workspace files
ompatel-aiml May 19, 2026
b92af70
test(core): add comprehensive tests for explicit skip messaging
ompatel-aiml May 19, 2026
bffe155
Merge branch 'main' into fix/path-traversal-custom-commands
ompatel-aiml May 19, 2026
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15 changes: 15 additions & 0 deletions packages/core/src/utils/pathReader.test.ts
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -413,6 +413,21 @@ describe('readPathFromWorkspace', () => {
).rejects.toThrow('Path not found in workspace: not-found.txt');
});

it('should prevent path traversal outside the workspace via relative paths', async () => {
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mock({
[CWD]: {},
[OUTSIDE_DIR]: {
'secret.txt': 'secrets',
},
});
const config = createMockConfig(CWD);
// Attempt to traverse out of CWD to OUTSIDE_DIR
const relativeTraversal = path.join('..', 'outside', 'secret.txt');
await expect(
readPathFromWorkspace(relativeTraversal, config),
).rejects.toThrow(`Path not found in workspace: ${relativeTraversal}`);
});

// mock-fs permission simulation is unreliable on Windows.
it.skipIf(process.platform === 'win32')(
'should return an error string if reading a file with no permissions',
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11 changes: 11 additions & 0 deletions packages/core/src/utils/pathReader.ts
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -40,6 +40,12 @@ export async function readPathFromWorkspace(
const searchDirs = workspace.getDirectories();
for (const dir of searchDirs) {
const potentialPath = path.resolve(dir, pathStr);

// Security check: ensure the resolved path is actually within the workspace.
if (!workspace.isPathWithinWorkspace(potentialPath)) {
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continue;
}

try {
await fs.access(potentialPath);
absolutePath = potentialPath;
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -81,6 +87,11 @@ export async function readPathFromWorkspace(
);

for (const filePath of finalFiles) {
// Defense in depth: validate each file found within the directory.
if (!workspace.isPathWithinWorkspace(filePath)) {
continue;
}
Comment on lines +91 to +97

@gemini-code-assist gemini-code-assist Bot May 18, 2026

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high

While this check is important for security (defense in depth), calling isPathWithinWorkspace for every file in a directory expansion can lead to significant performance degradation. isPathWithinWorkspace performs a realpath resolution which involves I/O. For directories with a large number of files, this will result in thousands of synchronous-like I/O operations. Consider optimizing this by checking if the file is a symbolic link first, or by using a more efficient path validation that doesn't require full resolution for every entry if the parent directory has already been validated and the entry is not a symlink.


const relativePathForDisplay = path.relative(absolutePath, filePath);
allParts.push({ text: `--- ${relativePathForDisplay} ---\n` });
const result = await processSingleFileContent(
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