Add ERC: A Capability-Based Security Framework #1115
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| ## Abstract | ||
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| This ERC proposes a comprehensive capability-based security framework for smart contracts that implements zero-trust security principles through unforgeable capability tokens, policy enforcement points, and cryptographic proof systems. The framework enforces the principle of least privilege by requiring callers to present single-use capability tokens issued by recognized authorities through policy-constrained enforcement mechanisms. The system supports local-first architectures with on-chain data commitments, utilizes transient storage for efficiency, and provides revocation mechanisms while maintaining upgradeability through established proxy patterns. |
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You might want to define local-first architecture.
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| Zero-trust security models offer several advantages for smart contract systems: | ||
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| 1. **Elimination of Ambient Authority**: Unlike traditional access control systems, capability-based security ensures that **"the capability is an unforgeable token of authority"** that directly designates resources and authorizes access. |
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| ### Core Interfaces | ||
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| #### ICapabilityRegistry |
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| #### ICapabilityRegistry | |
| #### `ICapabilityRegistry` |
Put code snippets, even in titles, in backticks.
| The central registry that maps capability pointers to function signatures and manages authority registration. | ||
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| ```solidity | ||
| // SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT |
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Code within the proposal itself must be CC0-1.0 licensed. You can include MIT code in your assets directory and link to it if you'd prefer.
| The framework utilizes **[EIP-1153](eip-1153) transient storage** for gas-efficient temporary data management: | ||
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| ```solidity | ||
| library TransientCapabilityStorage { |
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Libraries are often an implementation detail. Is it necessary to use this exact code to implement your standard? If not, you should move it to the reference implementation section.
| Protected functions use the capability enforcement modifier: | ||
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| ```solidity | ||
| modifier onlyWithCapability(bytes32 capabilityPointer, bytes calldata tokenData) { |
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Similarly, modifiers are also normally implementation details. The specification section should only describe the externally visible behaviours of a contract, not how it is implemented.
| Before production deployment, the framework requires: | ||
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| 1. **Formal Security Audit**: Independent review by recognized security firms | ||
| 2. **Formal Verification**: Mathematical proof of critical security properties | ||
| 3. **Bug Bounty Program**: Community-driven security testing | ||
| 4. **Gradual Rollout**: Phased deployment with limited exposure | ||
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| The framework follows **EthTrust Security Levels** specifications for comprehensive security certification. |
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You cannot enforce that implementations are audited. You can certainly recommend it, but that recommendation holds for nearly all contract code so it's somewhat implied.
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This ERC proposes a comprehensive capability-based security framework for smart contracts that implements zero-trust security principles through unforgeable capability tokens, policy enforcement points, and cryptographic proof systems. The framework enforces the principle of least privilege by requiring callers to present single-use capability tokens issued by recognized authorities through policy-constrained enforcement mechanisms. The system supports local-first architectures with on-chain data commitments, utilise transient storage for efficiency, and provides revocation mechanisms while maintaining upgradeability through established proxy patterns.