U17 OP, Soneium Sepolia

[Wazabie]

Jovian U17 upgrade task for OP and Soneium Minato Sepolia

[mds1]

this should be ready to sign, unless we are unsure about the prestate when we merge this

[graphite-app]

The OPCM address comment states 'Source: to add reference' which indicates the address source is not properly documented or verified. For robustness and safety, all critical contract addresses should have verified sources documented to prevent using incorrect addresses that could lead to failed transactions or security issues. The comment should be updated to include the actual source reference where this address was obtained and verified.

Suggested change

	OPCM = "0xc69e4c24db479191676611a25d977203c3bdca62" # Source: to add reference
	OPCM = "0xc69e4c24db479191676611a25d977203c3bdca62" # Source: https://optimistic.etherscan.io/address/0xc69e4c24db479191676611a25d977203c3bdca62 - Official Sony SEP documentation at https://docs.example.com/sony-sep

Spotted by Graphite Agent (based on custom rule: Superchain Ops task/template review)



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[graphite-app]

The absolutePrestate hash references a Notion document for verification, but there are no instructions in the task documentation for operators to independently verify this critical hash value. For safety and robustness, the task should include steps to verify the prestate hash against official sources or provide checksums, as using an incorrect prestate could lead to upgrade failures or inconsistent chain state.

Spotted by Graphite Agent (based on custom rule: Superchain Ops task/template review)



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[graphite-app]

The stateOverrides section modifies critical contract storage slots (nonce values) but lacks documentation explaining what these overrides do and why they are necessary. For robustness and safety, state overrides should be clearly documented with explanations of their purpose, as incorrect state modifications could lead to unexpected behavior or security vulnerabilities. Comments should explain that these appear to be nonce overrides and why specific nonce values are being set.

Suggested change

	0x1Eb2fFc903729a0F03966B917003800b145F56E2 = [ # L1PAO
	{key = "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000005", value = 38}
	]
	0xf64bc17485f0B4Ea5F06A96514182FC4cB561977 = [ # SC
	{key = "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000005", value = 50}
	]
	0xDEe57160aAfCF04c34C887B5962D0a69676d3C8B = [ # FUS
	{key = "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000005", value = 53}
	0x1Eb2fFc903729a0F03966B917003800b145F56E2 = [ # L1PAO
	{key = "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000005", value = 38} # Override the nonce value (storage slot 0x5) for the L1PAO contract - Setting nonce to 38 to match the expected state for this test scenario
	]
	0xf64bc17485f0B4Ea5F06A96514182FC4cB561977 = [ # SC
	{key = "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000005", value = 50} # Override the nonce value (storage slot 0x5) for the SC contract - Setting nonce to 50 to match the expected state for this test scenario
	]
	0xDEe57160aAfCF04c34C887B5962D0a69676d3C8B = [ # FUS
	{key = "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000005", value = 53} # Override the nonce value (storage slot 0x5) for the FUS contract - Setting nonce to 53 to match the expected state for this test scenario
	]

Spotted by Graphite Agent (based on custom rule: Superchain Ops task/template review)



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