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[Snyk] Security upgrade copy-webpack-plugin from 6.4.1 to 9.0.1 #332

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@dotam99 dotam99 commented Jan 9, 2024

This PR was automatically created by Snyk using the credentials of a real user.


Snyk has created this PR to fix one or more vulnerable packages in the `npm` dependencies of this project.

Changes included in this PR

  • Changes to the following files to upgrade the vulnerable dependencies to a fixed version:
    • package.json
    • package-lock.json

Vulnerabilities that will be fixed

With an upgrade:
Severity Priority Score (*) Issue Breaking Change Exploit Maturity
medium severity 698/1000
Why? Proof of Concept exploit, Recently disclosed, Has a fix available, CVSS 6.1
Cross-site Scripting (XSS)
SNYK-JS-SERIALIZEJAVASCRIPT-6147607
Yes Proof of Concept

(*) Note that the real score may have changed since the PR was raised.

Commit messages
Package name: copy-webpack-plugin The new version differs by 29 commits.

See the full diff

Check the changes in this PR to ensure they won't cause issues with your project.


Note: You are seeing this because you or someone else with access to this repository has authorized Snyk to open fix PRs.

For more information:
🧐 View latest project report

🛠 Adjust project settings

📚 Read more about Snyk's upgrade and patch logic


Learn how to fix vulnerabilities with free interactive lessons:

🦉 Cross-site Scripting (XSS)

@github-actions github-actions bot added the triage label Jan 9, 2024
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guardrails bot commented Jan 9, 2024

⚠️ We detected 98 security issues in this pull request:

Mode: paranoid | Total findings: 98 | Considered vulnerability: 98

Insecure Access Control (6)
Severity Details Docs
Medium Title: Tainted input passed to an open redirect (express)
return res.redirect(301, externalSites[req.path])
📚
Medium Title: Tainted input passed to an open redirect (express)
return res.redirect(301, redirect)
📚
Medium Title: Tainted input passed to an open redirect (express)
return res.redirect(`https://enterprise.github.com/releases/${requestedVersion}.0/notes`)
📚
Medium Title: Tainted input passed to an open redirect (express)
return res.redirect(301, req.baseUrl + req.path.replace(/^\/en/, ''))
📚
Medium Title: Tainted input passed to an open redirect (express)
return res.redirect(301, redirect)
📚
Medium Title: Tainted input passed to an open redirect (express)
return res.redirect(301, req.path.replace(redirectPattern, `/${language.code}`))
📚

More info on how to fix Insecure Access Control in JavaScript.


Insecure File Management (11)
Severity Details Docs
High Title: Path Traversal from user input
'/developers/apps'
📚
High Title: Path Traversal from user input
newHref = path.join('/', languageCode, href)
📚
High Title: Path Traversal from user input
newHref = path.join('/', languageCode, href)
📚
High Title: Path Traversal from user input
const mapTopicOrArticlePath = path.posix.join(categoryPath, pathParts[2])
📚
High Title: Path Traversal from user input
const categoryPath = removeFPTFromPath(path.posix.join('/', 'en', req.context.currentVersion, 'early-access', pathParts[0], pathParts[1]))
📚
High Title: Path Traversal from user input
title: product.title
📚
High Title: Path Traversal from user input
const categoryPath = removeFPTFromPath(path.posix.join('/', req.context.currentLanguage, req.context.currentVersion, productPath, pathParts[1]))
📚
High Title: Path Traversal from user input
const productPath = path.posix.join('/', req.context.currentProduct)
📚
High Title: Path Traversal from user input
href: removeFPTFromPath(path.posix.join('/', req.context.currentLanguage, req.context.currentVersion, productPath)),
📚
High Title: Path Traversal from user input
const proxyPath = path.join('/', requestedVersion, assetPath)
📚
High Title: Path Traversal from user input
const href = removeFPTFromPath(path.join('/', context.currentLanguage, version, linkPath))
📚

More info on how to fix Insecure File Management in JavaScript.


Insecure Processing of Data (6)
Severity Details Docs
High Title: Insecure Deserialization (js-yaml)
const data = yaml.load(fs.readFileSync(fullpath, 'utf8'), { fullpath })
📚
High Title: Insecure Deserialization (js-yaml)
return yaml.load(fs.readFileSync(filename, 'utf8'), { filename })
📚
Medium Title: Tainted input passed to Express response
return res.send(await liquid.parseAndRender(layouts['dev-toc'], req.context))
📚
Medium Title: Tainted input passed to Express response
return res.send(req.path.replace(/\//g, ''))
📚
Medium Title: Tainted input passed to Express response
return res.send(await liquid.parseAndRender(layouts['enterprise-server-releases'], req.context))
📚
Medium Title: Tainted input passed to Express response
res.send(addCsrf(req, output))
📚

More info on how to fix Insecure Processing of Data in JavaScript.


Insecure Use of Language/Framework API (42)
Severity Details Docs
Medium Title: User Controlled Method Invocation
schema.send(:own_orphan_types).clear
📚
High Title: Child process (child_process) methods accept untrusted data to execute
const changedFilesRelPaths = execSync('git diff --name-only origin/main | egrep "^translations/.*/.+.(yml|md)$"', { maxBuffer: 1024 * 1024 * 100 }).toString().split('\n')
📚
High Title: Child process (child_process) methods accept untrusted data to execute
const fixable = execSync(`cat ${fixableErrorsLog} | egrep "^translations/.*/(.+.md|.+.yml)$" | sed -e 's/^/- [ ] /' | uniq`).toString()
📚
High Title: Child process (child_process) methods accept untrusted data to execute
const filesToAdd = execSync(`cat ${parsingErrorsLog} ${renderingErrorsLog} | egrep "^translations/.*/(.+.md|.+.yml)$" | sed -e 's/^/- [ ] /' | uniq`).toString()
📚
High Title: Child process (child_process) methods accept untrusted data to execute
const allErrors = execSync('cat ~/docs-*').toString()
📚
High Title: Child process (child_process) methods accept untrusted data to execute
execSync(`git checkout main -- ${relativePath}`, { stdio: 'pipe' })
📚
High Title: Child process (child_process) methods accept untrusted data to execute
const githubBranch = execSync('git rev-parse --abbrev-ref HEAD', { cwd: githubRepoDir }).toString().trim()
📚
High Title: Child process (child_process) methods accept untrusted data to execute
execSync('git pull', { cwd: githubRepoDir })
📚
High Title: Child process (child_process) methods accept untrusted data to execute
execSync(`${path.join(githubRepoDir, 'bin/openapi')} bundle -o ${tempDocsDir} --include_unpublished`, { stdio: 'inherit' })
📚
High Title: Child process (child_process) methods accept untrusted data to execute
execSync(`find ${tempDocsDir} -type f -name "*deref.json" -exec mv '{}' ${dereferencedPath} ';'`)
📚
High Title: Child process (child_process) methods accept untrusted data to execute
const gitStatusOfFile = execSync(`git status --porcelain ${oldContentPath}`).toString()
📚
High Title: Child process (child_process) methods accept untrusted data to execute
execSync(`mv ${oldContentPath} ${newContentPath}`)
📚
High Title: Child process (child_process) methods accept untrusted data to execute
execSync(`git mv ${oldContentPath} ${newContentPath}`)
📚
High Title: Child process (child_process) methods accept untrusted data to execute
await exec(`script/reset-translated-file.js --prefer-main ${file}`)
📚
High Title: Child process (child_process) methods accept untrusted data to execute
const currentBranch = execSync('git symbolic-ref --short HEAD', { encoding: 'utf8' }).trim()
📚
High Title: Child process (child_process) methods accept untrusted data to execute
const filenames = execSync('git diff --cached --name-only').toString().trim().split('\n')
📚
High Title: Child process (child_process) methods accept untrusted data to execute
const result = execSync(`${purgeCommand} ${localizedUrl}`).toString()
📚
High Title: Child process (child_process) methods accept untrusted data to execute
const secondResult = execSync(`${purgeCommand} ${localizedUrl}`).toString()
📚
High Title: Child process (child_process) methods accept untrusted data to execute
execSync(`TEST_TRANSLATION=true npx jest content/lint-files > ${parsingErrorsLog}`)
📚
High Title: Child process (child_process) methods accept untrusted data to execute
execSync(`script/test-render-translation.js > ${renderErrorsLog}`)
📚
High Title: Child process (child_process) methods accept untrusted data to execute
execSync(`cat ${parsingErrorsLog} ${renderErrorsLog} | egrep "^translations/.*/(.+.md|.+.yml)$" | uniq | xargs -L1 script/reset-translated-file.js --prefer-main`)
📚
High Title: Child process (child_process) methods accept untrusted data to execute
execSync(`mkdir ${productDir}`)
📚
High Title: Child process (child_process) methods accept untrusted data to execute
execSync(`git mv ${oldCategoryDir} ${productDir}`)
📚
High Title: Child process (child_process) methods accept untrusted data to execute
const grepResults = execSync(grepCmd).toString()
📚
High Title: Child process (child_process) methods accept untrusted data to execute
const changedFilesRelPaths = execSync(cmd).toString().split('\n')
📚
High Title: Child process (child_process) methods accept untrusted data to execute
const newPath = execSync(`find ${newDotcomDir} -name ${filename}`).toString()
📚
High Title: Child process (child_process) methods accept untrusted data to execute
execSync('gem which graphql')
📚
High Title: Child process (child_process) methods accept untrusted data to execute
execSync('npx prettier -w "**/*.{yml,yaml}"')
📚
High Title: Child process (child_process) methods accept untrusted data to execute
const remoteClean = execSync(`${removeHiddenMembersScript} ${tempSchemaFilePath}`).toString()
📚
High Title: Child process (child_process) methods accept untrusted data to execute
execSync('npm run build', { stdio: 'inherit' })
📚
High Title: Child process (child_process) methods accept untrusted data to execute
currentBranch = execSync('git branch --show-current').toString()
📚
High Title: Child process (child_process) methods accept untrusted data to execute
let branchExists = execSync(`git ls-remote --heads ${earlyAccessFullRepo} ${earlyAccessBranch}`).toString()
📚
High Title: Child process (child_process) methods accept untrusted data to execute
branchExists = execSync(`git ls-remote --heads ${earlyAccessFullRepo} ${earlyAccessBranch}`).toString()
📚
High Title: Child process (child_process) methods accept untrusted data to execute
cwd: earlyAccessCloningParentDir
📚
High Title: Child process (child_process) methods accept untrusted data to execute
exec(`git reset $(git merge-base ${base} HEAD)`)
📚
High Title: Child process (child_process) methods accept untrusted data to execute
exec('git add -A')
📚
High Title: Child process (child_process) methods accept untrusted data to execute
exec(`git commit -m "${message}"`)
📚
High Title: Child process (child_process) methods accept untrusted data to execute
while ((optionsMatch = OptionsSyntax.exec(match.groups.options))) {
📚
High Title: Child process (child_process) methods accept untrusted data to execute
const changedFiles = execSync('git diff --name-only HEAD').toString()
📚
High Title: Child process (child_process) methods accept untrusted data to execute
const changedFilesRelPaths = execSync('git diff --name-only origin/main | egrep "^translations/.*/.+.md$"', { maxBuffer: 1024 * 1024 * 100 })
📚
High Title: Child process (child_process) methods accept untrusted data to execute
const grepResults = execSync(grepCmd).toString()
📚
High Title: Child process (child_process) methods accept untrusted data to execute
const match = liquidVariableSyntax.exec(this.param)
📚

More info on how to fix Insecure Use of Language/Framework API in Ruby and JavaScript.


Insecure Use of Regular Expressions (1)
Severity Details Docs
Medium Title: Tainted input passed to Regular Expression
const englishPath = req.path.replace(new RegExp(`^/${req.language}`), '/en')
📚

More info on how to fix Insecure Use of Regular Expressions in JavaScript.


Vulnerable Libraries (32)
Severity Details
N/A pkg:npm/[email protected] upgrade to: 11.8.5,12.1.0
High pkg:npm/[email protected] upgrade to: > 5.0.0
Medium pkg:npm/[email protected] upgrade to: > 4.6.0
High pkg:npm/[email protected] upgrade to: 6.5.3,6.3.3,6.2.4,6.8.3,6.7.3,6.6.1,6.4.1,4.17.3,6.10.3,6.9.7
High pkg:npm/[email protected] upgrade to: > 1.7.4
High pkg:npm/[email protected] upgrade to: > 3.35.1
High pkg:npm/[email protected] upgrade to: > 3.12.0
Informational pkg:npm/[email protected] upgrade to: > 3.1.0
Critical pkg:npm/[email protected] upgrade to: > 5.0.0
High pkg:npm/[email protected] upgrade to: 3.1.1,2.6.7
High pkg:npm/[email protected] upgrade to: > 1.7.0
Critical pkg:npm/[email protected] upgrade to: > 1.4.1
Critical pkg:npm/[email protected] upgrade to: > 1.2.1
High pkg:npm/[email protected] upgrade to: > 7.0.2
High pkg:npm/[email protected] upgrade to: > 1.9.1
Medium pkg:npm/[email protected] upgrade to: 10.0.0
High pkg:npm/[email protected] upgrade to: > 1.0.0-rc.3
Critical pkg:npm/[email protected] upgrade to: > 4.0.0
High pkg:npm/[email protected] upgrade to: > 4.0.2
High pkg:npm/[email protected] upgrade to: > 1.1.4
High pkg:npm/[email protected] upgrade to: > 1.32.8
Critical pkg:npm/[email protected] upgrade to: > 9.0.2
High pkg:npm/[email protected] upgrade to: 5.76.0
Critical pkg:npm/[email protected] upgrade to: > 3.0.3
High pkg:npm/@babel/[email protected] upgrade to: > 7.11.0
Critical pkg:npm/[email protected] upgrade to: > 2.13.1
Critical pkg:npm/[email protected] upgrade to: 5.0.1
Medium pkg:npm/[email protected] upgrade to: 7.5.2
Critical pkg:npm/[email protected] upgrade to: > 8.1.0
Medium pkg:npm/[email protected] upgrade to: 4.17.21
High pkg:npm/[email protected] upgrade to: > 5.0.0
High pkg:npm/[email protected] upgrade to: > 3.0.0

More info on how to fix Vulnerable Libraries in JavaScript.


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