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fix: rebase SND-003 onto PR893 + QA-campaign fix batches - #894

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lklimek merged 64 commits into
fix/tx-historyfrom
fix/snd-003-receive-inert
Jul 16, 2026
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fix: rebase SND-003 onto PR893 + QA-campaign fix batches#894
lklimek merged 64 commits into
fix/tx-historyfrom
fix/snd-003-receive-inert

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@lklimek lklimek commented Jul 15, 2026

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Why this PR exists

  • Problem: The SND-003 "Receive (QR) is inert" fix needed rebasing onto PR892, and a full desktop-GUI walkthrough of the 175 user stories surfaced a batch of real defects (a crash, silent hangs, dead buttons, a wallet self-lockout, a missing delete confirmation) plus security gaps in local data deletion.
  • What breaks without it: Updating a data contract crashes the app; Load-Identity / Load-Masternode / Fetch-Documents / Add-Token hang silently with no feedback; transfer-credits and several token buttons are dead; a locked wallet becomes permanently stuck; single-key wallets delete with no confirmation; and "Clear Database" can report success while identity private keys (including masternode voting/owner/payout keys) survive on disk.

What was done

  • SND-003: the Receive (QR) dialog no longer dismisses itself on the click that opens it.
  • QA fixes: DOC-002 crash → typed error; IDN-002 / MN-001 / DOC-004 / TOK-003 silent hangs → timeouts + typed errors; IDN-006 / TOK-005 / TOK-011 / TOK-018 dead buttons; WAL-005/006/007 (rename, unlock self-lockout, single-key removal confirmation); SND-005 fee + total shown before send; IDN-008/009/013a / DPN-008 navigation; MCP-001 cross-process wallet visibility; NEW-002/003/004.
  • Security: SEC-001/002 — "Clear Database" now wipes identity private keys and surfaces partial failures fail-closed (was silent / warn-only). clear_identity_vault_keys propagates instead of swallowing read/decode/delete errors, IdentityKeyView::delete_all attempts every key rather than short-circuiting, and DashPay sidecar/overlay delete failures are accumulated instead of warn-only.
  • New controls: NEW-006 developer-only "Wipe Platform Data" — on the Network Chooser, in the "Database Maintenance" section beside "Clear {Network} Database", alongside its sibling destructive controls (devnet only, type-WIPE-to-confirm). NEW-007 "View Profile" for contacts.
  • Hardening: database-version migration safety gate; contact-request idempotency; platform dependency bump pulling the AssetLockProof rehydration fix; unified test env-var lock (removes a flaky cross-module test race); per-instance modal guard id so two popups on one screen can no longer dismiss each other.

Test plan

  • cargo build — clean
  • cargo clippy --all-features --all-targets -- -D warnings — clean (verified via a forced, non-cached recompile)
  • cargo test --all-features --workspace — 2142 passed, 0 failed (68 network-gated backend-e2e ignored, as expected)
  • Suite verified green under both parallel and serial execution — the previously flaky cross-module DASH_EVO_DATA_DIR test race is fixed in this PR
  • cargo +nightly fmt --all -- --check — clean
  • Desktop-GUI walkthrough across the 175-story catalog drove the QA fix batches; an annotated status report tracks every finding as Fixed/Open
  • NEW-006 exercised live in the GUI (Developer role, fresh data dir): the control renders in "Database Maintenance" directly beneath "Clear Devnet Database"; the type-WIPE dialog holds (empty → confirm disabled, lowercase wipe → still disabled, Enter does not bypass, WIPE → enabled); confirming dispatches without panic. Gate verified live by round-trip with the role held constant — Devnet: present → Testnet: absent → Devnet: present.
  • NEW-007 ("View Profile") is not yet exercised live in the GUI, nor is NEW-006's removal from the Identity Hub → Settings tab. Both screens require a loaded identity (and, for NEW-007, established DashPay contacts). The QA campaign's dataset cannot currently be opened by this branch: another checkout migrated the shared wallet storage in ~/.config/dash-evo-tool to schema 4, and this branch's platform-wallet pin supports max 3, so it fails closed with SchemaVersionUnsupported { found: 4, max_supported: 3 }. NEW-006's removal from the Settings tab is nonetheless certain statically — the button, its dialog field, and its helpers no longer exist in settings.rs, so no code path can render it. The security, modal-guard and test-lock fixes remain covered by unit + integration tests only.

Breaking changes

  • None.

🤖 Co-authored by Claudius the Magnificent AI Agent

lklimek and others added 28 commits July 14, 2026 13:20
Restores the migration password prompt reverted from PR #887 so it can be
reworked in isolation. This commit is the original implementation verbatim;
the review findings that caused the revert are fixed in the commits that
follow.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

<sub>🤖 Co-authored by [Claudius the Magnificent](https://github.com/lklimek/claudius) AI Agent</sub>
…skip

Two defects found by real-world testing of the migration password prompt.

The SPV progress overlay and the passphrase modal both painted at
`egui::Order::Foreground`. Suppressing only `ProgressOverlay::claim_input`
released the keyboard but left the overlay's pointer sink and dim/card layers
live, so they swallowed clicks aimed at the password field — the prompt was
visible but unusable whenever migration ran alongside an SPV sync (which is
always, at boot). A blocking secret prompt now owns the whole interaction
surface: while one is active the overlay stays logically in its stack but
paints no dimmer, pointer sink, card, or focus trap, and claims no keyboard.
Queued ordinary secret prompts are promoted before the frame's overlay
decision, so their first visible frame is protected too.

The prompt was also inescapable: a user who had forgotten a wallet password
could not proceed, and the only exit the UI permitted was deleting the wallet.
"Skip this wallet" now records the seed hash in a per-run exclusion set, drops
it from the published pending list, and wakes the migration task — so skipping
the last wallet still completes the migration and writes the sentinel. A
skipped wallet stays closed, keeps its legacy protected envelope, and is
registered upstream on a later ordinary unlock via the existing
`handle_wallet_unlocked` -> `bootstrap_wallet_addresses_jit` chokepoint.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

<sub>🤖 Co-authored by [Claudius the Magnificent](https://github.com/lklimek/claudius) AI Agent</sub>
…ngle-flight

INCOMPLETE — DO NOT MERGE. Committed to preserve work across a session
restart; the Codex job producing it was cancelled mid-edit.

State: compiles clean (clippy --all-features --all-targets -D warnings, exit 0),
but the full test gate is RED (exit 101, 1771 passed / 2 failed):

  context::wallet_lifecycle::tests::migrated_protected_wallet_blocks_migration_until_password_submission
  context::wallet_lifecycle::tests::protected_wallet_registers_upstream_on_unlock_without_restart

Both are tests the legacy-read-only and registration-race changes must rewrite;
the job was cancelled partway through that rewrite. Whoever picks this up must
finish those two and re-run the full gate before trusting any of it.

Intended scope (per review findings + owner directives):
- P1 headless fail-fast: migration must refuse, not block, when a protected
  wallet needs a password and no interactive prompt exists (mcp/resolve.rs
  drives the same migration with no egui frame loop -> det-cli hung forever).
- P2 legacy DB strictly read-only: never DROP/DELETE/UPDATE the pre-migration
  database; write only the new store/vault. Makes a skipped or abandoned
  migration cost the user nothing.
- P3 registration race: single-flight per wallet (unlock spawned a
  fire-and-forget registration while migration inline-awaited its own for the
  same wallet -> spurious RegistrationIncomplete, reproduced as a real failure).
- P4 split MigrationState::is_running(), which silently came to mean
  "running OR blocked on a human"; five callers inherited the conflation.
- P5 cross-wallet password bleed (modal state keyed on window title), swallowed
  re-encryption failure, unified lock-poisoning policy.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

<sub>🤖 Co-authored by [Claudius the Magnificent](https://github.com/lklimek/claudius) AI Agent</sub>
`run_shielded_task` had no capability check, so the five state-changing
shielded operations were reachable from any caller that dispatches a
`ShieldedTask` directly. The MCP shielded tools do exactly that, bypassing
the UI gate at `ui/wallets/shielded_tab.rs`. Shielded operations are not
defined on any current network, so `ShieldFromAssetLock` would create an
asset lock committing real L1 funds and then attempt a state transition no
network can settle — stranding the funds and burning the fee.

Enforce `FeatureGate::ShieldedOperations` as the first statement of
`run_shielded_task`, before any wallet or backend access, mirroring the
`RootKeyDerivationRefused` guard in `backend_task/wallet/mod.rs`. The UI
gate stays as defense in depth.

Scope is exactly the five fund movers: `ShieldedTask` carries only
write variants. Shielded init, sync, balance and address reads reach the
coordinator through their own paths and stay ungated, so shielded funds
remain viewable wherever the wallet runs.

Add `TaskError::ShieldedOperationsUnavailable` and a regression test that
dispatches a write task the way an MCP tool does; it is confirmed failing
without the guard, proving the refusal precedes backend access.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…nt declines

Three independent defects in the DashPay contact flow.

Contact-info write silently erased the accepted-account allow-list.
`resolve_accepted_accounts` collapsed four distinct states — no document,
missing privateData, decrypt failure, deserialize failure — into an empty
Vec, which `create_or_update_contact_info` then re-encrypted and wrote back
over the live Platform document. Any present-but-unreadable payload (e.g. a
contact whose privateData was written by another DashPay client) lost its
allow-list irreversibly on the next rename or unhide. Only an absent document
now yields an empty list; a present payload that cannot be read aborts the
write with a typed `DashPayContactInfoRead` error. The test that asserted the
data-losing behaviour is inverted, and the missing/undecodable payload states
get their own regressions.

A failed task released every request guard, allowing a paid double-submit.
`display_task_error` cleared all Accept/Decline/Cancel guards on any error, so
an unrelated concurrent failure re-enabled an in-flight Accept and a second
click bought a second state transition. Failures from the three request actions
now carry their request ID in `DashPayContactRequestActionFailed`, so only the
guard named by the error is released. Guards no longer matched by a result
expire on a timeout instead of being cleared wholesale, so a lost result cannot
strand a row forever.

A declined request reappeared after refresh. `reject_contact_request` logged and
swallowed a failed `dashpay_mark_declined` write and still reported success,
even though that local marker is the only thing that retires the row — Platform
keeps the `contactRequest` document forever. The failure now propagates, matching
the sibling `mark_withdrawn` cancel path.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…g password

A password-protected wallet whose at-rest envelope is corrupted (truncated or
otherwise wrong-length) failed the AES-GCM tag check and surfaced as "The
password is incorrect", trapping the user in a retry loop whose only escape was
deleting the wallet. Structural damage is now classified before the AEAD can
mistake it for a bad password.

- decrypt_message takes the caller's known plaintext length and rejects an
  impossible ciphertext/tag or salt length as DecryptError::Malformed.
- WalletSeed::open returns the typed EncryptionError instead of a flattened
  String, so callers branch on the variant rather than on message text.
- The unlock popup maps Malformed to the same "saved data looks damaged, re-add
  it from your recovery phrase" sentence the unprotected path already shows, and
  keeps the password hint on the wrong-password branch only.

Finish the two migration lifecycle tests left red at the previous checkpoint.
Both now install a TestPrompt::never(), which panics if asked and so pins the
contract that migration defers to the UI-owned unlock flow instead of driving a
secret prompt itself:

- the protected wallet waits, is then skipped, and data.db is asserted
  byte-unchanged, holding the legacy database strictly read-only;
- the unlock path joins the migration's single registration flight
  (registration_attempt_count() == 1).

Verified green on the full workspace suite (2023 passed, 0 failed), the
all-features/all-targets lint gate with warnings denied, and the nightly
formatter check.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…arded

The contactInfo document is written whole, so every writer decides the fate
of the fields it does not edit. Decline, withdraw, unhide and rename each
rebuilt the payload from scratch, erasing the nickname, note and
accepted-account list stored by the user or by another DashPay client.

Replace the implicit `Vec<u32> -> AcceptedAccounts::Replace` coercion, which
made the destructive path the short one, with an explicit `ContactInfoUpdate`
that states field by field what is preserved and what is replaced. Visibility
flips now preserve everything else; only the contact-details form, which owns
the whole form, replaces.

A payload this client cannot read is no longer either silently overwritten or
a permanent dead-end: the write aborts, the user is told, and confirming an
explicit, danger-styled dialog re-runs the write with an overwrite policy, so
a contact with unreadable details can still be unhidden, declined or renamed.
The v0 parser now rejects unknown versions, invalid UTF-8, non-canonical
flags and foreign trailing bytes instead of decoding them as absent details.

Paid request actions (Accept, Decline, Cancel) keep their in-flight guard
across a routine tab switch or refresh, which previously released it and made
the row clickable again while its state transition was still running. An
identity, wallet or network change still clears the guards, since they belong
to the identity being left. Task results reach only the screen that is visible
when they land, so the wall-clock backstop is retained: without it, an action
resolved while the user was on another screen would strand its row with dead
buttons for the rest of the session.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…assword

A password-protected wallet hydrates from a secret-free model: the
Tier-2/Protected arm of cold-boot reconstruction carries a placeholder
envelope, because the real secret stays in the vault. The unlock popup
verified the password against that placeholder, so after the first
restart the CORRECT password was reported as damaged data and the owner
was permanently locked out of the wallet.

Verify the password only through the secret chokepoint, which reads the
real stored envelope, and flip the in-memory seed open solely after that
succeeds (`mark_open_after_verification`). The popup maps the resulting
typed error to user copy structurally — wrong password vs damaged vault —
instead of pre-checking the model.

Operation-only unlocks now forget the session seed through an RAII guard,
so an early return or panic in the reconciliation subtask can no longer
strand a plaintext seed in the cache. A migration unlock is operation-only
too: that prompt offers no "keep unlocked" choice, so it must not silently
retain the seed for the session.

Regression cover, both entry points against a real cold boot: the context
API and the unlock popup itself. The popup test fails (correct password →
Pending) if the model pre-check is ever reintroduced.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Removing the progress overlay's pointer sink (so it could not cover a
secret prompt it had triggered) also removed the only barrier in front of
the app: while the storage update paused on the migration password prompt,
clicks still reached the wallet screen behind it.

Give the modal its own barrier instead. A non-dismissible `modal_chrome`
window installs a full-screen pointer sink and registers itself as egui's
modal layer, so every layer beneath it is ignored for interaction while
the window itself — drawn above the sink — stays fully interactive.
Dismissible dialogs keep their existing click-outside behaviour.

The kittest asserts the widget beneath the prompt does NOT register a
click, and that the prompt's own controls remain hittable.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…s a password

`is_running()` had become an alias for `is_executing()`, which reports
`false` while the migration is paused on `AwaitingWalletPasswords`. Every
caller that meant "the storage update has not finished yet" therefore
opened up mid-migration: wallet-touching backend tasks slipped past the
`WalletStorageNotReady` gate and hit a half-migrated vault, the MCP
wait/join logic stopped waiting, and the wallets screen offered
Create/Import CTAs against a wallet list about to be rehydrated.

Replace it with `is_in_progress()` — `Running | AwaitingWalletPasswords` —
and use it at all three sites. `is_executing()` keeps its narrow meaning
for callers that really do mean "a step is running right now".

Covered by a test dispatching an MCP-style wallet task during
`AwaitingWalletPasswords` and asserting `WalletStorageNotReady`.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…promising data removal

Legacy seed-envelope garbage collection, restored for the vault copy only.
Once the current-format secret is durable — the raw seam, a Tier-2 sealed
envelope, or an eager/lazy migration write — the superseded `envelope.v1`
row in the SAME vault is deleted best-effort, so a seed has exactly one
current copy at rest instead of an indefinitely retained duplicate. A
cold-boot scheme probe repeats the sweep after an interrupted run. The
pre-update `data.db` is NOT touched: it stays a read-only recovery
artifact.

Stop promising deletions the app no longer performs. "Remove Wallet" and
"Clear Database" said they erase all local data, while an earlier
version's read-only recovery database — which may still hold wallet
recovery data — stays on disk; the copy now says so. "Clear Platform
Addresses" is disabled rather than pretending to work: its only
implementation wrote to that read-only database.

The two remaining legacy-database writers are signposted as test-only;
neither has a production caller.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The blocking progress overlay yields to ANY passphrase prompt — the gate is
`has_blocking_secret_prompt()`, true for cancellable and non-dismissible prompts
alike — and paints no dimmer, pointer sink, or focus trap while one is up. But
the replacement barrier was wired to dismissability (`blocks_input: !cancellable`),
so the ordinary just-in-time unlock prompt, which is cancellable, installed no
sink at all: pointer and keyboard fell straight through to the panels the overlay
exists to freeze.

Dismissal and input-blocking are orthogonal. `blocks_input` is now unconditional;
`cancellable` still governs only Cancel / X / Escape / click-outside, which read
raw pointer input and are unaffected by the sink.

The two comments asserting the prompt "supplies its own input barrier" described a
precondition the code did not establish; they now describe what it does.

Covered by a kittest that presses a control behind a cancellable prompt while an
overlay is raised (RED before this change: the control activated), plus one
pinning that the prompt still dismisses from its own Cancel button.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…one subtask

A wallet unlocked for the storage update has two consumers of the seed it just
promoted: the unlock gesture's own `wallet_unlock_registration` subtask, and the
update's `bootstrap_loaded_wallets()` pass, which re-enters the seed scope for
the very wallet it prompted for. Their lifetimes overlap in an order nobody
controls, yet the seed's lifetime was owned outright by the subtask's RAII guard.
Whichever finished first evicted the seed from under the other — and a cache miss
on a protected scope prompts, so the update raised a background passphrase prompt
for a wallet the user had just unlocked. If the user ticked "keep unlocked" on
that second prompt, it also silently restored the session-long retention the
migration prompt deliberately withholds.

Retention shorter than the session is now enforced by `SecretLease`, a ref-counted
claim at the secret chokepoint: each consumer holds a clone and the seed is
forgotten when the last one drops. The storage update takes its own lease for the
wallets it prompted for (`WalletUnlockRetention::UntilStorageUpdateComplete`) and
releases it on every exit path, so neither consumer can strand the other, and the
unlock still does not outlive the update.

The regression test drives the losing interleaving explicitly: the unlock subtask
is joined to completion first, then the update's pass must resolve the seed from
the session cache with zero prompts, and the seed must be gone once the run's
lease is released.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…e-dispatch

The storage-update gate rejects every wallet-touching task — `DashPayTask`
included — with a bare `WalletStorageNotReady`, before it reaches
`run_dashpay_task`, the only place that wraps a failure into
`DashPayContactRequestActionFailed { request_id, .. }`. That typed variant is
also the only one `release_request_guard_for_error` matched, so a contact
request's Accept / Decline / Cancel clicked during the first launch after an
upgrade claimed a guard nothing would ever release: the row's buttons went dead
for the full five-minute in-flight timeout, long after the update finished.

A pre-dispatch refusal names no request precisely because nothing ran, which is
exactly the condition under which a blanket release is safe. `clear_in_flight` is
restored for that one match arm only — every other failure still keeps its guard,
so an unrelated error cannot re-enable a row whose paid action may still be in
flight.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…gate

The shielded family is refused during a storage update only because it is listed
in `is_wallet_touching`; nothing failed if a refactor dropped that membership.
Sibling of `wallet_task_is_rejected_while_migration_awaits_password`, dispatching
a shielded write while migration awaits passwords.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
"Clear Platform Addresses" explained its own unavailability twice in the same
row — a tooltip ("...because...") and an italic label ("...while...") — giving a
translator two units for one idea, and drifting on the word that carries the
meaning: the tool is disabled permanently, so "while" is wrong. Keeps the
always-visible label (a tooltip on a disabled control is easy to miss) with the
permanent reading, and drops the tooltip.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…ge set

NET-019 still promised to "permanently delete all local data" and that "the
action cannot be undone", which the shipped Clear Database dialog now
contradicts: it discloses that an earlier version's read-only recovery database
stays on the device and may still contain wallet recovery data. The story now
matches the dialog and its sibling WAL-007 — the population it is written for
(clearing a machine before handing it on) is the one it most misleads.

UX-001 described the progress block yielding its pointer sink to a passphrase
prompt but never said the prompt installs its own in its place, reading as if the
click-through hole were still open. It now states the hand-off as an invariant,
for every prompt, dismissible or not — an unwritten invariant is how that hole
was reopened the first time.

CHANGELOG covered only the DashPay change set. Adds the two user-visible ones it
missed: the per-wallet password prompt on the first launch after an upgrade (with
its safe skip path), the read-only recovery database that "Clear Database" and
"Remove Wallet" no longer erase and the developer tool that is disabled as a
result, and the shielded refusal message.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…per scope

Independent verification of the SEC-002 fix (integration composition review)
found that lease() mints a fresh Arc on every call — two unrelated consumers
calling lease(scope) directly get two independent refcounts, so the first to
drop can evict the secret while the second is still relying on it. Not
currently reachable (the one call site correctly clones), but the type can't
enforce the invariant, so the next new consumer would reach for the public
lease() API and silently reintroduce the exact race SEC-002 just closed.
Document the footgun at the point of call rather than leave it undiscoverable.
egui resolves each frame's click at begin_pass against the previous frame's
widget geometry and modal layer. On the frame a passphrase prompt first
renders, the control beneath still existed last frame with no sink and no
modal layer above it, so the click completes on it before modal_chrome
installs the sink — mirroring AppState::update, where the visible screen
renders before render_secret_prompt.

- transition_frame_click_leaks_through_a_newly_activated_prompt: RED repro,
  parked #[ignore]; un-ignore once the barrier is installed before the
  visible screen renders on the activation frame.
- primed_prompt_blocks_the_same_injected_click_sequence: control (green) —
  the identical injected click, with the prompt primed one frame earlier, is
  absorbed. Isolates the leak to the transition frame, not the test harness.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
… gate rejections to one request

Two migration-gate refinements in run_backend_task, both closing bot-review
findings on PR #893.

Shielded pre-check: a shielded fund movement now short-circuits with
ShieldedOperationsUnavailable as the very first thing run_backend_task does —
before ensure_wallet_backend materializes seeds, registers upstream, and binds
Orchard for every loaded wallet just to run an op the app refuses. is_available
is a side-effect-free config read, safe before backend init; the in-handler gate
in run_shielded_task stays as belt-and-suspenders. Shielded ops are unavailable
on every network today, so this pre-check also precedes the migration gate: a
shielded write during a storage update now gets the accurate "not available"
message instead of a misleading "wait for the update".

DashPay guard scoping: the migration gate now tags a rejected contact action
(Accept/Reject/Cancel) with DashPayContactRequestActionFailed carrying its
request ID, so the Identity Hub releases only that request's in-flight guard.
The previous stopgap blanket-cleared every guard on a bare WalletStorageNotReady,
which could re-enable a different contact action's row while its paid state
transition was genuinely still in flight. release_request_guard_for_error drops
the blanket-clear arm; the now-unused clear_in_flight is removed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…ivates

egui resolves each frame's click at begin_pass against the previous frame's
widget geometry and modal layer, before update() runs. On the frame a passphrase
prompt first renders, the previous frame had no prompt and no input sink, so a
press-then-release completing now still lands on the control beneath — the modal
installs its sink one frame too late, and reordering the render within the frame
cannot help.

AppState::update now detects the prompt-activation rising edge (covering both the
just-in-time unlock and the migration password prompt, via
has_blocking_secret_prompt) and calls drop_activation_frame_pointer_click, which
clears this frame's pending pointer input before the screen beneath runs. A
widget only reports a click while a Released event is still in input.pointer, so
dropping it strands the leaked click; keyboard input is left intact for the
freshly focused password field, and the sink covers every later frame.

Un-ignores the transition-frame repro (now GREEN) and adds a migration-prompt
sibling; the primed-prompt and yielding-overlay sink tests still pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…e loop

The two existing transition-frame repro tests mirror
drop_activation_frame_pointer_click directly in a hand-rolled closure — they
never drive AppState::update(), so the production rising-edge call site in
app.rs was untested: deleting it left the suite green. Add
appstate_jit_prompt_activation_drops_transition_frame_click and
appstate_migration_prompt_activation_drops_transition_frame_click, which
mount a real AppState via build_eframe, activate a prompt through the actual
JIT (test_set_secret_prompt_active) and migration (MigrationStatus) paths,
and assert a click completed on the activation frame does not reach the
welcome screen beneath. Independently confirmed both fail when the app.rs
call site is neutralized and pass when restored.

Also corrects a stale doc comment/assertion in hub_screen.rs left over from
3e69b2f, which removed the blanket WalletStorageNotReady guard-release arm:
the comment still described a "blanket release... scoped to refusals that
prove nothing is running" that no longer exists in the code.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Fix SND-003, WAL-005, and WAL-006 by ignoring outside-click dismissal on each dialog's opening frame.

Co-Authored-By: Codex GPT-5 <noreply@openai.com>
…etLockProof rehydration fix

Updates dash-sdk / rs-sdk-trusted-context-provider / platform-wallet /
platform-wallet-storage git pins from 93b967f9 to d18020f5
(dashpay/platform#3968 tip), which includes the AssetLockEntryWire fix
for the AssetLockProof deserialize_any bug (dashpay/platform#4133) that
was blocking wallet rehydration on every relaunch once any asset lock
existed.

Adapts to unrelated upstream API drift pulled in by the same bump:
DataContractJsonConversionMethodsV0::to_json(&self, platform_version)
was removed as part of dpp's JSON/Value conversion trait unification
(dashpay/platform#3573, already a known pre-existing lint debt in this
branch). The canonical replacement for "give me this contract's
current wire-format JSON" is
DataContractInSerializationFormat::try_from_platform_versioned(...)
+ serde_json::to_value(...) — updated the 3 affected call sites
(contract_chooser_panel.rs x2, update_contract_screen.rs,
token_creator.rs); from_json usage elsewhere is unaffected.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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opening_click_does_not_immediately_dismiss previously only asserted that
seeding PassphraseModalState with an armed ModalOpeningGuard left the cache
entry readable — a plain data-cache round trip that never called
clicked_outside_window_after_open and could not fail regardless of the
guard's behavior. Rewrite it to simulate an actual outside click via
egui::RawInput and call the real function: the opening click must be
swallowed once, then a later check against the same pending click must
detect it normally. Also drops the internal commit-SHA reference in the
adjacent comment per the "describe present state, not history" convention.

Found by an independent adversarial review of this branch's merge (QA-001,
QA-002).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
lklimek and others added 9 commits July 15, 2026 21:54
…out)

KeysScreen renders a read-only key list pushed onto the screen stack but
returned AppAction::None unconditionally, trapping the user with no way
back to the identity view. Add a Back control in the header row that
returns AppAction::PopScreen, matching the sibling read-only detail
screens (e.g. contact_profile_viewer). A kittest asserts the button
renders and its click pops the screen off the stack.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Send Dash screen dispatched a payment with no fee or total shown, so
the user committed without seeing what would leave their balance. Add a
fee summary rendered directly above the Send button:

- Simple mode: estimated network fee, total deducted, and (when the fee
  is taken out of the amount, e.g. Core -> Platform) what the recipient
  receives. Covers every cleanly-estimable source/destination pair
  (Core->Core/Platform/Shielded, Platform->Platform/Core/Shielded,
  Identity->Core/Platform/Identity), reusing the same
  model::fee_estimation estimators the amount field's "Max" reserve uses
  so the two never disagree. Combinations whose fee depends on inputs the
  backend selects at send time (identity top-ups, shielded spends) show a
  neutral "calculated when you send" note instead of a wrong number.
- Advanced mode: estimated network fee for the count-driven paths
  (Core->Core, Platform->Platform), else the same neutral note.

All fee math stays in model::fee_estimation; FeePreview only arranges
already-estimated numbers for display. Pure unit tests cover the on-top
vs deducted-from-amount total/recipient semantics and saturation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
… the recipient (NEW-002)

Sending a contact request to a recipient with no DashPay decryption key
raised DashPayError::MissingDecryptionKey, whose message ("Your identity
is missing a decryption key required for contacts") blamed the SENDER —
even though the sender's keys are fine and it is the RECIPIENT
(to_identity) that lacks the key. The Add Contact screen compounded the
error by offering an "Add Decryption Key" button that would add a key to
the sender's own identity, a remedy that cannot fix a recipient-side gap.

Rename the variant to RecipientMissingDecryptionKey and reword it to
correctly attribute the failure to the recipient with an actionable,
jargon-free message. Drop it from requires_user_action() and remove the
misleading self-remedy button — the sender has no key to add; the message
tells them to ask the recipient to finish setting up their profile. Both
error classifiers and their tests are updated to the renamed variant.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
… summary

The SND-005 acceptance criterion described the fee estimate as "shown in
confirmation dialog", but the HD-wallet Send Dash screen surfaces it
inline above the Send button (simple and advanced modes) before dispatch.
Reword the criterion to match the implemented behavior.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…s (NEW-003)

InfoPopup and SelectionDialog closed themselves on the same frame they
opened: the click that opened the popup lands outside the not-yet-rendered
window rect, so the unguarded clicked_outside_window() check fired true on
the opening frame and dismissed the popup before it was ever visible
(e.g. the token "More Info" popup never appeared).

Both components are value-constructed every frame from consumer-held state,
so a persistent ModalOpeningGuard field cannot survive across frames. Add
clicked_outside_window_after_open_by_id(), which records the last render
pass in egui temp memory keyed by a stable id and skips the outside-click
check on the opening frame — detected as a gap in rendering, so it re-arms
automatically however the popup was previously dismissed, with no teardown.
Fixing this inside the two components fixes every consumer at once
(InfoPopup: 13 call sites; SelectionDialog: no current consumers, so this
is preventive). Unit tests cover the opening-frame skip and the re-arm.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…-003)

Six screen-level popups used the unguarded clicked_outside_window(), so the
click that opened them was seen as an outside click on the first render
frame and dismissed them before they appeared. Give each a persistent
ModalOpeningGuard field, arm it where the popup's open state is set, and
switch the check to clicked_outside_window_after_open() — mirroring the
existing wallets_screen rename-dialog and receive-dialog pattern.

Sites fixed:
- contracts_documents_screen: "Select Properties" fields dropdown
- dashpay/profile_screen: avatar-URL popup
- identities_screen: edit-alias modal (both open buttons)
- tokens my_tokens: "More Info" token popup and reward-explanation popup
- wallets add_new_wallet_screen: "Fund Wallet" receive popup
- wallets_screen/dialogs: fund-platform-address and mine-blocks dialogs
  (the receive dialog in the same file was already guarded)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…-004)

The DashPay payment-history row printed the raw duffs value with a "Dash"
label — a 0.001 DASH payment rendered as "-100000 Dash" — because the
amount (duffs, from DashPayPaymentHistory) was formatted with `{} Dash`
and no unit conversion. Format it with `format_duffs_as_dash` so it reads
"-0.001 DASH". Fixed in both the Pay screen history (the live path) and
the contact-details history (currently unpopulated, fixed defensively);
documented that the `Credits`-aliased field actually holds duffs.

Counterparty label (NEW-004 part 2) is left as scoped follow-up: the
payment history resolves names against saved DashPay contacts only, so a
recipient paid by DPNS username (not a mutual contact) shows
"Unknown (<prefix>)". Resolving it needs a DPNS lookup by identity id or
persisting the send-time name — deeper plumbing than this cached-read
path — so it is marked with a TODO(NEW-004) rather than forced.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…r creation

WAL-007: single-key wallets had a separate Remove handler that called
forget() immediately, bypassing the HD wallet's confirmation state
entirely. Both wallet types now route through the same pending-removal
state feeding the existing danger confirmation modal.

ALK-002: Loaded(empty) was a terminal cache state as reported, but the
actual navigation gap was that PopScreenAndRefresh invokes
refresh_on_arrival(), not refresh(), which is where the cache
invalidation previously lived. The selected wallet's asset-lock cache
entry is now invalidated on root-screen arrival so a freshly created
lock is picked up on the next render.

Cherry-picked from 2693790 onto fix/snd-003-receive-inert. Conflict
resolution: the single-key-remove-button block was refactored into
request_selected_wallet_removal() (theirs); the snd003 branch's
customized HD-removal confirmation message (the earlier-version
read-only recovery-database note) was preserved into that method's HD
branch. The branch's NEW-003 rename-dialog ModalOpeningGuard usage in
this file is untouched.

Co-Authored-By: Codex GPT-5 <noreply@openai.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
… input

NEW-005 (release-blocking): the wallet-unlock / JIT secret password field
could not receive keyboard focus or typed input. `modal_chrome` registered a
separate full-screen "sink" Area as egui's modal layer; because that sink was
a different layer than the `egui::Window` holding the field, the window
resolved *below* the modal layer, so egui's `Memory::allows_interaction`
silently denied the `TextEdit` focus (and clicks on it).

Register the window's OWN layer as the modal layer instead: comparing a layer
against itself is `Equal`, so the modal's fields always resolve at/above the
modal layer and stay focusable, while every lower layer is blocked. The
full-screen sink is retained — moved to `Order::Middle`, strictly below the
`Order::Foreground` window — because it is load-bearing for background input
blocking: egui's `layer_id_at` only redirects a below-modal click to the modal
layer when some interactable area covers that position, so without full-screen
coverage a click landing outside the centered window would fall through to the
app beneath.

Add a kittest regression, passphrase_modal_password_field_focuses_and_blocks_background,
asserting the field takes focus and receives typed text (surfaced via Submit),
the modal layer is the window's own layer (not the sink), and a widget behind
the modal receives none of it. The pre-existing background-blocking and
dismissal kittests continue to pass, confirming the sink still blocks input.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

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Preliminary review — Codex only

Exact head ffa7ea0 has seven in-scope blocking defects: three unresolved prior issues, a stranded token-refresh guard, and three scheduled-vote regressions. The original migration/password scheduled-vote race is fixed, but no-op completion, retry eligibility, and nested vote-result handling remain incorrect. Focused tests could not run because fetching the pinned Platform revision required network access that was not approved.

Validated blockers were found in the Codex precheck. Sonnet is deferred until a fresh Codex revalidation clears the blocker gate.

Review provenance

  • Codex reviewers: gpt-5.6-sol — general (completed), gpt-5.6-sol — rust-quality (completed)
  • Verifier: gpt-5.6-sol — verifier
  • Sonnet: not run (deferred by blocker gate)

🔴 7 blocking | 🟡 1 suggestion(s)

1 additional finding(s) omitted (not in diff).

3 carried-forward finding(s) already raised on this PR; not re-posting as new inline comments.

🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
These findings are from an automated code review. Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.

In `src/backend_task/tokens/query_my_token_balances.rs`:
- [BLOCKING] src/backend_task/tokens/query_my_token_balances.rs:58-60: Do not strand the token refresh single-flight guard
  The guard that clears `token_balance_refresh_in_flight` is moved into the spawned network request. `await_managed_network_request_with_timeout` returns a timeout after 90 seconds but deliberately leaves that request running under a reaper. If the underlying request remains hung, the guard is never dropped and every later refresh returns `TokenBalanceRefreshInProgress` for the rest of the session. Add bounded cancellation or a completion protocol that can safely release and reconcile the single-flight state after timeout.

In `src/app.rs`:
- [BLOCKING] src/app.rs:1815-1818: Do not treat terminal no-op migration state as permanently in progress
  `migration_allows_scheduled_vote_sweep` excludes `Idle`, but `FinishUnwire::terminal_state(false)` deliberately returns `Idle` when the completion sentinel already exists or no legacy data was moved. Acknowledging unreadable-data warnings also returns to `Idle`. The reconciler's per-network dispatch guard prevents another migration run, while this branch records a deferred sweep every frame and never resumes voting. Track whether the cold-start run completed instead of interpreting every `Idle` state as pre-dispatch.
- [BLOCKING] src/app.rs:1819-1826: Retain recovery eligibility until the deferred sweep succeeds
  The preserved migration cutoff is removed before the asynchronous recovery sweep reads the database, loads identities, or casts any vote. Task-level failures do not restore it, and per-vote network failures are caught while the sweep returns outer success. Every later periodic sweep receives `None`, so votes that became stale during migration are permanently filtered out despite being logged as left for the next sweep. Keep the cutoff until all eligible recovery work reaches a durable terminal outcome.
- [SUGGESTION] src/app.rs:2052-2068: Exercise AppState snapshot wiring instead of ArcSwap ownership
  This test proves only that an `Arc` returned by `MigrationStatus::state` retains the previous allocation after a replacement is published. It never drives `AppState::update` or verifies that input claiming, prompt activation, overlay rendering, banner reconciliation, and scheduled-vote gating all consume the same frame snapshot. A direct `migration_status().state()` read could be reintroduced in any one consumer without failing this test. Add an AppState-level regression that publishes during a frame and checks those consumers remain consistent until the next frame.

In `src/backend_task/contested_names/mod.rs`:
- [BLOCKING] src/backend_task/contested_names/mod.rs:242-246: Do not mark a rejected recovered vote as executed
  `vote_on_dpns_name` returns `Ok(DPNSVoteResults(...))` even when the Platform broadcast failed; the failure is stored inside the result vector. This sweep treats every outer `Ok` as success and emits `CastScheduledVote`. `AppState` then marks the database row executed and shows a success banner, permanently suppressing retries for a rejected vote. Inspect the nested result for the scheduled voter and emit success only when its Platform result is `Ok`.

Comment on lines +58 to +60
async move {
let _refresh_guard = refresh_guard;
context.refresh_upstream_token_balances(watch_sets).await

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🔴 Blocking: Do not strand the token refresh single-flight guard

The guard that clears token_balance_refresh_in_flight is moved into the spawned network request. await_managed_network_request_with_timeout returns a timeout after 90 seconds but deliberately leaves that request running under a reaper. If the underlying request remains hung, the guard is never dropped and every later refresh returns TokenBalanceRefreshInProgress for the rest of the session. Add bounded cancellation or a completion protocol that can safely release and reconcile the single-flight state after timeout.

source: ['codex']

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Resolved in b633a52Do not strand the token refresh single-flight guard no longer present.

Auto-resolved by the review system based on the latest commit diff. If you believe this was closed in error, reopen the thread.

Comment thread src/app.rs
Comment on lines +1815 to +1818
if !migration_allows_scheduled_vote_sweep(migration_state.as_ref()) {
self.scheduled_vote_sweep_deferred_since_ms
.entry(network)
.or_insert_with(unix_time_ms);

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🔴 Blocking: Do not treat terminal no-op migration state as permanently in progress

migration_allows_scheduled_vote_sweep excludes Idle, but FinishUnwire::terminal_state(false) deliberately returns Idle when the completion sentinel already exists or no legacy data was moved. Acknowledging unreadable-data warnings also returns to Idle. The reconciler's per-network dispatch guard prevents another migration run, while this branch records a deferred sweep every frame and never resumes voting. Track whether the cold-start run completed instead of interpreting every Idle state as pre-dispatch.

source: ['codex']

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Resolved in 0fda1f6Do not treat terminal no-op migration state as permanently in progress no longer present.

Auto-resolved by the review system based on the latest commit diff. If you believe this was closed in error, reopen the thread.

Comment thread src/app.rs
Comment on lines +1819 to +1826
} else if let Some(preserve_eligibility_since_ms) =
self.scheduled_vote_sweep_deferred_since_ms.remove(&network)
{
self.last_scheduled_vote_check = now;
self.handle_backend_task(BackendTask::ContestedResourceTask(
ContestedResourceTask::CastDueScheduledVotes,
ContestedResourceTask::CastDueScheduledVotes {
preserve_eligibility_since_ms: Some(preserve_eligibility_since_ms),
},

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🔴 Blocking: Retain recovery eligibility until the deferred sweep succeeds

The preserved migration cutoff is removed before the asynchronous recovery sweep reads the database, loads identities, or casts any vote. Task-level failures do not restore it, and per-vote network failures are caught while the sweep returns outer success. Every later periodic sweep receives None, so votes that became stale during migration are permanently filtered out despite being logged as left for the next sweep. Keep the cutoff until all eligible recovery work reaches a durable terminal outcome.

source: ['codex']

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Resolved in 0fda1f6Retain recovery eligibility until the deferred sweep succeeds no longer present.

Auto-resolved by the review system based on the latest commit diff. If you believe this was closed in error, reopen the thread.

Comment thread src/app.rs
Comment on lines +2052 to +2068
fn migration_frame_snapshot_is_stable_after_async_publish() {
let status = crate::context::migration_status::MigrationStatus::new_idle();
let frame_state = status.state();

status.set_state(
crate::context::migration_status::MigrationState::AwaitingWalletPasswords {
wallets: Vec::new(),
},
);

assert!(
!MigrationReconciler::is_prompting(&frame_state),
"a transition published mid-frame must wait for the next frame",
);
assert!(
MigrationReconciler::is_prompting(&status.state()),
"the next frame snapshot must observe the prompt",

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🟡 Suggestion: Exercise AppState snapshot wiring instead of ArcSwap ownership

This test proves only that an Arc returned by MigrationStatus::state retains the previous allocation after a replacement is published. It never drives AppState::update or verifies that input claiming, prompt activation, overlay rendering, banner reconciliation, and scheduled-vote gating all consume the same frame snapshot. A direct migration_status().state() read could be reintroduced in any one consumer without failing this test. Add an AppState-level regression that publishes during a frame and checks those consumers remain consistent until the next frame.

source: ['codex']

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Resolved in 0fda1f6Exercise AppState snapshot wiring instead of ArcSwap ownership no longer present.

Auto-resolved by the review system based on the latest commit diff. If you believe this was closed in error, reopen the thread.

lklimek and others added 4 commits July 16, 2026 00:25
DET ran its startup data migration without checking the on-disk data
version, so migrating from an unsupported (too-old) version failed in
confusing ways. Read settings.database_version before migrating and gate
at both entry points (legacy-settings import and FinishUnwire) before any
sentinel or state is written; the legacy data.db is opened read-only.

Data versions 11..=40 migrate directly (v0.9.3 = 11 = the supported floor,
already migratable). Older data is rejected with an actionable "install
Dash Evo Tool 0.9.3 first" message; newer data fails closed. Fresh installs
(initialize writes v38 before the gate) are never rejected; a corrupt DB
missing the version row fails closed.

Typed errors SavedDataTooOld/SavedDataTooNew and LegacyDataTooOld/
LegacyDataTooNew carry numeric context and #[source] only (no user strings
in variants). Adds src/model/data_migration.rs (pure version classification).

Implemented by Codex (gpt-5.6-sol, high effort); data-safety reviewed
(gate-before-mutation, exact 11..=40 boundaries, fail-fast-no-write,
fresh-install-safe) — 0 blocking findings.

Co-Authored-By: Codex gpt-5.6-sol <noreply@openai.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018m6b2TRP1e6S3uQHcaq3Cq
Marvin flagged two LOW gaps in the startup DB-version gate. This feature is not
GUI-testable, so tests are its primary safety net.

- Add an async `finish_unwire::run` test (too_new_database_version_is_rejected_
  before_migration) mirroring the existing too-old test: a version above the
  ceiling (41) is rejected before any pass runs, surfacing the typed
  SavedDataTooNew / LegacyDataTooNew chain, and NEITHER the completion sentinel
  NOR any migration state is written (state stays Idle).
- Add an upper-accept boundary test (max_supported_database_version_is_accepted_
  for_direct_migration): MAX_DIRECT_MIGRATION_VERSION (40) — the top of the
  accepted 11..=40 range — is accepted, and the first version above it is
  rejected as too new. Previously only 11-accept and 41-too-new were pinned; the
  top of the accept range was never asserted accepted.

QA-001: document the deliberate headroom on MAX_DIRECT_MIGRATION_VERSION (40)
above DEFAULT_DB_VERSION (38), so data from a slightly newer build (39, 40) still
migrates rather than failing closed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Wire the previously-orphaned SystemTask::WipePlatformData to a developer-only
button on the Identity Hub Settings tab, gated to Devnet (the backend
wipe_devnet handler only clears devnet identities, tokens, and user contracts).
Guarded by a type-"WIPE"-to-confirm destructive dialog via a new
ConfirmationDialog::require_confirmation_text builder. Implemented by Codex Sol.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018m6b2TRP1e6S3uQHcaq3Cq
…-007 / DPY-005)

Each active-contact row now offers a View Profile action that opens the working
ContactProfileViewerScreen for the selected contact, alongside the existing Pay
action. Reuses the same viewer the legacy DashPay paths use; the orphaned
ContactDetailsScreen is left untouched. Implemented by Codex Sol.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018m6b2TRP1e6S3uQHcaq3Cq

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Preliminary review — Codex only

Carried-forward revalidation confirms three scheduled-vote blockers remain, while four prior issues are fixed, token-refresh guard retention is intentional, and the AppState snapshot test remains a suggestion. The latest delta adds six blockers involving future database versions, incomplete data wiping, and uncorrelated document results. With nine confirmed blockers total, this PR requires changes.

Validated blockers were found in the Codex precheck. Sonnet is deferred until a fresh Codex revalidation clears the blocker gate.

Review provenance

  • Codex reviewers: gpt-5.6-sol — general (failed), gpt-5.6-sol — rust-quality (failed), gpt-5.6-sol — general (completed), gpt-5.6-sol — rust-quality (completed)
  • Verifier: gpt-5.6-sol — verifier
  • Sonnet: not run (deferred by blocker gate)

🔴 9 blocking

4 additional finding(s) omitted (not in diff).

2 carried-forward finding(s) already raised on this PR; not re-posting as new inline comments.

🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
These findings are from an automated code review. Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.

In `src/model/data_migration.rs`:
- [BLOCKING] src/model/data_migration.rs:6-9: Reject database versions newer than the understood schema
  The current schema and migration ladder end at version 38, but this gate accepts versions 39 and 40 despite having no definitions for either layout. A newer build can change SQL columns or serialized blob formats under either version, after which this older binary may skip undecodable records and write completion sentinels. Set the ceiling to the newest schema whose exact layout is understood, currently DEFAULT_DB_VERSION.

In `src/wallet_backend/mod.rs`:
- [BLOCKING] src/wallet_backend/mod.rs:1194-1214: Use fallible enumeration for the authoritative wallet wipe
  forget_all_wallets_local relies on WalletMetaView::list and SingleKeyView::list_persisted to discover every secret that must be removed. Both APIs log and suppress listing, key-parsing, and blob-decoding failures, returning an empty or incomplete vector. Clear Database can therefore report success while seeds or imported private keys remain on disk. Add fallible enumeration for this destructive path and propagate every listing or decoding failure into ClearAllOutcome.failures.

In `src/context/identity_db.rs`:
- [BLOCKING] src/context/identity_db.rs:994-1011: Do not purge identity metadata when its private keys were not deleted
  clear_identity_vault_keys silently returns when the stored identity cannot be read or decoded and only logs delete_all failures. Both Clear Database and Wipe Platform Data then purge the identity scope and enumeration index, leaving private keys in the secret store while deleting the metadata needed to identify and retry those deletions. Return a typed error and preserve the identity record and index until all associated vault rows are removed successfully.

In `src/context/wallet_lifecycle/spv.rs`:
- [BLOCKING] src/context/wallet_lifecycle/spv.rs:41-114: Wait for and propagate every database-clear operation
  Upstream wallet removal and shielded-store clearing are detached, while DashPay listing and deletion failures are only logged. The method can return Ok before durable cleanup finishes or after persisted contacts, wallet state, or shielded state failed to clear, and the UI immediately reports that all local data was removed. Await the asynchronous operations and add every synchronous or asynchronous failure to the authoritative WalletDataClearIncomplete result.

In `src/ui/contracts_documents/contracts_documents_screen.rs`:
- [BLOCKING] src/ui/contracts_documents/contracts_documents_screen.rs:582-604: Correlate successful document-query results before updating the screen
  Failures are checked against pending_fetch_context, but successful Documents and PageDocuments results still use the context-blind callback. Fetch Documents remains enabled while a request is pending, and document results can also arrive from other screens. An older or unrelated completion can therefore clear the active request and replace its documents and pagination state. Override display_backend_task_result and mutate state only when the supplied context matches pending_fetch_context.

In `src/ui/tokens/view_token_claims_screen.rs`:
- [BLOCKING] src/ui/tokens/view_token_claims_screen.rs:80-99: Prevent stale document results from replacing token claims
  The claims screen correlates failures but accepts every successful Documents result routed to the visible screen. Both Refresh and Fetch claims remain available during Fetching, so multiple requests can overlap, and results from unrelated document queries can also reach this callback. Correlate successful results to the pending operation; because repeated claims queries have identical contexts, also disable duplicate dispatches while fetching or add a unique operation identifier.

In `src/app.rs`:
- [BLOCKING] src/app.rs:84-92: Treat a completed no-op migration as terminal
  migration_allows_scheduled_vote_sweep excludes Idle, while finish_unwire deliberately leaves a successful no-op run in Idle. MigrationReconciler dispatches only once per network, so an ordinary launch with no data to move remains Idle permanently and defers scheduled votes on every frame. Represent completed-with-no-changes as a distinct terminal state or track cold-start completion separately from MigrationState::Idle.

In `src/backend_task/contested_names/mod.rs`:
- [BLOCKING] src/backend_task/contested_names/mod.rs:231-247: Do not mark nested vote failures as successful casts
  vote_on_dpns_name returns an outer Ok(DPNSVoteResults) even when Platform rejected the submission, storing that failure inside the nested result vector. This branch treats every outer Ok as success and emits CastScheduledVote, after which AppState marks the database row executed and shows a success message. Inspect the nested result and emit CastScheduledVote only when the scheduled voter's submission succeeded.

Comment on lines +6 to +9
/// Deliberately kept a few versions above `DEFAULT_DB_VERSION` (38) as headroom,
/// so data written by a slightly newer build (39, 40) still migrates rather than
/// failing closed; only a version above this ceiling is rejected as too new.
pub(crate) const MAX_DIRECT_MIGRATION_VERSION: i64 = 40;

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🔴 Blocking: Reject database versions newer than the understood schema

The current schema and migration ladder end at version 38, but this gate accepts versions 39 and 40 despite having no definitions for either layout. A newer build can change SQL columns or serialized blob formats under either version, after which this older binary may skip undecodable records and write completion sentinels. Set the ceiling to the newest schema whose exact layout is understood, currently DEFAULT_DB_VERSION.

source: ['codex']

Comment on lines 41 to +114
@@ -51,37 +54,47 @@ impl AppContext {
// per-contact private memos and address-index cursors now live in
// each owner's `DetScope::Identity` scope (Wave 2 promotion), which
// the Global sweep cannot reach — so fan the per-owner clear out
// over the identity index. Best-effort when the wallet backend has
// not been wired yet (clear at first run before any wallet exists)
// — there is nothing to drain in that case.
if let Ok(backend) = self.wallet_backend() {
let kv = backend.kv();
match kv.list(DetScope::Global, Some("det:dashpay:")) {
Ok(keys) => {
for k in keys {
if let Err(e) = kv.delete(DetScope::Global, &k) {
tracing::warn!(key = %k, "DashPay sidecar delete failed: {e:?}");
}
// over the identity index.
let kv = backend.kv();
match kv.list(DetScope::Global, Some("det:dashpay:")) {
Ok(keys) => {
for k in keys {
if let Err(e) = kv.delete(DetScope::Global, &k) {
tracing::warn!(key = %k, "DashPay sidecar delete failed: {e:?}");
}
}
Err(e) => {
tracing::warn!("DashPay sidecar listing failed: {e:?}");
}
}
match self.local_identity_ids() {
Ok(owners) => {
for owner in owners {
if let Err(e) = backend.dashpay_clear_owner_overlays(&owner) {
tracing::warn!(
owner = %owner,
"DashPay per-owner overlay clear failed: {e:?}"
);
}
Err(e) => {
tracing::warn!("DashPay sidecar listing failed: {e:?}");
}
}
match self.local_identity_ids() {
Ok(owners) => {
for owner in owners {
if let Err(e) = backend.dashpay_clear_owner_overlays(&owner) {
tracing::warn!(
owner = %owner,
"DashPay per-owner overlay clear failed: {e:?}"
);
}
// Wipe each identity's vault keys and det:identity:* records too —
// Tier-1 keyless identity keys (incl. masternode voting/owner/payout)
// are plaintext-recoverable, so a full wipe must remove them as well.
if let Err(e) = self.delete_local_qualified_identity(&owner) {
tracing::warn!(
owner = %owner,
"Identity private-key wipe failed during clear: {e:?}"
);
failures.push(e);
}
}
Err(e) => {
tracing::warn!("Identity index listing for DashPay clear failed: {e:?}");
}
}
Err(e) => {
// A listing failure skips every per-identity key wipe, so it must
// surface as an incomplete clear — never a silent success that
// leaves identity private keys on disk.
tracing::warn!("Identity index listing for DashPay clear failed: {e:?}");
failures.push(e);
}
}

@@ -90,19 +103,15 @@ impl AppContext {
// shielded files. The coordinator reset is async, so it runs off-thread
// as a best-effort subtask; the legacy-file unlinks are synchronous and
// scoped strictly to THIS network's spv directory.
if let Ok(backend) = self.wallet_backend() {
cleanup_legacy_shielded_files(backend.spv_storage_dir())?;
cleanup_legacy_shielded_files(backend.spv_storage_dir())?;

let ctx = Arc::clone(self);
self.subtasks
.spawn_sync("shielded_coordinator_clear", async move {
if let Ok(backend) = ctx.wallet_backend()
&& let Err(error) = backend.clear_shielded().await
{
tracing::warn!(%error, "Shielded coordinator reset failed during clear");
}
});
}
let backend = Arc::clone(&backend);
self.subtasks
.spawn_sync("shielded_coordinator_clear", async move {
if let Err(error) = backend.clear_shielded().await {
tracing::warn!(%error, "Shielded coordinator reset failed during clear");
}
});

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🔴 Blocking: Wait for and propagate every database-clear operation

Upstream wallet removal and shielded-store clearing are detached, while DashPay listing and deletion failures are only logged. The method can return Ok before durable cleanup finishes or after persisted contacts, wallet state, or shielded state failed to clear, and the UI immediately reports that all local data was removed. Await the asynchronous operations and add every synchronous or asynchronous failure to the authoritative WalletDataClearIncomplete result.

source: ['codex']

Comment thread src/app.rs
Comment on lines +84 to +92
fn migration_allows_scheduled_vote_sweep(state: &MigrationState) -> bool {
matches!(
state,
MigrationState::Success
| MigrationState::SucceededWithUnreadableVotes { .. }
| MigrationState::SucceededWithUnreadableIdentities { .. }
| MigrationState::SucceededWithUnreadableIdentitiesAndVotes { .. }
)
}

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🔴 Blocking: Treat a completed no-op migration as terminal

migration_allows_scheduled_vote_sweep excludes Idle, while finish_unwire deliberately leaves a successful no-op run in Idle. MigrationReconciler dispatches only once per network, so an ordinary launch with no data to move remains Idle permanently and defers scheduled votes on every frame. Represent completed-with-no-changes as a distinct terminal state or track cold-start completion separately from MigrationState::Idle.

source: ['codex']

Comment on lines 231 to 247
@@ -232,9 +241,9 @@ impl AppContext {
{
Ok(_) => {
let _ = sender
.send(TaskResult::Success(Box::new(
.send(TaskResult::unattributed_success(
BackendTaskSuccessResult::CastScheduledVote(vote),
)))
))
.await;

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🔴 Blocking: Do not mark nested vote failures as successful casts

vote_on_dpns_name returns an outer Ok(DPNSVoteResults) even when Platform rejected the submission, storing that failure inside the nested result vector. This branch treats every outer Ok as success and emits CastScheduledVote, after which AppState marks the database row executed and shows a success message. Inspect the nested result and emit CastScheduledVote only when the scheduled voter's submission succeeded.

source: ['codex']

lklimek and others added 3 commits July 16, 2026 08:18
…ase failures (SEC-001, SEC-002)

clear_identity_vault_keys now returns Result and propagates instead of
swallowing vault read/decode/delete errors, so identity removal (Clear
Database, identities screen, masternode detail, migration) reports incomplete
rather than clean when private keys — including masternode voting/owner/payout
keys — cannot be deleted. IdentityKeyView::delete_all attempts every key and
returns the first error instead of short-circuiting. DashPay sidecar/overlay
delete failures in clear_network_database are now accumulated into the failures
list (SEC-002) rather than warn-only. Adds a masternode-removal regression test
that injects a vault-key delete failure. Fixes found by security review.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018m6b2TRP1e6S3uQHcaq3Cq
Replace per-module mutexes guarding DASH_EVO_DATA_DIR with a single crate-wide
lock in a new test_support module. Module-local locks let tests in different
modules race on the process-global env var under parallel execution, causing
intermittent AppState::new failures (e.g. add_token_by_id_screen's
display_task_result test). One shared lock serializes them deterministically.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018m6b2TRP1e6S3uQHcaq3Cq
…ch other (QA-001)

The opening-frame dismiss guard keyed on a single global Id shared by every
InfoPopup and SelectionDialog, so two independent popups on one screen (e.g. the
profile screen's Profile-Guidelines and Avatar-Guidelines info popups) shared
render-history state: closing one via outside-click then opening the other on
the next frame dismissed the second on its own opening frame. Each InfoPopup and
SelectionDialog now takes a caller-provided per-instance Id (mirroring
passphrase_modal), so guards no longer collide. Adds a two-popup regression test.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018m6b2TRP1e6S3uQHcaq3Cq

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Preliminary review — Codex only

All nine carried-forward blocker candidates and the prior test-coverage suggestion remain valid; the three Clear Database blockers are consolidated into one comment because they share the same false-success outcome. Latest-delta review adds one blocker for dynamic help popups sharing a guard ID and one suggestion for immediate same-popup reopening. With eight consolidated blockers and two suggestions, this PR requires changes.

Validated blockers were found in the Codex precheck. Sonnet is deferred until a fresh Codex revalidation clears the blocker gate.

Review provenance

  • Codex reviewers: gpt-5.6-sol — general (completed), gpt-5.6-sol — rust-quality (completed)
  • Verifier: gpt-5.6-sol — verifier
  • Sonnet: not run (deferred by blocker gate)

🔴 8 blocking | 🟡 1 suggestion(s)

2 additional finding(s) omitted (not in diff).

6 carried-forward finding(s) already raised on this PR; not re-posting as new inline comments.

🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
These findings are from an automated code review. Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.

In `src/ui/contracts_documents/contracts_documents_screen.rs`:
- [BLOCKING] src/ui/contracts_documents/contracts_documents_screen.rs:582-604: Correlate successful document-query results before updating the screen
  Failures are checked against `pending_fetch_context`, but successful `Documents` and `PageDocuments` results still use the context-blind callback. The fetch control remains available while a request is pending, and results are routed to whichever screen is visible. An older or unrelated completion can therefore clear the active request and replace its documents and pagination state. Override `display_backend_task_result` and mutate state only when the supplied context matches the pending query.

In `src/ui/tokens/view_token_claims_screen.rs`:
- [BLOCKING] src/ui/tokens/view_token_claims_screen.rs:80-99: Prevent stale document results from replacing token claims
  The claims screen correlates failures but accepts every successful `Documents` result routed to the visible screen. Refresh and Fetch claims can dispatch overlapping requests, and an unrelated document query can also complete while this screen is visible. Correlate successful results with the expected claims-query context and prevent duplicate identical requests while a fetch is active, or add a unique operation identifier.

In `src/ui/identities/add_existing_identity_screen.rs`:
- [BLOCKING] src/ui/identities/add_existing_identity_screen.rs:1117-1120: Give each dynamic help popup its own guard ID
  This screen multiplexes at least five help messages through one `InfoPopup` ID. Because the popup does not block background input, clicking a different help icon while one popup is open replaces the message before rendering. The guard sees the same ID on consecutive passes, treats that opening click as an ordinary outside click, and immediately closes the second popup. Include the message or another stable help-site discriminator in the ID; the same dynamic-single-ID pattern appears in `AddNewIdentityScreen` and `ContactProfileViewerScreen`.

In `src/ui/helpers.rs`:
- [SUGGESTION] src/ui/helpers.rs:66-70: Re-arm a modal guard after an outside-click dismissal
  The helper records the current pass before reporting an outside-click dismissal. If the same popup ID is reopened on the immediately following pass, the stored pass still looks continuous, so the reopening click closes the popup again. Remove the temporary pass entry when dismissal is reported so a new rendering episode is recognized even without a full non-rendering pass between episodes.

Comment on lines +1117 to +1120
let mut popup = InfoPopup::new(
egui::Id::new("load_identity_info_popup"),
"Load Identity Information",
&show_pop_up_info_text,

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🔴 Blocking: Give each dynamic help popup its own guard ID

This screen multiplexes at least five help messages through one InfoPopup ID. Because the popup does not block background input, clicking a different help icon while one popup is open replaces the message before rendering. The guard sees the same ID on consecutive passes, treats that opening click as an ordinary outside click, and immediately closes the second popup. Include the message or another stable help-site discriminator in the ID; the same dynamic-single-ID pattern appears in AddNewIdentityScreen and ContactProfileViewerScreen.

Suggested change
let mut popup = InfoPopup::new(
egui::Id::new("load_identity_info_popup"),
"Load Identity Information",
&show_pop_up_info_text,
let mut popup = InfoPopup::new(
egui::Id::new("load_identity_info_popup").with(&show_pop_up_info_text),
"Load Identity Information",
&show_pop_up_info_text,
);

source: ['codex']

Comment thread src/ui/helpers.rs
Comment on lines +66 to +70
let this_pass = ctx.cumulative_pass_nr();
let last_pass: Option<u64> = ctx.data(|d| d.get_temp(id));
ctx.data_mut(|d| d.insert_temp(id, this_pass));
let is_opening_frame = last_pass != Some(this_pass.wrapping_sub(1));
!is_opening_frame && clicked_outside_window(ctx, window_rect)

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🟡 Suggestion: Re-arm a modal guard after an outside-click dismissal

The helper records the current pass before reporting an outside-click dismissal. If the same popup ID is reopened on the immediately following pass, the stored pass still looks continuous, so the reopening click closes the popup again. Remove the temporary pass entry when dismissal is reported so a new rendering episode is recognized even without a full non-rendering pass between episodes.

Suggested change
let this_pass = ctx.cumulative_pass_nr();
let last_pass: Option<u64> = ctx.data(|d| d.get_temp(id));
ctx.data_mut(|d| d.insert_temp(id, this_pass));
let is_opening_frame = last_pass != Some(this_pass.wrapping_sub(1));
!is_opening_frame && clicked_outside_window(ctx, window_rect)
let this_pass = ctx.cumulative_pass_nr();
let last_pass: Option<u64> = ctx.data(|d| d.get_temp(id));
ctx.data_mut(|d| d.insert_temp(id, this_pass));
let is_opening_frame = last_pass != Some(this_pass.wrapping_sub(1));
if is_opening_frame {
return false;
}
let clicked = clicked_outside_window(ctx, window_rect);
if clicked {
ctx.data_mut(|d| d.remove::<u64>(id));
}
clicked

source: ['codex']

lklimek and others added 3 commits July 16, 2026 09:53
…(NEW-006)

The developer-only "Wipe Platform Data" control (story NET-011) wipes data
for the whole devnet, but was rendered on the Identity Hub -> Settings tab,
a per-identity screen. Its siblings are network-scoped and live on the
Network Chooser: "Clear {Network} Database" (NET-019) in the "Database
Maintenance" section and "Clear SPV Data" (NET-020).

Move the control into "Database Maintenance", directly after the Clear
Database button, matching that file's danger-button styling and its
existing selected_role.at_least(UserRole::Developer) gating idiom.

Gating is unchanged and stays deliberately narrow: Developer role AND
Devnet. The devnet condition is load-bearing, not cosmetic, because the
backend wipe_devnet() is devnet-scoped
(delete_all_local_qualified_identities_in_devnet / _tokens_in_devnet /
clear_user_contracts).

Gate is now enforced in three places: the render check, a re-check in
show_wipe_platform_data_confirmation that dismisses the dialog if the gate
stops holding (so a dialog opened on Devnet cannot fire after a network
switch), and a fail-closed wipe_platform_data_action.

The type-WIPE confirmation and all user-facing wording are unchanged. Both
unit tests move to ui::network_chooser_screen::tests and now assert the
negative cases in both directions.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018m6b2TRP1e6S3uQHcaq3Cq
A state transition can be accepted for broadcast while the separate result wait fails. Treat SDK broadcast-error envelopes without a structured consensus cause as submitted but unconfirmed, and direct the user to verify completion before retrying.

Co-authored-by: Codex GPT-5 <noreply@openai.com>
…stories) (#895)

* docs(qa): scaffold PR892 user-story QA campaign checklist

Populated progress.md with all 123 stories from docs/user-stories.md
(112 Implemented to test, 11 Gap pre-marked N/A). Note: source brief
referenced 152 stories incl. UX/IDH/MN categories that don't exist in
the current doc — proceeding with the doc as it actually is.

* docs(qa): confirm PR892 tx-history regression fix; WAL/SND/NET spot checks

Critical result: full quit + cold-boot relaunch on the same data dir now
correctly re-renders transaction history (was the PR892 bug). Verified
with 3 real testnet transactions via the Pasta faucet.

Also: NET-001 (switch networks) PASS, WAL-001/004/010/011/016/023/024
PASS, SND-001 PASS (nav only), SND-003 (Receive button) FAIL — no QR
code or modal appears, reproduced 3x.

* docs(qa): add shared campaign context for delegated per-category agents

* docs(qa): complete remaining WAL user-story QA pass (PR892)

Finishes WAL-002/003/005/006/007/008/012/013/017-020/021/022 against the
PR892 build. All WAL stories now checked off in progress.md.

Notable findings:
- WAL-005 (Rename): FAIL — Rename button is completely inert on both HD
  and single-key wallets, reproduced across multiple attempts.
- WAL-006 (Lock/unlock): FAIL — Lock works and correctly blocks sensitive
  ops, but Unlock never opens a password prompt; a locked wallet cannot be
  re-unlocked through the UI (self-lockout bug).
- WAL-007 (Remove): FAIL (partial) — HD wallets get a proper confirmation
  dialog; single-key wallets are deleted instantly with zero confirmation.
- WAL-017 (Fund Platform address from wallet): FAIL — asset-lock coin
  selection reports "No UTXOs available for selection" despite the wallet
  holding 3 confirmed UTXOs; reproduced twice, non-transient.
- WAL-018/019/020: BLOCKED, all downstream of the WAL-017 coin-selection
  bug (no asset lock can be created, no Platform address ever holds a
  balance to transfer/withdraw from).
- WAL-002/003/008/012/013/021/022: PASS, with UX notes (Default view does
  not actually simplify the Wallet screen; System tab is gated on "not
  Default view" rather than strictly Developer mode).

QA Wallet 1 confirmed intact (3 DASH) throughout; throwaway wallets used
for destructive testing were cleaned up. App left in Testnet / Expert
view. No PR892 application source code modified.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(qa): complete SND user-story QA pass (PR892)

Completes SND-002/005/006/007/008/009/010/011/012/013 against the PR892
build. Confirmed FAILs: SND-002 (single-key send disabled by design,
typed error SingleKeyWalletsUnsupported), SND-005 (no fee estimate or
confirmation dialog anywhere pre-broadcast), SND-007 (shielded
destinations rejected with "Invalid output address" — root cause
disclosed in-app as "Shielded sending is not available on this network
yet"). Confirmed PASS: SND-006 (multi-recipient send, single broadcast,
verified on-chain). Also completed the SND-001 full E2E send that was
deferred in the prior pass, surfacing the missing-confirmation-dialog
finding that drives SND-005's FAIL.

BLOCKED with concrete reasoning (no workarounds attempted, per campaign
rules): SND-009/010 (Platform/shielded balance can never be funded due
to WAL-017's asset-lock bug and SND-007's shielded-sending limitation)
and SND-011/012/013 (no identity exists yet — IDN category not run).
SND-008 partially verified: the Send screen correctly recognizes a
Base58 identity ID as a destination and offers "Top Up Identity", but
full completion is blocked by the same two root causes.

App left in a clean state: network Testnet, Expert view, QA Wallet 1
intact (2.99999288 DASH), no leftover throwaway wallets.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(qa): complete ALK asset-lock QA pass, prove WAL-017 bug is narrow not global

ALK-001 (Create Asset Lock) PASSES end-to-end: builds, signs, and broadcasts a
real InstantSend-locked asset lock from the wallet's ordinary (pre-existing)
UTXO balance. A differential re-test of WAL-017's exact failing scenario
("Fund Platform Address"), run immediately after in the same live session,
now succeeds too — same wallet, same account, no code change. This confirms
the shared asset-lock coin-selection builder is not globally/persistently
broken; WAL-017's failure was state-dependent/transient. IDN/DPN/DPY/TOK/DOC
should not be pre-emptively marked BLOCKED on account of it.

ALK-002/ALK-003 FAIL/BLOCKED: the Wallet screen's "Asset Locks" list never
surfaces a just-created, confirmed-usable lock (verified present and correct
via direct SQLite inspection), even after Refresh/renavigation — a UI/cache
bug independent of the coin-selection question.

Also documents: a UI overflow bug hiding the "Create Asset Lock" button at
the campaign's standard window size/zoom, and an unresolved, well-narrowed
Testnet-specific wallet-storage (SQLite persister) failure that blocked
restarting the app in this data dir during this pass (9 process restarts +
in-app reconnect all failed identically; Mainnet syncs fine in the same
process, isolating the fault to Testnet's persisted wallet-storage state).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(qa): narrow Testnet wallet-backend connectivity blocker, disprove asset_locks hypothesis

Non-destructive differential test (fresh throwaway wallet, zero asset
locks) reproduces the same failure, ruling out ALK's original theory
that the two asset_lock rows created during testing were the trigger.
Two non-destructive repair attempts (WAL/SHM sidecar clear; app-UI
Remove-wallet) did not help and the latter was correctly halted by the
permission system before any destructive confirmation. Updated
CAMPAIGN-CONTEXT.md so downstream category agents know to mark
Testnet-connectivity-dependent stories BLOCKED rather than re-diagnose.

* docs(qa): complete DEV developer-tools QA pass (PR892)

Covers DEV-001 through DEV-008. Two stories (DEV-002 proof request log,
DEV-006 masternode list diff) have no UI implementation at all, confirmed
by both UI exploration and source-code search. DEV-003's GroveSTARK proof
generation/verification is coded but deliberately hidden from all
navigation. DEV-004/005/007 are mostly blocked by the known Testnet
environment issue (see ALK.md) — testing here additionally shows the
blocker also affects pure DAPI/Platform-info calls that don't touch the
wallet at all (masternode-list/quorum sync required for proof
verification), narrowing the likely root cause. DEV-001 (state transition
decoding) and the Contract/Proof deserializers pass standalone since they
require no network connectivity.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(qa): complete MCP CLI/server user-story QA pass (PR892)

MCP-001 (Manage wallets via CLI) — FAIL: core_wallets_list reads only the
in-memory AppContext.wallets map, which is never hydrated from the DB/vault
outside the SPV-gated path. An imported wallet is invisible to every
subsequent det-cli invocation (core-wallets-list/core-address-create/
core-balances-get all report "Wallet not found"), breaking the CLI's
documented process-per-command usage pattern. Root cause confirmed by
reading src/mcp/tools/wallet.rs and context/wallet_lifecycle/registration.rs.

MCP-002 (MCP server access for AI agents) — PASS: both stdio (det-cli serve)
and HTTP (det-cli headless) transports verified end-to-end (protocol
lifecycle, bearer auth, session handling, network-mismatch guard, dynamic
tool discovery); carries the same wallet-hydration caveat but that's a
wallet-tooling defect, not a transport defect.

Tested against two dedicated throwaway data dirs
(/data/tmp/det-qa-mcp-cli-data, /data/tmp/det-qa-mcp-http-data), never
touching the main GUI campaign data dir or its running instance.

* docs(qa): complete IDN identity user-story QA pass (PR892)

Tested IDN-001 through IDN-013 (IDN-011 pre-existing N/A Gap) against the
Testnet environment. Two new defects found independent of the known
masternode-list/quorum-sync blocker: the "Load Identity" (ID+key) and "Load
masternode" (ProTxHash) submit buttons hang completely silently with zero
user feedback (no banner, no log line), unlike every other blocked flow in
the campaign which degrades with a clean typed/generic error — marked FAIL
for IDN-002/IDN-003 on that basis. Also found the Create-Identity wizard's
Advanced-mode "+ Add Key" button is a no-op (cache-miss + unconditional
rebuild race, confirmed via source, independent of the environment issue).

IDN-004 through IDN-009 and IDN-013 are transitively BLOCKED (no identity
ever loads locally to operate on). IDN-010 and IDN-012 confirmed to dispatch
correctly and fail/hide cleanly on the documented environment blocker.
Environment was also found to be in a worse state than DEV.md's snapshot:
the wallet-storage layer itself fails to open this session (not just SPV
sync), so even local-DB-cached balance views render 0 — documented but not
re-diagnosed per campaign instructions.

No PR892 application source modified. Verified zero persistent side effects
via direct SQLite inspection (0 identities before/after, wallets unchanged).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(qa): complete DPN/DPY user-story QA pass (PR892)

All 7 DPN stories and 10 in-scope DPY stories (DPY-010 already N/A)
marked BLOCKED — no Platform identity (user or masternode/evonode) is
reachable in this environment, per scenarios/IDN.md's silent-hang and
environment-blocker findings.

One fresh recheck confirmed the environment is unchanged since IDN.md
(same three red banners, 0 DASH wallet, 0 identities in SQLite) before
assuming the blocker still applies.

Source review confirms DPN/DPY have no alternate reachability path:
DPNS registration/contests and all DashPay functionality are gated
behind the Identity Hub (0 identities -> onboarding empty state only)
or a loaded masternode's detail screen for voting; the sidebar's
standalone DPNS/DashPay nav entries were intentionally removed in this
PR's identity-hub redesign. Also confirms DPN-001's registration form
does implement real client-side name-format validation (3-63 chars,
charset) and a fee estimate before submission, and empirically ruled
out the "Create multiple test identities" dev-tool breadcrumb shortcut
as a bootstrap path (unreachable with zero identities).

No PR892 application source was modified; no persistent state changed.

* docs(qa): complete TOK/DOC user-story QA pass (PR892)

Tests all 17 TOK and 9 DOC stories against the PR892 build. Most are
BLOCKED on the known Testnet masternode-list/quorum-sync/wallet-backend
issue, but explicit live testing (not assumption) confirms two public
read-only query paths work without a loaded identity: token keyword
search (TOK-002) and contract import (DOC-003), both dispatching real
DAPI queries that fail cleanly on the shared proof-verification issue.

Three real defects found, independent of the environment blocker:
- DOC-002 (Update Contract) causes a full application crash: an
  unguarded .expect() on get_contracts() panics on
  WalletBackendNotYetWired, unlike its sibling Register Contract screen
  which handles the same condition with a clean message. Confirmed
  pre-existing on v1.0-dev too, not a PR892 regression. App relaunched
  cleanly, no persistent state lost.
- DOC-004 (Fetch Documents) dispatches a real query that hangs silently
  forever with a misleading ever-counting progress banner, reproduced
  across two independent sessions.
- TOK-003 (Import Token by ID) silently drops a well-formed request's
  failure with zero user feedback, reproduced twice.

QA-only: no PR892 application source was modified. SQLite confirms zero
persistent state changes across the whole pass.

* docs(qa): complete NET user-story QA pass (PR892)

Covers NET-002/003/004/005/007/008/009/010/015. NET-011 deliberately
left for the final destructive pass.

Verdicts: PASS - NET-004 (theme), NET-005 (interface mode gating),
NET-007 (refresh mode, partial - only 2 of the documented 3 states
exist, by architectural design post platform-wallet migration),
NET-010 (onboarding wizard), NET-015 (SPV-only zero-config operation,
with a UX note that the default-view banner still says "SPV sync
failed"). FAIL - NET-002 (no dashmate detection/import UI, .env
requires manual copy-paste), NET-003 (dash_qt_path has no UI surface),
NET-008 (Core backend mode selector was explicitly retired - chain
sync is SPV-only now), NET-009 (disable_zmq has no UI surface).

Confirmed the known Testnet wallet-backend blocker (SPV sync failure)
is still present; most NET stories are UI/settings-level and testable
regardless.

* docs(qa): finalize PR892 user-story QA campaign — 123/123 stories accounted for

NET-011 (Wipe Platform data) marked BLOCKED by design: the permission
system correctly halted the destructive action against the campaign's
shared evidence-bearing data dir and requires explicit human
authorization, which is unavailable in this unattended run.

Final summary-report.md rewritten with complete results: 25 PASS,
23 FAIL (real bugs/gaps, full list with severity), 64 BLOCKED (mostly
cascading from one environment issue, not independent defects),
11 N/A. PR892's actual regression fix (tx history surviving a cold
boot) remains confirmed solid and unrelated to the FAIL list.

* docs(qa): reconcile PR892 QA campaign against the correct 175-story catalog

The first pass tested against docs/user-stories.md in this qa-docs worktree
(v1.0-dev, 123 stories) due to a coordinator pointing error. PR892's real
catalog lives in the PR892-build worktree and is a superset: 175 stories
across the original 11 categories plus three new ones (UX, IDH, MN).

- progress.md rebuilt against the corrected catalog: unchanged stories keep
  their original verdicts, SND-002/IDN-003/DEV-002/DEV-006/NET-008
  reclassified to N/A (their FAIL findings are consistent with the
  Gap/Removed/Superseded reclassification), ~20 new/redefined stories added
  unchecked, IDN-013's duplicate-ID doc defect disambiguated as
  IDN-013a/IDN-013b.
- Scenario files (WAL/SND/IDN/DEV/NET) annotated with reconciliation notes
  at the affected stories; original evidence preserved as-is.
- summary-report.md: status reopened, methodology section added covering
  the catalog correction and a separate, unrelated binary-provenance
  incident (shared cargo target dir briefly clobbered by a concurrent
  build; assessed low-risk and deliberately not re-tested per coordinator
  judgment).
- CAMPAIGN-CONTEXT.md updated so future delegated agents launch from a
  private, hash-verified binary instead of the shared/clobber-prone
  target dir, and read the story catalog from the PR892-build worktree.

No PR892 application source modified. Local commit only, not pushed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* qa: WAL-025 through WAL-029 PR892 regression pass

Tests WAL-025 (restore protected imported key), WAL-026 (vault passphrase
unlock at startup), WAL-027 (balance health check after sync), WAL-028
(top-nav wallet pill on Wallets tab), WAL-029 (view/copy shielded address)
against the PR892 build.

This session's app instance hit the known Testnet wallet-backend/storage
environment blocker documented in ALK.md from its very first frame,
independently reconfirmed via a non-destructive Mainnet/Testnet network
switch. WAL-025/026/027/029 are BLOCKED as a result (026 additionally via
source review, since no vault fixture exists to exercise live). WAL-028
is a clean PASS, fully live-tested (its pill/wallet-selection mechanics
don't depend on SPV wiring) using an existing "DIAG throwaway" leftover
fixture plus a dedicated "WAL-028 Throwaway" wallet, both cleaned up
afterward. Also documents an incidental, reproducible-in-session wallet-
header rendering glitch found during WAL-028 testing (recovered by
toggling Interface mode).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(qa): SND-014/015/016 — PR892 Max-button and Shielded-tab entry points (all FAIL)

- SND-014 (Send maximum from a Core wallet): fee-reserve math is correct
  (core_max_send_amount_duffs/core_max_send_reserve_duffs), but the "fee
  reserved" label and the "balance too low" message are both dead code in
  the render path (AmountInput only surfaces max_exceeded_hint inside a
  max-exceeded validation error, which a successful Max click never
  triggers) — confirmed live and via source, root-causes SND-005.
- SND-015 (Unshield) / SND-016 (Send Private): the Shielded tab's dedicated
  buttons exist in source and are correctly wired to the unified Send
  screen preset (SND-016's spend-lock/verification UX is also correctly
  implemented), but the whole action-button row is unconditionally hidden
  behind a hardcoded SHIELDED_ACTIVATION_PROTOCOL_VERSION = None capability
  gate, so neither button is reachable by any live user in this build —
  consistent with SND-007.

Live testing this pass was constrained by the same unresolved Testnet
WalletBackendNotYetWired blocker documented in ALK.md/DEV.md (re-hit by the
WAL-025-029 pass immediately prior); findings were cross-checked against
PR892 source where the live UI could not reach the relevant code paths.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* qa: IDN-013a/014/015/016 — PR892 identity-protection, deposit-fund, auto-discovery, upgrade-migration pass

- IDN-013a (password-protect identity keys, SEC-001): BLOCKED for live UI, same
  "no identity reachable" root cause as the rest of the IDN category; read-only
  source review confirms the full feature (Key Protection UI, danger warnings,
  just-in-time sign prompts, headless SecretPromptUnavailable fail-closed,
  Tier-2 Argon2id+XChaCha20-Poly1305 seam reuse) is implemented per spec.
- IDN-014 (fund via shown deposit address/QR): FAIL, not BLOCKED — re-verified
  live and reproduced fresh: the wizard's "Receive a new deposit" step still
  renders zero content (no address, no QR, no amount field, no error),
  correlated in det.log to the wallet-backend-not-wired environment condition
  but with total silence instead of a typed error banner.
- IDN-015 (automatic identity discovery after sync): PASS — det.log from the
  live running process shows the once-per-session auto-trigger firing and
  completing successfully on Platform readiness; source review confirms the
  rolling 5-index lookahead (IDENTITY_GAP_LIMIT) and alias-preserving refresh.
- IDN-016 (identities preserved across upgrade): BLOCKED — no pre-upgrade
  legacy identity-storage fixture exists in this data dir; out of scope to
  fabricate one. Source review of v093_upgrade.rs / migration_status.rs notes
  a mature, test-covered implementation as supporting context only.

No PR892 application source modified. No wallet/identity/database mutations
made this pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(qa): DPN-008/009, DPY-012/013/014, TOK-018 — all BLOCKED (identity-gated)

Follow-up QA pass covering the 6 remaining stories across DPN, DPY, TOK. Live
recheck confirms the environment blocker (Testnet masternode-list/quorum-sync/
wallet-storage failure) is unchanged: zero identities, contacts, or tracked
token balances reachable in this data dir. All 6 stories are BLOCKED for live
UI exercise as expected.

Read-only source review of the PR892-build worktree confirms every feature is
genuinely implemented (not a stub), each gated on a reachable local identity:

- DPN-008: "Set Alias" on the DPNS "My usernames" table persists via
  set_identity_alias(); a separate multi-alias panel in Identity Settings is a
  genuine stub, noted for the record (does not affect this verdict).
- DPN-009: scheduled-vote migration (choice/timestamp/executed-state
  preservation, per-row failure isolation, non-blocking of wallet migration,
  sticky unreadable-votes banner) is implemented in
  backend_task/migration/v093_upgrade.rs + finish_unwire.rs, mirroring
  IDN-016's identity-migration finding. No pre-upgrade fixture exists in this
  data dir to exercise it live.
- DPY-012: contact-payment detection and (tx_id, vout)-keyed dedup confirmed
  implemented and live-wired to the sync event bridge.
- DPY-013: offline-first read / avatar disk cache / explicit refresh mechanics
  are implemented, but live in a nav-unreachable legacy Contacts screen rather
  than the Identity Hub Contacts tab a user actually reaches — flagged for a
  live re-check once identities are unblocked.
- DPY-014: cancel-request flow (immutability messaging, network re-check,
  hidden-document broadcast + local withdrawal record, already-established
  handling) fully implemented and unit-tested — the most complete of the six.
- TOK-018: "Stop Tracking Balance" (per-pair dismissal, un-watch, both
  restoration paths) fully implemented with 3 targeted unit tests.

No PR892 application source was modified. No persistent state was changed
(read-only navigation + source review only).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(qa): test NET-006, NET-016/017/018/021, MCP-003/004 for PR892

- NET-006 (interface mode): PASS — Welcome screen and Settings card share
  identical labels/descriptions (source-shared UserRole methods, live
  cross-checked via a throwaway instance); change applies immediately and
  persists across a full quit + cold-boot restart.
- NET-016 (refresh DAPI endpoints): PASS — control present on Mainnet/Testnet,
  confirmation dialog appears with correct copy, Cancel is a true no-op. Notes
  a same-frame click_outside_window robustness quirk triggerable only by a
  sub-frame synthetic click, not a story-blocking defect.
- NET-017 (connection status): PASS — five-state top-panel indicator with
  hover tooltip confirmed (Error + Disconnected states observed live);
  Connection Status panel's SPV line is jargon-free by default with the raw
  error revealed only on hover.
- NET-018 (auto-start SPV): PASS — toggle persists across restart in both
  directions; sync behavior matched the toggle exactly (enabled = auto-connect
  attempt, disabled = idle with manual Connect). Restored to Enabled baseline.
- NET-021 (settings survive upgrade): BLOCKED, no legacy fixture in this data
  dir; source review of legacy_settings.rs + the v093_upgrade.rs composite
  regression test found the feature fully implemented, matching the story's
  acceptance criteria almost verbatim.
- MCP-003 (load masternode identity via CLI): BLOCKED for the full happy path
  (no real fixture); CLI plumbing verified clean with a fake ProTxHash/WIF —
  network required + must-match both enforced, zero key leakage across every
  captured run, clean parameter validation, SPV-gated dispatch with no
  crash/hang-without-progress.
- MCP-004 (withdraw masternode credits via CLI): BLOCKED, no loaded identity
  (MCP-003 prerequisite unmet); tool schema confirmed to encode the
  owner-key/payout-address restriction and fee-reporting requirements.

NET-011/019/020 (destructive) left untouched per campaign instructions. Main
QA GUI instance restored to healthy Testnet/Expert-view baseline before
finishing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(qa): UX-001/002/003 — blocking overlay, SPV-sync escape, global switcher

QA regression pass against PR892 for the new UX story category.

- UX-001 (unsafe-to-interrupt blocking overlay): FAIL. Component itself is
  correctly implemented and thoroughly unit-tested, but Send/broadcast — the
  story's own headline example and the suggested test trigger — does not
  raise it (uses a non-blocking MessageBanner instead). Only DPNS username
  registration adopts it, an explicit single-feature "Bucket A" rollout with
  the rest deferred per the component's own dev-plan doc.
- UX-002 (SPV-sync blocking overlay with background escape): PASS. Every
  acceptance-criteria bullet live-confirmed via screenshots and timestamped
  logs on a full quit + cold-boot restart of the main instance plus two
  throwaway Mainnet instances (to get past the Testnet-only backend blocker
  fast enough to interact with the overlay): jargon-free text, Step N of 5,
  total pointer/keyboard suppression, keyboard-only Enter/Tab+Enter
  dismissal via "Continue in the background", no re-raise for the rest of
  the sync episode, and auto-lower-on-Error confirmed twice.
- UX-003 (global wallet/identity switcher): FAIL. Works correctly on the 3
  root screens that adopt it (Wallets, Identity Hub, Masternodes), but 4 of
  7 root screens (Contracts, Tokens, Tools, Settings) render no switcher at
  all, not even the baseline wallet pill, contradicting "every root screen".

Testnet wallet-backend blocker (see ALK.md) remained active throughout,
blocking a genuine live Send broadcast for UX-001. App left running,
healthy, Testnet, Expert view.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(qa): add IDH (Identity Hub) scenario pass — PR892 user-story QA

Tests IDH-001, IDH-002, IDH-003, IDH-004, IDH-007, IDH-008 against the
PR892 build. IDH-001 (onboarding empty state) is PASS, live-verified
across Default/Expert/Developer views. The other five require a loaded
identity, unreachable due to the known Testnet wallet-backend blocker
(see ALK.md/DEV.md/IDN.md) — each marked BLOCKED with a read-only source
review confirming the underlying feature is genuinely implemented, and
cross-referenced against UX-003, DPY-014, and DPN-008 where relevant.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(qa): add MN (Masternodes) category — 12 stories tested against PR892

Covers MN-001 through MN-012, the new Masternodes tab introduced in this PR.
Live-tested MN-001, MN-002, MN-005, MN-010, MN-012 (no loaded node required);
MN-003/004/006/007/008/009/011 BLOCKED transitively since MN-001's "Load
masternode" still hangs silently on a well-formed ProTxHash (re-confirmed,
same defect class as IDN-003), with new det.log evidence pointing at the
known wallet-backend blocker as a likely contributing cause. MN-005 and
MN-010 both PASS cleanly (legacy Load Existing Identity screen now User-only;
network switch discards the Load form and clears stale banners).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(qa): mark NET-019/NET-020 BLOCKED — final destructive trio pending human authorization

Completes the PR892 175-story QA campaign. NET-019 (Clear all local data)
and NET-020 (Clear cached SPV data) map to the same Settings > Networks >
Advanced Settings controls documented for NET-011. Navigation and button
state were observed and cross-checked against source
(network_chooser_screen.rs, spv_status.rs) without triggering either
irreversible action, consistent with NET-011's precedent. All three
destructive stories are now BLOCKED pending explicit human authorization
against a disposable copy of the data dir.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(qa): finalize PR892 user-story QA campaign — 175/175 stories accounted for

Closes out summary-report.md now that every story from the corrected 175-story
catalog has a verdict: 37 PASS, 25 FAIL, 93 BLOCKED, 20 N/A. Folds in the FAIL
findings from the resumed sweep (SND-014/015/016, IDN-014, MN-001's
reconfirmed silent hang superseding IDN-003, UX-001's narrow overlay adoption,
UX-003's missing switcher on 4 screens), updates the destructive-trio section
now that NET-019/NET-020 were attempted and joined NET-011 as BLOCKED pending
human authorization, and refreshes the recommendations list accordingly.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(qa): record confirmed root cause of the Testnet wallet-storage blocker

An authorized, destructive follow-up investigation (on disposable copies only,
never the live QA data dir) root-caused the environment blocker that drove the
bulk of this campaign's BLOCKED verdicts: an asset_locks row's proof blob can
be written but never decoded back by the pinned platform-wallet crate's bincode
decoder (AnyNotSupported on an internally-tagged Serde enum) - a storage-format
incompatibility bug, not corruption. A verified recovery exists (precise row
deletion) but was not applied to the live QA data dir - that stays a separate,
explicit decision. Full findings archived at
/data/artifacts/dash-evo-tool/2026-07-14/pr892-user-story-qa/testnet-blocker-investigation/TEST-VECTOR.md.

Also reconciles this with ALK.md's earlier differential test, which correctly
ruled out "which wallet's asset locks" without being able to rule out "any bad
row anywhere in the shared table" - both findings were correct, just answering
different questions.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* qa(pr892): retest 7 previously-BLOCKED stories post wallet-backend fix

Testnet wallet-backend blocker (ALK.md) is now root-caused and fixed in the
live QA data dir, so the following stories were retested end-to-end:

- WAL-018: still BLOCKED, but for an independent, confirmed cause — asset
  lock creation now works, but the Asset Locks list never surfaces a
  created lock (ALK-002's UI bug), which is the only entry point to the
  fund-from-asset-lock dialog.
- WAL-019, WAL-020: PASS — Platform-to-Platform transfer and
  Platform-to-Core withdrawal both completed successfully with correct
  fee-strategy math.
- WAL-025: BLOCKED reasoning narrowed — restore-scan now runs cleanly
  every session, only the missing legacy fixture blocks the story.
- WAL-027: FAIL — genuine sync + real balance changes show totals always
  reconcile correctly, but source review confirms no balance-health
  reconciler/warning-banner mechanism exists in the codebase.
- WAL-029: PASS — Shielded tab renders correctly; both click-address and
  click-Copy verified via xclip to copy the full untruncated address.
- SND-009: FAIL — Platform source now funded and auto-selects correctly,
  but shielded destination hits the same "Invalid output address" defect
  as SND-007.

Bonus: reconfirmed ALK-002/ALK-003 verdicts stand — a fresh asset lock
created in this healthy session still never appears in the Asset Locks
list.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* qa(IDN): retest 12 previously-BLOCKED identity stories post-env-fix

IDN-001 is the critical unlock: full E2E identity registration now works
("From your wallet" funding), producing a real loaded identity for the
first time in this campaign. Retested all 12 dependent stories:

PASS (7): IDN-001, IDN-004, IDN-005, IDN-007, IDN-010, IDN-012, IDN-013b
FAIL (3): IDN-006 (Transfer-between-identities button is a confirmed,
  reproducible click no-op despite a demonstrably ready/enabled state),
  IDN-008 (no per-key list/detail view reachable for a normal keyed
  identity - KeysScreen/KeyInfoScreen exist in source but have no live
  nav trigger), IDN-009 (Refresh dispatches cleanly but key state never
  updates, tied to IDN-007's newly-added key)
BLOCKED (1): IDN-013a (same KeyInfoScreen navigation gap as IDN-008)
BLOCKED, literal criteria unchanged (1): IDN-016 (no pre-upgrade fixture)

Critical finding: IDN-016's restart-survival test confirmed the
flagged asset-lock recurrence risk. A clean quit+relaunch reproduced
the exact ALK.md/TEST-VECTOR.md WalletBackendNotYetWired failure on a
NEW is_locked row (WAL-018's 0.5 DASH lock), leaving all 3 identities
inaccessible via the UI. Data confirmed intact via direct SQLite check
(not corrupted, just unreadable at load time) - same root-caused
defect recurring, not a new bug. No DB fix attempted per instructions.

Data dir is currently in this broken state (app PID 3213927,
WalletBackendNotYetWired) - flagging before DPN/DPY/TOK/DOC/IDH/MN
retesting continues.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(qa): NET-020 retest — Clear SPV Data now safely testable, PASS

Unlike its NET-011/NET-019 destructive-trio siblings, Clear SPV Data only
touches the chain-sync cache (block_headers/filters/filter_headers), not
wallet/identity/contact/token data, so it doesn't need to wait for the
identity-dependent backend-recurrence fix to land. Live-executed:
confirmation dialog and success banner matched acceptance criteria exactly,
confirmed via on-disk removal of the cache directories.

* docs(qa): summary-report — reflect 2026-07-15 retest pass results

Updates the overview tallies (37/25/93/20 -> 48/30/77/20), documents the two
completed retest phases (WAL/SND, IDN), the confirmed asset-lock-defect
recurrence during IDN-016 restart testing, the five new FAIL findings from
this pass, and NET-020's flip to PASS (safe to run independently of the
NET-011/019 wallet-wiping controls, which remain deliberately held pending
the recurrence-fix decision).

* docs(qa): retest DPN/DPY categories post-environment-fix (22 stories)

With the Testnet wallet-backend blocker fixed (dashpay/platform#4133), two real
identities (QA Identity 1, QA Identity 2) are now available. Retested all 9 DPN
and 13 DPY stories previously BLOCKED on "no identity reachable":

- DPN-001, DPN-002: flip to PASS (username registration + owned-username listing)
- DPN-003..007: remain BLOCKED, now for the correct independent reason (no
  masternode/evonode identity available), not the prior blanket identity gate
- DPN-008: remains BLOCKED — "My usernames" table has no nav path even with a
  real usernamed identity (structural gap, same class as IDN-008/013a)
- DPN-009: remains BLOCKED — no pre-upgrade fixture; no masternode identity to
  create a vote to restart-test; restart skipped (nothing to test)
- DPY-001..005, 008, 011, 014: PASS, self-tested via the two QA identities
- DPY-006 (Send payment to contact): FAIL — confirmed general, reproducible
  EncryptionError "Missing senderKeyIndex" bug in derive_contact_payment_address
  (payments.rs), a CBOR-integer-decoding mismatch affecting every DashPay
  payment, independent of test setup
- DPY-009 (Edit contact info): FAIL — hiding a contact doesn't move it to a
  "Show hidden contacts" section on the Identity Hub Contacts tab
- DPY-007, DPY-013: Partial PASS (reachable/correct but incomplete verification
  or a stale-data finding on a secondary legacy screen)
- DPY-012: BLOCKED — depends on DPY-006's broken send path

Also documents a cross-cutting navigation-reliability defect in the legacy
DashPay screen family's internal sub-nav (My Profile/Contacts/Payment
History/Search Profiles), and confirms the environment stayed healthy
throughout (zero known-issue recurrences).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(qa): retest DOC-001,003,005-009 after wallet-backend fix — all PASS/Partial PASS

Environment blocker (dashpay/platform#4133) is fixed; retested with real funded
identities and a registered contract:

- DOC-001 Register contract: PASS (full E2E, owner ID cross-checked on-chain)
- DOC-003 Import/manage contracts: Partial PASS (import-by-ID works; "Remove
  cached contract" confirmed non-functional via a11y-verified click no-op)
- DOC-005 Create document: PASS
- DOC-006 Replace/update document: PASS (same $id, content updated on-chain)
- DOC-007 Delete document: PASS (confirmed absent from subsequent query)
- DOC-008 Transfer document ownership: PASS (required a purpose-built
  "transferable: 1" fixture contract; original contract correctly rejects
  transfer per platform consensus rules)
- DOC-009 Purchase + set document price: PASS (required "transferable: 1" +
  "tradeMode: 1" fixture contract; purchase atomically pays and transfers
  ownership, confirmed on-chain)

DOC-002 (crash) and DOC-004 (hang) were not retested live this pass — out of
this 24-story scope, findings from the original pass stand.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(qa): retest 17 TOK stories post asset-lock-fix — find 3 click-no-op defects

Retests TOK-001/002/004-018 against PR892 now that dashpay/platform#4133
(wallet-backend/asset-lock env blocker) is fixed and real funded identities
are reachable, completing the 24-story DOC+TOK regression sweep.

9 of 17 flip from BLOCKED to a live verdict:
- PASS: TOK-001, TOK-002, TOK-014, TOK-015
- FAIL: TOK-005 (Create Token), TOK-011 (Claim), TOK-018 (Stop Tracking) —
  three confirmed, a11y-verified click no-ops sharing one code shape: the
  handler's sole action is setting a "show confirmation popup" bool/Option
  field, with no dispatch or UI response ever observed
- PARTIAL: TOK-016 (result appears to contradict TOK-011 on the same token)

Remaining 8 (TOK-004/006-010/012/013) stay BLOCKED for a narrower reason:
TOK-005's failure means no QA-owned token can ever be minted, so owner-only
actions can only be exercised via a third-party fixture token
(lklimek-20260217), confirming DET's authorization-gating logic is correct
even though the privileged action itself can't complete for a QA identity.

TOK-003 was out of this pass's scope; its prior FAIL stands unretested.
Asset-lock recurrence was not hit at any point in this pass.

* docs(qa): retest 20 previously-BLOCKED IDH/SND/DEV/MN/MCP stories post asset-lock fix

Retested stories blocked on "no identity reachable" / masternode-list-sync now that
QA Identity 1/2 exist and the platform#4133 encoding bug is fixed:

- IDH-002/003/007/008: upgraded BLOCKED -> PASS (real multi-identity live testing:
  Home tab layout, one-click identity switching + picker grid, contact search/Pay,
  full name-on-device edit/save/clear/restore cycle with breadcrumb fallback).
- IDH-004: stays BLOCKED (both fixture identities already have a DashPay profile,
  no reversible way to reach the no-profile gate state) but with upgraded live
  evidence for the Settings-tab social-profile block.
- SND-008/011/012/013: upgraded BLOCKED -> PASS (top-up, identity-to-identity
  transfer, withdraw-to-Core, transfer-to-Platform-address all executed live via
  Platform-Addresses/Identity sources, deliberately avoiding new asset-lock
  creation per the standing recurrence-avoidance rule).
- DEV-004/007: upgraded BLOCKED -> PASS (masternode-list/quorum-sync blocker
  confirmed resolved; Document deserializer dropdowns populate, Address balance
  lookup returns real data).
- MN-003/004/006/007/008/009/011: stay BLOCKED (no real masternode/evonode fixture
  registered on Testnet) but reasoning narrowed after discovering, incidental to
  this check, that MN-001's silent hang is fixed (now a clean "not found" error) -
  MN-001 upgraded FAIL -> PASS.
- MCP-003/004: stay BLOCKED (same fixture constraint), schema re-verified via a
  freshly rebuilt det-cli, reasoning updated to note the CLI's underlying dispatch
  is very likely fixed too (same backend code path as MN-001).

No asset-lock recurrence hit. 38 stories remain BLOCKED campaign-wide (out of 175
tracked), all for independent, confirmed reasons (destructive-action deferrals,
missing fixtures, or genuine product gaps).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(qa): campaign retest complete — final tally 79/4/34/38/20

All previously-BLOCKED stories have been retested following the second
recurrence fix (dashpay/platform#4133). Five retest phases (WAL/SND, IDN,
DPN/DPY, DOC/TOK, IDH/SND-remainder/DEV/MN/MCP) resolved 55 of the original
93 environment-blocked stories to live verdicts without hitting the
recurrence again. Final: 79 PASS, 4 Partial PASS, 34 FAIL, 38 BLOCKED (all
independent reasons: masternode fixtures, TOK-005's click-no-op defect,
deliberately-deferred NET-011/019, missing legacy fixtures), 20 N/A.

Bonus finding: MN-001's silent-hang defect (previously FAIL) is confirmed
fixed — it was a downstream symptom of the same wallet-backend blocker.

* chore(qa): stop tracking QA scenario screenshots in git

221 PNGs (21M) under docs/ai-design/2026-07-14-pr892-user-story-qa/scenarios/screenshots/
don't belong in the repo history — they're evidence artifacts, not source.
Archived them to /data/artifacts/dash-evo-tool/2026-07-15/pr892-user-story-qa-screenshots/
and gitignored the pattern so future QA campaigns don't repeat this.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018m6b2TRP1e6S3uQHcaq3Cq

* docs(gui-testing): import GUI-testing guidelines + PR892 campaign lessons

Adds docs/gui-testing/README.md (incl. the PR892 sequencing / defect-triage /
quirk lessons captured in fe8c3bc5) and scenarios/TEMPLATE.md to the PR895 docs
branch. Docs only — no code from pr-892-fix-tx-history-build.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore(qa): gitignore QA scenario screenshots (archived to /data/artifacts)

Screenshots live in /data/artifacts, not git. Keeps both the merged
.codex/ ignore and the screenshots ignore rule.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(qa): redact committed wallet recovery phrases from campaign context

Remove two plaintext BIP39 mnemonics (one Testnet, one Mainnet) from
CAMPAIGN-CONTEXT.md. Seed phrases must never be committed to the repository.
The phrases remain in earlier, already-pushed history, so both wallets should
be treated as compromised and rotated (the Mainnet one especially, if funded).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018m6b2TRP1e6S3uQHcaq3Cq

* docs: forbid committing plaintext seeds, keys, and secrets

Add a "Never commit secrets" rule to CLAUDE.md General rules, after two
plaintext BIP39 mnemonics were found committed in a QA campaign doc. Secrets
must never appear in source, tests, fixtures, or documentation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018m6b2TRP1e6S3uQHcaq3Cq

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
@lklimek
lklimek merged commit 81ef37e into fix/tx-history Jul 16, 2026
5 checks passed
@lklimek
lklimek deleted the fix/snd-003-receive-inert branch July 16, 2026 10:38

@thepastaclaw thepastaclaw left a comment

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Preliminary review — Codex only

Nine in-scope blocking issues remain at head 0e79a89, including a newly committed, cryptographically valid mnemonic and testnet private key. All ten prior findings remain valid; the two modal-guard findings are consolidated into one canonical blocker, leaving nine blockers and one suggestion within the comment budget.

Validated blockers were found in the Codex precheck. Sonnet is deferred until a fresh Codex revalidation clears the blocker gate.

Review provenance

  • Codex reviewers: gpt-5.6-sol — general (completed), gpt-5.6-sol — rust-quality (completed)
  • Verifier: gpt-5.6-sol — verifier
  • Sonnet: not run (deferred by blocker gate)

🔴 9 blocking

2 additional finding(s) omitted (not in diff).

7 carried-forward finding(s) already raised on this PR; not re-posting as new inline comments.

🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
These findings are from an automated code review. Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.

In `docs/ai-design/2026-07-14-pr892-user-story-qa/scenarios/WAL.md`:
- [BLOCKING] docs/ai-design/2026-07-14-pr892-user-story-qa/scenarios/WAL.md:116-117: Remove committed wallet recovery material
  These lines contain a checksum-valid 12-word BIP39 mnemonic, and line 140 contains a checksum-valid compressed testnet WIF private key. Deleting the test wallets or recording that they currently have no balance does not revoke these credentials: anyone with repository access can derive their addresses and spend funds sent there later, and removing the text in a later commit leaves it recoverable from history. Remove the literals, rewrite the affected history, and treat both credentials as compromised.

In `src/ui/contracts_documents/contracts_documents_screen.rs`:
- [BLOCKING] src/ui/contracts_documents/contracts_documents_screen.rs:582-604: Correlate successful document-query results before updating the screen
  Failures are correlated against `pending_fetch_context`, but successful `Documents` and `PageDocuments` results still use the legacy context-blind callback. The fetch control remains available while a request is pending, and results are routed asynchronously to whichever screen is visible. An older or unrelated completion can therefore clear the active request and replace its documents and pagination state. Override `display_backend_task_result` and mutate state only when its context matches the pending query.

In `src/ui/tokens/view_token_claims_screen.rs`:
- [BLOCKING] src/ui/tokens/view_token_claims_screen.rs:80-99: Prevent stale document results from replacing token claims
  The claims screen compares task context only for failures and accepts every successful `Documents` result routed to it. Both Refresh and Fetch claims can dispatch while work is active, and unrelated document queries can also complete while this screen is visible. A stale completion can overwrite the claims and reset `fetch_status`; successful results need the same context correlation as failures, with duplicate identical requests suppressed or assigned unique operation identifiers.

Comment on lines +116 to +117
1. Used the Create Wallet entropy-grid flow to generate a fresh 12-word mnemonic (`sail
eager shrug goose primary position under shuffle swarm occur fall diet`), noted the

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🔴 Blocking: Remove committed wallet recovery material

These lines contain a checksum-valid 12-word BIP39 mnemonic, and line 140 contains a checksum-valid compressed testnet WIF private key. Deleting the test wallets or recording that they currently have no balance does not revoke these credentials: anyone with repository access can derive their addresses and spend funds sent there later, and removing the text in a later commit leaves it recoverable from history. Remove the literals, rewrite the affected history, and treat both credentials as compromised.

source: ['codex']

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3 participants