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Security: daki90/stumpless

Security

docs/SECURITY.md

Stumpless Security Policy

This document describes the security support for Stumpless, including versions that will be patched and the procedure for submitting vulnerabilities. It also includes security-relevant guidance on how to use the library, and particular pitfalls that must be avoided to ensure that vulnerabilities are not introduced into the system.

Supported Versions

The table below lists the current supported versions of Stumpless. Generally, the current and previous major versions are supported at their highest minor version.

Version Supported
2.2.x ✔️
2.1.x
2.0.x
1.6.x ✔️
<= 1.5

Reporting a Vulnerability

If you discover a problem with Stumpless, please report it immediately to the project owner, Joel Anderson. The issue will be investigated as soon as possible and you will receive a response within 14 days of the message.

A fix will be deployed to all affected supported versions with a high priority. However, there is currently no guaranteed timeline for the patch as the project does not have any dedicated resources.

You can increase the speed and effectiveness of the response by including as much detail in your report as possible. Suggested fixes are welcome as well, though we ask that you keep your fixes limited to private correspondence until a fix can be deployed to limit the risk to users of the library in the meantime.

Secure Use

The following aspects of use should be carefully considered by anyone using stumpless. Mistakes in these areas can lead to vulnerabilities in an application using the library.

Understand new vs. load lifetimes

Stumpless provides a number of functions with similar functionality but different mechanics in an effort to give users the most efficient way to accomplish what they need. For example, in some cases, a structure like a log entry will only be needed within a short or well-defined scope, and therefore does not need to be allocated on the heap. The load functions allow the caller to provide a pointer to a structure, avoiding the heap allocation for the entry that would otherwise occur in a new function.

However, this performance boost does come with a risk. Users need to make sure that they are using the matching unload functions with structures initialized this way. In particular, the recursive destructors need to be careful matched so that for example stumpless_destroy_entry_and_contents isn't called on an entry that had a param created with stumpless_load_param.

Failure to adhere to these rules can result in issues ranging from memory leaks to serious security risks like double free and attempting to free memory not on the heap. The best way to mitigate this is to follow a single convention in your project, and stick with that. Avoid mixing styles of allocation unless you absolutely must.

There aren’t any published security advisories