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security(codex): pin vendor binary SHA-256 on first use and verify on load (#1245)#1250

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security(codex): pin vendor binary SHA-256 on first use and verify on load (#1245)#1250
shaun0927 wants to merge 28 commits intocoleam00:devfrom
shaun0927:security/codex-binary-sha256-pinning

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@shaun0927 shaun0927 commented Apr 16, 2026

Summary

  • Problem: packages/providers/src/codex/binary-resolver.ts resolved the Codex CLI binary from three sources (env, config, ~/.archon/vendor/codex/) with only fileExists() as a trust gate — no hash verification, signature check, or directory permission validation. If ~/.archon/vendor/codex/ was writable by another local user (shared workstation, misconfigured container, prior malware), the next Archon workflow using Codex would execute the attacker's binary with the user's full privileges.
  • Why it matters: Local privilege escalation gateway. Silent — no log entry distinguishes "expected binary" from "replaced binary." Risk increases for archon serve deployments on shared infrastructure, Docker images with shared volumes, and CI runners where the vendor dir persists across jobs.
  • What changed: Added verifyOrPinBinaryHash(): on first resolution, computes SHA-256 of the binary and writes it to a .sha256 sidecar file next to the binary. On subsequent loads, verifies the hash matches — throws with a clear diagnostic on mismatch. Applied to all three resolution paths (env, config, vendor). Pin-write failure is non-fatal (warn, don't block — graceful degradation for read-only filesystems). Added readFile wrapper for test spyability (same pattern as fileExists). Updated existing tests to mock verifyOrPinBinaryHash so resolution tests remain filesystem-independent.
  • What did not change: Resolution order (env → config → vendor → throw). fileExists guard (still the first check — hash verification runs after existence is confirmed). Dev mode behavior (BUNDLED_IS_BINARY=false → returns undefined). Error messages for missing binaries. The .sha256 file is not security-critical itself (it's a TOFU anchor, not a signed attestation) — but it catches post-installation tampering, which is the primary threat.

UX Journey

Before

$ ls -la ~/.archon/vendor/codex/
-rwxr-xr-x  user  codex        # legitimate binary

# Attacker replaces it:
$ cp /tmp/malicious ~/.archon/vendor/codex/codex

# Next workflow run:
archon workflow run my-workflow   # silently executes malicious binary
                                  # no warning, no hash check

After

# First run (pinning):
archon workflow run my-workflow
  → codex.binary_hash_pinned: { hash: "a1b2c3...", hashPath: "~/.archon/vendor/codex/codex.sha256" }

# Normal subsequent run:
archon workflow run my-workflow
  → codex.binary_hash_verified: { hash: "a1b2c3..." }

# After tampering:
archon workflow run my-workflow
  → ERROR: Codex binary hash mismatch — possible tampering detected.
      binary:   ~/.archon/vendor/codex/codex
      expected: a1b2c3...
      actual:   d4e5f6...
    If you intentionally updated the binary, delete the .sha256 file and re-run.

Files Changed

  • packages/providers/src/codex/binary-resolver.ts — (+45 −1): readFile wrapper, verifyOrPinBinaryHash, integrated into all 3 resolve paths
  • packages/providers/src/codex/binary-resolver.test.ts — (+5 −0): mock verifyOrPinBinaryHash in existing tests

Testing

  • bun run type-check — all 10 packages clean
  • bun run lint — zero warnings
  • bun test packages/providers/src/codex/binary-resolver.test.ts — 7 pass, 0 fail

Closes #1245

Summary by CodeRabbit

  • New Features

    • Adds binary integrity checks that compute and verify SHA-256 pins, create a per-binary trust pin on first use, refuse symlinked pin files, and log verification/pinning outcomes.
    • Pin write failures are non-blocking and emit warnings instead of blocking resolution.
  • Bug Fixes

    • Detects and errors on mismatched or malformed pin contents to prevent using tampered binaries.
  • Tests

    • Expanded tests for verification, pinning, mismatch and malformed-pin cases using isolated temp directories and cleanup.

Architecture Diagram

Before

resolveCodexBinaryPath()
   │
   ├─ env / config / vendor-dir resolution → binaryPath
   ▼
verifyOrPinBinaryHash(binaryPath)
   │
   ├─ getHashPinPath(binaryPath)
   │     ├─ realpathSync(binaryPath)   ← attacker-relevant
   │     └─ sha256(realpath) → pin file under writable binary dir
   ▼
   ├─ pin exists → compare → throw on mismatch
   └─ pin missing → silently pin "first use"

Threat: in the writable-vendor-dir model this PR addresses, an attacker who swaps the symlink target at the expected binary location resolves to a different realpath, misses the existing pin, and silently re-pins as if it were the first run — defeating the pinning guarantee. Pin files also lived in the writable directory itself, leaving them open to symlink-overwrite tricks.

After

resolveCodexBinaryPath()
   │
   ├─ env / config / vendor-dir resolution → binaryPath
   ▼
verifyOrPinBinaryHash(binaryPath)
   │
   ├─ getHashPinPath(binaryPath)
   │     ├─ resolve(binaryPath)         ← logical path, NEVER realpath
   │     └─ sha256(logicalPath) → pin file under ~/.archon/trust/codex/ (mode 0700)
   ▼
   ├─ pin exists → lstat → reject symlink ┐
   │             → readPinnedHash       ┘ (refuses malformed; never echoes contents)
   │             → compare → throw + structured log on mismatch
   └─ pin missing → openSync(O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_WRONLY|O_NOFOLLOW, 0600) → write hash

Connection inventory:

From To Status Notes
binary-resolver.ts ~/.archon/trust/codex/ (Archon-owned, 0700) new pin storage moved out of attacker-writable vendor dir
getHashPinPath path.resolve(binaryPath) new replaces realpathSync — pin keyed by where Archon expects the binary
readPinnedHash lstat symlink check + sha256-format validation new rejects symlinked / malformed pin files
pin write openSync(... O_NOFOLLOW, 0600) new refuses dangling/preexisting symlink at the pin path
hash-mismatch path getLog().error(... 'codex.binary_hash_mismatch') new structured signal survives even if provider.ts re-wraps the error

Label Snapshot

  • Risk: risk: high (security)
  • Size: size: M
  • Scope: providers
  • Module: providers:codex/binary-resolver

Change Metadata

  • Change type: security
  • Primary scope: providers
  • Files: 2 (packages/providers/src/codex/binary-resolver.ts, binary-resolver.test.ts)

Linked Issue

Validation Evidence

bun run type-check    # clean
bun run lint          # zero warnings
bun test packages/providers/src/codex/binary-resolver.test.ts    # 12/12 pass
bun test packages/providers/src/codex/binary-resolver-dev.test.ts # passes

Test coverage now includes:

  • mismatch throws AND emits codex.binary_hash_mismatch structured log;
  • pin-on-first-use writes to the trust dir, not next to the binary;
  • malformed pin file rejected without leaking its contents in the error;
  • symlinked pin paths rejected;
  • swapped symlink target trips the existing logical-path pin (regression for the realpath bypass).

Security Impact

  • New permissions/capabilities? No
  • New external network calls? No
  • Secrets/tokens handling changed? No (binary contents are never written anywhere; only their hash is)
  • File system access scope changed? Yes — narrower: trust dir is created with 0700 and pin files are created with 0600 + O_EXCL | O_NOFOLLOW. Pin storage is no longer in any attacker-writable directory.
  • Threat model addressed: an attacker with write access to ~/.archon/vendor/codex/ cannot (a) skip pinning by swapping the binary's symlink target, (b) coerce error messages to leak arbitrary file contents, or (c) plant a symlinked sidecar to overwrite an arbitrary user-readable file.

Compatibility / Migration

  • Backward compatible? Mostly — first-time runs after upgrade will re-pin (the trust file path changes from sidecar to logical-path-keyed). This is a one-time intentional re-pin and is documented in the resolved-info log line.
  • Config/env changes? No
  • Database migration needed? No
  • Operator note: existing *.sha256 sidecars next to the binary are now ignored (no longer read or written). Cleanup is optional.

Human Verification

  • Verified scenarios:
    • Fresh install → first call pins, second call verifies, third call (manual binary swap) throws.
    • Symlinked binary swap (the new regression test) → throws as designed.
    • macOS realpath-vs-resolve divergence (/var → /private/var) handled — the test helper mirrors the production logical-path keying.
    • Pin write race against a pre-placed symlink → openSync(O_EXCL|O_NOFOLLOW) refuses; resolver logs codex.binary_hash_pin_write_failed and the binary still loads (intentional non-fatal fallback for the write path).
  • Not verified: Windows behaviour for O_NOFOLLOW (Node falls back to default semantics; tests skip the symlink case there if symlinkSync requires admin).

Side Effects / Blast Radius

  • Affected subsystems: Codex provider load only. Claude provider unchanged.
  • Potential unintended effects: legitimate binary upgrades now require deleting the trust pin file before the new hash is accepted — instructions are in the throw message itself ("delete the pin file and re-run to re-pin").
  • Guardrails: structured logs (codex.binary_hash_pinned, codex.binary_hash_verified, codex.binary_hash_mismatch, codex.binary_hash_pin_write_failed) make every state change observable.

Rollback Plan

  • Fast rollback: revert the branch. Restores the prior sidecar-next-to-binary pinning. (No data loss — the sidecars were never deleted, just ignored.)
  • Operational signal: a wave of codex.binary_hash_mismatch errors after a routine binary upgrade would indicate operators need the documented "delete pin and re-run" flow surfaced more prominently.

Risks and Mitigations

  • Risk: First-launch after upgrade re-pins everywhere. Mitigation: intentional and documented; emits an info log per pin.
  • Risk: an operator deletes the trust dir to "fix" a mismatch caused by genuine tampering. Mitigation: the throw message names the binary path and the pin file path so the operator has the data to investigate first.
  • Risk: Bun/Node changes alter O_NOFOLLOW semantics on a future platform. Mitigation: symlink rejection is layered (lstat + O_NOFOLLOW + format validation); any single layer breaking still leaves the others.

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coderabbitai Bot commented Apr 16, 2026

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📝 Walkthrough

Walkthrough

Add SHA‑256 verification and deterministic per‑binary pinning for Codex binaries: new exported helpers readFile and verifyOrPinBinaryHash; resolveCodexBinaryPath invokes verification/pinning for each candidate. Tests updated to run with per‑test Archon home and cover mismatch, initial pin, malformed pins, and symlink rejection.

Changes

Cohort / File(s) Summary
Tests
packages/providers/src/codex/binary-resolver.test.ts
Run tests with per-test temp Archon home; mock @archon/paths.getArchonHome; spy/stub verifyOrPinBinaryHash; add suites for hash mismatch, initial pin creation (no sidecar), malformed pins, symlink target swap detection, and symlinked-pin rejection; cleanup temp dirs.
Binary resolver + helpers
packages/providers/src/codex/binary-resolver.ts
Add exported readFile(path): Buffer and verifyOrPinBinaryHash(binaryPath): void. Compute SHA‑256 of resolved binary, use deterministic trust-pin path under ${getArchonHome()}/trust/codex/ keyed by logical path, validate existing pins (reject symlinked pin paths and malformed hex), create exclusive pin on first use (non‑fatal failures warn), and call verification/pinning from resolveCodexBinaryPath for each candidate.

Sequence Diagram

sequenceDiagram
    participant Caller
    participant Resolver as resolveCodexBinaryPath
    participant Verifier as verifyOrPinBinaryHash
    participant Reader as readFile
    participant FS as Filesystem
    participant Crypto

    Caller->>Resolver: request codex binary path
    Resolver->>Resolver: assemble candidate paths
    loop per candidate
        Resolver->>Verifier: verifyOrPinBinaryHash(candidate)
        Verifier->>Reader: readFile(candidate)
        Reader->>FS: read binary bytes
        FS-->>Reader: Buffer
        Reader-->>Verifier: Buffer
        Verifier->>Crypto: compute SHA-256(Buffer)
        Crypto-->>Verifier: digest
        alt trust-pin exists
            Verifier->>FS: read trust-pin file
            FS-->>Verifier: storedHash or error
            Verifier->>Verifier: validate format & symlink status
            Verifier->>Verifier: compare storedHash vs digest
            alt match
                Verifier-->>Resolver: verified
            else mismatch
                Verifier-->>Resolver: throw error (hash mismatch)
            end
        else trust-pin missing
            Verifier->>FS: create trust-pin (exclusive write)
            FS-->>Verifier: success or error
            alt write success
                Verifier-->>Resolver: pinned
            else write fails
                Verifier-->>Resolver: warn (non-fatal)
            end
        end
    end
    Resolver-->>Caller: return first verified candidate or throw
Loading

Estimated code review effort

🎯 4 (Complex) | ⏱️ ~45 minutes

Possibly related issues

Possibly related PRs

"I nibble bytes and count each bite,
I hash the path by moonlit light,
A pin is written, a thunk of glee,
Beware the symlink trickery,
Hooray — my trusted binaries sleep tight! 🐇"

🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4 | ❌ 1

❌ Failed checks (1 warning)

Check name Status Explanation Resolution
Docstring Coverage ⚠️ Warning Docstring coverage is 44.44% which is insufficient. The required threshold is 80.00%. Write docstrings for the functions missing them to satisfy the coverage threshold.
✅ Passed checks (4 passed)
Check name Status Explanation
Title check ✅ Passed The title clearly and specifically describes the main security change: pinning vendor binary SHA-256 on first use and verifying on load.
Linked Issues check ✅ Passed Check skipped because no linked issues were found for this pull request.
Out of Scope Changes check ✅ Passed Check skipped because no linked issues were found for this pull request.
Description check ✅ Passed PR description is comprehensive and well-structured, covering problem statement, threat model, implementation details, testing, and security considerations across most template sections.

✏️ Tip: You can configure your own custom pre-merge checks in the settings.

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Reviewed commit: 6348722a93

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*/
/** Exported for test spyability (same pattern as fileExists). */
export function verifyOrPinBinaryHash(binaryPath: string): void {
const hashPath = binaryPath + '.sha256';
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P1 Badge Store pinned hash outside writable binary directory

verifyOrPinBinaryHash pins the trust file as binaryPath + '.sha256', so the hash lives in the same directory as the binary. In the exact threat model this change targets (another user/process can write the vendor binary directory), an attacker can replace both the binary and the sidecar hash before execution, and the verification will still pass. This means the new check does not actually prevent post-install tampering unless the directory is already protected, so the security hardening is ineffective in writable-dir deployments.

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Caution

Some comments are outside the diff and can’t be posted inline due to platform limitations.

⚠️ Outside diff range comments (1)
packages/providers/src/codex/binary-resolver.test.ts (1)

24-43: ⚠️ Potential issue | 🟠 Major

Test setup correctly mocks hash verification, but verifyOrPinBinaryHash lacks dedicated tests.

The spy setup follows the established pattern and appropriately isolates resolution tests from filesystem access. However, the security-critical verifyOrPinBinaryHash function has no dedicated tests covering:

  1. Hash mismatch detection (throws on tampered binary)
  2. Hash pinning on first use (writes .sha256 sidecar)
  3. Non-fatal handling when pin file write fails

These scenarios are essential for validating the security guarantees this PR introduces.

Would you like me to generate a test suite for verifyOrPinBinaryHash covering these scenarios? I can create tests that mock readFile and fileExists to simulate hash match, mismatch, and first-use pinning paths.

🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.

In `@packages/providers/src/codex/binary-resolver.test.ts` around lines 24 - 43,
Add unit tests for the security-critical function verifyOrPinBinaryHash in the
resolver: create tests that (1) simulate a tampered binary by mocking readFile
to return content whose computed hash does not match the expected hash and
assert that verifyOrPinBinaryHash throws, (2) simulate first-use pinning by
mocking fileExists to return false and mocking writeFile to succeed, then assert
that verifyOrPinBinaryHash writes the sidecar .sha256 file with the expected
hash, and (3) simulate a pin file write failure by mocking writeFile to throw
and assert that verifyOrPinBinaryHash does not crash but returns/handles the
error path as designed; use the same spy/mocking patterns (spyOn
resolver.verifyOrPinBinaryHash, mock readFile, writeFile, fileExists) used
elsewhere in the test suite to isolate filesystem access and verify each
behavior.
🧹 Nitpick comments (1)
packages/providers/src/codex/binary-resolver.ts (1)

32-40: Consolidate duplicate JSDoc comments.

Lines 32-38 and line 39 both use JSDoc syntax (/**). The second comment should be a regular comment since it's supplementary information about why the function is exported.

✨ Suggested fix
 /**
  * Verify a binary's SHA-256 against a pinned hash, or pin on first use.
  *
  * On first resolution: computes SHA-256 and writes it to a `.sha256` sidecar file.
  * On subsequent loads: verifies the binary matches the pinned hash.
  * Throws if the hash doesn't match (possible tampering).
+ *
+ * Exported for test spyability (same pattern as fileExists).
  */
-/** Exported for test spyability (same pattern as fileExists). */
 export function verifyOrPinBinaryHash(binaryPath: string): void {
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.

In `@packages/providers/src/codex/binary-resolver.ts` around lines 32 - 40, The
file has duplicate JSDoc blocks: the main JSDoc for the function and an extra
`/** Exported for test spyability (same pattern as fileExists). */` immediately
before the function; change that second JSDoc to a regular single-line or block
comment (e.g. `// Exported for test spyability...` or `/* ... */`) so only the
primary JSDoc documents verifyOrPinBinaryHash and the supplementary note is not
treated as JSDoc.
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.

Outside diff comments:
In `@packages/providers/src/codex/binary-resolver.test.ts`:
- Around line 24-43: Add unit tests for the security-critical function
verifyOrPinBinaryHash in the resolver: create tests that (1) simulate a tampered
binary by mocking readFile to return content whose computed hash does not match
the expected hash and assert that verifyOrPinBinaryHash throws, (2) simulate
first-use pinning by mocking fileExists to return false and mocking writeFile to
succeed, then assert that verifyOrPinBinaryHash writes the sidecar .sha256 file
with the expected hash, and (3) simulate a pin file write failure by mocking
writeFile to throw and assert that verifyOrPinBinaryHash does not crash but
returns/handles the error path as designed; use the same spy/mocking patterns
(spyOn resolver.verifyOrPinBinaryHash, mock readFile, writeFile, fileExists)
used elsewhere in the test suite to isolate filesystem access and verify each
behavior.

---

Nitpick comments:
In `@packages/providers/src/codex/binary-resolver.ts`:
- Around line 32-40: The file has duplicate JSDoc blocks: the main JSDoc for the
function and an extra `/** Exported for test spyability (same pattern as
fileExists). */` immediately before the function; change that second JSDoc to a
regular single-line or block comment (e.g. `// Exported for test spyability...`
or `/* ... */`) so only the primary JSDoc documents verifyOrPinBinaryHash and
the supplementary note is not treated as JSDoc.

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  • packages/providers/src/codex/binary-resolver.test.ts
  • packages/providers/src/codex/binary-resolver.ts

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Reviewed commit: 67eb24d3d3

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Comment on lines +46 to +50
const expected = readFile(hashPath).toString('utf-8').trim();
if (actual !== expected) {
throw new Error(
'Codex binary hash mismatch — possible tampering detected.\n' +
` binary: ${binaryPath}\n` +
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P1 Badge Stop leaking sidecar file contents in mismatch errors

In the writable-directory threat model this change targets, an attacker can point codex.sha256 at any file the Archon user can read (for example via symlink), and the mismatch path will include that file’s full contents in the thrown error via expected. That can exfiltrate local secrets into CLI output or centralized logs even when execution is blocked; the sidecar should be parsed/validated as a 64-char hex digest and the raw value should never be echoed.

Useful? React with 👍 / 👎.

getLog().debug({ binaryPath, hash: actual }, 'codex.binary_hash_verified');
} else {
try {
writeFileSync(hashPath, actual + '\n', { mode: 0o644 });
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P2 Badge Refuse symlinked hash paths when pinning

The pinning write uses writeFileSync(hashPath, ...) with default semantics, which follows symlinks. If the binary directory is attacker-writable (the scenario this hardening is meant to cover), an attacker can race in or pre-place a dangling symlink at codex.sha256 so the first-run pin write creates/truncates an arbitrary file as the current user. Open the file with no-follow/exclusive semantics (or lstat + safe create) before writing.

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Actionable comments posted: 2

🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.

Inline comments:
In `@packages/providers/src/codex/binary-resolver.test.ts`:
- Around line 126-133: Update the "pins hash on first use when sidecar does not
exist" test to assert the pin side-effect instead of only checking no throw:
spyOn the method that writes the sidecar (e.g., spyOn(resolver, 'writeFile') or
spyOn(fs, 'writeFileSync') depending on implementation) before calling
resolver.verifyOrPinBinaryHash('/tmp/codex'), then expect that the write call
was made with the sidecar filename (e.g., '/tmp/codex.sha256') and the SHA-256
value computed from binaryContent (or assert that a `codex.binary_hash_pinned`
log/event was emitted) to ensure the sidecar is actually written.
- Around line 140-144: The test falsely spies on node:fs.writeFileSync because
binary-resolver.ts uses an ESM named import; create an internal wrapper
following the readFile/fileExists pattern: add a _writeFileSync binding to the
original writeFileSync (from 'node:fs') and expose a thin writeFile(...)
function that delegates to _writeFileSync, update binary-resolver.ts to call
writeFile(...) instead of writeFileSync, and change the test
(binary-resolver.test.ts) to spyOn the module's writeFile wrapper
(spyOn(writeFile)). This ensures the test can mock the implementation while
preserving the original sync call via _writeFileSync.
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Reviewing files that changed from the base of the PR and between 6348722 and 67eb24d.

📒 Files selected for processing (2)
  • packages/providers/src/codex/binary-resolver.test.ts
  • packages/providers/src/codex/binary-resolver.ts
🚧 Files skipped from review as they are similar to previous changes (1)
  • packages/providers/src/codex/binary-resolver.ts

Comment thread packages/providers/src/codex/binary-resolver.test.ts Outdated
Comment on lines +140 to +144
// Mock writeFileSync to throw by re-importing and spying on the fs module
const fs = require('node:fs');
const writeSpy = spyOn(fs, 'writeFileSync').mockImplementation(() => {
throw new Error('EACCES: permission denied');
});
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⚠️ Potential issue | 🟠 Major

🧩 Analysis chain

🌐 Web query:

In Bun test runtime and Node ESM semantics, if module A imports writeFileSyncviaimport { writeFileSync } from 'node:fs', will spyOn(require('node:fs'), 'writeFileSync') reliably intercept calls inside module A? If not, what mocking pattern is recommended?

💡 Result:

No, spyOn(require('node:fs'), 'writeFileSync') will not reliably intercept calls to writeFileSync inside module A that uses ESM import { writeFileSync } from 'node:fs'. Module A captures a direct reference to the writeFileSync function at import time via ESM named import live bindings. The spyOn approach only replaces the 'writeFileSync' property on the module object returned by require('node:fs'), but module A calls the original captured function reference, not the property on the module object. Bun's test runner follows standard ESM semantics where spyOn replaces object properties but does not affect closed-over or directly imported function references, as confirmed in Bun GitHub issues discussing spyOn behavior with ESM modules. Recommended mocking pattern: Use Bun's mock.module to mock the entire 'node:fs' module before module A is imported. This intercepts both ESM imports and CJS requires. Example (use --preload for hoisting if needed before import): import { test, expect, mock } from "bun:test"; mock.module('node:fs', => ({ writeFileSync: mock( => { // spy implementation }), // include other fs exports as needed })); test('intercepts fs call in A', async => { const A = await import('./A.js'); A.someFunction; // calls mocked writeFileSync expect(fsSpy).toHaveBeenCalled; });

Citations:


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Create an internal wrapper for writeFileSync to enable spyOn mocking in tests.

The current test mocks writeFileSync by spying on require('node:fs').writeFileSync, but binary-resolver.ts imports writeFileSync via ESM named import (import { ... writeFileSync } from 'node:fs'). ESM imports capture a direct reference at load time, so spying on the module object's property won't intercept calls from within the module—this makes the test a false positive.

Follow the existing pattern in the file (like readFile and fileExists): create a writeFile wrapper that delegates to _writeFileSync, then spy on the wrapper in tests.

Required refactor
# packages/providers/src/codex/binary-resolver.ts
-import { existsSync as _existsSync, readFileSync as _readFileSync, writeFileSync } from 'node:fs';
+import { existsSync as _existsSync, readFileSync as _readFileSync, writeFileSync as _writeFileSync } from 'node:fs';

 /** Wrapper for readFileSync — enables spyOn in tests. */
 export function readFile(path: string): Buffer {
   return _readFileSync(path);
 }

+/** Wrapper for writeFileSync — enables spyOn in tests. */
+export function writeFile(path: string, data: string, options: { mode: number }): void {
+  _writeFileSync(path, data, options);
+}
# packages/providers/src/codex/binary-resolver.ts (in verifyOrPinBinaryHash)
-      writeFileSync(hashPath, actual + '\n', { mode: 0o644 });
+      writeFile(hashPath, actual + '\n', { mode: 0o644 });
# packages/providers/src/codex/binary-resolver.test.ts (line 140-144)
-    const fs = require('node:fs');
-    const writeSpy = spyOn(fs, 'writeFileSync').mockImplementation(() => {
+    const writeSpy = spyOn(resolver, 'writeFile').mockImplementation(() => {
       throw new Error('EACCES: permission denied');
     });
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.

In `@packages/providers/src/codex/binary-resolver.test.ts` around lines 140 - 144,
The test falsely spies on node:fs.writeFileSync because binary-resolver.ts uses
an ESM named import; create an internal wrapper following the
readFile/fileExists pattern: add a _writeFileSync binding to the original
writeFileSync (from 'node:fs') and expose a thin writeFile(...) function that
delegates to _writeFileSync, update binary-resolver.ts to call writeFile(...)
instead of writeFileSync, and change the test (binary-resolver.test.ts) to spyOn
the module's writeFile wrapper (spyOn(writeFile)). This ensures the test can
mock the implementation while preserving the original sync call via
_writeFileSync.

@shaun0927
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I addressed the current review findings on this branch and pushed the follow-up commit.

What changed:

  • move the pinned Codex hash out of the writable binary directory and into an Archon-owned trust directory under ~/.archon/trust/codex
  • reject symlinked or malformed trust pin files
  • stop echoing raw pin-file contents in mismatch/error paths
  • strengthen regression coverage for first-use pinning, malformed trust files, and symlinked pin paths

Validation:

  • bun test packages/providers/src/codex/binary-resolver.test.ts
  • result: 11 pass

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💡 Codex Review

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Reviewed commit: b4b12c7abe

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Comment on lines +49 to +50
const resolvedBinaryPath = realpathSync(binaryPath);
const pinName = createHash('sha256').update(resolvedBinaryPath).digest('hex') + '.sha256';
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P1 Badge Pin hash by logical binary path

getHashPinPath derives the trust-pin filename from realpathSync(binaryPath), so the pin key changes whenever the resolved target changes. In the exact model this patch addresses (attacker can write the vendor binary directory but not the trust store), an attacker can replace vendor/codex/codex with a symlink to a different executable; the resolver then computes a new pin path, sees no existing pin, and silently pins+executes the attacker binary instead of detecting tampering. The pin key needs to stay bound to the configured/logical path (or inode/device identity checked against prior state), not the mutable symlink target path.

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Actionable comments posted: 1

Caution

Some comments are outside the diff and can’t be posted inline due to platform limitations.

⚠️ Outside diff range comments (1)
packages/providers/src/codex/binary-resolver.ts (1)

154-182: ⚠️ Potential issue | 🟠 Major

Avoid re-hashing the full binary on every request.

verifyOrPinBinaryHash reads the entire binary and computes SHA-256 on every invocation (line 81). Per packages/providers/src/codex/provider.ts:477-500, createCodexClient calls resolveCodexBinaryPath on every request that supplies a custom requestEnv, so under sustained traffic you pay a full-file I/O + hash per call (tens of MB for a Codex CLI → measurable latency and Buffer allocation pressure). The cached getCodex() path only hashes once, but the per-request new Codex({ codexPathOverride: ... }) path does not.

Consider memoizing successful verification per realpathSync(binaryPath) for the process lifetime (the pin is TOFU, so once verified in-process it doesn't need to be re-verified on every request):

♻️ Sketch
+const verifiedPaths = new Set<string>();
+
 export function verifyOrPinBinaryHash(binaryPath: string): void {
+  const realBinaryPath = realpathSync(binaryPath);
+  if (verifiedPaths.has(realBinaryPath)) return;
   const hashPath = getHashPinPath(binaryPath);
   const actual = createHash('sha256').update(readFile(binaryPath)).digest('hex');
   // ... existing verify/pin logic ...
+  verifiedPaths.add(realBinaryPath);
 }

(If you go this route, export a test-only reset hook, or clear the set between tests.)

🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.

In `@packages/providers/src/codex/binary-resolver.ts` around lines 154 - 182,
resolveCodexBinaryPath currently calls verifyOrPinBinaryHash on every resolution
which re-reads and re-hashes the full binary; memoize successful verifications
by realpathSync(binaryPath) to avoid repeated file I/O: maintain an in-process
Set (e.g., verifiedBinaryRealpaths) keyed by the resolved realpath and check it
at the top of verifyOrPinBinaryHash (or in resolveCodexBinaryPath) to skip
re-hashing if present, add the realpath to the set after a successful hash/pin,
and expose a test-only reset hook to clear the set between tests; update
references to verifyOrPinBinaryHash, resolveCodexBinaryPath, and
createCodexClient/getCodex to rely on this memoization.
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.

Inline comments:
In `@packages/providers/src/codex/binary-resolver.ts`:
- Around line 85-93: Before throwing the existing Error in the hash check inside
binary-resolver.ts, emit a structured security log event named
"codex.binary_hash_mismatch" (error level) that includes binaryPath, hashPath,
expected, and actual; then re-throw the same Error so upstream createCodexClient
still receives the exception. Locate the hash comparison block (the if (actual
!== expected) { ... } in binary-resolver.ts) and call the module's logger (the
same logger used elsewhere in this module) with a structured payload { event:
'codex.binary_hash_mismatch', binaryPath, hashPath, expected, actual }
immediately before the throw to ensure the security event is captured even if
createCodexClient wraps the error.

---

Outside diff comments:
In `@packages/providers/src/codex/binary-resolver.ts`:
- Around line 154-182: resolveCodexBinaryPath currently calls
verifyOrPinBinaryHash on every resolution which re-reads and re-hashes the full
binary; memoize successful verifications by realpathSync(binaryPath) to avoid
repeated file I/O: maintain an in-process Set (e.g., verifiedBinaryRealpaths)
keyed by the resolved realpath and check it at the top of verifyOrPinBinaryHash
(or in resolveCodexBinaryPath) to skip re-hashing if present, add the realpath
to the set after a successful hash/pin, and expose a test-only reset hook to
clear the set between tests; update references to verifyOrPinBinaryHash,
resolveCodexBinaryPath, and createCodexClient/getCodex to rely on this
memoization.
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  • Push a commit to this branch (recommended)
  • Create a new PR with the fixes

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  • packages/providers/src/codex/binary-resolver.test.ts
  • packages/providers/src/codex/binary-resolver.ts

Comment thread packages/providers/src/codex/binary-resolver.ts
@shaun0927
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I addressed the structured mismatch logging follow-up in 8c7bd3ac.

What changed:

  • emit codex.binary_hash_mismatch with binaryPath, hashPath, expected, and actual immediately before throwing on a verified hash mismatch
  • extend the resolver test to assert that security log event

Validation:

  • cd /Users/jh0927/Workspace/Archon-pr1250-followup && bun --filter @archon/providers type-check
  • cd /Users/jh0927/Workspace/Archon-pr1250-followup && bun --filter @archon/providers test

On the memoization suggestion: I intentionally did not cache successful verification results in-process on this branch. In the current threat model (writable binary directory / TOFU pinning), process-lifetime memoization would reduce repeated I/O, but it would also weaken detection of same-process post-start tampering. I think that tradeoff should be an explicit design decision rather than bundled into this security hardening PR.

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💡 Codex Review

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Reviewed commit: 8c7bd3aced

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  • Mark a draft as ready
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Comment on lines +83 to +84
if (fileExists(hashPath)) {
const expected = readPinnedHash(hashPath);
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P2 Badge Reject dangling pin symlinks before falling back to warn-only path

Fresh evidence in this revision: verifyOrPinBinaryHash gates on fileExists(hashPath), and existsSync returns false for dangling symlinks, so a dangling trust/codex/*.sha256 symlink is treated as “missing.” The code then enters the pin-write branch, openSync(...O_EXCL...) fails with EEXIST, and the broad catch only logs codex.binary_hash_pin_write_failed, allowing resolution to continue without any hash verification. This creates a persistent integrity-check bypass until the symlink is removed; EEXIST (or a pre-existing non-regular path) should be handled as a hard failure or re-verified path, not warn-and-continue.

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Actionable comments posted: 2

🧹 Nitpick comments (1)
packages/providers/src/codex/binary-resolver.ts (1)

79-81: Stream the binary into the hasher instead of loading it whole into memory.

readFile(binaryPath) buffers the entire Codex CLI binary (commonly tens of MB, can exceed 100MB depending on release) before hashing. Since verifyOrPinBinaryHash runs on every resolveCodexBinaryPath() call (no in-process memoization — intentional per PR notes), each resolution allocates a Buffer the size of the binary on the request path. A streamed hash keeps peak RSS bounded regardless of binary size and avoids a large sync read on the event loop.

♻️ Proposed fix
-import { createHash } from 'node:crypto';
-import { dirname, join } from 'node:path';
+import { createHash } from 'node:crypto';
+import { createReadStream } from 'node:fs';
+import { dirname, join } from 'node:path';
+import { pipeline } from 'node:stream/promises';
-export function verifyOrPinBinaryHash(binaryPath: string): void {
+export async function verifyOrPinBinaryHash(binaryPath: string): Promise<void> {
   const hashPath = getHashPinPath(binaryPath);
-  const actual = createHash('sha256').update(readFile(binaryPath)).digest('hex');
+  const hasher = createHash('sha256');
+  await pipeline(createReadStream(binaryPath), hasher);
+  const actual = hasher.digest('hex');

…and await the calls at lines 158, 171, 183 in resolveCodexBinaryPath.

Note: if you prefer to keep the function synchronous, readFileSync with a stream-like chunked approach is awkward; switching to async (the resolver is already async) is the cleaner path.

🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.

In `@packages/providers/src/codex/binary-resolver.ts` around lines 79 - 81, The
function verifyOrPinBinaryHash currently reads the entire binary into memory;
change it to an async function that streams the file into the hasher instead:
convert to async verifyOrPinBinaryHash(binaryPath: string): Promise<void>,
create a ReadStream (fs.createReadStream) and use either stream/promises
pipeline or listen to 'data'/'end' to feed chunks into createHash('sha256'),
await stream completion, then compare/write the pin file via async fs methods;
also update every call site in resolveCodexBinaryPath that invokes
verifyOrPinBinaryHash to await the returned Promise so hashing runs
asynchronously and doesn't block or buffer the whole binary.
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.

Inline comments:
In `@packages/providers/src/codex/binary-resolver.test.ts`:
- Around line 200-212: The test 'refuses symlinked trust pin paths' uses
symlinkSync which can fail on Windows (EPERM); update the test in
binary-resolver.test.ts so it skips or tolerates symlink creation failures on
Windows: either add a platform guard (skip the test when process.platform ===
'win32') or wrap the symlinkSync call in a try/catch and if it throws due to
EPERM/permission issues, skip the assertion (i.e., return early) so that
resolver.verifyOrPinBinaryHash(binaryPath) is only asserted when the symlink was
actually created; reference the test name, symlinkSync invocation,
getTrustPinPath(binaryPath) and resolver.verifyOrPinBinaryHash(binaryPath) when
making the change.

In `@packages/providers/src/codex/binary-resolver.ts`:
- Around line 99-106: The write path uses openSync(hashPath, ...,
(fsConstants.O_NOFOLLOW ?? 0)) which silently disables O_NOFOLLOW on Windows;
before calling openSync in the pin creation logic, call lstatSync(hashPath) and
if it exists and isSymbolicLink() throw/abort to avoid following a pre-planted
symlink, or alternatively only include fsConstants.O_NOFOLLOW when it is defined
(i.e., if (typeof fsConstants.O_NOFOLLOW !== 'undefined') use it else perform
the lstatSync check); refer to the existing readPinnedHash behavior and the
openSync call on hashPath to locate where to add the check.

---

Nitpick comments:
In `@packages/providers/src/codex/binary-resolver.ts`:
- Around line 79-81: The function verifyOrPinBinaryHash currently reads the
entire binary into memory; change it to an async function that streams the file
into the hasher instead: convert to async verifyOrPinBinaryHash(binaryPath:
string): Promise<void>, create a ReadStream (fs.createReadStream) and use either
stream/promises pipeline or listen to 'data'/'end' to feed chunks into
createHash('sha256'), await stream completion, then compare/write the pin file
via async fs methods; also update every call site in resolveCodexBinaryPath that
invokes verifyOrPinBinaryHash to await the returned Promise so hashing runs
asynchronously and doesn't block or buffer the whole binary.
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Fix all unresolved CodeRabbit comments on this PR:

  • Push a commit to this branch (recommended)
  • Create a new PR with the fixes

ℹ️ Review info
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Review profile: CHILL

Plan: Pro

Run ID: 0ea3fa58-c793-45fd-9547-0deed41e9d3e

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📒 Files selected for processing (2)
  • packages/providers/src/codex/binary-resolver.test.ts
  • packages/providers/src/codex/binary-resolver.ts

Comment thread packages/providers/src/codex/binary-resolver.test.ts Outdated
Comment thread packages/providers/src/codex/binary-resolver.ts
github-actions Bot and others added 13 commits April 22, 2026 11:26
…be (coleam00#1359)

The pre-flight binary smoke does a bare `bun build --compile` — it
deliberately skips `scripts/build-binaries.sh` to stay fast. That means
packages/paths/src/bundled-build.ts retains its dev defaults, including
BUNDLED_IS_BINARY = false.

version.ts branches on BUNDLED_IS_BINARY: when true it returns the
embedded string; when false it calls getDevVersion(), which reads
package.json at `SCRIPT_DIR/../../../../package.json`. Inside a compiled
binary SCRIPT_DIR resolves under `$bunfs/root/`, the walk produces a CWD-
relative path that doesn't exist, and the smoke aborts with "Failed to
read version: package.json not found" — a false positive.

Hit during the 0.3.8 release attempt: the real Pi lazy-load fix was
working end-to-end; the smoke test was the only thing failing.

Use --help instead. It exercises the same module-init graph (so it still
catches the real failure modes the skill lists — Pi package.json init
crash, Bun --bytecode bugs, CJS wrapper issues, circular imports under
minify) but has no dev/binary branch, so no false positive.

Also add a longer comment block explaining why --help is preferred, so
this doesn't get "normalized" back to `version` by a future drive-by.
The brew path of /test-release runs `brew uninstall` in Phase 5 to leave the
system in its pre-test state. For operators using the dual-homebrew pattern
(renamed brew binary at `/opt/homebrew/bin/archon-stable` so it coexists with
a `bun link` dev `archon`), that uninstall wipes the Cellar dir the
`archon-stable` symlink points into → `archon-stable` becomes dangling →
`brew cleanup` sweeps it away on the next brew op. Next time the operator
wants stable, they have to manually re-run `brew-upgrade-archon`.

Fix: make the skill aware of `archon-stable` and restore it transparently.

- Phase 2 item 4: detect the `archon-stable` symlink before any brew op;
  export `ARCHON_STABLE_WAS_INSTALLED=yes` so Phase 5 knows to restore it.
  Only triggers for the brew path (curl-mac/curl-vps don't touch brew so
  they leave `archon-stable` alone).
- Phase 5 brew path: after `brew uninstall + untap`, if the flag was set,
  re-tap + re-install + rename. Verifies the restored `archon-stable`
  reports a version and warns (non-fatal) if the rename target is missing.
  Documents the tradeoff: the restored version is "whatever the tap ships
  today", not necessarily the pre-test version — usually that's what the
  operator wants (the release they just tested becomes stable) but the
  back-version-QA case requires a manual `brew-upgrade-archon` after.
- Phase 1 confirmation banner now mentions that `archon-stable` will be
  preserved so the operator isn't surprised by the reinstall during Phase 5.

No changes to curl-mac/curl-vps paths. No changes to Phase 4 test suite.
… a compiled binary (coleam00#1360)

v0.3.9 made Pi boot-safe: lazy-loading its imports meant `archon version`
no longer crashed on `@mariozechner/pi-coding-agent/dist/config.js`'s
module-init `readFileSync(getPackageJsonPath())`. That's what the
`provider-lazy-load.test.ts` regression test guards.

The fix was only half the problem though. When a Pi workflow actually
runs, sendQuery() triggers the dynamic import — and Pi's config.js
module-init fires then, hitting the exact same ENOENT on
`dirname(process.execPath)/package.json`. Discovered by running
`archon workflow run test-pi` against a locally-compiled 0.3.9 binary:

    [main] Failed: ENOENT: no such file or directory,
           open '/private/tmp/package.json'
        at readFileSync (unknown)
        at <anonymous> (/$bunfs/root/archon-providertest:184:7889)
        at init_config

Boot-safe ≠ runtime-safe. The `/test-release` run for 0.3.9 passed
because it only exercised `archon-assist` (Claude); Pi was never
actually invoked on the released binary.

Fix: before the dynamic `import('@mariozechner/pi-coding-agent')` in
sendQuery, install a PI_PACKAGE_DIR shim. Pi's config.js checks
`process.env.PI_PACKAGE_DIR` first in its `getPackageDir()` and
short-circuits the `dirname(process.execPath)` walk. We write a
minimal `{name, version, piConfig:{}}` stub to
`tmpdir()/archon-pi-shim/package.json` (idempotent — existsSync check)
and set the env var. Pi only reads `piConfig.name`, `piConfig.configDir`,
and `version` from that file, all optional, so the stub surface is
genuinely minimal.

Localized to PiProvider: no global state, no mutation of any shared
config, no upstream fork. Claude and Codex providers are unaffected
(their SDKs don't have this class of module-init side effect).

Verified end-to-end: built a compiled archon binary with this patch,
ran `archon workflow run test-pi --no-worktree` (Pi workflow with
model `anthropic/claude-haiku-4-5`), got a clean response. Before the
patch, same binary crashed at `dag_node_started` with the ENOENT above.

Regression test added: asserts `PI_PACKAGE_DIR` is set after sendQuery
hits even its fast-fail "no model" path. Together with the existing
`provider-lazy-load.test.ts` (boot-safe) this covers both halves.
… and Codex (coleam00#1361)

Both binary resolvers previously stopped at env-var + explicit config and
threw a "not found" error when neither was set. Users who followed the
upstream-recommended install flow (Anthropic's `curl install.sh` for
Claude, `npm install -g @openai/codex`) still had to manually set either
`CLAUDE_BIN_PATH` / `CODEX_BIN_PATH` or the corresponding config field
before any workflow could run.

Add a tier-N autodetect step between the explicit config tier and the
install-instructions throw. Purely additive: env and config still win
when set (precedence covered by new tests). On autodetect miss, the same
install-instructions error fires as before.

Claude probe list (verified against docs.claude.com "Uninstall Claude
Code → Native installation" section):
  - $HOME/.local/bin/claude            (mac/linux native installer)
  - $USERPROFILE\.local\bin\claude.exe (Windows native installer)

Codex probe list (verified against openai/codex README; npm global-
install puts the binary at `{npm_prefix}/bin/<name>` on POSIX,
`{npm_prefix}\<name>.cmd` on Windows):
  - $HOME/.npm-global/bin/codex   (user-set `npm config set prefix`)
  - /opt/homebrew/bin/codex       (mac arm64 with homebrew-node)
  - /usr/local/bin/codex          (mac intel / linux system node)
  - %APPDATA%\npm\codex.cmd       (Windows npm global default)
  - $HOME\.npm-global\codex.cmd   (Windows user-set prefix)

Not probed (explicit override still required):
  - Custom npm prefixes — `npm root -g` would need a subprocess per
    resolve, too much surface for a probe helper
  - `brew install --cask codex` — cask layout isn't a PATH binary
  - Manual GitHub Releases extracts — placement is user-determined
  - `~/.bun/bin/codex` — not documented in openai/codex README

Pi provider intentionally has no equivalent change: the Pi SDK is
bundled into the archon binary (no subprocess), so there's no "binary"
to resolve. Pi auth lives at `~/.pi/agent/auth.json` which the SDK
already finds by default, and the PR A shim (`PI_PACKAGE_DIR`) handles
the package-dir case via Pi's own documented escape hatch.

E2E verified: removed both config entries from ~/.archon/config.yaml,
rebuilt compiled binary, ran `archon workflow run archon-assist` and a
Codex workflow. Logs showed `source: 'autodetect'` for both, responses
returned cleanly.
…ry autodetect test

The native-installer autodetect test computed its expected path from
process.env.HOME, but the implementation uses node:os homedir(). On
Windows, HOME is typically unset (Windows uses USERPROFILE), so the
test fell back to '/Users/test' while the resolver returned the real
home dir — making the spy's path-equality check fail and breaking CI
on windows-latest.

Mirror the implementation by importing homedir() from node:os and
joining with node:path so the expected path matches the actual
platform-resolved home and separator.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…ver (coleam00#1365)

Reported in coleam00#1365: a user running `archon serve` with DISCORD_BOT_TOKEN
set but the "Message Content Intent" toggle disabled in the Discord
Developer Portal saw the entire server crash with `Used disallowed
intents`. Discord rejects the gateway connection (close code 4014) when
a privileged intent is requested without being enabled, and the
unguarded `await discord.start()` propagated the error all the way up,
taking the web UI down with it.

Wrap discord.start() in try/catch — log the failure with an actionable
hint (special-cased for the disallowed-intent error) and continue
running. Other adapters and the web UI come up regardless. The shutdown
handler already uses optional chaining (`discord?.stop()`) so nulling
discord after a failed start is safe.

Other adapters (Telegram, Slack, GitHub, Gitea, GitLab) have the same
unguarded-start pattern but are out of scope for this fix — addressing
them is tracked separately.

Also expanded the Discord setup docs with a caution callout that names
the exact error string and the new log event so users can grep for
both.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…0#1362)

* docs(script-nodes): add dedicated guide and teach the archon skill how to write them

Script nodes (script:) have been a first-class DAG node type since v0.3.3 but
were documented only as one-liners in CLAUDE.md and a CI smoke test. Claude
Code reading the archon skill would see "Four Node Types: command, prompt,
bash, loop" and reach for bash+node/python one-liners instead of a proper
script node — losing bun's --no-env-file isolation, uv's --with dependency
pins, and the .archon/scripts/ reuse story.

- New packages/docs-web/src/content/docs/guides/script-nodes.md mirroring the
  structure of loop-nodes.md / approval-nodes.md: schema, inline vs named
  dispatch, runtime/deps semantics, scripts directory precedence (repo > home),
  extension-runtime mapping, env isolation, stdout/stderr contract, patterns,
  and the explicit list of ignored AI fields.
- guides/authoring-workflows.md and guides/index.md updated so the new guide is
  discoverable from both the node-types table and the guides landing page.
- reference/variables.md calls out the no-shell-quote difference between
  bash: and script: substitution — a subtle correctness trap when adapting a
  bash pattern into a script node.
- Sidebar order bumped +1 on hooks/mcp-servers/skills/global-workflows/
  remotion-workflow to slot script-nodes at order 5 next to the other
  node-type guides.

- .claude/skills/archon/SKILL.md: replaces stale "Four Node Types" (which
  also silently omitted approval and cancel) with the accurate seven, with a
  script-node code block showing both inline and named patterns.
- references/workflow-dag.md: full Script Node section covering dispatch,
  resolution, deps, stdout contract, and the list of AI-only fields that are
  ignored; validation-rules list updated.
- references/dag-advanced.md and references/variables.md: retry-support line
  corrected; no-shell-quote note added.
- examples/dag-workflow.yaml: added an extract-labels TypeScript script node
  and updated the header comment.

* fix(docs): review follow-ups for script-node guide

- skills example: extract-labels was reading process.env.ISSUE_JSON which is
  never set; use String.raw`$fetch-issue.output` so the upstream bash node's
  JSON is actually consumed
- guides/script-nodes.md + skills/workflow-dag.md: idle_timeout is accepted
  but ignored on script (and bash) nodes — executeScriptNode only reads
  node.timeout. Clarify that script/bash use `timeout`, not idle_timeout
- archon-workflow-builder.yaml: prompt enumerated only bash/prompt/command/loop,
  so the AI builder could never propose script or approval nodes. Add both
  (plus examples + rule about script output not being shell-quoted) and
  regenerate bundled defaults
- book/dag-workflows.md + book/quick-reference.md + adapters/web.md: fill in
  the node-type references that were missing script, approval, and cancel.
  adapters/web.md also overclaimed "loop" in the palette — NodePalette.tsx
  only drags command/prompt/bash, so note that the other kinds are YAML-only
…nv gaps, add good-practices + troubleshooting (coleam00#1363)

* fix(skill/when): document the full `when:` operator set and compound expressions

The skill reference previously stated "operators: ==, != only" which is
materially wrong — the condition evaluator supports ==, !=, <, >, <=, >=
plus && / || compound expressions with && binding tighter than ||, plus
dot-notation JSON field access. An agent authoring a workflow from the
skill would think half the operators don't exist.

Replaces the single-sentence section with a structured reference covering:
- All six comparison operators (string and numeric modes)
- Compound expressions with precedence rules and short-circuit eval
- JSON dot notation semantics and failure modes
- The fail-closed rules in full (invalid expression, non-numeric side,
  missing field, skipped upstream)

Grounded in packages/workflows/src/condition-evaluator.ts.

* feat(skill): document Approval and Cancel node types

Approval and cancel nodes are first-class DAG node types (approval since the
workflow lifecycle work in coleam00#871, cancel as a guarded-exit primitive) but the
skill never described either one. An agent reading the skill and asked to
"add a review gate before implementation" or "stop the workflow if the input
is unsafe" would fall back to bash + exit 1, losing the proper semantics
(cancelled vs. failed, on_reject AI rework, web UI auto-resume).

Approval node coverage (references/workflow-dag.md, SKILL.md):
- Full configuration block with message, capture_response, on_reject
- The interactive: true workflow-level requirement for web UI delivery
- Approve/reject commands across all platforms (CLI, slash, natural
  language) and the capture_response → $node-id.output flow
- Ignored-fields list + the on_reject.prompt AI sub-node exception

Cancel node coverage (references/workflow-dag.md, SKILL.md):
- Single-field schema (cancel: "<reason>")
- Lifecycle: cancelled (not failed); in-flight parallel nodes stopped;
  no DAG auto-resume path
- The "cancel: vs bash-exit-1" decision rule (expected precondition miss
  vs. check itself failing)
- Two canonical patterns — upstream-classification gate, pre-expensive-step
  gate

Validation-rules list updated to enumerate approval/cancel constraints
(message non-empty, on_reject.max_attempts range 1-10, cancel reason
non-empty), plus a forward note that script: joins the mutually-exclusive
set once PR coleam00#1362 lands.

Placement in both files is after the Loop section and before the validation
section, so this commit stays additive with respect to PR coleam00#1362's Script
node insertion between Bash and Loop — rebase is clean.

* feat(skill): document workflow-level fields beyond name/provider/model

The skill's Schema section previously showed only name, description, provider,
and model at the workflow level — which is most of a stub. Agents asked to
"use the 1M-context Claude beta" or "run this under a network sandbox" or
"add a fallback model in case Opus rate-limits" had no way to discover
that any of these fields existed at the workflow level.

Adds a comprehensive Workflow-Level Fields section covering:
- Core: name, description, provider, model, interactive (with explicit
  callout that interactive: true is REQUIRED for approval/loop gates on
  web UI — a common footgun)
- Isolation: worktree.enabled for pin-on/pin-off (the only worktree field
  at workflow level; baseBranch/copyFiles/path/initSubmodules are
  config.yaml only, so a cross-reference points there)
- Claude SDK advanced: effort, thinking, fallbackModel, betas, sandbox,
  with explicit per-node-only exceptions (maxBudgetUsd, systemPrompt)
- Codex-specific: modelReasoningEffort (with note that it's NOT the same
  as Claude's effort — this has confused users), webSearchMode,
  additionalDirectories
- A complete worked example combining sandbox + approval + interactive

All fields cross-referenced against packages/workflows/src/schemas/workflow.ts
and packages/workflows/src/schemas/dag-node.ts.

* feat(skill/loop): document interactive loops and gate_message

Interactive loop nodes pause between iterations for human feedback via
/workflow approve — used by archon-piv-loop and archon-interactive-prd.
The skill's Loop Nodes section previously omitted both interactive: true
and gate_message entirely, so an agent writing a guided-refinement
workflow wouldn't know the feature exists or that gate_message is
required at parse time.

Adds:
- interactive and gate_message rows to the config table (marking
  gate_message as required when interactive: true — enforced by the
  loader's superRefine)
- A dedicated "Interactive Loops" subsection explaining the 6-step
  iterate-pause-approve-resume flow
- Explicit call-out that $LOOP_USER_INPUT populates ONLY on the first
  iteration of a resumed session — easy to miss and a common surprise
- Workflow-level interactive: true requirement for web UI delivery
  (loader warning otherwise) so the full-flow example is complete
- Note that until_bash substitution DOES shell-quote $nodeId.output
  (unlike script bodies) — called out since the audit surfaced this
  inconsistency

* fix(skill/cli): complete the CLI command reference with missing lifecycle commands

The CLI reference previously documented only list, run, cleanup, validate,
complete, version, setup, and chat — missing nearly every workflow
lifecycle command an agent needs to operate a paused, failed, or stuck
run. The interactive-workflows reference assumed these commands existed
without actually documenting them.

Adds full documentation for:
- archon workflow status — show running workflow(s)
- archon workflow approve <run-id> [comment] — resume approval gate
  (also populates $LOOP_USER_INPUT on interactive loops and the gate
  node's output when capture_response: true)
- archon workflow reject <run-id> [reason] — reject gate; cancels or
  triggers on_reject rework depending on node config
- archon workflow cancel <run-id> — terminate running/paused with
  in-flight subprocess kill
- archon workflow abandon <run-id> — mark stuck row cancelled without
  subprocess kill (for orphan-cleanup after server crashes — matches
  the coleam00#1216 precedent)
- archon workflow resume <run-id> [message] — force-resume specific
  run (auto-resume is default; this is for explicit override)
- archon workflow cleanup [days] — disk hygiene for old terminal runs
  (with explicit callout that it does NOT transition 'running' rows,
  a common confusion)
- archon workflow event emit — used inside loop prompts for state
  signalling; documented so agents don't invent their own mechanism
- archon continue <branch> [flags] [msg] — iterative-session entry
  point with --workflow and --no-context flags

Also:
- Adds --allow-env-keys flag to the `workflow run` flag table with
  audit-log context and the env-leak-gate remediation use case
- Adds an "Auto-resume without --resume" note disambiguating when
  --resume is needed vs. when auto-resume handles it
- Adds --include-closed flag to `isolation cleanup`, which was
  previously missing; converts the flag list to a structured table
- Explains the cancel/abandon distinction (live subprocess vs. orphan)

All grounded in packages/cli/src/commands/workflow.ts, continue.ts,
and isolation.ts.

* feat(skill/repo-init): add scripts/ and state/, three-path env model, per-project env injection

The repo-init reference was missing two first-class .archon/ directories
(scripts/ since v0.3.3, state/ since the workflow-state feature) and had
nothing to say about env — the coleam00#1 thing a user hits on first-run when
their repo has a .env file with API keys.

Directory tree updates:
- Adds .archon/scripts/ with the extension->runtime rule (.ts/.js -> bun,
  .py -> uv) so agents know where to put named scripts referenced by
  script: nodes.
- Adds .archon/state/ with explicit "always gitignore" callout — these
  are runtime artifacts, not source. Previously undocumented in the skill.
- Adds .archon/.env (repo-scoped Archon env) and distinguishes it from
  the target repo's top-level .env.
- Adds a "What each directory is for" list so the structure isn't just
  a tree with no narrative.

.gitignore guidance:
- state/ and .env added as must-gitignore (state/ matches CLAUDE.md and
  reference/archon-directories.md — skill was lagging).
- mcp/ demoted to conditional — gitignore only if you hardcode secrets.

New "Three-Path Env Model" section:
- ~/.archon/.env (trusted, user), <cwd>/.archon/.env (trusted, repo),
  <cwd>/.env (UNTRUSTED, target project — stripped from subprocess env).
- Precedence (override: true across archon-owned paths) and the
  observable [archon] loaded N keys / stripped K keys log lines so
  operators can verify what actually happened.
- Decision tree for where to put API keys vs. target-project env vs.
  things Archon shouldn't touch.
- Links to archon setup --scope home|project with --force for writing
  to the right file with timestamped backups.

New "Per-Project Env Injection" section:
- Documents both managed surfaces: .archon/config.yaml env: block
  (git-committed, $REF expansion) and Web UI Settings → Projects →
  Env Vars (DB-stored, never returned over API).
- Names every execution surface that receives the injected vars:
  Claude/Codex/Pi subprocess, bash: nodes, script: nodes, and direct
  codebase-scoped chat.
- Documents the env-leak gate with all 5 remediation paths so an agent
  hitting "Cannot register: env has sensitive keys" knows the options.

Grounded in CHANGELOG v0.3.7 (three-path env + setup flags), v0.3.0
(env-leak gate), and reference/security.md on the docs site.

* fix(skill/authoring-commands): correct override paths and add home-scoped commands

The file-location and discovery sections described an override layout that
does not match the actual resolver. It showed:

  .archon/commands/defaults/archon-assist.md  # Overrides the bundled

and claimed `.archon/commands/defaults/` was where repo-level overrides
lived. In fact the resolver (executor-shared.ts:152-200 + command-
validation.ts) walks `.archon/commands/` 1 level deep and uses basename
matching — putting `archon-assist.md` at the top of `.archon/commands/`
is the canonical way to override the bundled version. The `defaults/`
subfolder is a Archon-internal convention for shipping bundled defaults,
not a user-facing override pattern.

Also, home-scoped commands (`~/.archon/commands/`, shipped in v0.3.7)
were completely absent — agents authoring personal helpers wouldn't
know they could live at the user level and be shared across every repo.

Changes:
- File Location section now shows all three discovery scopes (repo,
  home, bundled) with precedence ordering and 1-level subfolder rules
- Duplicate-basename rule documented as a user error surface
- Discovery and Priority section rewritten with accurate 3-step lookup
  order — no more references to the nonexistent defaults/ override path
- Adds the Web UI "Global (~/.archon/commands/)" palette label note so
  users authoring helpers for the builder know what to expect

No code changes — this is a pure fix of stale/incorrect skill reference
material.

* feat(skill): add workflow good-practices and troubleshooting reference pages

Closes two gaps from the audit. The skill previously had zero guidance on
designing multi-node workflows (what to avoid, what to reach for first,
how to structure artifact chains) and zero guidance on where to look
when things go wrong (log paths, env-leak gate remediations, orphan-row
cleanup, resume semantics).

New references/good-practices.md (9 Good Practices + 7 Anti-Patterns):

- Use deterministic nodes (bash:/script:) for deterministic work, AI for
  reasoning — the single biggest quality lever
- output_format required whenever downstream when: reads a field — the
  most common source of "workflow silently routes wrong"
- trigger_rule: none_failed_min_one_success after conditional branches —
  the classic bug where all_success fails because a skipped when:-gated
  branch doesn't count as a success
- context: fresh requires artifacts for state passing — commands must
  explicitly "read $ARTIFACTS_DIR/..." when downstream of fresh
- Cheap models (haiku) for glue, strong for substance
- Workflow descriptions as routing affordances
- Validate (archon validate workflows) + smoke-run before shipping
- Artifact-chain-first design
- worktree.enabled: true for code-changing workflows (reversibility)
- Anti-patterns with before/after YAML examples for each (AI-for-tests,
  free-form when: matching, context: fresh without artifacts, long flat
  AI-node layers, secrets in YAML, retry on loop nodes, tiny
  max_iterations, missing workflow-level interactive:, tool-restricted
  MCP nodes)

New references/troubleshooting.md:

- Log location (~/.archon/workspaces/<owner>/<repo>/logs/<run-id>.jsonl)
  with jq recipes for common queries (last assistant message, failed
  events, full stream)
- Artifact location for cross-node handoff debugging
- 9 Common Failure Modes, each with root cause + concrete fix:
  - $BASE_BRANCH unresolvable
  - Env-leak gate (5 remediations)
  - Claude/Codex binary not found (compiled-binary-only)
  - "running" forever (AI working / orphan / idle_timeout)
  - Mid-workflow failure and auto-resume semantics
  - Approval gate missing on web UI (workflow-level interactive:)
  - MCP plugin connection noise (filtered by design)
  - Empty $nodeId.output / field access (4 causes)
- Diagnostic command cheat sheet (list, status, isolation list, validate,
  tail-log, --verbose, LOG_LEVEL=debug)
- Escalation protocol (version + validate + log tail + CHANGELOG + issue)

SKILL.md routing table now dispatches "Workflow good practices /
anti-patterns" and "Troubleshoot a failing / stuck workflow" to the new
references so an agent can find them without having to know they exist.

* docs(book): update node-types coverage from four to all seven

The book is the curated first-contact reading path (landing page → "Get
Started" → /book/). Both dag-workflows.md and quick-reference.md were
stuck on "four node types" — missing script, approval, and cancel. A user
reading the book as their first introduction would form an incomplete
mental model, then find three more node types in the reference section
later with no explanation of when they arrived.

book/dag-workflows.md:
- "four node types" → "seven node types. Exactly one mode field is
  required per node"
- Table now lists Command, Prompt, Bash, Script, Loop, Approval, Cancel
  with one-line "when to use" for each, and cross-links to the dedicated
  guide pages for Script / Loop / Approval
- New sections below the table for Script (inline + named examples with
  runtime and deps), Approval (with the interactive: true workflow-level
  note that's easy to miss), and Cancel (guarded-exit pattern) — keeping
  the existing narrative shape for Bash and Loop

book/quick-reference.md:
- Node Options table now includes script, approval, cancel rows
- agents row added (inline sub-agents, Claude-only)
- New "Script-specific fields" and "Approval-specific fields" subsections
  so the cheat-sheet is actually complete rather than pointing users
  elsewhere for the required constraints
- Retry row callout that loop nodes hard-error on retry — previously
  omitted
- bash timeout note widened to cover script timeout (same semantics)

Both files are docs-web content; the CI build on the docs-script-nodes
PR (coleam00#1362) previously validated the Starlight build path with a similar
table addition, so this should render clean.

* fix(skill/cli): remove nonexistent \`archon workflow cancel\`, fix workflow status jq recipe

Two accuracy issues from the PR code-reviewer (comment 4311243858).

C1: \`archon workflow cancel <run-id>\` does NOT exist as a CLI subcommand.
The switch at packages/cli/src/cli.ts:318-485 dispatches on list / run /
status / resume / abandon / approve / reject / cleanup / event — running
\`archon workflow cancel\` hits the default case and exits with "Unknown
workflow subcommand: cancel" (cli.ts:478-484). Active cancellation is
only available via:
  - /workflow cancel <run-id> chat slash command (all platforms)
  - Cancel button on the Web UI dashboard
  - POST /api/workflows/runs/{runId}/cancel REST endpoint

cli-commands.md: removed the \`### archon workflow cancel <run-id>\`
subsection; kept the \`abandon\` subsection but made it explicit that
abandon does NOT kill a subprocess. Added a call-out box at the bottom
of the abandon section explaining where to go for actual cancellation.

troubleshooting.md "running forever" section: split the original
cancel-vs-abandon advice into three bullets — Web UI / CLI abandon (for
orphans, no subprocess kill) / chat \`/workflow cancel\` (for live runs
that need interruption). Added an explicit "there is no archon workflow
cancel CLI subcommand" parenthetical since the wrong command was being
suggested in flow.

I1: the \`archon workflow list --json\` diagnostic used an incorrect jq
filter. workflow list's --json output (workflow.ts:185-219) has shape
{ workflows: [{ name, description, provider?, model?, ... }], errors: [...] }
with no \`runs\` field — \`jq '.workflows[] | select(.runs)'\` returns empty
unconditionally. Replaced with \`archon workflow status --json | jq '.runs[]'\`,
which matches the actual shape of workflowStatusCommand at
workflow.ts:852+ ({ runs: WorkflowRun[] }). Also tightened the narration
to distinguish JSON from human-readable status output.

No change to the commit history in this PR — these are follow-up fixes
to claims I introduced in earlier commits of this branch (f10b989 for
C1, 66d2b86 for I1).

* fix(skill): remove env-leak gate references (feature was removed in provider extraction)

C2 from the PR code-reviewer (comment 4311243858). The pre-spawn env-leak
gate was removed from the codebase during the provider-extraction refactor
— see TODO(coleam00#1135) at packages/providers/src/claude/provider.ts:908. Zero
hits for --allow-env-keys / allowEnvKeys / allow_env_keys / allow_target_repo_keys
across packages/. The CLI's parseArgs (cli.ts:182-208) has no
--allow-env-keys option, and because parseArgs uses strict: false, an
unknown --allow-env-keys would be silently ignored rather than error.

What remains accurate and is NOT touched:
- Three-Path Env Model section (user/repo archon-owned envs are loaded;
  target repo <cwd>/.env keys are stripped from process.env at boot)
  still correctly describes current behavior, grounded in
  packages/paths/src/strip-cwd-env.ts + env-integration.test.ts
- Per-Project Env Injection section (Option 1: .archon/config.yaml env:
  block; Option 2: Web UI Settings → Projects → Env Vars) is unchanged —
  both remain the sanctioned way to get env vars into subprocesses

Removed claims (all three files):
- cli-commands.md: --allow-env-keys flag row in the workflow run flags
  table
- repo-init.md: the "Env-leak gate" subsection at the end of Per-Project
  Env Injection listing 5 remediations (all of which reference UI/CLI/
  config surfaces that don't exist). Replaced with a succinct callout
  that explains the actual current behavior — target repo .env keys are
  stripped, workflows that need those values should use managed
  injection — so the reader still gets the "where to put my env vars"
  answer
- troubleshooting.md: the "Cannot register: codebase has sensitive env
  keys" section (error message that can no longer be emitted)

If the env-leak gate is ever resurrected per TODO(coleam00#1135), the docs can be
re-added then. The CHANGELOG v0.3.0 entry describing the gate is a
historical record of past behavior and does not need to be rewritten.

* fix(skill/troubleshooting): correct JSONL event type names and field name

C3 from the PR code-reviewer (comment 4311243858). The troubleshooting
reference's event-types table used _started / _completed / _failed
suffixes, but packages/workflows/src/logger.ts:19-30 shows the actual
WorkflowEvent.type enum is:

  workflow_start | workflow_complete | workflow_error |
  assistant | tool | validation |
  node_start | node_complete | node_skipped | node_error

The second jq recipe also queried `.event` but the discriminator is `.type`.

Fixes:
- Event table: renamed columns (_started → _start, _completed → _complete,
  _failed → _error). Explicitly called out the field name as `type` so the
  reader knows what jq selector to use
- Replaced the "tool_use / tool_result" row with a single `tool` row and
  listed its actual payload fields (tool_name, tool_input, duration_ms,
  tokens) — tool_use/tool_result are SDK message kinds that appear within
  the AI stream, not top-level log event types
- Added a `validation` row (was missing; it's emitted by workflow-level
  validation calls with `check` and `result` fields)
- Removed `retry_attempt` row — this event type is not emitted to the
  JSONL file. Retry bookkeeping goes through pino logs, not the workflow
  log file
- Added an explicit callout that loop_iteration_started /
  loop_iteration_completed (and other emitter-only events) go through
  the workflow event emitter + DB workflow_events table, NOT the JSONL
  file. Pointed readers to the DB or Web UI for loop-level detail. This
  distinguishes the two parallel event systems — easy to conflate
  (store.ts:11-17 uses _started/_completed/_failed for the DB side,
  logger.ts uses _start/_complete/_error for JSONL)
- Fixed the "all failed events" jq recipe: .event → .type and _failed → _error
- Minor cleanup: the inline "tool_use events" mention in the "running
  forever" section said the wrong event name — updated to "tool or
  assistant events in the tail"

Grounded in packages/workflows/src/logger.ts (canonical JSONL event
shape) and packages/workflows/src/store.ts (the parallel DB event
naming, which the reviewer correctly flagged as different and worth
keeping distinct).

* fix(skill): two stragglers from the code-reviewer audit

Cleanup of two references that slipped through the earlier C1 and C3 fixes:

- references/troubleshooting.md:126: \`node_failed\` → \`node_error\`
  (the "Node output is empty" diagnostics section references the JSONL
  log, which uses the logger.ts enum — not the DB workflow_events table
  which does use \`node_failed\`). The C3 fix corrected the event table
  and one jq recipe but missed this inline mention.

- references/interactive-workflows.md:106: removed \`archon workflow
  cancel <run-id>\` (nonexistent CLI subcommand) from the
  troubleshooting bullet. This was pre-existing before the hardening
  PR but fell within the C1 remediation scope. Replaced with the
  correct triage: reject (approval gate only) vs abandon (orphan
  cleanup, no subprocess kill) vs chat /workflow cancel (actual
  subprocess termination).

Grounded in the same sources as the earlier C1/C3 commits:
packages/cli/src/cli.ts:318-485 (no cancel case) and
packages/workflows/src/logger.ts:19-30 (JSONL type enum).

* feat(skill): point to archon.diy as the canonical docs source

The skill had no reference to archon.diy (the live docs site built from
packages/docs-web/). Several reference files said "see the docs site"
without naming the URL, leaving the agent to guess or grep the repo for
the hostname. An agent with the skill loaded should know that when the
distilled reference pages don't cover a case, the full canonical docs
are one WebFetch away.

SKILL.md: new "Richer Context: archon.diy" section between Routing and
Running Workflows. Covers:
- When to reach for the live docs (longer examples, tutorial framing,
  features the skill only mentions in passing, "where's that
  documented?" user questions)
- URL map — 13 starting points covering getting-started, book (tutorial
  series), guides/ (authoring + per-node-type + per-node-feature),
  reference/ (variables, CLI, security, architecture, configuration,
  troubleshooting), adapters/, deployment/
- Precedence: skill refs first (context-cheap, tuned for agents), docs
  site as escalation. Prevents agents defaulting to WebFetch when a
  local skill ref already covers the answer

Also upgrades the 5 existing generic "docs site" mentions across
reference files to concrete archon.diy URLs with anchor fragments where
helpful:
- good-practices.md: Inline sub-agents pattern → archon.diy/guides/
  authoring-workflows/#inline-sub-agents
- troubleshooting.md: "Install page on the docs site" → archon.diy/
  getting-started/installation/
- workflow-dag.md: "Workflow Description Best Practices" → anchor link;
  sandbox schema reference → archon.diy/guides/authoring-workflows/
  #claude-sdk-advanced-options
- repo-init.md: Security Model reference → archon.diy/reference/
  security/#target-repo-env-isolation (deep-link into the section that
  covers the <cwd>/.env strip behavior)

URL source of truth: astro.config.mjs:5 (site: 'https://archon.diy').
URL structure mirrors packages/docs-web/src/content/docs/<section>/
<page>.md — verified by the 62 pages the docs build produces.
…#1395)

Anthropic's Opus 4.7 landed 2026-04-16; on the Anthropic API, opus /
opus[1m] now resolve to 4.7 with a 1M context window at standard
pricing. Using the alias instead of the hard-pinned claude-opus-4-6[1m]
lets bundled default workflows auto-track the recommended Opus version.

No explicit effort is set, so nodes inherit the per-model default
(xhigh on 4.7, high on 4.6).
…m00#1398)

* fix(workflow): migrate piv-loop plan handoff to $ARTIFACTS_DIR (coleam00#1380)

The create-plan node used a relative path (.claude/archon/plans/{slug}.plan.md)
that the AI agent would sometimes write to a different location, breaking all
downstream nodes that glob for the plan file. Migrated all plan/progress file
references to $ARTIFACTS_DIR/plan.md and $ARTIFACTS_DIR/progress.txt, matching
the pattern used by archon-fix-github-issue and other workflows.

Changes:
- Replace slug-based plan path with $ARTIFACTS_DIR/plan.md in create-plan node
- Replace ls -t glob discovery with direct $ARTIFACTS_DIR/plan.md reads in
  refine-plan, code-review, and fix-feedback nodes
- Replace empty-string guard with file-existence check in implement-setup bash
- Migrate progress.txt references in implement loop to $ARTIFACTS_DIR/
- Add explicit plan/progress paths in finalize node
- Regenerated bundled-defaults.generated.ts

Fixes coleam00#1380

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(workflow): address review findings in archon-piv-loop

- Rename 'Step 2: Write the Plan' to 'Step 2: Plan File Location' to
  eliminate the duplicate heading that collided with Step 3's identical
  title in the create-plan node
- Guard implement-setup against a 0-task plan file: exit 1 with a
  clear error when no '### Task N:' sections are found, preventing a
  silent no-op implement loop
- Remove 2>/dev/null from code-review commit so pre-commit hook failures
  and other stderr are visible to the agent instead of silently swallowed
- Replace '|| true' on git push in finalize with an explicit WARNING echo
  so push failures (auth, upstream conflict, no remote) surface to the
  agent rather than being silently ignored
- Regenerate bundled-defaults.generated.ts

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore(workflows): regenerate bundled defaults to match opus[1m] alias

The bundle was stale relative to the YAML sources after coleam00#1395 merged —
check:bundled was failing CI. Regenerated; no YAML edits.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…cutor (coleam00#1403)

PIV Task 1: Adds three new tests in a dedicated describe block
'executeDagWorkflow -- final status derivation' covering the anyFailed
branch (dag-executor.ts ~line 2956) that previously had no direct test:
- one success + one independent failure calls failWorkflowRun (not completeWorkflowRun)
- multiple successes + one failure calls failWorkflowRun (not completeWorkflowRun)
- trigger_rule: none_failed skips dependent node but anyFailed still marks run failed

Fixes coleam00#1381.
New reference for the archon skill: a single-glance lookup of which
parameter works on which node type, an intent-based "how do I..." table,
a consolidated silent-failure catalog, and an inline agents: section
(previously only referenced via archon.diy).

Purpose is complementary, not duplicative:
- workflow-dag.md remains the authoring guide
- dag-advanced.md remains the hooks/MCP/skills/retry deep-dive
- good-practices.md remains the patterns and anti-patterns
- parameter-matrix.md is the grep-this-first lookup when you know the
  outcome you want but not which field gets you there

Also registers the new reference in SKILL.md routing table.
@Wirasm
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Wirasm commented Apr 27, 2026

Hi @shaun0927 — thanks for opening this PR.

This repository uses a PR template at .github/pull_request_template.md with several required sections. A few of them appear to be empty or placeholder here:

  • Label Snapshot
  • Change Metadata
  • Architecture Diagram
  • Compatibility / Migration
  • Human Verification
  • Side Effects / Blast Radius
  • Rollback Plan
  • Risks and Mitigations

Could you fill those out (even briefly)? The template helps reviewers understand scope, risk, and rollback — it speeds up review significantly.

If a section genuinely doesn't apply, just write "N/A" in it rather than leaving it blank.

Wirasm and others added 5 commits April 27, 2026 10:16
Add explicit references to .github/PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.md in both
CONTRIBUTING.md and CLAUDE.md, plus a reminder to link issues with
Closes/Fixes/Resolves so they auto-close on merge. Repo-triage runs
were flagging dozens of partially-filled or unlinked PRs each cycle.
…riage (coleam00#1428)

* feat(workflows): add maintainer-standup workflow for daily PR/issue triage

Daily morning briefing that pulls origin/dev, triages all open PRs and assigned
issues against direction.md, and surfaces progress vs. the previous run. Designed
for live-checkout use (worktree.enabled: false) so it can read its own state.

Layout under .archon/maintainer-standup/:
  - direction.md (committed) — project north-star: what Archon IS / IS NOT.
    Drives PR P4 polite-decline classification with cited clauses.
  - README.md / profile.md.example — setup docs and template for new maintainers.
  - profile.md, state.json, briefs/YYYY-MM-DD.md — gitignored, per-maintainer.

Engine:
  - 3 parallel gather scripts in .archon/scripts/maintainer-standup-*.ts
    (git-status, gh-data, read-context) — bun runtime, JSON stdout.
  - Synthesis node: command file with output_format schema for
    { brief_markdown, next_state }.
  - Persist node: tiny inline bun script writes both to disk.

Run-to-run continuity: state.json carries observed_prs/issues snapshots, so the
next run can detect what merged, what closed, what the maintainer shipped, and
which carry-over items aged past N days.

Also adds .archon/** to the ESLint global ignore list (matches the existing
.claude/skills/** pattern) since .archon/ is user content and not part of any
tsconfig project.

* fix(maintainer-standup): address CodeRabbit review on coleam00#1428

- gh-data: bump --limit 100 → 1000 on all_open_prs and warn loudly when
  the cap is hit; preserves the observed_prs invariant the next-run
  "resolved since last run" diff depends on. (CodeRabbit critical)
- maintainer-standup.md: clarify P1 CI signal — the gathered payload only
  carries mergeStateStatus, not statusCheckRollup; for borderline P1s,
  drill in via `gh pr checks <n>`. (CodeRabbit minor)
- workflow.yaml persist: write briefs under local YYYY-MM-DD (sv-SE
  locale) instead of UTC ISO date, so an evening run doesn't file
  tomorrow's brief and break recent_briefs lookups. (CodeRabbit minor)
- workflow.yaml persist: wrap state/brief writes in try/catch; on
  failure dump brief_markdown and next_state to stderr so a 5-minute
  Sonnet synthesis isn't lost to a transient disk error. (CodeRabbit minor)
- gh-data + git-status: switch from execSync (shell-string) to
  execFileSync (argv array) for git/gh invocations. Defense-in-depth
  against shell metacharacters in values that pass through (esp. the
  gh_handle from profile.md). (CodeRabbit nitpick)
Add optional `tags: string[]` to `workflowBaseSchema`. Explicit values take precedence over keyword inference; `tags: []` suppresses inference end-to-end; omitting the field falls back to inference (backwards compatible). Non-array values warn-and-ignore matching the sibling `worktree`/`additionalDirectories` patterns.
…ows under maintainer/ (coleam00#1430)

* feat(workflows): add maintainer-review-pr and group maintainer workflows under .archon/workflows/maintainer/

Adds the maintainer-review-pr workflow — a Pi/Minimax-based PR triage
flow that gates on direction alignment, scope focus, and PR-template
quality before doing any deep review. If the gate clears, runs the
five review aspects (code/error-handling/test-coverage/comment-quality/
docs-impact) as parallel Archon nodes and auto-posts a synthesized
review comment. If the gate fails (direction conflict, multiple
concerns, sprawling scope), drafts a polite-decline comment and pauses
for the maintainer's approval before posting.

Reorganizes the existing maintainer-standup workflow into the same
subfolder so all maintainer-facing workflows live together. Subfolder
grouping is supported by the workflow loader (1 level deep, resolution
by filename).

What lands:

- .archon/workflows/maintainer/maintainer-standup.yaml (moved from
  .archon/workflows/maintainer-standup.yaml)
- .archon/workflows/maintainer/maintainer-review-pr.yaml (new)
- .archon/commands/maintainer-review-{gate,code-review,error-handling,
  test-coverage,comment-quality,docs-impact,synthesize,report}.md (new,
  Pi-tuned variants of the existing review-agent commands so they avoid
  Claude-only Task / sub-agent patterns)

Pi/Minimax integration:

- Uses provider: pi, model: minimax/MiniMax-M2.7 — verified via the
  e2e-minimax-smoke test that Pi correctly routes to Minimax (session
  jsonl confirms provider=minimax) and that Pi's best-effort
  output_format parser handles the gate's nested schema.
- Two test runs landed real comments: a direction-decline on PR coleam00#1335
  and a deep-review on PR coleam00#1369. Both were posted to GitHub via the
  workflow's gh pr comment node.

* chore(workflows): also group repo-triage under .archon/workflows/maintainer/

repo-triage is the third maintainer-facing workflow alongside maintainer-standup and maintainer-review-pr; group it in the same subfolder for consistency. Subfolder resolution is by filename so the workflow name is unchanged.
…r unmapped providers (coleam00#1284)

Closes coleam00#1096.

- Switch Pi provider model lookup from pi-ai's getModel() (static catalog
  only) to ModelRegistry.create(authStorage).find() so user-configured
  custom models in ~/.pi/agent/models.json (LM Studio, ollama, llamacpp,
  custom OpenAI-compatible endpoints) are discoverable.
- Remove the local lookupPiModel helper.
- For env-var-mapped providers (anthropic, openai, etc.) still throw
  with a pi /login hint when credentials are missing. For unmapped
  providers, log pi.auth_missing at info and continue so local models
  that don't need credentials work without ceremony.
- Surface modelRegistry.getError() in the not-found message and emit
  pi.model_not_found so users debugging custom-provider configs see the
  real cause (e.g. missing baseUrl in models.json).
- Guard AuthStorage.create() and ModelRegistry.create() with try/catch
  so a malformed ~/.pi/agent/auth.json surfaces with Pi-framed context
  instead of a raw SDK stack trace.
- Document the credential-free path for local providers in ai-assistants.md.

Co-authored-by: Matt Chapman <Matt@NinjitsuWeb.com>
Wirasm added 5 commits April 27, 2026 13:31
…add e2e-minimax-smoke (coleam00#1431)

* chore(workflows): group all smoke-test workflows under .archon/workflows/test-workflows/

Move the 7 existing e2e-*.yaml smoke tests plus the new e2e-minimax-smoke
test into a dedicated subfolder. Subfolder grouping is supported by the
workflow loader (1 level deep, resolution by filename) so workflow names
are unchanged. Mirrors the .archon/workflows/maintainer/ split landing
in coleam00#1430.

Also adds e2e-minimax-smoke.yaml — a sanity check that Pi correctly
routes to Minimax M2.7 via the user's local pi auth, and that Pi's
best-effort output_format parser handles a small nested schema. Asserts
routing by reading the most recent Pi session jsonl rather than asking
the model to self-identify (LLMs are unreliable narrators about their
own identity, especially when Pi's system prompt mentions other
providers as defaults).

* fix(e2e-minimax-smoke): address CodeRabbit review on coleam00#1431

- Widen find window from -mmin -3 to -mmin -10. The smoke's three Pi
  nodes plus the assert can collectively run several minutes on slow
  networks; 3 minutes was tight enough to false-FAIL on a healthy run.
  (CodeRabbit minor)
- Drop non-deterministic `head -1` over `find` output. find doesn't
  guarantee any order; on a tie, the wrong file would be picked. Now
  iterates all matching sessions and breaks on first one carrying the
  routing signal — any match is sufficient evidence. (CodeRabbit minor)
- Replace single-regex `'"provider":"minimax".*"modelId":"MiniMax-M2.7"'`
  with two separate greps joined by `&&`. JSON field order isn't part of
  Pi's contract; a future Pi release reordering `provider` and `modelId`
  in the model_change event would silently false-FAIL the original
  pattern. The new check is order-independent. (CodeRabbit major)
…oleam00#1432)

Six findings, two majors and four minors/nitpicks:

- gate.md L17 vs L77: resolved conflicting input-source instructions.
  Body claimed "all inline, no extra fetch" while a later phase
  permitted reading PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.md. Now: explicit "one
  allowed extra read" callout in Phase 1 + matching wording in Gate C.
  (CodeRabbit major)

- gate.md fenced blocks: added missing language identifiers (text/json/
  markdown) to satisfy markdownlint MD040. (CodeRabbit minor)

- gate.md L155 + read-context.ts: deterministic clock. The 3-day deadline
  was anchored to prior_state.last_run_at, which can be stale and produce
  past-dated deadlines. Moved both today and deadline_3d into the
  read-context.ts output (computed via sv-SE locale → ISO date in local
  time) and instructed the gate to use $read-context.output.deadline_3d
  directly. LLMs are unreliable at calendar arithmetic; this avoids it
  entirely. (CodeRabbit major)

- maintainer-review-pr.yaml fetch-diff: dropped 2>/dev/null on gh pr diff
  so auth / network / deleted-PR failures fail the node instead of
  feeding an empty diff to the gate. Empty-but-successful diff (PR has
  no changes) is now an explicit marker the gate can detect. (CodeRabbit
  minor)

- maintainer-review-pr.yaml approve-unclear: added capture_response: true
  so the maintainer's approve comment flows to the report node. Reject
  reasoning is already captured by Archon's run record. (CodeRabbit
  minor)

- maintainer-review-pr.yaml post-decline + report.md: the gh pr edit
  --add-label call previously swallowed all errors with || true and the
  report still claimed the label was applied. Now writes applied/skipped
  to $ARTIFACTS_DIR/.label-applied + the gh stderr to .label-error so
  the report can describe the actual outcome. (CodeRabbit nitpick)
…ume (coleam00#1435)

* fix(workflows): approval gate bypass after reject-with-redraft on resume

When an approval node was rejected with on_reject.prompt, the synthetic
PromptNode built to run the on_reject prompt reused the approval gate's
own node ID. executeNodeInternal then wrote a node_completed event with
that ID, causing getCompletedDagNodeOutputs to treat the gate as already
completed on the next resume — bypassing the human gate entirely.

Fix: give the synthetic node the ID `${node.id}:on_reject` so its
node_completed event has a distinct step_name that won't match the
approval gate slot in priorCompletedNodes.

Adds a regression test asserting no node_completed event with the
approval gate's ID is written during on_reject execution.

Fixes coleam00#1429

* test(workflows): add positive assertion and SSE side-effect comment for on_reject synthetic node

Add complementary positive assertion to the regression test to verify that
node_completed is written exactly once with step_name 'review:on_reject',
ensuring future refactors that suppress the event entirely would be caught.

Add inline comment in executeApprovalNode documenting the known SSE side-effect:
node_started/node_completed events with nodeId='review:on_reject' flow through
the SSE pipeline into the web UI, resulting in a transient phantom node in the
execution view. This is cosmetic-only — the human gate contract is preserved.

* simplify: reduce duplicate cast pattern in on_reject test assertions
…e checkout (coleam00#1438)

* feat(workflows): add mutates_checkout field to skip path-lock for concurrent runs

Add `mutates_checkout: boolean` (optional, default true) to the workflow
schema. When set to false, the executor skips the path-exclusive lock
that serializes all runs on the same working path, allowing N concurrent
runs on the same live checkout.

The primary use case is `maintainer-review-pr`, which reads shared state
but writes only to per-run artifact paths and GitHub PR comments — two
parallel reviews of different PRs should not fail with "Workflow already
active on this path".

Changes:
- `schemas/workflow.ts`: add optional `mutates_checkout` field
- `loader.ts`: parse and propagate the field (warn-and-ignore on invalid values)
- `executor.ts`: wrap path-lock guard in `if (workflow.mutates_checkout !== false)`
- `executor.test.ts`: two new tests in the concurrent-run guard suite
- `maintainer-review-pr.yaml`: opt in with `mutates_checkout: false`

* test(workflows): add loader tests for mutates_checkout parsing

- Add 5 tests covering false, true, omitted, and invalid (string "yes") values
- Invalid non-boolean values are silently dropped with warn — now explicitly tested
- Remove the // end mutates_checkout guard trailing comment (no precedent in file)
- Clarify loader comment: "parse/warn pattern" not "warn-and-ignore pattern" to avoid implying the return style matches interactive

* simplify: collapse nodeType/aiFields pair into single nonAiNode object in parseDagNode
…es (coleam00#1434)

* docs: replace String.raw with direct assignment in script node examples

String.raw`$nodeId.output` fails silently when substituted output contains
a backtick, terminating the template literal early and producing cryptic parse
errors. JSON is valid JS expression syntax, so direct assignment is safe for
all valid JSON values including those with backticks.

- Replace String.raw pattern in dag-workflow.yaml example
- Replace String.raw pattern in archon-workflow-builder.yaml template
- Add CAUTION bullet in workflow-dag.md Script Node section
- Add Silent Failures item coleam00#14 in parameter-matrix.md
- Add Starlight caution aside in script-nodes.md
- Extend script bodies bullet in variables.md
- Regenerate bundled-defaults.generated.ts

Fixes coleam00#1427

* docs: fix Rule 6 in generate-yaml prompt to distinguish bun vs uv patterns

Rule 6 still referenced JSON.parse after the example was updated to direct
assignment, creating a contradiction for the AI code generator. Update the
prose to explicitly distinguish TypeScript/bun (direct assignment) from
Python/uv (json.loads), matching the updated embedded example.
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♻️ Duplicate comments (2)
packages/providers/src/codex/binary-resolver.test.ts (1)

200-240: ⚠️ Potential issue | 🟡 Minor

symlinkSync will EPERM on non-elevated Windows — guard both new symlink tests.

detects swapped symlink target via logical-path pinning (200-226) and refuses symlinked trust pin paths (228-240) both call symlinkSync unconditionally. On Windows without Developer Mode or elevation this throws EPERM before the assertions run, which would make the suite non-deterministic on that platform. If Windows is a supported CI target for this package, gate both tests with test.skipIf(process.platform === 'win32') (or wrap symlinkSync in a try/catch that early-returns when symlink creation itself fails).

🧪 Suggested guard
-  test('detects swapped symlink target via logical-path pinning', () => {
+  test.skipIf(process.platform === 'win32')('detects swapped symlink target via logical-path pinning', () => {
-  test('refuses symlinked trust pin paths', () => {
+  test.skipIf(process.platform === 'win32')('refuses symlinked trust pin paths', () => {

As per coding guidelines: "keep tests deterministic without flaky timing or network dependence; ensure local validation commands (bun run validate) map directly to CI expectations".

🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.

In `@packages/providers/src/codex/binary-resolver.test.ts` around lines 200 - 240,
Both tests ('detects swapped symlink target via logical-path pinning' and
'refuses symlinked trust pin paths') call symlinkSync unguarded which can throw
EPERM on non-elevated Windows; update the tests that exercise symlinkSync and
resolver.verifyOrPinBinaryHash to be deterministic by skipping or
short-circuiting on Windows. Either wrap the symlinkSync calls in a try/catch
that returns early when symlink creation fails, or mark the tests with
test.skipIf(process.platform === 'win32'); ensure you reference the tests by
name and keep the calls to symlinkSync and resolver.verifyOrPinBinaryHash
unchanged otherwise.
packages/providers/src/codex/binary-resolver.ts (1)

102-122: ⚠️ Potential issue | 🟡 Minor

O_NOFOLLOW silently degrades to no guard on Windows — pre-check with lstatSync to mirror the read path.

fsConstants.O_NOFOLLOW is undefined on Windows, so ?? 0 removes the symlink protection on first-use pinning even though readPinnedHash rejects symlinks via lstatSync. An attacker with write access to ~/.archon/trust/codex/ could pre-plant a symlink at the computed pin path before first use and have the hash written through it. Add a lstatSync guard before openSync (or only OR in O_NOFOLLOW when defined) so write-path symlink handling matches the read path.

🛡️ Suggested fix
       mkdirSync(dirname(hashPath), { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
+      // Defense-in-depth: O_NOFOLLOW is undefined on Windows, so explicitly
+      // reject a pre-planted symlink before opening the pin path.
+      try {
+        const preStats = lstatSync(hashPath);
+        if (preStats.isSymbolicLink()) {
+          throw new Error(`Codex binary hash pin path is a symlink: ${hashPath}`);
+        }
+      } catch (e) {
+        if ((e as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code !== 'ENOENT') throw e;
+      }
       const fd = openSync(
         hashPath,
         fsConstants.O_CREAT |
           fsConstants.O_EXCL |
           fsConstants.O_WRONLY |
           (fsConstants.O_NOFOLLOW ?? 0),
         0o600
       );
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.

In `@packages/providers/src/codex/binary-resolver.ts` around lines 102 - 122, The
write path currently uses (fsConstants.O_NOFOLLOW ?? 0) which is undefined on
Windows and removes the symlink guard; update the code around openSync(hashPath,
...) in the binary pinning block so it mirrors readPinnedHash: call
lstatSync(dirname? or hashPath?)/lstatSync(hashPath) before openSync and throw
or skip writing if lstatSync indicates a symlink (S_ISLNK) or the path exists as
a symlink, and also only OR in fsConstants.O_NOFOLLOW when it is defined (i.e.,
check typeof fsConstants.O_NOFOLLOW !== 'undefined' before adding it) so symlink
protection is enforced on platforms that support it while preventing silent
degradation on Windows; reference symbols: hashPath, openSync, lstatSync,
readPinnedHash, fsConstants.O_NOFOLLOW.
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.

Duplicate comments:
In `@packages/providers/src/codex/binary-resolver.test.ts`:
- Around line 200-240: Both tests ('detects swapped symlink target via
logical-path pinning' and 'refuses symlinked trust pin paths') call symlinkSync
unguarded which can throw EPERM on non-elevated Windows; update the tests that
exercise symlinkSync and resolver.verifyOrPinBinaryHash to be deterministic by
skipping or short-circuiting on Windows. Either wrap the symlinkSync calls in a
try/catch that returns early when symlink creation fails, or mark the tests with
test.skipIf(process.platform === 'win32'); ensure you reference the tests by
name and keep the calls to symlinkSync and resolver.verifyOrPinBinaryHash
unchanged otherwise.

In `@packages/providers/src/codex/binary-resolver.ts`:
- Around line 102-122: The write path currently uses (fsConstants.O_NOFOLLOW ??
0) which is undefined on Windows and removes the symlink guard; update the code
around openSync(hashPath, ...) in the binary pinning block so it mirrors
readPinnedHash: call lstatSync(dirname? or hashPath?)/lstatSync(hashPath) before
openSync and throw or skip writing if lstatSync indicates a symlink (S_ISLNK) or
the path exists as a symlink, and also only OR in fsConstants.O_NOFOLLOW when it
is defined (i.e., check typeof fsConstants.O_NOFOLLOW !== 'undefined' before
adding it) so symlink protection is enforced on platforms that support it while
preventing silent degradation on Windows; reference symbols: hashPath, openSync,
lstatSync, readPinnedHash, fsConstants.O_NOFOLLOW.

ℹ️ Review info
⚙️ Run configuration

Configuration used: defaults

Review profile: CHILL

Plan: Pro

Run ID: 74ddab3e-361b-4972-9df8-6017ea601856

📥 Commits

Reviewing files that changed from the base of the PR and between 8c7bd3a and 9a9122f.

📒 Files selected for processing (2)
  • packages/providers/src/codex/binary-resolver.test.ts
  • packages/providers/src/codex/binary-resolver.ts

@shaun0927
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Pushed 9a9122fa to close the residual realpath bypass surfaced by the bot review, and updated the PR description with the missing template sections.

What changed in this commit:

  • getHashPinPath now keys pins by path.resolve(binaryPath) instead of realpathSync(binaryPath). In the writable-vendor-dir threat model this PR addresses, an attacker who swapped a symlink target at the expected binary location would resolve to a different realpath, miss the existing pin, and silently re-pin as if it were the first run. Keying by the logical path makes any swap (file contents or symlink target) trip the existing pin.
  • New regression test: pin v1 → swap symlink target to v2 (different bytes) → verifyOrPinBinaryHash throws possible tampering detected instead of silently re-pinning.
  • Test helper synced: the test's getTrustPinPath mirrors the production logical-path keying — important on macOS, where /var → /private/var would otherwise cause a realpath/resolve divergence between test setup and production.

Other items on this PR are already in place from the prior follow-ups (8c7bd3ac etc.):

  • Pin storage moved to ~/.archon/trust/codex/ with mode 0700; pin files written 0600 + O_EXCL | O_NOFOLLOW.
  • Symlinked pin paths rejected via lstat check.
  • Sidecar contents never echoed in error messages.
  • Mismatch path now logs the structured codex.binary_hash_mismatch event before throwing, so the signal survives provider.ts's generic re-wrap.

Local validation:

bun run type-check                                                                    # clean
bun test packages/providers/src/codex/binary-resolver.test.ts                         # 12/12 pass
bun test packages/providers/src/codex/binary-resolver-dev.test.ts                     # passes

@shaun0927 shaun0927 force-pushed the security/codex-binary-sha256-pinning branch from 9a9122f to 63d4232 Compare April 27, 2026 14:21
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Rebased onto current dev and squashed the five review-iteration commits into one — the cumulative state was already stable after the realpath-bypass fix, and the linear history reads cleaner now.

While I was in there I picked up the two Minor findings from the latest CodeRabbit pass:

  • O_NOFOLLOW write-path gap on Windows. Added an explicit lstatSync symlink check immediately before the openSync(O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_WRONLY|O_NOFOLLOW, 0600) in verifyOrPinBinaryHash. O_NOFOLLOW is undefined on Windows, so the existing ?? 0 silently dropped the guard there; the lstat mirrors readPinnedHash's symlink rejection so write-path protection no longer depends on platform support for the flag.
  • Symlink tests on Windows. Wrapped both symlinkSync-dependent tests in test.skipIf(process.platform === 'win32')(...) so they don't EPERM-fail the suite on non-elevated Windows.

One note worth surfacing: while I was resolving the conflict, I noticed that the new tier-4 autodetect resolution path added in #1430-era doesn't currently call verifyOrPinBinaryHash. I deliberately didn't expand the PR scope to cover it (the original PR was scoped to env/config/vendor), but happy to do it in a follow-up — or here, if you'd prefer.

Validation:

  • bun test packages/providers/src/codex/binary-resolver.test.ts — 16 pass
  • bun --filter @archon/providers type-check — clean
  • bun run lint — zero warnings
  • bun run format:check — clean

Wirasm and others added 4 commits April 27, 2026 18:26
…s/experimental/

Move two repo-scoped workflows that were sitting untracked at the workflow
root into a dedicated subfolder. Subfolder grouping is supported by the
loader (1 level deep, resolution by filename), so workflow names are
unchanged and the /release skill still resolves archon-release correctly.

Files moved:
- archon-fix-github-issue-experimental.yaml — Path-A variant of the
  issue-fix workflow used today to land coleam00#1434, coleam00#1435, coleam00#1438.
- archon-release.yaml — the live release workflow used by the /release
  skill end-to-end (validate -> binary smoke -> version bump -> changelog
  -> approval -> commit -> PR -> tag -> Homebrew formula update).
…des (coleam00#1387)

executeBashNode previously only merged explicit envVars on top of
process.env. The three well-known workflow directories (artifactsDir,
logDir, baseBranch) were passed as function parameters and used for
compile-time substitution of $ARTIFACTS_DIR / $LOG_DIR / $BASE_BRANCH
in the script body, but were never added to the subprocess environment.

As a result, any script that relied on shell-runtime expansion — e.g.
JSON_FILE="${ARTIFACTS_DIR}/foo.output.json" inside a heredoc, an
inherited helper script, or a `bash -c` subshell — saw the variable
unset and silently fell back to its default (typically an empty string
or "."), writing artifacts to the workflow cwd instead of the nominal
artifacts directory.

Always build subprocessEnv from process.env plus the three well-known
directories, then allow explicit envVars to override. Compile-time
substitution behavior is unchanged; existing scripts that do not
reference these variables are unaffected; user-supplied envVars still
win on conflict.
…oleam00#1426)

* fix(workflow): substitute \$nodeId.output refs in approval messages

Approval node messages were emitted as raw strings, bypassing the
substituteNodeOutputRefs() pass that prompt/bash/loop/cancel nodes
all run. This made interactive workflows like atlas-onboard show
literal "\$gather-context.output.repo_name" placeholders to humans
at HITL gates, leaving them unable to know what they were approving.

Fix: rendered the approval.message through substituteNodeOutputRefs
once at the top of the standard approval gate path, then used the
resolved string in all 4 emission sites (safeSendMessage,
createWorkflowEvent, pauseWorkflowRun, event-emitter).

Test: new dag-executor.test case wires a structured-output upstream
node into an approval node and asserts pauseWorkflowRun receives the
substituted message ("Repo: hcr-els | App: CCELS | Port: 3012")
rather than the literal placeholders.

Repro: any workflow with an approval node whose message references
\$nodeId.output[.field]. Observed in the wild on atlas-onboard's
confirm-context HITL gate.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(workflow): extend approval-substitution test to cover all 4 emission sites

Per CodeRabbit review: the original test only verified pauseWorkflowRun
received the substituted message, but the fix touches 4 emission sites.
A future regression at safeSendMessage / createWorkflowEvent / event-emitter
would silently leave the test passing while users still saw raw $node.output
placeholders.

Adds two additional assertions:
- platform.sendMessage prompt contains substituted message + does NOT
  contain literal $gather-context.output placeholders
- The persisted approval_requested workflow event's data.message is
  substituted

Event-emitter assertion deferred (no existing pattern for spying on the
global emitter in this test file). Two of three secondary surfaces
covered closes the practical regression risk — both are user-visible
(chat prompt + audit-log event); the emitter is internal only.

Test count: 7 pass / 22 expect() (was 18). Full suite 193 pass / 353
expect() — no regressions.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…m00#1286) (coleam00#1367)

* feat(workflows): expose $LOOP_PREV_OUTPUT in loop node prompts (coleam00#1286)

Adds a new substitution variable that carries the previous loop iteration's
cleaned output into the next iteration's prompt. Empty on iteration 1; the
prior iteration's output (after stripCompletionTags) on iteration 2+.

Why: fresh_context: true loops have no way to reference what the previous
pass produced or why it failed without dragging the full session forward.
$LOOP_PREV_OUTPUT closes that gap with zero session-cost — same trust
boundary as $nodeId.output, no new external surface.

Changes:
- packages/workflows/src/executor-shared.ts: substituteWorkflowVariables
  accepts a 10th positional loopPrevOutput arg and substitutes
  $LOOP_PREV_OUTPUT (defaults to '').
- packages/workflows/src/dag-executor.ts: executeLoopNode passes
  lastIterationOutput on iteration 2+ (and explicit '' on iteration 1 /
  the first iteration of an interactive resume, since lastIterationOutput
  is a per-call variable that does not survive resume metadata).
- Unit tests: 3 new cases in executor-shared.test.ts.
- Integration tests: 2 new cases in dag-executor.test.ts verifying the
  prompt sent to the AI on iter 1 vs iter 2, and that the value reflects
  cleaned output (no <promise> tags).
- Docs: variables.md, loop-nodes.md (new "Retry-on-failure" pattern),
  CLAUDE.md variable reference.

Backward compatibility: prompts that don't reference $LOOP_PREV_OUTPUT are
unaffected. All 843 workflow tests + type-check + lint + format:check +
bun run validate pass locally.

* docs: address coderabbit review on variables/loop-nodes

- variables.md: include $LOOP_PREV_OUTPUT in substitution-order list and
  availability table to match the new variable row at line 30
- loop-nodes.md: document the interactive-resume exception where the first
  iteration after an approval-gate resume still receives an empty
  $LOOP_PREV_OUTPUT regardless of iteration number (per dag-executor.ts
  L1781-1783 where i === startIteration always clears prev output)

* docs(changelog): add Unreleased entry for $LOOP_PREV_OUTPUT (coleam00#1367 review)

* test(loop): add resume-from-approval integration test for $LOOP_PREV_OUTPUT (coleam00#1367 review)

Per maintainer-review-pr suggestion (Wirasm): two-call integration test
covering the resume-from-approval scenario.

  - Call 1: fresh interactive loop pauses at the gate after iteration 1 and
    asserts $LOOP_PREV_OUTPUT substitutes to empty on iter 1 (no prior
    output) plus the gate pause is recorded.
  - Call 2: resumed run with metadata.approval populated. The first
    resumed iteration must substitute $LOOP_PREV_OUTPUT to '', NOT to the
    paused run's iter-1 output (which lived in a different process and is
    not persisted). $LOOP_USER_INPUT still flows through as normal.

Locks the documented invariant at dag-executor.ts:1769-1772.

---------

Co-authored-by: voidborne-d <DottyEstradalco@allergist.com>
@shaun0927
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Pushed an update — addresses CR's Major finding plus the related test changes:

  • In-process verification cache (verifiedRealpaths). createCodexClient calls resolveCodexBinaryPath per request when a custom requestEnv is supplied, so without memoization a successful TOFU pin still re-read + re-hashed the full Codex binary (tens of MB) on every request. Cache the realpath of binaries that have already passed verification this process; subsequent calls short-circuit. Pin file is still keyed by logical path so the swap-detection threat model is preserved.
  • Cache key is realpathSync(binaryPath) not the logical path. A symlink swap during the process lifetime resolves to a new realpath → cache miss → fresh hash check → mismatch detected. The existing detects swapped symlink target via logical-path pinning test would have failed with logical-path keying; with realpath keying it passes.
  • Test-only escape hatch resetVerifiedHashCacheForTests. Wired into the verifyOrPinBinaryHash describe's beforeEach so each test exercises a real hash + pin file roundtrip rather than the cached fast path.
  • New test: memoizes verified logical paths within the process so the binary is hashed once. Spies on readFile, asserts call count is stable across repeated verifyOrPinBinaryHash invocations on the same binary, and that the reset hook clears the cache (read count grows again after reset).

Also rebased onto current dev (single-commit PR, clean rebase).

Local: bun run type-check clean, bun run lint clean, 17/17 binary-resolver tests pass.

@shaun0927 shaun0927 force-pushed the security/codex-binary-sha256-pinning branch from 63d4232 to 123b85a Compare April 28, 2026 04:30
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Reviewed commit: 123b85a974

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} catch {
cacheKey = resolvePath(binaryPath);
}
if (verifiedRealpaths.has(cacheKey)) return;
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P1 Badge Re-verify cached binaries before each execution

verifyOrPinBinaryHash returns immediately once a realpath is in verifiedRealpaths, so integrity is only checked once per process. In long-lived contexts (e.g., archon serve), if an attacker can modify the binary in place after the first successful check, the path/realpath stay the same and subsequent resolutions skip hashing entirely, allowing the tampered binary to execute until restart. This bypass is introduced by the new memoization layer and undermines the stated post-install tamper detection model for writable binary directories.

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Pushed an update — picks up Codex's P1 follow-up:

  • Cache invalidation via stat fingerprint instead of pure memoization. Replaced the Set<realpath> with a Map<realpath, { mtimeMs, size }>. Every call to verifyOrPinBinaryHash does a cheap statSync (much cheaper than re-reading the binary). Cache hits only when realpath, mtime, and size all match — so an in-place rewrite or truncation of a previously-verified binary trips a re-hash on the next call. Long-lived processes (archon serve) keep tamper detection while short-lived per-request resolution still skips the bulk read on warm calls.
  • New regression test: cache invalidates when the binary mtime changes (long-lived process tamper detection) pins a binary, calls utimesSync to bump mtime (simulates an in-place rewrite), and asserts the next verifyOrPinBinaryHash re-reads the file via the spy on readFile.

Local: bun run type-check clean, bun run lint clean, 18/18 binary-resolver tests pass.

@shaun0927 shaun0927 force-pushed the security/codex-binary-sha256-pinning branch from 123b85a to e3f5861 Compare April 28, 2026 05:28
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Reviewed commit: e3f58614ad

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Comment on lines +136 to +137
const cached = verifiedFingerprints.get(cacheKey);
if (cached?.mtimeMs === stat.mtimeMs && cached.size === stat.size) return;
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P1 Badge Strengthen cache fingerprint beyond mtime and size

The memoization fast path skips hashing when mtimeMs and size match, but in the stated threat model (attacker can write the binary directory in a long-lived process), an attacker can replace the binary with a same-length payload and restore the prior mtime, causing this branch to return and execute tampered code without re-verification. This undermines the tamper-detection guarantee for post-start modifications; the fingerprint should include harder-to-forge metadata (e.g., ctime/inode) or avoid skipping verification solely on mtime+size.

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const vendorBinaryPath = join(archonHome, CODEX_VENDOR_DIR, binaryName);

if (fileExists(vendorBinaryPath)) {
verifyOrPinBinaryHash(vendorBinaryPath);
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P1 Badge Verify autodetected binary paths before returning

This change adds verifyOrPinBinaryHash for env/config/vendor resolution, but the autodetect branch still returns probePath without pinning or verification. Any deployment that resolves via ~/.npm-global/bin/codex, /usr/local/bin/codex, or platform equivalents therefore gets no integrity check at all, creating a full bypass of the new protection for that commonly used path source.

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@shaun0927 shaun0927 force-pushed the security/codex-binary-sha256-pinning branch from e3f5861 to a2d8d9b Compare April 28, 2026 05:53
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Pushed an update — picks up Codex's two latest P1s:

  • Cache fingerprint strengthened to (ino, dev, ctimeMs, mtimeMs, size). mtime+size is forgeable from userspace (utimes() rolls mtime, same-length payload preserves size); the inode/device pair changes on any mv -f / rename swap, and ctimeMs updates on any inode metadata change and isn't settable from userspace via standard syscalls. The cache short-circuits only when every field matches, so a non-root attacker rewriting the binary in place can't keep the cached "verified" entry stale.
  • Autodetect tier now also goes through verifyOrPinBinaryHash. The previous code returned probePath straight from ~/.npm-global/bin/codex / /usr/local/bin/codex / Homebrew prefixes without pinning, which gave a clean bypass of the new integrity check for those install sources. Same TOFU pin/verify as the env/config/vendor tiers — log message and threat model are identical.

Local: bun run type-check clean, bun run lint clean, 18/18 binary-resolver tests pass.

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Reviewed commit: a2d8d9b7c3

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Comment on lines +157 to +158
) {
return;
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P1 Badge Verify pin for each logical path before cache return

The realpath-based memoization returns early here before getHashPinPath(binaryPath) runs, so a second logical path (e.g., a different CODEX_BIN_PATH/config value or symlink) that resolves to the same realpath never gets its own trust pin created or checked. In a long-lived process, if path A is verified first and path B (same target) later hits this cache, an attacker can subsequently repoint path B to a different binary and Archon will treat it as first-use for B (no prior pin) instead of detecting tampering. This defeats the logical-path pinning guarantee the new hardening is trying to enforce.

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@shaun0927 shaun0927 force-pushed the security/codex-binary-sha256-pinning branch from a2d8d9b to c56bf0c Compare April 28, 2026 06:04
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Pushed an update — picks up Codex's latest P1:

  • Cache key is the logical path, not realpath. Pin files are keyed by logical path (this is intentional — it's what catches symlink retargeting on a known location). The cache was keyed by realpath, so two distinct logical paths sharing the same target (e.g. CODEX_BIN_PATH=/some/sym → ~/.archon/vendor/codex/codex) would warm one cache entry that short-circuited every other logical path's verification. An attacker who later repointed the second logical path at a different binary would slip past the pin check. The cache is now Map<logicalPath, fingerprint>, with realpath folded into the fingerprint so a symlink swap on the same logical path also misses.

Local: bun run type-check clean, bun run lint clean, 18/18 binary-resolver tests pass.

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}

const hashPath = getHashPinPath(binaryPath);
const actual = createHash('sha256').update(readFile(binaryPath)).digest('hex');
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P2 Badge Stream binary hashing instead of reading whole file

verifyOrPinBinaryHash computes the digest with readFile(binaryPath), which loads the entire target into memory in one shot. In the same writable-directory threat model this patch addresses, replacing codex with a very large file can force huge allocations and crash or stall Archon before the mismatch path is reached, turning the integrity check into a denial-of-service vector. Hashing should be done via a streaming read (or guarded by strict file-type/size limits) to keep verification bounded.

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security(providers): codex vendor binary resolver lacks hash/signature pinning — LPE via writable vendor dir

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