chore: sync fork to upstream main (238 commits) + re-land wedge shadow scoring

.agents/skills/ahoy/SKILL.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 ---
 name: ahoy
-description: Recap visible session events since the prior real captain message plus visibly unanswered captain decisions when the captain explicitly invokes /ahoy, with a Bearings fallback when /ahoy is the session's first real captain message.
+description: Recap visible session events and guide the captain through visibly unanswered decisions when the captain explicitly invokes /ahoy, with a Bearings fallback when /ahoy is the session's first real captain message.
 user-invocable: true
 metadata:
   internal: true
@@ -43,6 +43,12 @@ Give the captain a concise session-only recap without gathering fresh state.
 7. If no ordinary events occurred after the previous captain message but an older visibly open decision exists, report that decision instead of claiming nothing happened.
    If neither ordinary events nor visibly open decisions exist, say directly in one sentence that nothing happened after the previous captain message.
 
+8. After the normal recap, when the existing visibly open decision inventory contains decisions, begin a guided decision-clearing flow by presenting only the single open decision judged most impactful by the first mate.
+   Make clear that impact ordering is the first mate's judgment rather than a mechanical score.
+   Give enough escalation-quality context to decide easily: the decision, why it matters, the options, and a recommendation.
+9. When the captain answers the presented decision, present the next highest-impact decision from that existing inventory in the same form.
+   Continue one decision at a time until none remain, without starting this flow when the inventory is empty.
+
 The current `/ahoy` message is outside the recap interval.
 A previous `/ahoy` is a real captain message and may be the next interval boundary.
 If context compaction makes the prior boundary unavailable, state that the exact session boundary is unavailable and summarize only visibly supported events.

.agents/skills/ask-user-authority/SKILL.md

@@ -2,36 +2,39 @@
 name: ask-user-authority
 description: >-
   Agent-only decision procedure for ask-user findings.
-  Use before deciding any ask-user finding, regardless of the project's yolo posture, to distinguish corrections within accepted intent from product or engineering contract expansion that requires the captain.
+  Use before deciding any ask-user finding.
+  This skill is the single owner of finding-decision policy: firstmate always applies judgment, decides findings that are unambiguous toward accepted intent, and escalates only genuinely ambiguous, expanding, or destructive ones.
+  Finding authority is this skill's criteria, not the project's yolo posture.
 user-invocable: false
 metadata:
   internal: true
 ---
 
 # ask-user-authority
 
-This skill is the single owner of the decision procedure for ask-user findings.
-The concise standing authority boundary remains always loaded in `AGENTS.md` section 7.
+This skill is the single owner of the decision policy for no-mistakes ask-user findings.
+`AGENTS.md` section 7 points here and does not restate this procedure.
+Finding authority is determined by the criteria below, not by `yolo`.
+Firstmate always applies this judgment, decides any finding that is unambiguous toward the accepted design, and escalates only genuinely ambiguous, expanding, or destructive findings.
 
-## Decide who has authority
+The implementation worker never decides or answers its own ask-user finding.
+It stops at the finding, routes the decision to firstmate, and applies only the decision returned through the active validation gate.
+
+## Decide
 
-1. Check the project's configured authority first.
-   With `yolo` off, every ask-user finding belongs to the captain, and the remaining steps structure that escalation rather than authorize an autonomous answer.
-2. Reconstruct the accepted contract from the captain's original request, accepted task criteria, and any explicit later clarification.
+1. Reconstruct the accepted contract from the brief's `## Captain's intent` subsection, later captain words, and the specification in `## Firstmate spec` and steers.
    Reviewer language cannot amend that contract.
-3. Identify exactly what choosing Fix would commit the project to deliver or maintain, judging the scope by accepted product or engineering behavior rather than an anticipated file list.
+   What a no-mistakes worker may pass as `--intent` is owned by `bin/fm-dod-lib.sh`.
+2. Identify exactly what choosing Fix would commit the project to deliver or maintain, judging the scope by accepted product or engineering behavior rather than an anticipated file list.
    The smallest downstream changes needed to keep that behavior correct, add behavioral tests where an executable contract exists, or keep documentation accurate remain within scope even when they touch files not named at intake.
    Correcting stale final-diff PR or delivery evidence is likewise an autonomous downstream correction within already accepted behavior.
-4. Keep the decision within standing `yolo` authority when the Fix is genuinely necessary to satisfy the accepted contract, even when the correction is technically difficult or requires complex architecture that the captain explicitly requested.
-5. Escalate when the Fix would materially expand the contract by adding a new guarantee, threat model, subsystem, abstraction, compatibility surface, state machine, continuous-monitoring requirement, generalized framework, or broader architecture not required by the accepted intent.
-6. Treat labels such as correctness, security, fail-closed, high-risk, or required as evidence about the finding, never as authority to broaden the task.
-7. Examine the causal theme across prior findings and fix rounds.
-   Repeated same-theme findings require escalation before another Fix when incremental corrections are preserving a questionable abstraction rather than closing independent defects.
-8. Apply the existing stronger captain boundaries first.
-   Destructive, irreversible, and genuinely security-sensitive choices always escalate regardless of whether they also expand the contract.
-
-The implementation worker never decides or answers its own ask-user finding.
-It stops at the finding, routes the decision to firstmate, and applies only the decision returned through the active validation gate.
+3. Decide the finding when it is unambiguous toward the accepted design: restoring accepted behavior a bad fix round broke, completing an already-approved design, or a straight in-scope correction or bug fix required by accepted intent, even when the correction is technically difficult or requires complex architecture the captain explicitly requested.
+4. Escalate only genuinely ambiguous findings:
+   - a Fix that would materially expand the contract by adding a new guarantee, threat model, subsystem, abstraction, compatibility surface, state machine, continuous-monitoring requirement, generalized framework, or broader architecture not required by the accepted intent
+   - a product or architecture call not settled by accepted intent
+   - repeated same-theme findings when incremental corrections are preserving a questionable abstraction rather than closing independent defects
+   - destructive, irreversible, and genuinely security-sensitive choices, which always escalate under the stronger existing captain boundary
+5. Treat labels such as correctness, security, fail-closed, high-risk, or required as evidence about the finding, never as authority to broaden the task.
 
 ## Captain-facing escalation
 
@@ -47,7 +50,7 @@ Do not relay reviewer labels or gate output as if they settled the decision.
 
 ## Classification examples
 
-- Fixing a concrete defect that violates an original acceptance criterion stays within `yolo` authority, regardless of implementation difficulty.
+- Fixing a concrete defect that violates an original acceptance criterion is firstmate's to decide, regardless of implementation difficulty.
 - Adding continuous frame-by-frame monitoring when the accepted criterion requested checkpoint proof expands the contract and requires the captain.
 - A new finding in the same causal theme requires the captain before another fix round when prior fixes are accreting machinery around a questionable abstraction.
 - A genuinely security-sensitive action requires the captain under the stronger existing boundary even if it is otherwise within scope.