add detail impact on users and validators by Combatting MEV

BEPs/BEP-341.md

@@ -82,9 +82,12 @@ Each epoch will choose a new validator set, assuming an epoch contains epochSlot
 #### 4.2.3 Block Avoidance
 To prevent fewer than 1/2 of the nodes from controlling the entire network, block producers are required to produce fewer than n blocks within the previous ((validatorN/2+1)\*n-1) historical blocks.
 
+
 #### 4.2.4 Governable Number of Consecutive Blocks
 When n=1, it is equivalent to disabling the feature of consecutive block production, while significant optimization is observed when n belongs to the range [3,5]. Currently, the range for the value of n is set to [1,9] but except 2.
 
+The initial value of n is 1, and changing its value requires the BSC governance process.
+
 #### 4.2.5 Combatting MEV
 As the consecutive period in which a single validator gains priority in block production extends, it may facilitate MEV extraction, potentially leading validators to include more transactions in the later blocks they consecutively produce. To constrain validators to promptly package transactions, within a validator's consecutive priority over n blocks, the transaction fees' split to the SystemRewardContract will increase linearly with block number, capped at the value denoted as systemRewardAntiMEVRatio.
 Respectively, the split ratio remains at systemRewardBaseRatio when continuous block production is disabled. Once continuous block production is enabled (i.e., when n > 1), the systemRewardRatio is calculated as:
@@ -95,10 +98,14 @@ as shown in the following picture:
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-In addition, systemRewardAntiMEVRatio will be governable.
+
+The initial value of systemRewardAntiMEVRatio is 0, and changing its value also requires the BSC governance process.
 
 ## 5. Incentive Fairness Analysis
 Within a single epoch, tail validators have fewer block-producing opportunities, but the allocation of priority rights is unbiased and cannot be manipulated. Therefore, from a statistical perspective, it is fair.
+
+If a validator tries to extract more MEV by placing more transactions in later blocks they produce, it will also increase user transaction confirmation times. To curb this, the systemRewardAntiMEVRatio can be raised through the governance process, which will increase the proportion of transaction fees allocated to the SystemRewardContract. These bonuses will be distributed as Fast Finality voting rewards to validators, keeping their overall benefits unchanged. However, during high traffic and transaction backlog, high-performance validators usually handle more transactions. These changes will reduce the income advantage of having high performance.
+
 ## 6. Security Analysis
 This BEP relies on BSC's Fast Finality feature. If Fast Finality fails, it may result in the following issues:
 1. Nodes intentionally hide mined blocks, potentially leading to longer short-term reorganizations.