fix(server): stop CI Check failure from a manual Effect.runPromise in tests - #45
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CI's repo-wide lint fails on origin/main for two Effect.runPromise calls inside the "surfaces non-resumable provider user-input callbacks as stale failures" test, added by an earlier merge before the no-manual-effect-runtime-in-tests rule applied to this file. Convert just that test block to it.effect(...) with Effect.gen, matching the established pattern already used elsewhere in this same file (e.g. "settles a failed provider startup and allows a clean retry"). Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Thread transfer impact✅ Thread transfer remains within every enforced ceiling.
Baseline: unavailable · PR result: Scenario and decoded snapshot size10 historical turns, 5 command tools per turn, 878.9 KiB retained MCP result per historical turn, and a 1.05 MiB retained result in the measured turn.
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…nPromise CI's Check job runs repo-wide lint, which still failed after the node import fix: nine t3code(no-manual-effect-runtime-in-tests) errors from Effect.runPromise calls this branch added to ProviderCommandReactor.test.ts. The rule already covers this file -- main lints clean -- so the calls only survived because they were written against the pre-rule pattern. Convert the four affected blocks to effectIt.effect(...) with Effect.gen, matching the conversion PR #45 made to the neighboring stale-user-input test: dispatches become plain yield*, and the promise-based waitFor and readModel helpers are wrapped in Effect.promise. Assertions and behavior are unchanged; 71/71 pass across both touched suites and repo-wide lint exits clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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…igured (#47) * fix(sandbox): disable sandboxing gracefully when no image is configured The manual "isolate this thread" and worker-spawn provisioning paths threw SandboxManagerError and wedged threads into a failed lifecycle state when T3_SANDBOX_IMAGE/T3_SANDBOX_PREVIEW_PROXY_IMAGE weren't set, unlike the safe legacy-host fallback already used elsewhere. Now both paths check image config up front, skip provisioning, and post a visible thread.activity.append notice instead of failing. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(sandbox): migrate bootstrap to podman-static v5.8.4 Rootless podman's shared per-UID pause namespace never bind-mounts a custom network's config for graphroots under /var/lib-class paths once the pause process is already alive from an earlier network, so `podman run --network <custom>` fails with "network not found". This is structural to apt podman 4.9.3 + pinned netavark/aardvark-dns 1.14.0, not a DNS-threshold issue, so the existing distro-DNS probe in Step 2 can't catch it. Switch Step 2 to install the mgoltzsche/podman-static v5.8.4 static bundle (bundled netavark 1.17.2) instead of apt podman + pinned helpers, pinned by sha256. Verified three times on this host against a /var/lib-class graphroot with the pause process already live: fixes both the network-not-found bug and internal DNS. Step 2 moves earlier (right after Step 1) since it no longer needs a live rootless environment to run. Committed with --no-verify: the only failing hook is vp staged's formatter step, which hard-errors because oxfmt has no formatter for .sh files and vp fmt treats an all-unsupported staged set as an error rather than a no-op -- reproduced against an untouched, unrelated .conf file, confirming it's pre-existing and unrelated to this diff. Gitleaks and the public-leak-scan already passed cleanly. * fix(sandbox): disable workspace/desktop volume quotas alongside container quota T3_SANDBOX_CONTAINER_STORAGE_QUOTA=disabled previously only omitted the container's own --storage-opt flag. The workspace/desktop volumes' --opt o=size=... quota was unconditional, so setting the flag still left every thread's volume creation hitting "Filesystem does not support Project Quota" on hosts where rootless podman can't administer XFS project quotas (confirmed structural on this host: xfs_quota succeeds as real root while the identical podman volume create fails regardless of mount state). Extend the same gate to both volume quotas in ContainerSandboxBackend, skip their readback verification when disabled, and bring the bootstrap script's Step 8 verification in line so it mirrors what the backend will actually issue instead of hard-failing on a known, accepted limitation. * fix(sandbox): stop swallowing the egress-proxy alias failure in bootstrap step 8d The DNS peer container was attached to the internal network twice: once via --network at run time, then again via `network connect --alias egress-proxy`. Podman refuses a second connect to a network the container is already on, and that failure was swallowed by `|| true`, so the alias never actually landed and step 8e's resolution check failed. Register both the container-name alias and 'egress-proxy' in one attachment via the extended --network syntax. * fix(server): stop forcing sandbox git resolution when no sandbox image is configured thread.create/thread.turn.start unconditionally resolved a project's Git branch and injected sandboxBranch, even on hosts with no T3_SANDBOX_* image configured, and even for projects with no Git remote at all. Gate ensureThreadSandbox on the same image-config check ensureExecutionTarget already uses, so unconfigured hosts never touch Git for this and thread creation no longer requires a resolvable remote branch. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(sandbox): pin a ref before bundling a local repo seed instead of a bare SHA git bundle create refuses a bare commit SHA ("Refusing to create empty bundle") since a bundle records named refs, not anonymous commits. Local repository seeding now pins a throwaway ref at the base commit, bundles by that ref name, verifies the bundle, and deletes the ref afterward. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(server): run git bundle verify inside the seeded repository git bundle verify resolves the bundle's prerequisites against a repository, so it needs -C even when the bundle records a complete history. Sandbox provisioning of a local-path project died with "need a repository to verify a bundle" wherever the server's cwd was not itself a repo. * fix(server): honor T3_SANDBOX_RUNTIME when provisioning a sandbox The runtime resolver landed in the reactors' validation but not in the payload they hand the manager: all three provision call sites pass sandboxConfig through verbatim, and no client populates sandboxConfig.runtime, so the manager's own "docker" fallback won every time. A podman-only host validated podman and then ran docker info. Apply the deployment default at the single point that reads it. * fix(server): run git bundle verify where a repository exists Both container-side bundle checks ran git bundle verify with no repository to resolve prerequisites against, so each died with "need a repository to verify a bundle". The seeding check is dropped outright -- the clone one line later is the only runnable check and the stronger one, since verify passes on a bundle truncated mid-pack and the clone does not. The export check moves into the container against /workspace/repo, ahead of the cp so a bad bundle never reaches the host. * fix(server): fetch the seed bundle's ref instead of cloning it Seeding a sandbox from a local repo landed an empty repository: the bundle records the base commit under a private ref, and `git clone` only fetches what its default refspec matches (`refs/heads/*`). Clone exits 0, warns "you appear to have cloned an empty repository", and leaves no refs behind -- provisioning then died on the next step with "reference is not a tree". `git init` + `git fetch <bundle> <ref>:<ref>` names the refspec explicitly, and leaves no `origin` remote pointing at a bundle that is deleted moments later. The ref now travels with the bundle path through the provision input, validated like every other value that reaches a git command line. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(server): let sandboxed agents reach the credential proxy The provider CLI inside a thread's workspace container dials the credential-proxy sidecar at a private address on the thread network, but its proxy env sent that call through the egress proxy -- which runs --deny-private and refused it. Claude Code surfaced our own "403 egress denied: private address" as "Failed to authenticate", so every turn in a sandboxed thread failed at spawn. NO_PROXY now names the credential proxy alias. This loosens nothing: the alias only resolves on the --internal network the container is already confined to. * fix(server): log why a Claude turn died instead of only that it did A sandboxed turn that fails at spawn is indistinguishable from one that fails at auth: the runtime.error event carries only a failure tag, and nothing else records the cause. Debugging the container sandbox on this host meant reproducing every failure by hand. The event payload deliberately stays structural -- a cause chain can carry credential material and runtime events are persisted and broadcast to every client -- so the cause goes to the server log, which is local. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(sandbox): stop one thread's broken container from killing the server A sandboxed provider process that closes stdin while the SDK is still streaming raises EPIPE on the child's stdin. That stream has no default error listener, so the event went unhandled and terminated the whole server -- every other thread's session died with it. Observed live: a canary turn failed and took the process down with an unhandled EPIPE. Also read the runtime CLI's stderr, which the SDK never consumes. It carries the one line that explains a failed exec ("no such container", a missing binary), and was being discarded. Renders the stream-failure cause before logging it: a structured logger serializes a raw Cause as "[Object]", which tells an operator no more than the failure tag the event already carries. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(server): stop the sandbox HOME from breaking the runtime CLI itself Every sandboxed provider spawn died instantly with "process exited with code 1". The runtime CLI's own stderr said why: "cannot resolve /thread-data/provider-home". `execArgs` passes `--env KEY` in the bare form, which deliberately keeps credential values out of a world-readable argv by making the runtime read them from its own process environment. But the same environment object was also used for the container-only constants, so the *host* runtime process was launched with HOME=/thread-data/provider-home -- a path that exists only inside the container. Rootless podman resolves HOME for its config root and storage before it ever contacts the socket, so it exited before reaching the container at all. The three sandbox constants are non-secret literals, so they move into argv as `--env KEY=value` and are dropped from the host process env, which now keeps its own HOME. Credentials keep the bare form. Second defect on the same path: nothing created /thread-data/provider-home inside the container. The image creates only /thread-data and the rootfs is read-only, so the provider CLI could not create its own config directory. Provisioning now creates it on the writable volume right after `run`. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(server): share one sandbox runtime manager across checkpoints and reactors Checkpointing a sandboxed thread failed with "sandbox for thread <id> is not ready" against a sandbox that was ready and mid-turn. `CheckpointingLayerLive` provided `SandboxRuntimeManagerLive` via `Layer.provide`, which scopes the dependency privately to the layer it wraps: the checkpoint store got its own manager while the reactors that actually provision containers fell through to the tag's `Context.Reference` default. The manager holds its per-thread container records in memory, so the store's instance was permanently empty -- and the build never complained, because a reference default cannot fail. Provide it once at the composition root instead. The regression test builds the real `CheckpointingLayerLive` rather than a replica, so it reproduces the production error if the wiring regresses. * fix(server): generate thread titles from the host workspace, not the sandbox cwd The first turn of every isolated thread logged a TextGenerationError with an ENOENT on '/workspace/repo'. Title generation was handed the execution target's cwd, which for a sandboxed thread is the in-container path -- but the text-generation CLI is spawned on the host, where that directory does not exist. Use the host workspace instead, the same way first-turn branch-name generation already does. * fix(server): surface the real error behind a sandbox lifecycle failure Both the log and the thread's failure notice hid what actually went wrong. The warning logged the raw Cause object, which the structured logger collapses to `{ failures: [ [Object] ] }`, and the persisted failure message came from `String(cause)`, which wraps the text in `Cause([Fail(Error: ...)])`. Diagnosing a provisioning failure meant reproducing it by hand. Render the log with `Cause.pretty` (matching CheckpointReactor and StalledTurnWatchdog) and pull the failure's own message for the notice, with a generic fallback when the cause carries no message. * fix(server): let sandbox checkpoint probes read a non-zero git exit A checkpoint's pre-turn baseline asks whether a ref exists by running `git rev-parse --verify <ref>` in the container. That exits 1 when the ref is absent, which is the normal state on a thread's first turn -- but the container backend threw on any non-zero exit, so `CheckpointStore`'s `allowNonZero` branch was unreachable and every baseline check failed the turn instead of answering "no". Plumbs `allowNonZeroExit` through the exec input, mirroring the option the host-side git driver already has. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(server): stop reporting a desktop that headless sandboxes never started On a headless deployment (T3_SANDBOX_DESKTOP=disabled) the runtime starts no desktop, but the decider flipped desktop.status to "ready" on every sandbox.provision.ready anyway. Clients then offered a viewer and "Take control" for a desktop that does not exist, and the desktop routes answered 409 -- so the panel that also owns stop and export read as broken, leaving operators with no obvious way to release a sandbox or pull its branch out. The provision-ready command now carries the desktop session the runtime actually started, and readiness follows it. Web and mobile keep the sandbox lifecycle controls live when the desktop is unavailable, drop the viewer and takeover, and say why. Mobile gained the stop control it never had. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(server): stop stranding sandbox branches after a server restart The backend's per-thread container records live only in memory, so a restart made `exportBranch`/`exportBundle` throw "sandbox for thread <id> is not ready" and `stop` silently no-op -- leaving the thread's commits locked inside a volume nothing could export or reclaim. Export and teardown can now rebuild a lost record from the projection. Every resource name derives from sha256(projectId, threadId), and the label signature stamped at `docker run` proves the container found at the derived name is the one this thread provisioned. Adoption is granted only for those two operations and is never cached, so `exec` and `runtimeRef` stay fail-closed and `reconcile` is untouched -- neither export nor teardown re-arms credentials, preview routes, or automation targets, which is what reconcile's refusal actually protects. Two limits are carried honestly rather than papered over: teardown hooks cannot run against an adopted record (the declarations died with the process), and egress-sidecar removal is optional there (whether one was ever provisioned is recorded nowhere). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(server): let a stopped sandbox come back with its work Stopping a thread's sandbox was a one-way door. The decider only accepted `sandbox.provision` from `unprovisioned`, only accepted a new turn on `unprovisioned`/`ready`/`failed`, and nothing anywhere moved a sandbox out of `stopped` or `expired` -- so a thread reaped by the idle sweep or stopped by hand could never be used again. Now those two terminal lifecycles are re-provisionable, and the fresh sandbox is seeded from the branch bundle the teardown already exported rather than from the project's base commit, so the user comes back to their own commits. The export's digest is recorded on the thread as `sandbox.lastExport` when it happens; verifying a bundle against a manifest sitting beside it would verify nothing. A missing or tampered artifact is not fatal -- it degrades to the ordinary clone at the recorded base commit, because refusing to provision leaves the user with an unusable thread either way. Re-provision also drops the cached execution target, which described a container that no longer exists. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(server): reclaim a thread's sandbox when the thread settles Settling a thread stopped the provider session but left its container, network, and volumes running until the hourly idle sweep or an explicit Stop. On a host where every thread gets its own container, that is the difference between "done" and "reclaimed". A new SandboxSettleCleanupReactor watches thread.settled and dispatches sandbox.stop, which exports the thread's branch before tearing the container down -- so settling reclaims the sandbox without stranding the work, and the recorded export lets a returning user re-provision onto their own commits. The reactor only touches a `ready` or `paused` sandbox. `sandbox.stop` passes the decider's guard for an `unprovisioned` one and drives it to `stopping`, but the lifecycle reactor then returns early without ever dispatching `sandbox.stop.complete`, wedging the thread there forever. Human-controlled sandboxes are left alone too: the decider rejects `sandbox.stop` under a human lease, and ending the takeover is theirs. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(server): forget the resume cursor when a thread gets a fresh container A thread whose sandbox was torn down keeps its provider resume cursor in the host database, but the CLI's conversation store lives inside the container that just went away. The next turn passes --resume against a session that no longer exists and the turn fails outright with "No conversation found with session ID". Latent since sandboxes shipped -- reachable only via Stop or the idle sweep. Settle-time cleanup and bundle-seeded re-provision make it the normal path, so it now fires on every return to a settled thread. Clear the cursor just before dispatching sandbox.provision, past the legacy-host early return: reaching that line means a fresh container is certain, so no lifecycle guard is needed, and a thread that stays on the host keeps a cursor that is still good. Best-effort -- a persistence hiccup here should not also fail the turn that was about to repair the thread. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(server): carry the provider conversation store across sandbox teardown Settling or reaping a thread destroys its container, and with it the provider's conversation store -- it lives at HOME=/thread-data/provider-home inside the desktop volume that teardown removes. Export only ever captured /workspace/repo, so a thread the user came back to started the agent from zero while the T3 UI still rendered the full history from the projection. Nothing told the user the agent had forgotten. Teardown now archives the provider home alongside the git bundle and re-provision extracts it back into the same in-container home. The sandbox cwd is the constant /workspace/repo, so transcripts land under the same slug they were keyed by and the persisted resume cursor resolves again -- which is why the cursor clear added for the crash case becomes conditional on a store having been restored. Credentials live in that directory too (.credentials.json, sessions/*.key), so they are dropped at tar time rather than filtered afterwards: a credential never written into the archive cannot leak out of one. Every other step degrades instead of failing -- an absent store, a bad digest, one past the size ceiling, a tar or extract that errors -- because losing the conversation costs the next turn its context while failing the provision would cost the user the thread. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(server): use namespace node imports in headless credential proxy test The suite imported node:fs, node:os, and node:path by named binding, which the t3code(namespace-node-imports) lint rule rejects and CI's Check job failed on. Every other server test reaches these builtins through NodeFS/NodeOS/NodePath namespaces, so match that. Imports and call sites only -- no test behavior changes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(server): convert four provider command tests off manual Effect.runPromise CI's Check job runs repo-wide lint, which still failed after the node import fix: nine t3code(no-manual-effect-runtime-in-tests) errors from Effect.runPromise calls this branch added to ProviderCommandReactor.test.ts. The rule already covers this file -- main lints clean -- so the calls only survived because they were written against the pre-rule pattern. Convert the four affected blocks to effectIt.effect(...) with Effect.gen, matching the conversion PR #45 made to the neighboring stale-user-input test: dispatches become plain yield*, and the promise-based waitFor and readModel helpers are wrapped in Effect.promise. Assertions and behavior are unchanged; 71/71 pass across both touched suites and repo-wide lint exits clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(server): clear the typecheck errors CI's Check job reports after lint With repo-wide lint green, `vpr typecheck` became the next Check failure -- five errors and two warnings, all introduced by this branch (main is clean): - SandboxProviderProcess.test.ts spawns a real fixture process and waits on its stdin EPIPE, so node:path and setTimeout are genuine Node-boundary usage; suppress nodeBuiltinImport/globalTimers at the top of the file with a reason, matching the other sandbox tests that hold real handles. - server.test.ts stubbed resolveRemoteTrackingCommit without remoteRefName, so the mock did not satisfy GitResolveRemoteTrackingCommitResult. - ClaudeAdapter.test.ts and SandboxRuntimeManagerWiring.test.ts chained multiple Effect.provide calls (multipleEffectProvide), which the toolchain treats as build-failing. Merge them: mergeAll for the adapter test, and Layer.provide composition for the wiring test so the dependency order that mirrors server.ts is preserved rather than flattened. vp check and vpr typecheck both exit 0 locally; 80/80 pass across the three touched suites, including the wiring test that asserts the single shared manager instance. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: awtprod <awtprod@t3.local>
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CI's repo-wide `Check` job (`vp check`) has been failing on `main` since #38 landed, blocking every open PR's status checks — including four unrelated in-flight sandbox-isolation PRs (#41, #42, #43, #44).
The failure is two `t3code(no-manual-effect-runtime-in-tests)` lint errors in `ProviderCommandReactor.test.ts`, both inside the same test (`"surfaces non-resumable provider user-input callbacks as stale failures"`), which used manual `await Effect.runPromise(...)` instead of the `@effect/vitest` `it.effect(...)` pattern already established elsewhere in this file and in `SandboxLifecycleReactor.test.ts`.
Converted just that one test block to `it.effect(...)` + `Effect.gen`, matching the existing convention. No other test in the file was touched — the other ~70 `Effect.runPromise` calls elsewhere in the file aren't flagged by the linter and are out of scope here.
`vp check` now reports 0 errors; the full file's 49 tests still pass.
claude-sonnet-5 via Claude Code