uv audit: pylock.toml support

[woodruffw]

Summary

WIP, not ready for review yet.

This adds uv audit -r pylock.toml support. I've elected for the same CLI design as uv pip install, i.e. an explicit -r option rather than a positional.

Note: I intentionally didn't include requirements file support in here, to make the diff (especially the tests) smaller. But adding it would be very easy in a follow-up.

Closes #18422. See #18506.

Test Plan

Added new integration tests.

[astral-sh-bot]

uv test inventory changes

This PR changes the tests when compared with the main base revision.

• Added tests: 6
• Removed tests: 0
• Changed suites: 1

uv::build: +6 / -0

Added:

• uv::build::audit::audit_pylock_conflicts
• uv::build::audit::audit_pylock_empty
• uv::build::audit::audit_pylock_invalid_inputs
• uv::build::audit::audit_pylock_project_status
• uv::build::audit::audit_pylock_vulnerability
• uv::build::audit::audit_pylock_whole_lock

Removed: none

[woodruffw]

This error message seems wrong for AuditSettings?

[astral-automations-bot]

[P2] Reject remote file indexes before Windows treats them as UNC paths

An on-path attacker who alters an explicitly selected plain-HTTP pylock can set package.index to a hosted file: URL. These lines now promote that untrusted URL into the project-status worklist; IndexUrl classifies every file: URL as a path, and the registry client ultimately calls read_to_string after Url::to_file_path. On Windows, file://attacker/share becomes a UNC path, so the audit can initiate SMB/NTLM authentication to the attacker-controlled host and expose a relayable or crackable challenge response for the invoking developer or CI identity. HTTPS, --no-index, and outbound-SMB policy mitigate the path, but this code should reject hosted file indexes.

Suggested change

	if let Some(index) = package.index.as_ref() {
	projects.insert((
	package.name.clone(),
	IndexUrl::from(VerbatimUrl::from_url(index.clone())),
	));
	if let Some(index) = package.index.as_ref()
	&& (index.scheme() != "file"
	|| index
	.host_str()
	.is_none_or(|host| host.eq_ignore_ascii_case("localhost")))
	{
	projects.insert((
	package.name.clone(),
	IndexUrl::from(VerbatimUrl::from_url(index.clone())),
	));

[astral-automations-bot]

[P3] Bind pylock project-status lookups to trusted indexes

When uv audit --requirements reads a pylock over plain HTTP, an on-path attacker can replace the response and choose packages[].index; project-status querying then issues a GET to that HTTP(S) origin, allowing blind requests to otherwise inaccessible loopback or private services from a developer or CI network. Authenticated HTTPS and --no-index prevent this path, but the default plain-HTTP flow does not bind embedded indexes or redirects to operator-authorized destinations.

[woodruffw]

NB I'm deferring this while I think about a cross-cutting approach to tracking the provenance of remote -r inputs.