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Fix protocol relative url in scripts tags #531
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Fix protocol relative url in scripts tags #531
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paweljq committed Jul 12, 2022
1 parent 3cdc262 commit 329dae7
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Showing 3 changed files with 48 additions and 30 deletions.
2 changes: 2 additions & 0 deletions CHANGELOG.md
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
# Changelog

- Protocol-relative URLs are properly supported for script tags

## 2.7.0 (2022-02-04)

- Allows a more sensible set of default attributes on `<img />` tags. Thanks to [Zade Viggers](https://github.com/zadeviggers).
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66 changes: 36 additions & 30 deletions index.js
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -287,7 +287,6 @@ function sanitizeHtml(html, options, _recursing) {
delete frame.attribs[a];
return;
}
let parsed;
// check allowedAttributesMap for the element and attribute and modify the value
// as necessary if there are specific values defined.
let passedAllowedAttributesMapCheck = false;
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -335,14 +334,14 @@ function sanitizeHtml(html, options, _recursing) {
let allowed = true;

try {
const parsed = new URL(value);
const parsed = parseUrl(value);

if (options.allowedScriptHostnames || options.allowedScriptDomains) {
const allowedHostname = (options.allowedScriptHostnames || []).find(function (hostname) {
return hostname === parsed.hostname;
return hostname === parsed.url.hostname;
});
const allowedDomain = (options.allowedScriptDomains || []).find(function(domain) {
return parsed.hostname === domain || parsed.hostname.endsWith(`.${domain}`);
return parsed.url.hostname === domain || parsed.url.hostname.endsWith(`.${domain}`);
});
allowed = allowedHostname || allowedDomain;
}
Expand All @@ -359,40 +358,20 @@ function sanitizeHtml(html, options, _recursing) {
if (name === 'iframe' && a === 'src') {
let allowed = true;
try {
// Chrome accepts \ as a substitute for / in the // at the
// start of a URL, so rewrite accordingly to prevent exploit.
// Also drop any whitespace at that point in the URL
value = value.replace(/^(\w+:)?\s*[\\/]\s*[\\/]/, '$1//');
if (value.startsWith('relative:')) {
// An attempt to exploit our workaround for base URLs being
// mandatory for relative URL validation in the WHATWG
// URL parser, reject it
throw new Error('relative: exploit attempt');
}
// naughtyHref is in charge of whether protocol relative URLs
// are cool. Here we are concerned just with allowed hostnames and
// whether to allow relative URLs.
//
// Build a placeholder "base URL" against which any reasonable
// relative URL may be parsed successfully
let base = 'relative://relative-site';
for (let i = 0; (i < 100); i++) {
base += `/${i}`;
}
const parsed = new URL(value, base);
const isRelativeUrl = parsed && parsed.hostname === 'relative-site' && parsed.protocol === 'relative:';
if (isRelativeUrl) {
const parsed = parseUrl(value);

if (parsed.isRelativeUrl) {
// default value of allowIframeRelativeUrls is true
// unless allowedIframeHostnames or allowedIframeDomains specified
allowed = has(options, 'allowIframeRelativeUrls')
? options.allowIframeRelativeUrls
: (!options.allowedIframeHostnames && !options.allowedIframeDomains);
} else if (options.allowedIframeHostnames || options.allowedIframeDomains) {
const allowedHostname = (options.allowedIframeHostnames || []).find(function (hostname) {
return hostname === parsed.hostname;
return hostname === parsed.url.hostname;
});
const allowedDomain = (options.allowedIframeDomains || []).find(function(domain) {
return parsed.hostname === domain || parsed.hostname.endsWith(`.${domain}`);
return parsed.url.hostname === domain || parsed.url.hostname.endsWith(`.${domain}`);
});
allowed = allowedHostname || allowedDomain;
}
Expand All @@ -407,7 +386,7 @@ function sanitizeHtml(html, options, _recursing) {
}
if (a === 'srcset') {
try {
parsed = parseSrcset(value);
let parsed = parseSrcset(value);
parsed.forEach(function(value) {
if (naughtyHref('srcset', value.url)) {
value.evil = true;
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -656,6 +635,33 @@ function sanitizeHtml(html, options, _recursing) {
return !options.allowedSchemes || options.allowedSchemes.indexOf(scheme) === -1;
}

function parseUrl(value) {
value = value.replace(/^(\w+:)?\s*[\\/]\s*[\\/]/, '$1//');
if (value.startsWith('relative:')) {
// An attempt to exploit our workaround for base URLs being
// mandatory for relative URL validation in the WHATWG
// URL parser, reject it
throw new Error('relative: exploit attempt');
}
// naughtyHref is in charge of whether protocol relative URLs
// are cool. Here we are concerned just with allowed hostnames and
// whether to allow relative URLs.
//
// Build a placeholder "base URL" against which any reasonable
// relative URL may be parsed successfully
let base = 'relative://relative-site';
for (let i = 0; (i < 100); i++) {
base += `/${i}`;
}

const parsed = new URL(value, base);

const isRelativeUrl = parsed && parsed.hostname === 'relative-site' && parsed.protocol === 'relative:';
return {
isRelativeUrl,
url: parsed
};
}
/**
* Filters user input css properties by allowlisted regex attributes.
* Modifies the abstractSyntaxTree object.
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10 changes: 10 additions & 0 deletions test/test.js
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -1476,5 +1476,15 @@ describe('sanitizeHtml', function() {
}), '<iframe></iframe>'
);
});
it('Should allow protocol-relative URLs for script tag', function() {
assert.equal(
sanitizeHtml('<script src="//example.com/script.js"></script>', {
allowedTags: [ 'script' ],
allowedAttributes: {
script: [ 'src' ]

}
}), '<script src="//example.com/script.js"></script>'
);
});
});

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