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89 changes: 89 additions & 0 deletions format/gcm-stream-spec.md
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title: "AES GCM Stream Spec"
url: gcm-stream-spec
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# AES GCM Stream (AGS) file format extension
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## Background and Motivation

Iceberg supports a number of data file formats. Two of these formats (Parquet and ORC) have built-in encryption capabilities, that allow to protect sensitive information in the data files. However, besides the data files, Iceberg tables also have metadata files, that keep sensitive information too (e.g., min/max values in manifest files, or bloom filter bitsets in puffin files). Metadata file formats (AVRO, JSON, Puffin) don't have encryption support.

Moreover, with the exception of Parquet, no Iceberg data or metadata file format supports integrity verification, required for end-to-end tamper proofing of Iceberg tables.

This document specifies details of a simple file format extension that adds encryption and tamper-proofing to any existing file format.
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## Goals

* Metadata encryption: enable encryption of manifests, manifest lists, snapshots and stats.
* Avro data encryption: enable encryption of data files in tables that use the Avro format.
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* Tamper proofing of Iceberg data and metadata files.

## Technical approach

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For the spec I don't think we need information about the reference implementation but that's just me.

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Sounds good. We have a section with this name in a parquet spec, but I don't see it in the iceberg specs. I'll remove this section, and move the spec-related parts to the relevant sections.


AGS leverages the Iceberg EncryptionManager interface that converts OutputFile objects (produced by Iceberg Avro and other writers) into EncryptedOutputFile objects. The PositionOutputStream, produced by the AGS EncryptedOutputFile, splits the output bytes into equal-size blocks (plus residue), and encrypts/signs the blocks with a given encryption key.
On the reader side, the Iceberg EncryptionManager converts EncryptedInputFile objects into InputFile objects consumable by Iceberg Avro and other readers. The AGS SeekableInputStream decrypts the stream blocks and verifies their integrity, using the encryption key.
The encryption, decryption and tamper proofing operations are transparent to Iceberg Avro, JSON and Puffin libraries.

### Encryption algorithm

AGS uses the standard AEG GCM cipher, and supports all AES key sizes: 128, 192 and 256 bits.

AES GCM is an authenticated encryption. Besides data confidentiality (encryption), it supports two levels of integrity verification (authentication): of the data (default), and of the data combined with an optional AAD (“additional authenticated data”). An AAD is a free text to be authenticated, together with the data. The structure of AGS AADs is described below.

AES GCM requires a unique vector to be provided for each encrypted block. In this document, the unique input to GCM encryption is called nonce (“number used once”). AGS encryption uses the RBG-based (random bit generator) nonce construction as defined in the section 8.2.2 of the NIST SP 800-38D document. For each encrypted block, AGS generates a unique nonce with a length of 12 bytes (96 bits).

## Format specification

### File structure

The AGS-encrypted files have the following structure

```
Magic BlockLength CipherBlock₁ CipherBlock₂ ... CipherBlockₙ
```

where

- `Magic` is four bytes 0x41, 0x47, 0x53, 0x31 ("AGS1", short for: AES GCM Stream, version 1)
- `BlockLength` is four bytes (little endian) integer keeping the length of the equal-size split blocks before encryption. The length is specified in bytes.
- `CipherBlockᵢ` is the i-th encrypted block in the file, with the structure defined below.

### Cipher Block structure

Cipher blocks have the following structure

| nonce | ciphertext | tag |
|-------|------------|-----|

@rdblue rdblue Aug 21, 2022

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To be able to split formats like Avro that are splittable, we need to be able to go back and forth between offsets in the underlying data stream and in the AGS stream. I think that's possible since this has a strict format. The header structure is 8 bytes (4 magic + 4 block length) and then there is 24 bytes of overhead per CipherBlock (12 nonce + 12 tag).

For any given offset in the underlying stream, we can find the block where it will be found by dividing by the block length:

def plain_block_index(plain_offset, block_length):
    return offset // block_length

Then we can skip to a given block:

def cipher_block_offset(block_index, block_length):
    return 8 + block_index * (24 + block_length)

But the problem is that we don't get split offsets in the underlying file, we get split offsets in the AGS stream and need to figure out where in the underlying file those translate to, so that we don't have overlapping ranges that tasks are responsible for. We have a picture like this for a block size of 1024, 3 blocks, and a last block of size 553:

magic block length nonce-1 ciphertext-1 tag-1 nonce-2 ciphertext-2 tag-2 nonce-3 ciphertext-3 tag-3 EOF
AGS offset 0 4 8 20 (to 1043) 1044 1056 1068 (to 2091) 2092 2104 2116 (to 2668) 2669 2681
Stream offset 0 (to 1023) 1024 (to 2047) 2048 (to 2601) 2602

To convert an AGS offset into a stream offset, I think we need to produce the the block index and an offset in that block. Producing the block index is the opposite of the cipher_block_offset function:

def cipher_block_index(cipher_offset, block_length):
    if (cipher_offset < 8):
        raise ValueError()
    return (cipher_offset - 8) // (block_length + 24)

Then the offset in the plaintext block can be produced by subtracting the ciphertext offset from the start of the ciphertext block and some extra accounting:

def plaintext_offset(cipher_offset, block_length):
    block_index = cipher_block_index(cipher_offset, block_length)
    block_start = cipher_block_offset(block_index, block_length)
    local_offset = min(cipher_offset - block_start, block_length)
    return block_index * block_length + local_offset

The min with block_length ensures that the local block offsets never overlap. Offsets that are between the ciphertext blocks (like 1048 in tag-1 for the example above) are mapped to the end of the plaintext block. This gives us a stable way to recover plaintext offsets.

Using the plaintext offsets, I think we can reliably split AGS files that store Avro data:

  1. Convert AGS byte range splits into plaintext splits, removing any 0-byte splits (unlikely but possible)
  2. Implement an AGS stream that can seek to plaintext offsets (using the translation methods above)
  3. Pass the plaintext splits into the Avro reader with the plaintext seeking AGS stream

@ggershinsky, what do you think?

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@rdblue , thanks! I need to think deeper about this; currently on vacation; will respond the first week of September.

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@rdblue I'm back in office, went through this carefully. I believe we are on the same page. The technical approach you describe is the same as used in the spec implementation PR

At a high level, this should be fully transparent to the current Avro readers. The API they use (file getLength; stream skip, seek, getPos) return the same values and work the same as before/without AGS encryption. This is the AGS code job to translate the plaintext<->ciphertext stuff behind the scenes. So, as long as the Avro split functionality depends on these APIs, it should continue to work as usual with the AGS encrypted files.

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@rdblue what do you think?

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I think that this should work.


where

- `nonce` is the AES GCM nonce, with a length of 12 bytes.
- `ciphertext` is the encrypted block. Its length is identical to the length of the block before encryption ("plaintext"). The length of all plaintext blocks, except the last, is `BlockLength` bytes. The last block keeps the data residue, with a length <= `BlockLength`.

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This seems a bit awkward because streaming through the file will eventually hit a partial block and EOF. Then the reader would need to backtrack and separate the last 12 bytes read for the tag. The reader could also keep track of position in the file and stop before reading the tag and hitting EOF, but then that requires position tracking and logic.

I don't see a good way around this, but I thought I'd raise it in case anyone else does.

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AGS should not hit EOF. It gets the length of the encrypted file from the source InputFile object, then reads the block side, and knows from the start the number/size of the encrypted blocks.

- `tag` is the AES GCM tag, with a length of 16 bytes.

AGS encrypts all blocks by the GCM cipher, without padding. The AES GCM cipher must be implemented by a cryptographic provider according to the NIST SP 800-38D specification. In AGS, an input to the GCM cipher is an AES encryption key, a nonce, a plaintext and an AAD (described below). The output is a ciphertext with the length equal to that of plaintext, and a 16-byte authentication tag used to verify the ciphertext and AAD integrity.

### Additional Authenticated Data

The AES GCM cipher protects against byte replacement inside a ciphertext block - but, without an AAD, it can't prevent replacement of one ciphertext block with another (encrypted with the same key). AGS leverages AADs to protect against swapping ciphertext blocks inside a file or between files. AGS can also protect against swapping full files - for example, replacement of a metadata file with an old version. AADs are built to reflects the identity of a file and of the blocks inside the file.

AGS constructs a block AAD from two components: an AAD prefix - a string provided by Iceberg for the file (with the file ID), and an AAD suffix - the block sequence number in the file, as an int in a 4-byte little-endian form. The block AAD is a direct concatenation of the prefix and suffix parts.

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Can you provide more context on how the AAD prefix is managed for the metadata tree?

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Technically, this spec is narrowly focused on the low level encryption stream and the tools it provides, including a file ID (aka AAD prefix) that should be supplied by the upper layers. We don't have the details yet on how it will be constructed for an Iceberg metadata tree; TBD; but once we have these details, I guess we can/should put them in a separate higher-level spec doc? E.g. a new encryption/integrity section in the Iceberg spec?

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Sounds fine. We'll need to solve that problem eventually though.