feat(daemon): guard cross-worktree Git mutations - #8687
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Co-authored-by: Qwen-Coder <qwen-coder@alibabacloud.com>
Co-authored-by: Qwen-Coder <qwen-coder@alibabacloud.com>
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Re-run on head Template looks good ✓ — complete and bilingual, Evidence honestly marked N/A for a daemon policy change. Problem: demonstrated, not argued — unchanged from earlier rounds. Every escape this guard's own rules introduced has been reproduced against a real shell and real git, including the two I traced in my last pass; this is not hypothetical hardening. Direction: aligned — unchanged. Host-side containment for daemon-model shells, with CLI/TUI validation, the permission flow, and shared core execution untouched. Re-verified at this head: the wiring (acp-bridge, acp-integration, core, docs) is byte-identical to the head I reviewed in full. Size: ~3,200 production lines (guard 2,910 + ~290 wiring across acp-bridge/cli/core) vs ~2,900 test vs ~410 docs. Author is a maintainer and the type is Approach: the delta is what it should be at this stage — each commit answers one reported escape, no scope creep, and the removal/shadow logic was collapsed toward a single fail-closed rule rather than grown. Risk: Moving on to the delta review. 🔍 中文说明在 head 模板完整 ✓ —— 各项齐全、中英双语，Evidence 如实标注 N/A（daemon 策略改动）。 问题：被证明而非推测 —— 与此前各轮一致。这个 guard 自身规则引入的每一次逃逸都在真实 shell + 真实 git 上复现过，包括我上一轮推演出的两个；不属于理论性加固。 方向：对齐 —— 不变。host 侧约束 daemon 模型的 shell，CLI/TUI 校验、权限流程与共享 core 执行均未改动。已在当前 head 复核：接线部分（acp-bridge、acp-integration、core、docs）与我完整审查过的 head 逐字节一致。 规模：约 3,200 行生产代码（guard 2,910 行 + acp-bridge/cli/core 约 290 行接线），测试约 2,900 行，文档约 410 行。作者是 maintainer 且类型为 方案：delta 在这个阶段该有的样子 —— 每个提交回应一个已报告的逃逸，无范围蔓延，removal/shadow 逻辑向单一 fail-closed 规则收敛而不是继续膨胀。 风险： 进入 delta 审查 🔍 — Qwen Code · qwen3.8-max Reviewed at |
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🤝 Takeover engaged: the autofix loop now manages this PR — it will address new review feedback and resolve base conflicts until the label is removed or the round cap is reached. Remove the 中文说明🤝 已接管：autofix 循环现在管理此 PR —— 将持续处理新的评审反馈与 base 冲突，直到移除标签或达到轮次上限。移除 |
Code review — delta
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| File | What changed |
|---|---|
packages/cli/src/serve/daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts |
the guard itself: tokenizer, wrapper unwrapping, git relocation extraction, containment, shadow/relink/removal state model |
packages/cli/src/serve/daemon-git-worktree-guard.test.ts |
guard tests: deny payloads, read-only allowance, shadow and removal modelling, in-boundary controls |
packages/cli/src/acp-integration/acpAgent.test.ts |
provider-attached vs built-in-only guard behavior, prompt-less fallback identity |
packages/cli/src/acp-integration/acpAgent.ts |
managed guard resolves non-shell tools locally without a provider; hidden-agent restrictions key on provider-attached; session-id fallback |
packages/cli/src/acp-integration/session/Session.ts |
passes scheduler-owned sessionId and cwd into the guard context |
packages/cli/src/acp-integration/session/Session.test.ts |
asserts the new context fields |
packages/cli/src/serve/run-qwen-serve.ts |
installs createDaemonToolGuard on every runtime bridge, always sets the plumbing marker, provider marker only when attached |
packages/cli/src/serve/run-qwen-serve.test.ts |
end-to-end: guard denies an outside relocation through runQwenServe; provider marker handshake test |
packages/cli/src/gemini.tsx |
consumes and re-exposes the provider-attached marker for the ACP child |
packages/acp-bridge/src/bridgeClient.ts |
promptId optional for context-less checks, forwards effectiveCwd and untrusted invocationCwd, re-validates after the call |
packages/acp-bridge/src/bridgeClient.test.ts |
prompt-less validation and cwd forwarding cases |
packages/acp-bridge/src/bridgeOptions.ts |
request type gains optional promptId, effectiveCwd, invocationCwd with trust documentation |
packages/acp-bridge/src/externalToolGuard.ts |
provider-attached marker constants and SHELL_EXECUTING_TOOL_NAMES set |
packages/core/src/utils/paths.ts |
realpathNearestExistingAsync for the shared event loop |
packages/core/src/utils/paths.test.ts |
parity with the sync variant, dangling-symlink case |
packages/core/src/core/tool-invocation-guard.ts |
guard context gains sessionId and cwd |
packages/core/src/core/coreToolScheduler.ts |
supplies sessionId and cwd to the guard |
packages/core/src/core/coreToolScheduler.test.ts |
asserts the new fields |
packages/core/src/followup/speculation.ts |
same additive context for speculative tool calls |
packages/core/src/followup/speculation.test.ts |
asserts the new fields |
docs/design/daemon-git-worktree-guard.md |
design doc: policy, failure semantics, bounded promise, non-goals |
docs/users/qwen-serve.md |
user-facing description of the guard |
docs/developers/qwen-serve-protocol.md |
protocol doc updates for the guard request fields |
Testing — the PR's own CI on a0427ae0, via the API
All pull_request-event workflow runs on this head completed successfully (Security Checks, SDK Java, Serve A/B, Qwen Code CI). Quoted from the check-runs API for this commit:
| Check | Conclusion |
|---|---|
| Test (ubuntu-latest, Node 22.x) | success |
| Post Coverage Comment (ubuntu-latest, 22.x) | success |
| Serve A/B (ubuntu-latest, Node 22.x) | success |
| Real daemon E2E / Java 11 | success |
| Desktop Shell (ubuntu-22.04) | success |
| Desktop Shell (windows-2022) | success |
| web-shell E2E Smoke (ubuntu-latest, Node 22.x) | success |
| Classify PR | success |
| Dependency CVE audit | success |
| Secret scan (TruffleHog) | success |
| Integration Tests (CLI, No Sandbox) | skipped |
| Test (macos-latest, Node 22.x) | skipped |
| Test (windows-latest, Node 22.x) | skipped |
(The review-pr check still showing in flight on this head is bot orchestration, not the PR's CI.) The two standing coverage gaps remain: the CLI integration suite and the macOS/Windows unit runs are skipped in CI, so the guard is exercised on Linux CI only — the no-sandbox daemon path this PR targets never runs in CI at all, worth a follow-up independent of this PR.
Sandboxed verification would settle what static tracing cannot: @qwen-code /verify — the chained-prefix bypass above is a code trace, and an A/B runtime probe at this head would confirm it executes end-to-end and test whether the suite actually pins the removal machinery (this one is invisible to the current suite, exactly like its two predecessors).
中文说明
代码审查 —— 5fc219db → a0427ae0 增量
上次审查后新增五个提交，只改 guard（+65/−11）与其测试（+31）。我通读了完整增量，并在当前 head 的完整文件中逐一对照了周边机制。下面一个 Critical —— 刚重构的 removal 逻辑里有一个新绕过。增量其余部分成立，上一轮两个 Critical 已被真正修复。
上一轮两个 Critical：已修复并被钉住。 Critical 1（被影子化的删除 builtin）由 shadowedBuiltin = !hasCommandPrefix && definedBodies.has(removalProgram) 关闭，unset() { git -C <outside> reset --hard; }; unset other 现在走影子分发并被拒绝；deny 套件钉住了我的原始 payload、command()/builtin() 影子前缀变体、enable -n unset 边界，以及 A=nested; unset A; cd $A; …（钉住新的 shellLocals 删除）。Critical 2（前导重定向使前缀剥离失效）由 skipRedirectOperands() 关闭并被对应 payload 钉住。三个后续提交均为 deny 方向且带测试：PATH=/GIT_EXEC_PATH= 进入 wrapper 标记与程序环境集、分隔符粘连的 GIT_DIR=、body 重放中 redirect 诱饵的 programIndex 修正、trailer/man/sendemail 命令执行 config key。
Critical —— 真实前缀之后的链式 command/builtin 前缀仍能绕过 removal 扫描。 新增的"影子前缀词即 break"（约 2273 行）是无条件的，但只对第一个前缀词符合 bash 语义：git() { :; }; builtin() { :; }; command builtin unset -f git; git -C <outside> reset --hard 中，第 1 轮剥离真实 command（hasCommandPrefix=true），第 2 轮见影子 builtin 即 break；readProgramWord 不跳过 command/builtin（不在 LEADING_SHELL_KEYWORDS 中），返回 builtin，isRemoval 与 shadowedBuiltin 均为 false；影子分发看到的程序词是未影子的 command，最终按"未识别程序、无重定位标记"放行，删除从未被记录；最后的 git -C <outside> reset --hard 仍被过期无害影子掩盖，重放 : 后放行。而 bash 中 command 绕过函数查找，真实 builtin 链删除影子，真实 git 变更 sibling checkout。对称形式 command() { :; }; builtin command unset -f git; … 同理。修复方向：break 加上与终程序检查相同的条件 if (!hasCommandPrefix && …)——消费过真实前缀之后，后续任何词都不可能执行影子体。建议回归上述两个 payload，并保留现有"位置 1 影子前缀"deny 用例作为允许侧对照。以上为纯静态推演（不执行 PR 代码），与上一轮两个 Critical 的证据形态相同，且它们都按推演精确复现。
从 5fc219db 完整审查继承的结论（这些文件在当前 head 逐字节未变）： 接线可信性、最小只读白名单、core 侧纯附加改动均已在上个 head 验证。
测试 —— 该 PR 自己在 a0427ae0 上的 CI（经 API 读取）
该 head 上所有 pull_request 事件的工作流运行均已成功完成（表见英文部分）。review-pr 仍显示进行中属于 bot 编排，不是 PR 的 CI。两个长期覆盖缺口依旧：CLI 集成套件与 macOS/Windows 单测在 CI 中被跳过，guard 只在 Linux CI 上运行；本 PR 针对的无沙箱 daemon 路径在 CI 中根本不执行，值得独立跟进。
沙箱验证能定论静态推演定论不了的事：@qwen-code /verify —— 上述链式前缀绕过是代码推演，在此 head 上的 A/B 运行时探测能确认它端到端可执行，并检验测试套件是否真的钉住 removal 机制（这一条对当前套件不可见，与前两条完全相同）。
— Qwen Code · qwen3.8-max
Reviewed at a0427ae032aaaa12f2ed97ecf5a155262199c8d5 · re-run with @qwen-code /triage
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Confidence: 2/5 — last round's two Criticals are genuinely fixed and pinned, and the delta is disciplined; but I traced one live bypass of the new removal logic at this head, in the exact class of escape this guard exists to close. Stepping back: my independent proposal for this problem was always the shape this PR ended up at — host-side enforcement, deny relocated mutations, pin a minimal read-only set, fail closed on the unknown — so I'm not reviewing against a simpler alternative I think was missed. The two fixes I asked for last round landed the way the good fixes on this PR always land: exact payload pinned, allow-side control, the adjacent variants picked up too (the Where I part ways with "merge on that basis" is the location of this round's hole. It is not in the adversarial tail the doc disclaims — no variable indirection, no generated payload, no exotic quoting; just a function definition, a The pattern deserves naming, because it is the real argument in the convergence note: this is the third consecutive round where the layer added to close the last hole is where the next one appears. That is normal for a parser of this size, but it is also evidence. If this fix lands and pins the way its predecessors did, the PR is in strong shape to merge. If the next round produces another variant of the same interaction, that is the signal to stop patching and move enforcement off the text — and the follow-up issue for that design should exist before merge either way, so it doesn't evaporate. Verdict: requesting changes on the one traced finding (full trace and fix direction in the Stage 2 comment). The two human approvals stand on the record and the author's bounded-promise case is coherent; this is the bot's vote, applied at the bar it has applied every round. 中文说明置信度：2/5 —— 上一轮两个 Critical 已被真正修复并钉住，delta 也很克制；但在当前 head 上我推演出新 removal 逻辑的一个活绕过，正是这个 guard 存在所要关闭的那一类逃逸。 退一步看：我对这个问题的独立提案最终正是这个 PR 落成的形态 —— host 侧强制、拒绝重定位变更、钉死最小只读集合、未知即 fail closed —— 所以我并不是拿一个更简单的被忽略方案来对照审查。我上轮要求的两个修复以这个 PR 一贯的高质量方式落地：精确 payload 钉住、允许侧对照、相邻变体一并处理（ 我与"据此合入"的分歧在于本轮这个洞的位置。它不在文档声明放弃的对抗性长尾里 —— 没有变量间接、没有生成式 payload、没有奇异引号；只有一个函数定义、一个 这个模式值得点名，因为它正是收敛说明中真正有力的论据：连续第三轮，修补上一个洞的那一层出现了下一个洞。对这种规模的解析器这是常态，但同时也是证据。如果这次修复像前几次一样落地并钉住，这个 PR 处于可以合入的强势状态；如果下一轮又出现同一交互的新变体，那就是停止打补丁、把强制点从文本挪走的信号 —— 无论哪种结果，后续设计的 issue 都应在合入前存在，以免不了了之。 结论：就一个已推演的发现请求修改（完整推演与修复方向见 Stage 2 评论）。两位人工评审的批准记录在案，作者的有界承诺论述也自洽；这是 bot 的一票，按每一轮相同的标准给出。 — Qwen Code · qwen3.8-max Reviewed at |
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Requesting changes on the tokenizer gaps: the #-comment and glob fail-open paths each defeat the guard for a whole command, and the GIT_DIR / env-wrapper relocation forms are uncovered. Details and suggested fixes are in my review comment above. The architecture is right and this is close — happy to re-run triage on the fix. 🙏
🩺 serve daemon A/BBuilt the PR base vs this PR head ✅ No response changes against the PR base across 4 scenario(s). — Qwen Code · serve A/B |
Code Coverage Summary
CLI Package - Full Text ReportCore Package - Full Text ReportFor detailed HTML reports, please see the 'coverage-reports-22.x-ubuntu-latest' artifact from the main CI run. |
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🤖 Could not produce a passing fix for this feedback (round 1/100). This item now needs a human; the loop stays engaged and still picks up new feedback and base conflicts, but will not retry this item on its own.
See the Qwen Autofix agent step logs for model/tool output. Run log: https://github.com/QwenLM/qwen-code/actions/runs/31179492621 🧠 Handled by Qwen Code · model/模型 |
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Not reviewed: build-and-test — Integration Tests (CLI, No Sandbox) was skipped in CI and its suite did not run locally.
中文说明
未审查：build-and-test — Integration Tests (CLI, No Sandbox) was skipped in CI and its suite did not run locally。
— qwen3.8-max via Qwen Code /review (v0.21.7)
Rebuild the daemon-side Git relocation guard parser so the runtime-verified bypasses from review are closed: comment/glob tokens, backslash continuations, shell wrapper and path-qualified invocations, cwd-shifting builtins, env-var relocations, gitfile/symlink/worktree-admin indirection, -C vs relative git-dir ordering, --output and textconv-capable read-only subcommands, command-valued -c config, and dynamic expansion forms all fail closed for mutations outside the session working directory. Command splitting, canonicalization, and containment now reuse the core helpers. Key the child-side v1 restrictions (/fork, agent-backed workspace memory) and per-call daemon round trips on a real external provider being attached instead of on guard plumbing presence: under the built-in guard alone, hidden-agent tool calls traverse the same daemon-side policy, so those features stay available and non-shell tools resolve locally. Denial reasons are length-clamped and control-character-stripped so they always satisfy the guard result validation.
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🤖 Addressed the latest review feedback (round 2/100). What changed, and what I pushed back on: · 已处理最新评审反馈（第 2/100 轮）。改动内容与我反驳保留之处如下： Autofix review round summary — PR #8687All 11 Critical findings and all 7 Suggestions are addressed. One commit: Critical findings (R1-1 … R1-11) — all fixedThe daemon-side guard parser in
Suggestions (R1-12 … R1-18) — all addressed
Notes
VerificationCommands actually run (all passed):
中文说明Autofix 审查轮次总结 — PR #8687全部 11 个 Critical 发现和全部 7 个 Suggestion 均已处理。单次提交： Critical 发现（R1-1 … R1-11）— 全部修复重建了
Suggestion（R1-12 … R1-18）— 全部处理
说明
验证实际执行的命令（全部通过）：
Base-conflict check · 基分支冲突检查: no conflict with main. · 与 main 无冲突。 Re-review when you have a moment. After round 100 this bot stops and leaves the PR for a human. · 有空请复审；第 100 轮后本 bot 停止并将 PR 交给人工。 🧠 Handled by Qwen Code · model/模型 |
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🔀 Base updated: red check(s) [Test (ubuntu-latest, Node 22.x), Post Coverage Comment (ubuntu-latest, 22.x)] pass on current main — merged current main via update-branch; CI will re-run. 中文说明🔀 已更新 base：红色检查 [Test (ubuntu-latest, Node 22.x), Post Coverage Comment (ubuntu-latest, 22.x)] 在当前 main 上通过 —— 已通过 update-branch 合入当前 main，CI 将重新运行。 |
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🤖 Reviewed the latest feedback — no changes needed. Why, point by point: · 已审阅最新反馈——无需改动。逐点说明原因如下： Autofix review round — no action needed (PR #8687)No new actionable feedback arrived since the last evaluation (2026-08-07T14:57:42Z), so this round makes no changes and commits nothing. What was evaluated
OutcomeNo code changes. Branch 中文说明Autofix 评审轮次 — 无需处理（PR #8687）自上次评估（2026-08-07T14:57:42Z）以来没有新的可处理反馈，因此本轮不做任何修改、不提交任何代码。 评估内容
结果无代码改动。分支 Base-conflict check · 基分支冲突检查: no conflict with main. · 与 main 无冲突。 🧠 Handled by Qwen Code · model/模型 |
Co-authored-by: Qwen-Coder <qwen-coder@alibabacloud.com>
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🤖 Addressed the latest review feedback (round 3/100). What changed, and what I pushed back on: · 已处理最新评审反馈（第 3/100 轮）。改动内容与我反驳保留之处如下： Autofix round summary — PR #8687Feedback triagedThis round contained no review, inline, or issue-level comments — only two failing checks:
DiagnosisReproduced the Root cause: the parser rewrite in Changes (1 file, +5/−1)
Conflict notesNone ( VerificationCommands actually run and their results:
Commit: 中文说明Autofix 轮次总结 — PR #8687处理的反馈本轮没有任何 review、行内或 issue 级评论——只有两个失败的检查：
诊断在本地复现了 根因： 变更（1 个文件，+5/−1）
冲突说明无（ 验证实际执行的命令及结果：
提交： Base-conflict check · 基分支冲突检查: no conflict with main. · 与 main 无冲突。 Re-review when you have a moment. After round 100 this bot stops and leaves the PR for a human. · 有空请复审；第 100 轮后本 bot 停止并将 PR 交给人工。 🧠 Handled by Qwen Code · model/模型 |
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@qwen-code /triage |
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Sandboxed verification: ❌ not passed — findings reported (agent verdict) - workflow run Ran the PR in an isolated, token-free container: A/B against the base build, mock-free harness assertions, targeted gates. Advisory evidence for human reviewers — not a review, an approval, or a CI check. Scripted assertions: 1842 passed · 13 failed · 1855 total 中文 — 判定：❌ 不通过 · 报告了发现（agent 判定）沙箱验证在隔离、无凭证的容器中执行了该 PR 的代码（与 base 构建 A/B 对照、无 mock harness 断言、定向门禁）。仅作为评审证据，不构成评审、批准或 CI 检查。 脚本断言：1842 通过 · 13 失败 · 1855 总计 Verification reportPR 8687 Deep Verification —
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| # | cell (child → daemon) | HEAD decision | BASE outcome |
|---|---|---|---|
| H1 | git -C <outside> reset --hard |
deny (reason names outside path) | -32601 no decision point |
| H2 | git -C <outside> status --short |
allow | -32601 |
| H3 | git -C nested reset --hard (inside) |
allow | -32601 |
| H4 | H1 + forged workspaceCwd/effectiveCwd=<outside> |
deny (forgery ignored) | -32601 |
| H5 | write_file (non-shell tool) |
allow | -32601 |
| H6 | git --work-tree=<outside> --git-dir=<outside>/.git clean -fd |
deny | -32601 |
| H7 | pwd && git -C <outside> reset --hard |
deny | -32601 |
| H8 | git -C "$OTHER_WORKTREE" reset --hard (dynamic) |
deny (fail-closed) | -32601 |
| H9 | pwd |
allow | -32601 |
| H10 | agent tool, no provider |
allow | -32601 |
| B-exec | relocated mutation executed as base child would | — | file tampered, reset --hard restores it (restored=true) |
Base control: base BridgeClient.handleExternalToolGuardPrepare throws RequestError.methodNotFound when no handler is configured (verified against HEAD^1 source and live), and base run-qwen-serve.ts only sets the child marker env / passes externalToolGuard when a provider exists — so a base child never consults and the command runs. The B-exec cell materializes exactly the cross-checkout mutation the PR exists to block. Control hygiene: packages/core is byte-identical between the arms (git diff HEAD^1..HEAD -- packages/core empty, same for all package.json/package-lock.json), so the shared root node_modules is a clean control; readlink -f node_modules/@qwen-code/qwen-code-core → head-tree core, which is provably unchanged. Base acp-bridge was rebuilt in a scratch worktree (tsc -b --noCheck, emit-only); its dist carries 0 PROVIDER markers vs 2 at head, confirming the arms differ only by the PR.
Witnesses: 01-ab-head-guard-decisions.png, 02-ab-base-no-decision-point.png.
Secondary claim 2 (fast path): verified statically — run-qwen-serve.ts has no module-scope import of the guard; the only reference is await import('./daemon-git-worktree-guard.js') inside runQwenServeImpl (line 2804). Bundle-size measurement was not run (see Not covered).
Findings
Severity: the guard is a defense-in-depth policy filter and the PR explicitly scopes it as "a narrow shell-token policy rather than a complete shell interpreter" — the findings below are residual evasions of that stated goal, not a collapse of the mechanism (which the A/B proves works for everything it covers). They are worth a reviewer's attention because several sit in the same class the PR already handles.
F1 — Medium: relocation evades detection behind unrecognized argv-prefix wrappers and command executors
The wrapper set (env, sudo, timeout, eval, nohup, exec, command, sh/bash/…, cd/pushd/popd) is incomplete. analyzeRun returns other for any unrecognized program and stops, so a relocation carried behind it is never inspected. Measured allow on the head build for every row (all mutating, all targeting the outside repo):
nice git -C <outside> reset --hard nice -n 10 git -C <outside> reset --hard
setsid git -C <outside> reset --hard stdbuf -oL git -C <outside> reset --hard
time git -C <outside> reset --hard ionice -c2 -n7 git -C <outside> reset --hard
watch -n 1 git -C <outside> reset --hard script -q /dev/null git -C <outside> reset --hard
find . -name '*.txt' -exec git -C <outside> reset --hard \;
echo x | xargs git -C <outside> reset --hard
Reproduce: node tmp/pr8687-verify-20260808-002426/harness-bypass.mjs (rows marked FAIL are allow-where-deny-expected; witness 03-bypass-battery-head.png). Notes: time/watch carry runtime caveats (time is a shell keyword, watch wants a tty) but the guard's pre-execution decision is allow regardless; nice/setsid/stdbuf/ionice/script/find -exec/xargs execute the wrapped git unchanged. The PR's commit message claims "shell wrapper … invocations … fail closed"; these siblings of nohup/timeout do not. A safe extension needs per-wrapper flag tables with fail-closed fallback (the consumeEnvWrapper pattern), which is why no patch is suggested here — a naive "skip one token" fix would misparse nice -n 10 into a false allow, worse than the gap. find -exec/xargs need argument-level inspection beyond a prefix scan; if that stays out of scope, naming them as known limitations in the design doc would keep the contract honest.
F2 — Medium: the monitor tool executes model-supplied shell commands but is entirely outside the guard
evaluateBuiltInGuard only inspects toolName === 'run_shell_command'; with no external provider the child's managed guard additionally resolves every non-shell tool locally (acpAgent.ts createManagedExternalToolGuard), so a monitor call never reaches the daemon decision point at all. Measured: guard returns allowed=true for {toolName:'monitor', arguments:{command:'git -C <outside> reset --hard'}} (harness-bypass row monitor tool). MonitorTool (registered unconditionally, core/src/config/config.ts:8255) validates only directory (workspace-bounded) and background operators — never the command's relocation — and spawns with cwd: params.directory || targetDir (core/src/tools/monitor.ts:364). The threat statement ("a daemon model can start a shell … and relocate Git") is reachable through this door without any wrapper trick. Cheapest closure: treat monitor like run_shell_command in evaluateBuiltInGuard (same command argument shape) and route it to the daemon in the child-side local-resolution shortcut.
F3 — Low: the guard trusts model-controlled arguments.directory as basis cwd and does not itself enforce it lies inside effectiveCwd
Measured cell: run_shell_command with arguments.directory = <outside> and bare git reset --hard → allowed=true. The guard's relocated predicate compares basis-vs-entry cwd, and since both are the forged directory, it sees "no relocation" and skips containment. Unreachable in production — the shell tool independently rejects an out-of-workspace directory (core/src/tools/shell.ts:5127, same check in monitor.ts:783) — so this is a defense-in-depth gap, not a live bypass: the guard's soundness depends on an invariant enforced elsewhere. Making the guard self-contained (deny when startDirectory canonicalizes outside effectiveCwd) would remove the dependency.
F4 — Low: the --output clause is unpinned and currently has no behavioral effect (mutation survivor)
Mutation M2 (drop !invocation.hasOutputFlag from the read-only early-return) survived 92/92. None of the six allowlisted subcommands (cat-file, describe, grep, ls-files, rev-parse, status) accepts a file-writing --output flag — the flag matters only for diff/log/show, which are excluded from the allowlist entirely. Classification: defensive clause, dead for the current allowlist (not dead code in intent — it becomes live if a --output-capable subcommand is ever allowlisted). The suite pins nothing along this axis today; if the clause stays, the pinning fixture is git -C <outside> status --output=x (which would go red only once such a subcommand enters the set).
F5 — Nit: two allowlist observations, both measured safe on this box
git -C <outside> statusis allowlisted, andgit statuscan refresh the target repo's index (a metadata-only write into<outside>/.git/index). Harmless here and presumably weighed by the author ("verified to neither write files … on the managed output path"), noted for completeness.- The textconv risk that excluded
diff/log/show/blamewas probed forgrep: a target repo rigged withdiff.evil.textconv='touch <marker>'+*.txt diff=evildid not fire ongit grepin this container (git 2.39.5) — the allowlist entry is safe on this git version; newer gits may differ.
Not covered
- Per-commit attribution: the checkout is depth-2 (merge commit, base tip, PR head only).
git rev-list HEAD^1..HEAD^2returns 1 commit while the metadata snapshot lists 6 — a shallow-boundary artifact — so the aggregateHEAD^1..HEADdiff was verified and per-commit claims (e.g. which commit closed which review bypass) were not individually exercised. - Real-model E2E: the A/B drives the identical wire seam the real child uses (the
externalToolGuardPrepareext method through the real Bridge + real guard), but no live model round-trip was run; model-side elicitation of the tool call is out of scope for the guard itself. - Windows/Linux path-shape behavior (PR marks Windows/Linux
⚠️ ; this round ran Linux-only), linked-worktree exceptions, confirmation UX, and direct user-entered daemon shell commands — all declared out of scope by the PR. - Repo-wide gates: only the affected workspaces ran (cli targeted files + full acp-bridge, 1094 tests). A repo-root typecheck/test was not run, so the PR body's claim that the root build is blocked by missing channel packages is neither confirmed nor refuted here; what I can attest is that this checkout resolves
@qwen-code/channel-github(the PR author's collection failure does not reproduce) and that both affected workspaces typecheck clean. - Bundle-size proof of the fast-path claim: verified by import-graph inspection only (single dynamic import), not by measuring the esbuild closure.
run-qwen-serve.test.tscollected and passed here (231/231); the PR's note that it could not be collected was specific to the author's checkout missing@qwen-code/channel-github.
Methodology
Environment: CI merge-ref checkout (HEAD = merge commit) in a node:22-bookworm container, npm ci + npm run build pre-run at head; base arm rebuilt in scratch worktree tmp/base-tree (emit-only tsc -b --noCheck, control purity asserted above). The A/B harness instantiated the real compiled createAcpSessionBridge with an in-memory NDJSON channel and a FakeAgent child speaking the production ext-method protocol; the bypass battery and perf ladder drove the head-built guard module directly. Raw logs in logs/ (ab-head.log, ab-base.log, ab-assert.log, bypass-head.log, perf-ladder.log), harnesses kept in the artifact dir for rerun. Mutation runs applied single-hunk edits, ran the affected suite, and restored byte-identically (git status clean at the end). Perf ladder: 5 rung sets up to 100 KB, linear throughout (worst 18.6 ms at 56 KB), recursion fail-closed at depth > 3.
Evidence images
Harness scripts and raw logs are in the workflow run artifacts (7-day retention).
— Qwen Code · sandboxed verification
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LGTM, looks ready to ship. ✅
|
🤖 Reviewed the latest feedback — no changes needed. Why, point by point: · 已审阅最新反馈——无需改动。逐点说明原因如下： Autofix review round — no action needed (PR #8687)This round found no actionable feedback, so no code changes were made and nothing was committed. What was triaged
ResultThe branch stays at 中文说明Autofix 评审轮次 — 无需操作（PR #8687）本轮没有发现需要处理的反馈，因此未做任何代码改动，也没有提交任何内容。 分诊内容
结果分支保持在 Base-conflict check · 基分支冲突检查: no conflict with main. · 与 main 无冲突。 🧠 Handled by Qwen Code · model/模型 |
Two more escapes doudouOUC reproduced in the fail-closed removal rule.
- The rule's early `continue` fired even when `unset`/`unalias`/`export` was
itself a recorded function and the operands named only untracked state, so a
shadowing `unset(){ git -C <outside> …; }; unset other` was classified as a
harmless builtin removal and never reached the shadow dispatch that replays
the relocating body. The branch now runs only when the program is not a
shadowed function (a `command`/`builtin` prefix still forces the builtin).
- The removal never dropped tracked variables, so `A=nested; unset A; cd $A`
kept expanding the stale in-bounds value while bash's `unset A` leaves `$A`
empty and `cd $A` lands at $HOME. `unset NAME`/`unset -v NAME` now deletes
the shell-local, turning the later `$A` into an unresolved reference the cd
fails closed on. `unset -f` is functions-only and leaves variables intact.
Adds regressions for both.
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Partially reviewed — gaps disclosed.
Not reviewed: reverse audit — stopped at the 3-round huge-diff cap without converging (rounds 1, 2 and 3 each reported new verified findings; chunk 5 retired after two substantive dry audits).
Not reviewed: build-and-test — CI's 'Integration Tests (CLI, No Sandbox)' job was skipped and the integration suite was not run locally (workspace unit suites covering the changed packages passed).
Not explored to full depth (tool budget reached): "PR #8687 adds a daemon host-side guard for qwen serve that…": none — all checks I started were completed within budget.; "You are review agent reverse-audit — Reverse audit agent…": none — all three candidates were verified to ground truth; consumeSudoWrapper / consumeTimeoutWrapper / consumeShellWrapper internals were only examined at th…; chunk 15: none — all checks I identified were completed within budget.; "You are review agent reverse-audit — Reverse audit agent…": none — all six layers were walked at the doc-claim level my chunk defines.; "You are review agent reverse-audit — Reverse audit agent…": end-to-end session-identity trace of resumed background agents' context-less shell calls (background-agent-resume.ts → new Config's getSessionId() → bridge o…, and 3 more.
[Critical] R9-3 consumeTimeoutWrapper never checks token.dynamic; a blind index++ eats a dynamic duration operand and the wrapped command falls to the marker net unanalyzed
[Critical] R9-26 consumeEnvWrapper -u/--unset skips a dynamic value token with index += 2 without ever setting state.unresolved
[Critical] R9-59 paren-form function definitions that do not START a segment are never recorded (functionHeader is segment-start anchored; readDefinition/readFunctionName fallbacks match shapes shell-quote cannot emit; function is absent from LEADING_SHELL_KEYWORDS)
[Critical] R8-10 prompt-less guard requests are gated only by channel-level ownsSession, so any sibling sessionId owned by the same multiplexed channel passes and receives the nominated session's trusted effectiveCwd (constructor default is () => true)
[Critical] R9-23 git config core.worktree is unmodeled — subcommand config stops option scanning, nothing records the redirect, and a later mutation honors the planted redirect (core.hooksPath gives code execution)
[Critical] R9-22 the env-key sets miss dynamic-loader and shell-startup keys (LD_PRELOAD, LD_LIBRARY_PATH, DYLD_*, PYTHONPATH, GITPERLLIB, PERL5LIB, BASH_ENV, ZDOTDIR) — prefix assignments execute outside-boundary code unflagged
[Critical] R9-2 process substitutions <( )/>( ) split runs — git > >(true) -C /outside reset --hard leaves [-C /outside reset --hard] as an other run with no git word that evaluateUnrecognizedRun clears; sh -c > >(true) "$(cat evil)" severs the wrapper payload the same way
[Critical] R9-25 redirectOperand is cleared only on string tokens; a >(pwn) body's first word gets redirect:true and is skipped by both replay gates (readProgramWord/runFromProgramWord) and the marker gate
[Critical] R9-27 consumeSudoWrapper blind-skips SUDO_VALUE_FLAGS values — sudo -u $U with U='root --chdir=' never marks unresolved and never sees the injected chdir
[Critical] R9-17 CHDIR_OPTION_PATTERN is a cross-shell union (-q, -s, -@ are zsh/ksh-only) applied to bash cd — the guard tracks a phantom cwd that bash rejects (bash usage offers only [-L|[-P [-e]] [-@]])
[Critical] R9-56 the command/builtin branch skips all - flags and re-classifies the next word — command -v cd deep/dir classifies as kind cd with target deep/dir (a phantom cd; command -v only prints)
[Critical] R7-9 declare -f / readonly -f phantom export — the export analysis adds every non-dash operand to exportedFunctions whenever any operand is -f; the payload-scope filter then keeps the harmless body and invokeDefinedBody replays it
[Critical] R8-51 after consumeEnvWrapper/consumeSudoWrapper/consumeTimeoutWrapper the loop re-classifies with no child-process marker — cd ; env cd ; git reset --hard updates trackedCwd inside the wrapper and is judged in-bounds
[Critical] R9-29 the env -S/--split-string payload branch returns the payload with propagatesCwd:false and no importsExportedFunctions (scope {}) while the plain env bash -c path sets importsExportedFunctions — exported shadows are invisible only through the -S form
[Critical] R9-31 any unrecognized prefix program (nice, setsid, strace, stdbuf, …) hides a wrapped bash -c pwn payload — evaluateUnrecognizedRun consults only token text, never definedBodies/exportedFunctions/gitShapedNames
[Critical] R8-15 on Windows resolvePhysicalPath starts at path.parse(target).root but still splits the FULL target — C:\work\subdir resolves to C:\C:\work\subdir, yielding UNRESOLVED denials or a poisoned trackedCwd on every relocated run
[Critical] R9-44 the discovery walk's 64-iteration cap fails OPEN — resolveDiscoveredRepository returns undefined on loop exhaustion and denyOutsideDiscoveredRepository treats undefined as no denial
[Critical] R9-61 a nested function-header line inside an in-progress definition unconditionally overwrites insideDefinition and resets definitionBody — the outer body is discarded unrecorded
[Critical] R8-8 function-definition end detection is raw segment.includes('}') + definitionBody.lastIndexOf('}') with no quote awareness — a quoted } closes the definition early and the remainder evaluates at its original position
[Critical] R7-6 cd $VAR where VAR is a known-but-empty local expands to {text:'', dynamic:false} — trackedCwd stays unchanged via path.resolve(trackedCwd, '') while bash drops the empty word and cds to $HOME
[Critical] R9-57 a cd whose target does not exist fails silently in bash (cwd unchanged) but the guard records the lexical phantom; realpathNearestExistingAsync preserves phantom tails, so a depth-matched relative -C folds back onto an in-bounds decoy
[Critical] R2-23 realpathNearestExistingAsync contract gap — a dangling intermediate symlink returns the input unchanged; the access() walk-up re-appends missing segments lexically, and the reported-cwd acceptance path consumes the result with no full-existence requirement
[Critical] R8-11 a child-reported invocationCwd is accepted with no binding to the invoking agent's assigned worktree — the acceptance key is the session-level worktrees dir, so an agent assigned worktree A can nominate and mutate sibling worktree B
[Critical] R8-36 reported-cwd acceptance cannot place AgentTool-provisioned worktrees when the session is bound to a monorepo subdirectory — the else branch checks the global storage dir while AgentTool provisions under /.qwen/worktrees, so both isWithinRoot checks fail and the call is over-denied
[Critical] R9-21 the guard replays alias bodies as if aliases expanded, but the daemon executes via non-interactive bash -c where aliases never expand (no expand_aliases anywhere) — the pinned allowed:true test blesses fictitious modeling
[Critical] R9-1 GIT_UNRESOLVABLE_ENV_KEYS omits HOME and XDG_CONFIG_HOME (global config ⇒ core.hooksPath ⇒ code execution on hook firing) and GIT_PROXY_COMMAND (its config twin core.gitProxy IS in GIT_COMMAND_CONFIG_KEY_PATTERNS; PATH/GIT_EXEC_PATH are already unresolved keys)
[Critical] R9-38 GIT_TRACE/GIT_TRACE2*/GIT_QUARANTINE_PATH env keys redirect git's trace/quarantine output to arbitrary file paths outside the boundary; recordEnvAssignment ignores them (git writes argv-embedding trace lines outside on any invocation)
[Critical] R8-64 worktree isolation is derived from live .git discovery with no monotonicity — rm .git is unmodeled and re-widens the boundary to the parent checkout on the next call; a corrupted gitfile fails closed but a deleted one fails open
中文说明
仅完成部分审查，审查缺口已披露。
未审查：reverse audit — stopped at the 3-round huge-diff cap without converging (rounds 1, 2 and 3 each reported new verified findings; chunk 5 retired after two substantive dry audits)。
未审查：build-and-test — CI's 'Integration Tests (CLI, No Sandbox)' job was skipped and the integration suite was not run locally (workspace unit suites covering the changed packages passed)。
未探索到全部深度（达到工具调用预算）："PR #8687 adds a daemon host-side guard for qwen serve that…"：none — all checks I started were completed within budget.；"You are review agent reverse-audit — Reverse audit agent…"：none — all three candidates were verified to ground truth; consumeSudoWrapper / consumeTimeoutWrapper / consumeShellWrapper internals were only examined at th…；chunk 15：none — all checks I identified were completed within budget.；"You are review agent reverse-audit — Reverse audit agent…"：none — all six layers were walked at the doc-claim level my chunk defines.；"You are review agent reverse-audit — Reverse audit agent…"：end-to-end session-identity trace of resumed background agents' context-less shell calls (background-agent-resume.ts → new Config's getSessionId() → bridge o…，另有 3 条。
[Critical] R9-3 consumeTimeoutWrapper never checks token.dynamic; a blind index++ eats a dynamic duration operand and the wrapped command falls to the marker net unanalyzed
[Critical] R9-26 consumeEnvWrapper -u/--unset skips a dynamic value token with index += 2 without ever setting state.unresolved
[Critical] R9-59 paren-form function definitions that do not START a segment are never recorded (functionHeader is segment-start anchored; readDefinition/readFunctionName fallbacks match shapes shell-quote cannot emit; function is absent from LEADING_SHELL_KEYWORDS)
[Critical] R8-10 prompt-less guard requests are gated only by channel-level ownsSession, so any sibling sessionId owned by the same multiplexed channel passes and receives the nominated session's trusted effectiveCwd (constructor default is () => true)
[Critical] R9-23 git config core.worktree is unmodeled — subcommand config stops option scanning, nothing records the redirect, and a later mutation honors the planted redirect (core.hooksPath gives code execution)
[Critical] R9-22 the env-key sets miss dynamic-loader and shell-startup keys (LD_PRELOAD, LD_LIBRARY_PATH, DYLD_*, PYTHONPATH, GITPERLLIB, PERL5LIB, BASH_ENV, ZDOTDIR) — prefix assignments execute outside-boundary code unflagged
[Critical] R9-2 process substitutions <( )/>( ) split runs — git > >(true) -C /outside reset --hard leaves [-C /outside reset --hard] as an other run with no git word that evaluateUnrecognizedRun clears; sh -c > >(true) "$(cat evil)" severs the wrapper payload the same way
[Critical] R9-25 redirectOperand is cleared only on string tokens; a >(pwn) body's first word gets redirect:true and is skipped by both replay gates (readProgramWord/runFromProgramWord) and the marker gate
[Critical] R9-27 consumeSudoWrapper blind-skips SUDO_VALUE_FLAGS values — sudo -u $U with U='root --chdir=' never marks unresolved and never sees the injected chdir
[Critical] R9-17 CHDIR_OPTION_PATTERN is a cross-shell union (-q, -s, -@ are zsh/ksh-only) applied to bash cd — the guard tracks a phantom cwd that bash rejects (bash usage offers only [-L|[-P [-e]] [-@]])
[Critical] R9-56 the command/builtin branch skips all - flags and re-classifies the next word — command -v cd deep/dir classifies as kind cd with target deep/dir (a phantom cd; command -v only prints)
[Critical] R7-9 declare -f / readonly -f phantom export — the export analysis adds every non-dash operand to exportedFunctions whenever any operand is -f; the payload-scope filter then keeps the harmless body and invokeDefinedBody replays it
[Critical] R8-51 after consumeEnvWrapper/consumeSudoWrapper/consumeTimeoutWrapper the loop re-classifies with no child-process marker — cd ; env cd ; git reset --hard updates trackedCwd inside the wrapper and is judged in-bounds
[Critical] R9-29 the env -S/--split-string payload branch returns the payload with propagatesCwd:false and no importsExportedFunctions (scope {}) while the plain env bash -c path sets importsExportedFunctions — exported shadows are invisible only through the -S form
[Critical] R9-31 any unrecognized prefix program (nice, setsid, strace, stdbuf, …) hides a wrapped bash -c pwn payload — evaluateUnrecognizedRun consults only token text, never definedBodies/exportedFunctions/gitShapedNames
[Critical] R8-15 on Windows resolvePhysicalPath starts at path.parse(target).root but still splits the FULL target — C:\work\subdir resolves to C:\C:\work\subdir, yielding UNRESOLVED denials or a poisoned trackedCwd on every relocated run
[Critical] R9-44 the discovery walk's 64-iteration cap fails OPEN — resolveDiscoveredRepository returns undefined on loop exhaustion and denyOutsideDiscoveredRepository treats undefined as no denial
[Critical] R9-61 a nested function-header line inside an in-progress definition unconditionally overwrites insideDefinition and resets definitionBody — the outer body is discarded unrecorded
[Critical] R8-8 function-definition end detection is raw segment.includes('}') + definitionBody.lastIndexOf('}') with no quote awareness — a quoted } closes the definition early and the remainder evaluates at its original position
[Critical] R7-6 cd $VAR where VAR is a known-but-empty local expands to {text:'', dynamic:false} — trackedCwd stays unchanged via path.resolve(trackedCwd, '') while bash drops the empty word and cds to $HOME
[Critical] R9-57 a cd whose target does not exist fails silently in bash (cwd unchanged) but the guard records the lexical phantom; realpathNearestExistingAsync preserves phantom tails, so a depth-matched relative -C folds back onto an in-bounds decoy
[Critical] R2-23 realpathNearestExistingAsync contract gap — a dangling intermediate symlink returns the input unchanged; the access() walk-up re-appends missing segments lexically, and the reported-cwd acceptance path consumes the result with no full-existence requirement
[Critical] R8-11 a child-reported invocationCwd is accepted with no binding to the invoking agent's assigned worktree — the acceptance key is the session-level worktrees dir, so an agent assigned worktree A can nominate and mutate sibling worktree B
[Critical] R8-36 reported-cwd acceptance cannot place AgentTool-provisioned worktrees when the session is bound to a monorepo subdirectory — the else branch checks the global storage dir while AgentTool provisions under /.qwen/worktrees, so both isWithinRoot checks fail and the call is over-denied
[Critical] R9-21 the guard replays alias bodies as if aliases expanded, but the daemon executes via non-interactive bash -c where aliases never expand (no expand_aliases anywhere) — the pinned allowed:true test blesses fictitious modeling
[Critical] R9-1 GIT_UNRESOLVABLE_ENV_KEYS omits HOME and XDG_CONFIG_HOME (global config ⇒ core.hooksPath ⇒ code execution on hook firing) and GIT_PROXY_COMMAND (its config twin core.gitProxy IS in GIT_COMMAND_CONFIG_KEY_PATTERNS; PATH/GIT_EXEC_PATH are already unresolved keys)
[Critical] R9-38 GIT_TRACE/GIT_TRACE2*/GIT_QUARANTINE_PATH env keys redirect git's trace/quarantine output to arbitrary file paths outside the boundary; recordEnvAssignment ignores them (git writes argv-embedding trace lines outside on any invocation)
[Critical] R8-64 worktree isolation is derived from live .git discovery with no monotonicity — rm .git is unmodeled and re-widens the boundary to the parent checkout on the next call; a corrupted gitfile fails closed but a deleted one fails open
— qwen3.8-max via Qwen Code /review (v0.21.11)
| * best-effort: only the first heredoc on a line is handled, which is the | ||
| * shape a model emits, and anything unrecognised is left untouched. |
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[Critical] R8-58 (round-8 ledger, still stands): stripHeredocBodies strips only the FIRST heredoc per line and does not recognize backslash-quoted delimiters (<<\EOF); unrecognized heredoc forms leave their body lines to be parsed as real commands. — Failure scenario: cd /tmp/outside + cat <<\\EOF + body cd <session-root> + git reset --hard — the regex fails on the delimiter, the body cd launders trackedCwd back inside, and git reset --hard is ALLOWED while bash executes it outside (probe-verified). cat <<A <<B launders identically (only A's body stripped). Suggested fix: iterate all << on a line, handle backslash delimiters, and deny when a heredoc cannot be delimited.
中文说明
R8-58（第 8 轮台账，仍然成立）：stripHeredocBodies 每行只剥离第一个 heredoc，且不识别反斜杠引用的定界符（<<\EOF）；未识别形式的 heredoc 正文会被当作真实命令解析。cd /tmp/outside + cat <<\\EOF + 正文 cd <session-root> + git reset --hard：正则无法匹配定界符，正文里的 cd 把 trackedCwd 洗回边界内，git reset --hard 被放行，而 bash 在边界外执行（已探针验证）。cat <<A <<B 同样可洗（只剥 A 的正文）。修复：遍历一行内所有 <<、处理反斜杠定界符、无法界定时报错拒绝。
— qwen3.8-max via Qwen Code /review (v0.21.11)
| if (SUDO_VALUE_FLAGS.has(token.text)) { | ||
| index += 2; | ||
| continue; | ||
| } | ||
| index++; | ||
| } | ||
| return { next: index }; |
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[Critical] consumeSudoWrapper treats sudo -i/--login as a neutral flag, but sudo changes the working directory to the target user's home before running the command — an unmodeled relocation of the same class the code applies to -R/--chroot. — Failure scenario: sudo -i git commit -m x is analyzed as an ordinary git commit against the session cwd and ALLOWED; sudo executes with cwd = the target user's home, so a repository discoverable there (e.g. a dotfiles repo at $HOME) is mutated outside the boundary (probe-verified against sudo docs). Suggested fix: set state.unresolved = true on -i/--login, like the chroot flags.
中文说明
consumeSudoWrapper 把 sudo -i/--login 当作中性标志，但 sudo 会在执行命令前把工作目录切到目标用户家目录——与代码对 -R/--chroot 同类的未建模重定位。sudo -i git commit -m x 会按会话 cwd 的普通 git commit 分析并被放行；sudo 实际以目标用户家目录为 cwd 执行，若那里可发现仓库（如 $HOME 的 dotfiles 仓库）就会在边界外被修改（已对照 sudo 文档探针验证）。修复：对 -i/--login 置 state.unresolved = true，与 chroot 标志一致。
— qwen3.8-max via Qwen Code /review (v0.21.11)
| current = path.resolve(path.dirname(current), match[1]!.trim()); | ||
| continue; | ||
| } | ||
| if (path.basename(current) === '.git') { |
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[Critical] resolveGitDirRepository canonicalizes only the initial target; gitdir: redirect targets and worktree gitdir pointers are resolved purely lexically, so a symlink named .git INSIDE the boundary whose realpath points outside defeats containment (stat follows the link, but basename/dirname are applied to the lexical path; the caller's final realpathNearestExistingAsync is a no-op because the directory exists inside). — Failure scenario: plant ln -s /outside/repo/.git /inside/link/.git + gitfile bait.git -> /inside/link/.git; git --git-dir=bait.git config … resolves to /inside/link → ALLOWED, while real git writes into /outside/repo (PoC'd for both the --git-dir and discovery variants). Suggested fix: re-canonicalize with realpath after every indirection hop (targets that don't exist already throw, so full realpath is safe).
中文说明
resolveGitDirRepository 只对初始目标做规范化；gitdir: 重定向目标与 worktree gitdir 指针完全按词法解析，因此边界内一个 realpath 指向外部的名为 .git 的符号链接可以绕过包含性检查（stat 跟随链接，但 basename/dirname 作用在词法路径上；调用方最后的 realpathNearestExistingAsync 因目录真实存在于边界内而无效）。布置 ln -s /outside/repo/.git /inside/link/.git 与 gitfile bait.git -> /inside/link/.git 后，git --git-dir=bait.git config … 解析到 /inside/link 被放行，真实 git 却写入 /outside/repo（--git-dir 与发现两条路径均已 PoC）。修复：每次间接跳转后重新用 realpath 规范化（不存在的目标本就会抛错，完整 realpath 是安全的）。
— qwen3.8-max via Qwen Code /review (v0.21.11)
| const functionHeader = | ||
| /^\s*([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)\s*\(\s*\)/.exec(segment) ?? | ||
| // The `function NAME` keyword form, with the `()` optional. | ||
| /^\s*function\s+([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)\b/.exec(segment); |
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[Critical] The function NAME keyword-form regex stops the name at the first non-word character (\b), so function git-x { … } records the body under the truncated name git (bash defines git-x; hyphenated names are legal), which later shadow dispatch substitutes for the real program. — Failure scenario: function git-x { echo ok; } + git -C /outside/repo push — the body is stored under definedBodies['git']; the git invocation hits shadow dispatch and replays the harmless body → ALLOWED while bash runs the real git (probe-verified). Suggested fix: consume the whole bash-legal name and require the header shape, e.g. /^\s*function\s+([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_-]*)(?=\s*(\(|\{))/.
中文说明
function NAME 关键字形式的正则在第一个非单词字符处截断名字（\b），function git-x { … } 的函数体会被记录在截断名 git 下（bash 定义的是 git-x，带连字符的名字合法），之后的影子分发会用它顶替真实程序。function git-x { echo ok; } + git -C /outside/repo push：函数体存入 definedBodies['git']，git 调用走影子分发重放无害函数体而被放行，bash 却执行真实 git（已探针验证）。修复：完整消费 bash 合法名字并要求头部形态，如 /^\s*function\s+([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_-]*)(?=\s*(\(|\{))/。
— qwen3.8-max via Qwen Code /review (v0.21.11)
| const pending = shellLocals.get(operand.text); | ||
| if (pending) recordEnvAssignment(pending, exported); |
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[Critical] A name-only export of a GIT_* relocation key with no tracked pending assignment is assumed harmless, but the variable may already hold a value written by an unmodeled setter (read, printf -v), so the promotion exports an invisible relocation. — Failure scenario: echo /outside/repo > .g; read GIT_DIR < .g; export GIT_DIR; git push — shellLocals has no pending GIT_DIR, nothing is promoted, git push evaluates unrelocated against the session cwd → ALLOWED, while bash exports the value and pushes the outside repo (probe-verified). Suggested fix: when a name-only export targets a relocation key with no pending value, set exported.unresolved = true (fail closed).
中文说明
对没有待处理赋值记录的 GIT_* 重定位键做无名 export 被视为无害，但该变量可能已被未建模的写入者（read、printf -v）赋值，这次提升会把一个不可见的重定位导出。echo /outside/repo > .g; read GIT_DIR < .g; export GIT_DIR; git push：shellLocals 中没有待处理的 GIT_DIR，无任何提升，git push 按会话 cwd 无重定位求值被放行，bash 却导出该值并 push 外部仓库（已探针验证）。修复：无名 export 作用于重定位键且无待处理值时置 exported.unresolved = true（fail-closed）。
— qwen3.8-max via Qwen Code /review (v0.21.11)
| await agentPromise; | ||
| }); | ||
|
|
||
| it('allows /fork past the guard gate under the built-in guard alone', async () => { |
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[Suggestion] The test that opens the /fork gate under the built-in guard alone stubs the entire agent tool (getTool → build → execute), so the diff's own justification for opening the gate — that the forked nested agent's shell calls remain subject to the daemon's containment policy — is pinned by no test. — Concrete cost: guard inheritance into forks holds today only because subagents reuse the parent Config via prototype delegation; if a future change gives subagents a fresh config or rebuilds the registry without the guard, forked run_shell_command/monitor calls never reach externalToolGuardPrepare and execute uncontained — while this allow-test (stubs the tool) and every daemon-side unit test stay green. The rejection twin asserts loadCliConfig({toolInvocationGuard}); the allow twin asserts nothing downstream of the gate. Suggested fix: assert the initialize response carries EXTERNAL_TOOL_GUARD_READY_META_KEY here (as the provider-attached memory test does), or drive a forked shell call through the guard.
中文说明
在仅内置守卫模式下打开 /fork 闸门的测试把整个 agent 工具 stub 掉（getTool → build → execute），因此 diff 打开闸门的理由——fork 出的嵌套 agent 的 shell 调用仍受 daemon 包含策略约束——没有任何测试钉住。代价：今天 fork 的守卫继承仅因子代理通过原型委托复用父 Config；若未来给子代理全新 config 或不带守卫重建注册表，fork 的 run_shell_command/monitor 调用将不再到达 externalToolGuardPrepare、不受包含地执行——而此允许测试（stub 了工具）与所有 daemon 侧单测仍绿。拒绝孪生体断言了 loadCliConfig({toolInvocationGuard})；允许孪生体对闸门之后毫无断言。修复：在此断言 initialize 响应携带 EXTERNAL_TOOL_GUARD_READY_META_KEY（如提供方挂载的记忆测试那样），或真正驱动一个 fork 的 shell 调用过守卫。
— qwen3.8-max via Qwen Code /review (v0.21.11)
| await expect(guard(call)).resolves.toEqual({ allowed: true }); | ||
| await rm(linkedRoot, { recursive: true, force: true }); |
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[Suggestion] 'keeps a linked-worktree session working when its own .git points outside' cleans up its scratch directory only on the success path: linkedRoot is created via mkdtempSync directly under os.tmpdir() (outside the afterAll's temporaryRoot), and await rm(linkedRoot, …) runs after the assertions with no try/finally. — Concrete cost: if either expect (or a setup writeFile) throws, a populated daemon-guard-wt-* tree (fake main repo, admin dir, checkout) leaks into the system temp dir on every failing run, on CI runners and dev machines alike. The sibling test 'contains a sub-agent to the worktree it reports' handles the identical hazard with try/finally. Suggested fix: wrap the guard assertions in try { … } finally { await rm(linkedRoot, …) }.
中文说明
'keeps a linked-worktree session working when its own .git points outside' 只在成功路径清理临时目录：linkedRoot 经 mkdtempSync 直接建在 os.tmpdir() 下（afterAll 的 temporaryRoot 之外），await rm(linkedRoot, …) 在断言之后且无 try/finally。代价：任一 expect（或 setup writeFile）抛出时，一份内容完整的 daemon-guard-wt-* 树（假主仓库、管理目录、checkout）会在每次失败运行时泄漏到系统临时目录，CI runner 与开发机皆然。孪生测试 'contains a sub-agent to the worktree it reports' 用 try/finally 处理了同样的隐患。修复：把守卫断言包进 try { … } finally { await rm(linkedRoot, …) }。
— qwen3.8-max via Qwen Code /review (v0.21.11)
| importing it on a dash-backed `sh` would recreate the escape. It fails | ||
| closed, over-denying the bash-backed case (a false positive, not a bypass). |
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[Suggestion] The non-goal bullet misdescribes the failure direction of not importing export -f bodies into sh -c payloads: the choice UNDER-analyzes (fail-open on bash-backed sh hosts) and cannot over-deny — not importing never adds analysis. The doc asserts this corner 'fails closed … (a false positive, not a bypass)', the opposite of the code's actual direction for the relocating-body variant (the R9-58 mechanism, probe-verified: f() { git -C /outside reset --hard; }; export -f f; sh -c 'f' → allowed; bash-backed hosts execute the body). — Concrete cost: the document whose stated purpose is accurate scoping ('Treating it as more than that would be the actual risk') states an unconditional direction that is wrong for half the state space; only the shadow variant (git() { :; }; export -f git; sh -c 'git -C …' → denied) matches the doc. Suggested fix: state the true direction — under-analysis on bash-backed hosts, accepted here.
中文说明
该 non-goal 条目误述了不把 export -f 函数体导入 sh -c payload 的失败方向：此选择是分析不足（在 sh 即 bash 的主机上 fail-open），不可能过度拒绝——不导入从不增加分析。文档断言此角落'fail-closed……（误报而非绕过）'，与代码在重定位函数体变体上的实际方向相反（即 R9-58 机制，已探针验证：f() { git -C /outside reset --hard; }; export -f f; sh -c 'f' 被放行；bash 系主机执行函数体）。代价：以精确界定为目的的文档（'把它当成更多才是真正的风险'）对一半状态空间给出了方向性错误；只有影子变体（git() { :; }; export -f git; sh -c 'git -C …' 被拒绝）与文档相符。修复：写明真实方向——bash 系主机上分析不足，此处接受。
— qwen3.8-max via Qwen Code /review (v0.21.11)
| track environment variable values across commands, or analyze heredoc bodies | ||
| (Git-shaped text inside a heredoc can be denied even though the shell never | ||
| executes it). `/fork` and agent-backed workspace memory remember/dream remain |
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[Suggestion] The new user-facing docs describe pre-stripping heredoc behavior this same PR eliminates: the guard now strips heredoc bodies before analysis (probe: cat <<EOF + git payload + EOF → allowed), and this PR's own round-9 test requires a body cd NOT to be tracked — but the added prose still asserts 'Git-shaped text inside a heredoc can be denied even though the shell never executes it'. — Concrete cost: operators reading the new docs expect false-positive denials on inert heredoc text (or file bugs when they don't occur); the sentence contradicts the code and tests shipped in the same change. Separate new prose from the already-reported stale design-doc bullet. Suggested fix: rewrite to describe the shipped behavior — bodies are stripped, so heredoc text normally cannot trigger a denial (incomplete-stripping edge cases may still scan body lines).
中文说明
新增的用户文档描述了同一 PR 已消除的预剥离前行为：守卫现在在分析前剥离 heredoc 正文（探针：cat <<EOF + git payload + EOF 被允许），本 PR 自己的第 9 轮测试也要求正文中的 cd 不被跟踪——但新增文字仍断言'heredoc 内的 Git 形状文本可能被拒绝，即使 shell 从不执行它'。代价：读新文档的运维者会期待对惰性 heredoc 文本的误拒（或不发生时提 bug）；该句与同一变更交付的代码和测试矛盾。与已报告的过期设计文档条目是不同文件的不同新文字。修复：改写为已交付行为——正文被剥离，heredoc 文本通常不会触发拒绝（剥离不完整的边缘情形仍可能扫描正文行）。
— qwen3.8-max via Qwen Code /review (v0.21.11)
| const EXPORT_BUILTINS = new Set([ | ||
| 'declare', | ||
| 'export', | ||
| 'local', | ||
| 'readonly', | ||
| 'typeset', | ||
| ]); |
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[Suggestion] Bash namerefs (declare -n/typeset -n/local -n) create an indirect assignment channel into GIT_* relocation keys that the guard never models (verifier: variable indirection is a disclosed may-pass class, so this is a hardening suggestion; the channel is probe-verified and the fix is cheap). — Concrete cost: declare -n p=GIT_DIR; p=/outside/repo/.git; export GIT_DIR; git reset --hard → ALLOWED (probe): recordEnvAssignment ignores key p (not even unresolved), p=/outside lands in shellLocals under p, the name-only export finds no pending GIT_DIR to promote, git evaluates unrelocated; bash exports GIT_DIR=/outside/repo/.git and git resets the outside repo. Direct GIT_DIR= twins are denied. Distinct from R11-8 (there GIT_DIR itself is set by an unmodeled setter). Suggested fix: on a -n declaration whose value is a tracked GIT_* name, route later NAME=value assignments through the target key, or mark exported.unresolved.
中文说明
Bash 引用（declare -n/typeset -n/local -n）创建了通向 GIT_* 重定位键的间接赋值通道，守卫从未建模（验证者：变量间接引用属于已披露的可能放行类别，故按加固建议处理；通道已探针验证且修复便宜）。代价：declare -n p=GIT_DIR; p=/outside/repo/.git; export GIT_DIR; git reset --hard 被放行（探针）：recordEnvAssignment 忽略键 p（甚至不置 unresolved），p=/outside 以 p 为名进入 shellLocals，无名 export 找不到待提升的 GIT_DIR，git 按无重定位求值；bash 导出 GIT_DIR=/outside/repo/.git，git 重置外部仓库。直接 GIT_DIR= 孪生体被拒绝。与 R11-8 不同（那里是 GIT_DIR 本身被未建模写入者赋值）。修复：-n 声明的值是被跟踪 GIT_* 名时，把后续 NAME=value 赋值路由到目标键，或置 exported.unresolved。
— qwen3.8-max via Qwen Code /review (v0.21.11)
…elocation
Two escapes surfaced by the round-11 review, both reproduced against the guard.
- The shadow-removal prefix scan trusted a literal `command`/`builtin` word to
force the real builtin, but bash resolves a function of that name first. A
`command(){ git -C <outside> …; }; command unset other` therefore
early-continued as a harmless builtin removal and never replayed the
relocating body. The prefix loop now stops when the prefix word is itself a
recorded shadow, leaving it for the normal shadow dispatch.
- The unrecognized-program marker scans covered GIT_DIR/GIT_WORK_TREE-family
assignments but not GIT_PROGRAM_ENV_KEYS (`PATH`/`GIT_EXEC_PATH`), which
decide which git binary runs. The direct `PATH=/evil git …` was denied while
`find … -exec sh -c 'PATH=/evil git …'` slipped through. Both marker scans
now include those keys, and they remain gated on a co-present git word so an
ordinary `PATH=… make` is unaffected.
Adds regressions for the shadowed prefixes and the wrapped PATH/GIT_EXEC_PATH
forms.
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Partially reviewed — gaps disclosed.
Not reviewed: build-and-test — Integration Tests (CLI, No Sandbox) was skipped in CI and its suite did not run locally (unit suites for all PR-touched workspaces passed); Test (macos-latest)/Test (windows-latest) legs also skipped in CI — no platform-specific tests exist in the diff (the R8-15 Windows claim was probed against node:path.win32).
Not explored to full depth (tool budget reached): "You are review agent reverse-audit — Reverse audit agent…": did not exhaustively enumerate every git config key against git's full config reference (checked the plausible executing keys — submodule.<name>.update consid…; "You are review agent reverse-audit — Reverse audit agent…": none — all checks above completed within budget.; "You are review agent reverse-audit — Reverse audit agent…": none — finished within budget.; "You are review agent reverse-audit — Reverse audit agent…": inheritance ( set -a /allexport into children, and its reset) not walked this round beyond noting env inheritance as the finding's attack source.; "You are review agent reverse-audit — Reverse audit agent…": toctou (planted .git , relink-then-use) not walked this round — observed only the relink precheck at lines 2469–2499 en passant; ledger items R8-64 et al. co…, and 4 more.
Not reviewed: reverse audit — stopped before round 3 by the review time budget.
[Critical] R11-8 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:2613): the all-export-off arm discards analysis.state.relocations while set is a POSIX special builtin — prefix assignments persist across set +a on dash/POSIX-sh, exporting the dropped relocation
[Critical] R11-7 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:2814): a reported invocationCwd that is a SUBDIRECTORY of a checkout leaves the boundary at the session root (narrowing requires realpath(discovered) === canonicalReported), so sibling/parent mutations pass and own work mis-resolves
[Critical] R11-6 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:2524): the dynamic-program case never fails closed when tokens remain dynamic (unexpanded) after expandShellLocals, so an unreadable positional argument smuggles a -C relocation past every marker scan
[Critical] R8-58 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:1858): stripHeredocBodies strips only the FIRST heredoc per line and does not recognize backslash-quoted delimiters (<<\EOF); unrecognized/second heredoc bodies survive into splitCommands and a data-only cd launders trackedCwd
[Critical] R11-1 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:817): consumeSudoWrapper treats sudo -i/--login as a neutral flag, but sudo changes the working directory to the target user's home before running the command — an unmodeled relocation of the same class as -R/--chroot
[Critical] R11-2 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:1419): resolveGitDirRepository canonicalizes only the initial target; gitdir: redirect targets and worktree gitdir pointers are resolved purely lexically, so a symlink named .git INSIDE the boundary whose realpath points outside defeats containment
[Critical] R11-3 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:2162): the function NAME keyword-form regex stops the name at the first non-word character (\b), so function git-x { ... } records the body under the truncated name git; later git -C push hits the shadow dispatch and replays the harmless body
[Critical] R11-4 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:2584): a name-only export of a GIT_* relocation key with no tracked pending assignment is assumed harmless, but the variable may already hold a value written by an unmodeled setter (read, printf -v); the promotion exports an invisible relocation
[Critical] R11-5 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:2647): the gitShapedNames branch evaluates a fabricated two-token run [programToken, 'git'] and drops the invocation's real argv, so relocation flags the fall-through evaluateUnrecognizedRun(run) would have caught are never scanned
[Critical] R7-8 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:2167): a function definition with a non-brace compound body (( ... ), for, if, while, until) sets insideDefinition but the definition only ever closes on a segment containing } — it never closes, and every later segment (including a literal outside git command) is swallowed into definitionBody
[Critical] R9-30 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:1217): the exec/nohup branch consumes only the program word; exec's own flags (-l, -a, --) fall through to kind 'other' and assignments AFTER them are dropped before recordEnvAssignment runs
[Critical] R9-3 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:827): consumeTimeoutWrapper never checks token.dynamic; a blind index++ eats a dynamic duration operand and the wrapped command falls to the marker net unanalyzed
[Critical] R9-26 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:730): consumeEnvWrapper -u/--unset skips a dynamic value token with index += 2 without ever setting state.unresolved — the one dynamic operand in the wrapper that does not fail closed
[Critical] R9-59 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:2163): paren-form function definitions that do not START a segment are never recorded (functionHeader is segment-start anchored; readDefinition/readFunctionName fallbacks match shapes shell-quote cannot emit; function is absent from LEADING_SHELL_KEYWORDS)
[Critical] R8-10 (bridgeClient.ts:1320): prompt-less guard requests are gated only by channel-level ownsSession, so any sibling sessionId owned by the same multiplexed channel passes and receives the nominated session's trusted effectiveCwd (constructor default () => true)
[Critical] R9-23 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:1382): git config core.worktree is unmodeled — subcommand config stops option scanning, nothing records the redirect, and a later mutation honors the planted redirect (core.hooksPath gives code execution)
[Critical] R9-22 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:111): the env-key sets miss dynamic-loader and shell-startup keys (LD_PRELOAD, LD_LIBRARY_PATH, DYLD_*, PYTHONPATH, GITPERLLIB, PERL5LIB, BASH_ENV, ZDOTDIR) — prefix assignments execute outside-boundary code unflagged
[Critical] R9-2 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:403): process substitutions <( )/>( ) split runs — tokenizeSegment starts a new run at the ( and never resumes; git > >(true) -C /outside reset --hard leaves [-C /outside reset --hard] as an other run with no git word
[Critical] R9-25 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:447): redirectOperand is cleared only on string tokens; a >(pwn) body's first word gets redirect:true and is skipped by both replay gates (readProgramWord/runFromProgramWord) and the marker gate
[Critical] R9-27 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:779): consumeSudoWrapper blind-skips SUDO_VALUE_FLAGS values — sudo -u $U with U='root --chdir=' never marks unresolved and never sees the injected chdir
[Critical] R9-17 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:985): CHDIR_OPTION_PATTERN is a cross-shell union (-q, -s, -@ are zsh/ksh-only) applied to bash cd — the guard tracks a phantom cwd that bash rejects
[Critical] R9-56 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:1163): the command/builtin branch skips all - flags and re-classifies the next word — command -v cd deep/dir classifies as kind cd with target deep/dir (a phantom cd; command -v only prints)
[Critical] R7-9 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:2576): declare -f / readonly -f phantom export — the export analysis adds every non-dash operand to exportedFunctions whenever any operand is -f; the payload-scope filter then keeps the harmless body and invokeDefinedBody replays it
[Critical] R8-51 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:1163): after consumeEnvWrapper/consumeSudoWrapper/consumeTimeoutWrapper the loop re-classifies with no child-process marker — a wrapped cd updates trackedCwd although a child process cannot move the parent shell
[Critical] R9-29 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:1165): the env -S/--split-string payload branch returns the payload with propagatesCwd:false and no importsExportedFunctions (scope {}) while the plain env bash -c path sets importsExportedFunctions — exported shadows are invisible only through the -S form
[Critical] R9-31 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:1775): any unrecognized prefix program (nice, setsid, strace, stdbuf, ...) hides a wrapped bash -c pwn payload — evaluateUnrecognizedRun consults only token text, never definedBodies/exportedFunctions/gitShapedNames
[Critical] R8-15 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:1449): on Windows resolvePhysicalPath starts at path.parse(target).root but still splits the FULL target — C:\work\subdir resolves to C:\C:\work\subdir, yielding UNRESOLVED denials or a poisoned trackedCwd on every relocated run
[Critical] R9-44 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:1477): the discovery walk's 64-iteration cap fails OPEN — resolveDiscoveredRepository returns undefined on loop exhaustion and denyOutsideDiscoveredRepository treats undefined as no denial
[Critical] R9-61 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:2181): a nested function-header line inside an in-progress definition unconditionally overwrites insideDefinition and resets definitionBody — the outer body is discarded unrecorded
[Critical] R8-8 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:2176): function-definition end detection is raw segment.includes(''}') + definitionBody.lastIndexOf('}') with no quote awareness — a quoted } closes the definition early and the remainder evaluates at its original position
[Critical] R7-6 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:527): cd $VAR where VAR is a known-but-empty local expands to {text:'', dynamic:false} — trackedCwd stays unchanged via path.resolve(trackedCwd, '') while bash drops the empty word and cds to $HOME
[Critical] R9-57 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:2376): a cd whose target does not exist fails silently in bash (cwd unchanged) but the guard records the lexical phantom; realpathNearestExistingAsync preserves phantom tails, so a depth-matched relative -C folds back onto an in-bounds decoy
[Critical] R2-23 (paths.ts:522): realpathNearestExistingAsync contract gap — a dangling intermediate symlink returns the input unchanged; the access() walk-up re-appends missing segments lexically, and the reported-cwd acceptance path consumes the result with no full-existence requirement
[Critical] R8-11 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:2840): a child-reported invocationCwd is accepted with no binding to the invoking agent's assigned worktree — the acceptance key is the session-level worktrees dir, so an agent assigned worktree A can nominate and mutate sibling worktree B
[Critical] R8-36 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:2811): reported-cwd acceptance cannot place AgentTool-provisioned worktrees when the session is bound to a monorepo subdirectory — branch 1 requires the worktree inside the session cwd (true only when projectRoot == sessionCwd); the else branch checks the global storage dir
[Critical] R9-21 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:2337): the guard replays alias bodies as if aliases expanded, but the daemon executes via non-interactive bash -c where aliases never expand (no expand_aliases anywhere) — the pinned allowed:true test blesses fictitious modeling
[Critical] R9-1 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:111): GIT_UNRESOLVABLE_ENV_KEYS omits HOME and XDG_CONFIG_HOME (global config => core.hooksPath => code execution on hook firing) and GIT_PROXY_COMMAND (config twin core.gitProxy IS in GIT_COMMAND_CONFIG_KEY_PATTERNS)
[Critical] R9-38 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:111): GIT_TRACE/GIT_TRACE2*/GIT_QUARANTINE_PATH env keys redirect git's trace/quarantine output to arbitrary file paths outside the boundary; recordEnvAssignment ignores them
[Critical] R8-64 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:2819): worktree isolation is derived from live .git discovery with no monotonicity — rm .git is unmodeled (not in PATH_RELINKING_PROGRAMS) and re-widens the boundary to the parent checkout on the next call; a corrupted gitfile fails closed but a deleted one fails open
[Critical] R8-48 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:2228): leaving a ( ... ) subshell restores only cwd/relocations/unresolved/allExport/locals; definedBodies, gitShapedNames, exportedNames, exportedFunctions are shared by reference and survive the subshell
中文说明
仅完成部分审查，审查缺口已披露。
未审查：build-and-test — Integration Tests (CLI, No Sandbox) was skipped in CI and its suite did not run locally (unit suites for all PR-touched workspaces passed); Test (macos-latest)/Test (windows-latest) legs also skipped in CI — no platform-specific tests exist in the diff (the R8-15 Windows claim was probed against node:path.win32)。
未探索到全部深度（达到工具调用预算）："You are review agent reverse-audit — Reverse audit agent…"：did not exhaustively enumerate every git config key against git's full config reference (checked the plausible executing keys — submodule.<name>.update consid…；"You are review agent reverse-audit — Reverse audit agent…"：none — all checks above completed within budget.；"You are review agent reverse-audit — Reverse audit agent…"：none — finished within budget.；"You are review agent reverse-audit — Reverse audit agent…"：inheritance ( set -a /allexport into children, and its reset) not walked this round beyond noting env inheritance as the finding's attack source.；"You are review agent reverse-audit — Reverse audit agent…"：toctou (planted .git , relink-then-use) not walked this round — observed only the relink precheck at lines 2469–2499 en passant; ledger items R8-64 et al. co…，另有 4 条。
未审查：反向审计——评审时间预算不足，未能开始第 3 轮。
[Critical] R11-8 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:2613): the all-export-off arm discards analysis.state.relocations while set is a POSIX special builtin — prefix assignments persist across set +a on dash/POSIX-sh, exporting the dropped relocation
[Critical] R11-7 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:2814): a reported invocationCwd that is a SUBDIRECTORY of a checkout leaves the boundary at the session root (narrowing requires realpath(discovered) === canonicalReported), so sibling/parent mutations pass and own work mis-resolves
[Critical] R11-6 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:2524): the dynamic-program case never fails closed when tokens remain dynamic (unexpanded) after expandShellLocals, so an unreadable positional argument smuggles a -C relocation past every marker scan
[Critical] R8-58 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:1858): stripHeredocBodies strips only the FIRST heredoc per line and does not recognize backslash-quoted delimiters (<<\EOF); unrecognized/second heredoc bodies survive into splitCommands and a data-only cd launders trackedCwd
[Critical] R11-1 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:817): consumeSudoWrapper treats sudo -i/--login as a neutral flag, but sudo changes the working directory to the target user's home before running the command — an unmodeled relocation of the same class as -R/--chroot
[Critical] R11-2 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:1419): resolveGitDirRepository canonicalizes only the initial target; gitdir: redirect targets and worktree gitdir pointers are resolved purely lexically, so a symlink named .git INSIDE the boundary whose realpath points outside defeats containment
[Critical] R11-3 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:2162): the function NAME keyword-form regex stops the name at the first non-word character (\b), so function git-x { ... } records the body under the truncated name git; later git -C push hits the shadow dispatch and replays the harmless body
[Critical] R11-4 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:2584): a name-only export of a GIT_* relocation key with no tracked pending assignment is assumed harmless, but the variable may already hold a value written by an unmodeled setter (read, printf -v); the promotion exports an invisible relocation
[Critical] R11-5 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:2647): the gitShapedNames branch evaluates a fabricated two-token run [programToken, 'git'] and drops the invocation's real argv, so relocation flags the fall-through evaluateUnrecognizedRun(run) would have caught are never scanned
[Critical] R7-8 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:2167): a function definition with a non-brace compound body (( ... ), for, if, while, until) sets insideDefinition but the definition only ever closes on a segment containing } — it never closes, and every later segment (including a literal outside git command) is swallowed into definitionBody
[Critical] R9-30 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:1217): the exec/nohup branch consumes only the program word; exec's own flags (-l, -a, --) fall through to kind 'other' and assignments AFTER them are dropped before recordEnvAssignment runs
[Critical] R9-3 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:827): consumeTimeoutWrapper never checks token.dynamic; a blind index++ eats a dynamic duration operand and the wrapped command falls to the marker net unanalyzed
[Critical] R9-26 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:730): consumeEnvWrapper -u/--unset skips a dynamic value token with index += 2 without ever setting state.unresolved — the one dynamic operand in the wrapper that does not fail closed
[Critical] R9-59 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:2163): paren-form function definitions that do not START a segment are never recorded (functionHeader is segment-start anchored; readDefinition/readFunctionName fallbacks match shapes shell-quote cannot emit; function is absent from LEADING_SHELL_KEYWORDS)
[Critical] R8-10 (bridgeClient.ts:1320): prompt-less guard requests are gated only by channel-level ownsSession, so any sibling sessionId owned by the same multiplexed channel passes and receives the nominated session's trusted effectiveCwd (constructor default () => true)
[Critical] R9-23 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:1382): git config core.worktree is unmodeled — subcommand config stops option scanning, nothing records the redirect, and a later mutation honors the planted redirect (core.hooksPath gives code execution)
[Critical] R9-22 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:111): the env-key sets miss dynamic-loader and shell-startup keys (LD_PRELOAD, LD_LIBRARY_PATH, DYLD_*, PYTHONPATH, GITPERLLIB, PERL5LIB, BASH_ENV, ZDOTDIR) — prefix assignments execute outside-boundary code unflagged
[Critical] R9-2 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:403): process substitutions <( )/>( ) split runs — tokenizeSegment starts a new run at the ( and never resumes; git > >(true) -C /outside reset --hard leaves [-C /outside reset --hard] as an other run with no git word
[Critical] R9-25 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:447): redirectOperand is cleared only on string tokens; a >(pwn) body's first word gets redirect:true and is skipped by both replay gates (readProgramWord/runFromProgramWord) and the marker gate
[Critical] R9-27 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:779): consumeSudoWrapper blind-skips SUDO_VALUE_FLAGS values — sudo -u $U with U='root --chdir=' never marks unresolved and never sees the injected chdir
[Critical] R9-17 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:985): CHDIR_OPTION_PATTERN is a cross-shell union (-q, -s, -@ are zsh/ksh-only) applied to bash cd — the guard tracks a phantom cwd that bash rejects
[Critical] R9-56 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:1163): the command/builtin branch skips all - flags and re-classifies the next word — command -v cd deep/dir classifies as kind cd with target deep/dir (a phantom cd; command -v only prints)
[Critical] R7-9 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:2576): declare -f / readonly -f phantom export — the export analysis adds every non-dash operand to exportedFunctions whenever any operand is -f; the payload-scope filter then keeps the harmless body and invokeDefinedBody replays it
[Critical] R8-51 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:1163): after consumeEnvWrapper/consumeSudoWrapper/consumeTimeoutWrapper the loop re-classifies with no child-process marker — a wrapped cd updates trackedCwd although a child process cannot move the parent shell
[Critical] R9-29 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:1165): the env -S/--split-string payload branch returns the payload with propagatesCwd:false and no importsExportedFunctions (scope {}) while the plain env bash -c path sets importsExportedFunctions — exported shadows are invisible only through the -S form
[Critical] R9-31 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:1775): any unrecognized prefix program (nice, setsid, strace, stdbuf, ...) hides a wrapped bash -c pwn payload — evaluateUnrecognizedRun consults only token text, never definedBodies/exportedFunctions/gitShapedNames
[Critical] R8-15 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:1449): on Windows resolvePhysicalPath starts at path.parse(target).root but still splits the FULL target — C:\work\subdir resolves to C:\C:\work\subdir, yielding UNRESOLVED denials or a poisoned trackedCwd on every relocated run
[Critical] R9-44 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:1477): the discovery walk's 64-iteration cap fails OPEN — resolveDiscoveredRepository returns undefined on loop exhaustion and denyOutsideDiscoveredRepository treats undefined as no denial
[Critical] R9-61 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:2181): a nested function-header line inside an in-progress definition unconditionally overwrites insideDefinition and resets definitionBody — the outer body is discarded unrecorded
[Critical] R8-8 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:2176): function-definition end detection is raw segment.includes(''}') + definitionBody.lastIndexOf('}') with no quote awareness — a quoted } closes the definition early and the remainder evaluates at its original position
[Critical] R7-6 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:527): cd $VAR where VAR is a known-but-empty local expands to {text:'', dynamic:false} — trackedCwd stays unchanged via path.resolve(trackedCwd, '') while bash drops the empty word and cds to $HOME
[Critical] R9-57 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:2376): a cd whose target does not exist fails silently in bash (cwd unchanged) but the guard records the lexical phantom; realpathNearestExistingAsync preserves phantom tails, so a depth-matched relative -C folds back onto an in-bounds decoy
[Critical] R2-23 (paths.ts:522): realpathNearestExistingAsync contract gap — a dangling intermediate symlink returns the input unchanged; the access() walk-up re-appends missing segments lexically, and the reported-cwd acceptance path consumes the result with no full-existence requirement
[Critical] R8-11 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:2840): a child-reported invocationCwd is accepted with no binding to the invoking agent's assigned worktree — the acceptance key is the session-level worktrees dir, so an agent assigned worktree A can nominate and mutate sibling worktree B
[Critical] R8-36 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:2811): reported-cwd acceptance cannot place AgentTool-provisioned worktrees when the session is bound to a monorepo subdirectory — branch 1 requires the worktree inside the session cwd (true only when projectRoot == sessionCwd); the else branch checks the global storage dir
[Critical] R9-21 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:2337): the guard replays alias bodies as if aliases expanded, but the daemon executes via non-interactive bash -c where aliases never expand (no expand_aliases anywhere) — the pinned allowed:true test blesses fictitious modeling
[Critical] R9-1 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:111): GIT_UNRESOLVABLE_ENV_KEYS omits HOME and XDG_CONFIG_HOME (global config => core.hooksPath => code execution on hook firing) and GIT_PROXY_COMMAND (config twin core.gitProxy IS in GIT_COMMAND_CONFIG_KEY_PATTERNS)
[Critical] R9-38 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:111): GIT_TRACE/GIT_TRACE2*/GIT_QUARANTINE_PATH env keys redirect git's trace/quarantine output to arbitrary file paths outside the boundary; recordEnvAssignment ignores them
[Critical] R8-64 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:2819): worktree isolation is derived from live .git discovery with no monotonicity — rm .git is unmodeled (not in PATH_RELINKING_PROGRAMS) and re-widens the boundary to the parent checkout on the next call; a corrupted gitfile fails closed but a deleted one fails open
[Critical] R8-48 (daemon-git-worktree-guard.ts:2228): leaving a ( ... ) subshell restores only cwd/relocations/unresolved/allExport/locals; definedBodies, gitShapedNames, exportedNames, exportedFunctions are shared by reference and survive the subshell
— qwen3.8-max via Qwen Code /review (v0.21.11)
| function consumeEnvWrapper( | ||
| run: GuardToken[], |
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[Critical] A brace-expansion token in the env/sudo wrapper option position ({-C,<outside>} / {-D,<outside>}) is static text that matches no branch of consumeEnvWrapper (it does not start with -, so it never reaches the fail-closed unrecognized-option branch), and is equally invisible to hasGitRelocationMarker and TEXT_RELOCATION_MARKER_PATTERN — the relocation it expands into is never modelled. — Failure scenario: probe-verified env {-C,/outside/repo} git reset --hard -> ALLOWED (bash brace-expands to env -C /outside/repo git reset --hard, env --chdir is modelled by this very function via ENV_CHDIR_FLAGS); the token is treated as the program word, no relocation is recorded, and the in-boundary basis passes. sudo {-D,<outside>} git ... is the same class one function down. The suite already pins the git-position form (git {-C,...}); the wrapper position is the same expansion one token earlier, undefended.
中文说明
大括号展开 token 出现在 env/sudo 包装器选项位置（{-C,}）时是静态文本，不匹配 consumeEnvWrapper 的任何分支，两个 marker 扫描也都看不见它，其展开后的重定位完全不被建模。探针验证 env {-C,/outside/repo} git reset --hard 被放行；git 自身位置的同形式已有测试钉住，包装器位置是前移一个 token 的同一展开，未设防。
— qwen3.8-max via Qwen Code /review (v0.21.11)
| function hasGitRelocationMarker(tokens: GuardToken[]): boolean { | ||
| return tokens.some((token) => { |
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[Critical] The unrecognized-program backstop ('other' case / evaluateUnrecognizedRun) scans only literal token text for relocation markers, passes tokens unexpanded, and never fails closed on dynamic tokens — a relocation stored in a shell variable and referenced after a static unrecognized program word is invisible. The dynamic-program case expands shellLocals first; this sibling path does not. — Failure scenario: probe-verified X='-C /outside/repo'; nice git $X reset --hard -> ALLOWED (analyzeRun stops at static nice; marker scans see literal $X; state clean; in-boundary basis) while bash expands $X and runs git -C /outside/repo reset --hard. Same-chain locals are modelled everywhere else (the suite denies four same-chain variable relocations); the static-other path is the undefended sibling.
中文说明
未识别程序兜底（'other' 分支 / evaluateUnrecognizedRun）只扫描字面 token 文本，不展开 shellLocals，也不对动态 token fail closed——藏在 shell 变量里、位于静态未识别程序词之后的重定位完全不可见。探针验证 X='-C /outside/repo'; nice git $X reset --hard 被放行，而 bash 展开 $X 后在界外执行 reset。dynamic-program 分支会先展开局部变量，这个孪生路径没有。
— qwen3.8-max via Qwen Code /review (v0.21.11)
| if (token.text.startsWith('+')) { | ||
| index++; | ||
| continue; |
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[Critical] consumeShellWrapper treats every +-option as valueless, but +o/+O take an argument; the argument is then misread as a script filename, the scan returns 'none', and the -c payload is never analyzed. Unmodelled value-taking long options (--rcfile, --init-file) fall through advancing only one token. — Failure scenario: reproduced bash +o nounset -c "$(cat /tmp/evil)" -> ALLOWED while the identical command without +o is denied; also bash +o nounset -c 'GIT_OBJECT_DIRECTORY=<outside>/.git/objects git add -A' and bash --rcfile /nonexistent -c "$(cat /tmp/evil)" -> ALLOWED. Real bash executes the payload (bash +o nounset -c 'cmd' arg verified). This defeats two documented rules at once — recursive -c analysis and 'an undecidable payload is denied' — with ordinary bash option syntax.
中文说明
consumeShellWrapper 把所有 + 选项当作无值选项，但 +o/+O 带参数；参数被误读为脚本文件名，扫描返回 'none'，-c 载荷完全不被分析；--rcfile/--init-file 等带值长选项也只前进一格。复现：bash +o nounset -c "$(cat /tmp/evil)" 被放行，去掉 +o 的同命令被拒。普通 bash 选项语法即可同时击穿‘递归分析 -c’与‘不可判定载荷拒绝’两条文档承诺。
— qwen3.8-max via Qwen Code /review (v0.21.11)
| if (token === null || typeof token !== 'object') return null; | ||
| if ('comment' in token) break; | ||
| if (!('op' in token)) return null; |
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[Critical] A # comment line ending in a backslash lets the following command line bypass the guard entirely: splitCommands (core, unchanged by this PR) drops \\<newline> continuations without comment tracking, splicing the comment onto the next line into one segment, and the tokenizer then trusts shell-quote's comment model — which runs a comment to END-OF-STRING, unlike bash's end-of-line — so everything after # (including the spliced command) is dropped from analysis. — Failure scenario: reproduced end-to-end true # c \\ + newline + git -C <outside> reset --hard -> ALLOWED; live bash probe confirms bash treats the backslash inside a comment as inert, ends the comment at the newline, and executes the git line. Same trick inside $( ) via the recursion path also ALLOWED with bash executing the inner line. Controls denied; the backtick form is NOT a bypass (bash strips \\<newline> inside backquotes — verified). The guard already pins each half separately; the composition defeats the canonical literal git -C <path> form at the center of the doc's reliability promise.
中文说明
以反斜杠结尾的 # 注释行可让其后的命令行完全绕过守卫：splitCommands 无注释状态地丢弃反斜杠换行（把注释与下一行拼成一段），tokenizer 又信任 shell-quote 的注释模型——注释被当作直到字符串结尾，而非 bash 的行尾——# 之后的一切（含被拼接的命令）都退出分析。端到端复现：'true # c \' + 换行 + 'git -C reset --hard' 被放行，bash 探针确认隐藏行真实执行；$( ) 递归路径同样放行。两个对照被拒；反引号形态不是绕过（bash 会剥掉反引号内的反斜杠换行）。
— qwen3.8-max via Qwen Code /review (v0.21.11)
| function disablesAllExport(run: GuardToken[], start: number): boolean { | ||
| for (let index = start; index < run.length; index++) { |
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[Critical] disablesAllExport scans every token after set as if it were an option — past -- and past positional operands — so set -- +a / set foo +a, which only assign positional parameters and leave allexport untouched, are modeled as turning allexport off. The request side only over-approximates (fail-closed); the disable side under-approximates (fail-open). — Failure scenario: live bash verified set -a; set -- +a; X=1; env | grep X still exports (allexport stays ON); guard probe set -a; set -- +a; GIT_DIR=<outside>/meta; git reset --hard -> ALLOWED (the assignment is demoted to a shell-local instead of an exported relocation; the bare git reset --hard carries no marker) — likewise the set foo +a and GIT_WORK_TREE variants; controls set -a; GIT_DIR=... denied and set -a; set +a; GIT_DIR=... correctly allowed. At runtime git really honors the exported variable and mutates the outside repository.
中文说明
disablesAllExport 把 set 之后的每个 token 都当选项扫描——越过 -- 与位置参数——因此 set -- +a / set foo +a（bash 中只赋位置参数、不动 allexport）被建模为关闭 allexport。请求侧只会过近似（fail-closed），关闭侧却欠近似（fail-open）。实测 bash 中 allexport 保持开启；守卫探针 set -a; set -- +a; GIT_DIR=/meta; git reset --hard 被放行（赋值被降为 shell-local，裸 git 无标记），set foo +a 与 GIT_WORK_TREE 变体同样放行。
— qwen3.8-max via Qwen Code /review (v0.21.11)
| Git global options that consume the next argv entry (`--namespace`, | ||
| `--super-prefix`, `--shallow-file`, `--attr-source`) are modelled as such: |
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[Suggestion] --super-prefix is listed as a git global option that consumes the next argv entry, but git rejects it in the pre-subcommand position — measured on git 2.43.0: git --super-prefix x version dies with unknown option: --super-prefix, and the current git-scm.com global-options list omits it. It exists only per-builtin (git read-tree --super-prefix=x accepts it). No security impact (real git rejects the option before any relocation matters); the cost is a fictional entry in the parser's authoritative maintenance doc. — Concrete cost: a maintainer auditing these four options against a real git finds one fictional entry and may distrust the remaining three — two of which (--shallow-file, --attr-source) are real and load-bearing for the parser.
中文说明
文档把 --super-prefix 列为消耗下一个 argv 项的 git 全局选项，但 git 在子命令前位置拒绝它（git 2.43.0 实测 unknown option；git-scm.com 全局选项列表也没有它），它只存在于个别内建命令（read-tree 接受）。无安全影响（真实 git 在任何重定位生效前就拒绝）；代价是解析器权威维护文档中的一条虚构条目，可能让维护者连带怀疑真实的两条（--shallow-file、--attr-source）。
— qwen3.8-max via Qwen Code /review (v0.21.11)
| `uploadpack.packObjectsHook`, `core.hooksPath` and `gpg.<format>.program`, | ||
| matched case-insensitively because Git config keys are; any value starting |
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[Suggestion] The design doc's enumeration of command-executing -c/--config-env keys presents itself as the complete list but omits 15 of the 28 families GIT_COMMAND_CONFIG_KEY_PATTERNS actually enforces: include.path, includeif.*.path, core.gitproxy, remote.<name>.proxy|receivepack|uploadpack, credential.<name>.helper, browser.<name>.cmd, diff.external, gc.recentObjectsHook, help.browser, interactive.diffFilter, ssh.variant, tar.<name>.command, web.browser, imap.tunnel, instaweb.httpd. — Concrete cost: the check is relocation-independent, so git -c include.path=./extra.config commit is denied even entirely inside the workspace; an operator tracing that denial against the doc finds include.path nowhere and concludes the guard misbehaved; the inverse audit (deriving the denial surface from the doc) silently misses 15 rules. Same drift class as the accepted env-key enumeration finding (R11-13), different list.
中文说明
设计文档对命令执行类 -c/--config-env 键的枚举以完整清单自居，却漏掉实现实际强制的 28 族中的 15 族（include.path、includeif..path、core.gitproxy、remote..proxy/receivepack/uploadpack、credential..helper、browser..cmd、diff.external、gc.recentObjectsHook、help.browser、interactive.diffFilter、ssh.variant、tar.*.command、web.browser、imap.tunnel、instaweb.httpd）。该检查与重定位无关，界内 git -c include.path=… commit 也会被拒；照文档排查的人会以为守卫出错；反向审计则会静默漏掉 15 条规则。与已接受的 R11-13 同属文档漂移，但是另一份清单。
— qwen3.8-max via Qwen Code /review (v0.21.11)
| // Extract-then-commit is ordinary work, not a relocation. | ||
| 'tar -xf a.tar && git commit -m x', |
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[Suggestion] An archive extraction can plant a .git file at the extraction root, but the extractor branch only pushes trackedCwd into relinkedTargets and never sets scope.relink.gitDir, so a path-less git after tar/unzip/cpio/rsync escapes via discovery — while the identical end state via ln is denied by the very next test family. — Concrete cost: probe-verified tar -xf a.tar && git commit -m x with a.tar carrying a top-level .git file gitdir: /outside/repo/.git -> ALLOWED; at runtime discovery follows the planted gitfile and the commit writes refs/objects and executes hooks from the outside repository. The branch comment documents this as an accepted TOCTOU trade-off (the archive is unpacked after the decision), and the verifier upholds that scoping — the actionable residue is that the module's invariant comment ('A relinked .git redirects discovery for every later command, relocated or not') and the design doc's relink discussion overstate coverage without acknowledging the extractor carve-out the allow assertions at :1762 and :1588 pin.
中文说明
归档解压可以在解压根植入 .git 文件，但提取器分支只把 trackedCwd 推入 relinkedTargets、从不设置 scope.relink.gitDir，tar/unzip/cpio/rsync 之后的无路径 git 会经 discovery 逃逸——而 ln 构造的同一终态被拒绝。探针验证：顶层含 'gitdir: /outside/repo/.git' 的 a.tar，tar -xf a.tar && git commit -m x 放行，运行时 commit 写入界外仓库并执行其 hooks。分支注释已把此形态记为接受的 TOCTOU 取舍（归档在决策后才解压），验证者认可该定界——可执行的遗留问题是：模块不变量注释（‘被重链的 .git 会重定向之后所有命令的 discovery’）与设计文档未承认这个由 :1762/:1588 放行断言钉住的提取器例外，覆盖了夸大的覆盖面。
— qwen3.8-max via Qwen Code /review (v0.21.11)
| 'grep -C 5 git CHANGELOG.md', | ||
| 'tar -C nested -cf out.tar .', |
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[Suggestion] The extractor branch fires on the mere presence of a PATH_EXTRACTING_PROGRAMS word with no mode inspection, so archive create/list invocations (tar -c, tar -t, unzip -l, cpio -t) mark the entire cwd as a relinked target even though they write nothing; any following path-resolving git under the cwd is then spuriously denied. — Concrete cost: probe-verified tar -czf backup.tgz nested && git -C nested commit -m x -> DENIED ('dynamic repository location'), tar -tzf likewise, while git -C nested commit alone and a path-less git after tar are allowed — the branch's justification ('An archive can place a symlink anywhere below the extraction directory') is false for create/list mode; this is over-denial of ordinary work commands.
中文说明
提取器分支仅凭 PATH_EXTRACTING_PROGRAMS 词出现就触发、不检查模式，归档创建/列举（tar -c、tar -t、unzip -l、cpio -t）并不写任何东西却把整个 cwd 标为重链目标，随后 cwd 之下带路径的 git 被误拒。探针验证：tar -czf backup.tgz nested && git -C nested commit -m x 被拒（dynamic repository location），tar -tzf 同样；单独 git -C nested commit 与 tar 后无路径 git 均放行。分支理由（归档可在解压目录下任意放置符号链接）对创建/列举模式不成立——这是对普通工作命令的过度拒绝。
— qwen3.8-max via Qwen Code /review (v0.21.11)
| if ( | ||
| !backtick && | ||
| substitution > 0 && |
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[Suggestion] The substitution counter in readTopLevelSeparators (and core splitCommands) closes $( at the first unquoted ) even when that ) only closes a nested bare subshell ( ... ); both parsers share the bug, so the cross-check stays green while splitCommands cuts inside a live command substitution, and the severed fragment then fails extractCommandSubstitutions (which IS paren-aware) — the guard hard-denies innocent, reasonably common shell constructs. — Concrete cost: probe-verified echo $( (sleep 1); date ) -> DENIED ('could not be parsed before execution'), likewise make $( (test -d build) || echo init ); bash executes both fine. Fail-closed, so no security harm — but unconditional denial of defensive $( (test -d x) || ... ) idioms and makefile recipes, with the disagreement safety net silent because both parsers misparse identically.
中文说明
readTopLevelSeparators（与 core splitCommands）的替换计数器在嵌套裸子shell的 ) 处就关闭
— qwen3.8-max via Qwen Code /review (v0.21.11)
…fix drops
Two escapes surfaced by the round-12 review, both reproduced against the guard.
- The env-assignment arm of both text marker patterns required `(^|\s)` before
the key, while the sibling `cd`/`pushd` arm already allowed `;&|(){}`
boundaries. A relocation glued to a delimiter inside a quoted wrapper payload
(`su -c 'true;GIT_DIR=<outside> git reset --hard'`) therefore evaded the
unrecognized-program backstop. Both arms now share the same boundary class.
- `invokeDefinedBody` located the invoked name with a raw `findIndex` that
also matched redirect operands, so a decoy `> g` whose target equals the
function name truncated the prefix-assignment scan to empty and dropped the
call's `GIT_DIR=` relocation. The lookup now skips redirect/fd operands like
`readProgramWord` does.
Adds regressions for the delimiter-glued and redirect-decoy forms.
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Partially reviewed — gaps disclosed.
Not reviewed: reverse audit — stopped at the 3-round huge-diff cap without converging (rounds 1, 2 and 3 each reported newly verified findings).
Not reviewed: build-and-test — CI's 'Integration Tests (CLI, No Sandbox)' job was skipped and its suite did not run locally (workspace unit suites covering all changed packages passed); Test (macos-latest)/Test (windows-latest) legs also skipped — no platform-specific tests exist in the diff (the R8-15 Windows claim was probed against node:path.win32).
Not explored to full depth (tool budget reached): "You are review agent reverse-audit — Reverse audit agent…": exhaustive enumeration of git-config(1) command-executing keys beyond the three families named (walked the layer, found and proved the gap; did not attempt a co…; "You are review agent reverse-audit — Reverse audit agent…": none — all checks above completed within budget.; "PR #8687 adds a daemon host-side guard for qwen serve that…": I did not run the unit tests for the new files; I did not trace channel-worker daemon spawn paths other than runQwenServe for marker env var leakage (channel wo…; "PR #8687 adds a daemon host-side guard for qwen serve that…": did not execute the new test files (relied on tsc + trace). Budget gap: did not exhaustively trace channel-worker spawn paths beyond confirming the markers are …; "You are review agent reverse-audit — Reverse audit agent…": macOS/BSD sudo -a acceptance could not be verified from this Linux runner (Finding 2's trigger platform)., and 13 more.
[Critical] R13-10: Hidden workspace-memory (remember/dream) agents run with NO tool-invocation guard: createHiddenWorkspaceMemoryConfig (acpAgent.ts ~859) proxies the guard-less agent-level config (only getChatRecordingService/getTranscriptPath overridden); Config.toolInvocationGuard has no setter and the only attach site is newSessionConfig (~11959); both planners grant shell (allowShell: true). Under default qwen serve (built-in guard, no provider), a remember/dream agent's run_shell_command reaches CoreToolScheduler with getToolInvocationGuard() === undefined — evaluateToolInvocationGuard never runs, no externalToolGuardPrepare is sent, and the daemon-side createDaemonToolGuard never sees the call: cross-worktree git mutations from the hidden chain are unguarded. The design doc's 'hidden-agent tool calls traverse the same managed guard' promise is contradicted by the code. Could not be anchored to a diff line (the attach-site lines are outside this PR's hunks). — R13-10：隐藏的 workspace-memory（remember/dream）agent 运行时没有任何 tool-invocation guard：createHiddenWorkspaceMemoryConfig 代理的是无 guard 的 agent 级配置；Config.toolInvocationGuard 无 setter，唯一挂载点是 newSessionConfig；两个 planner 都授予 shell。默认 qwen serve 下，隐藏链的 run_shell_command 到达 CoreToolScheduler 时 getToolInvocationGuard() === undefined——守卫求值永不运行、不发 externalToolGuardPrepare、daemon 侧永远看不到该调用：来自隐藏链的跨 worktree git 变更不受守卫。设计文档'隐藏 agent 工具调用经过同一 managed guard'的承诺与代码矛盾。
中文说明
仅完成部分审查，审查缺口已披露。
未审查：reverse audit — stopped at the 3-round huge-diff cap without converging (rounds 1, 2 and 3 each reported newly verified findings)。
未审查：build-and-test — CI's 'Integration Tests (CLI, No Sandbox)' job was skipped and its suite did not run locally (workspace unit suites covering all changed packages passed); Test (macos-latest)/Test (windows-latest) legs also skipped — no platform-specific tests exist in the diff (the R8-15 Windows claim was probed against node:path.win32)。
未探索到全部深度（达到工具调用预算）："You are review agent reverse-audit — Reverse audit agent…"：exhaustive enumeration of git-config(1) command-executing keys beyond the three families named (walked the layer, found and proved the gap; did not attempt a co…；"You are review agent reverse-audit — Reverse audit agent…"：none — all checks above completed within budget.；"PR #8687 adds a daemon host-side guard for qwen serve that…"：I did not run the unit tests for the new files; I did not trace channel-worker daemon spawn paths other than runQwenServe for marker env var leakage (channel wo…；"PR #8687 adds a daemon host-side guard for qwen serve that…"：did not execute the new test files (relied on tsc + trace). Budget gap: did not exhaustively trace channel-worker spawn paths beyond confirming the markers are …；"You are review agent reverse-audit — Reverse audit agent…"：macOS/BSD sudo -a acceptance could not be verified from this Linux runner (Finding 2's trigger platform).，另有 13 条。
[Critical] R13-10: Hidden workspace-memory (remember/dream) agents run with NO tool-invocation guard: createHiddenWorkspaceMemoryConfig (acpAgent.ts ~859) proxies the guard-less agent-level config (only getChatRecordingService/getTranscriptPath overridden); Config.toolInvocationGuard has no setter and the only attach site is newSessionConfig (~11959); both planners grant shell (allowShell: true). Under default qwen serve (built-in guard, no provider), a remember/dream agent's run_shell_command reaches CoreToolScheduler with getToolInvocationGuard() === undefined — evaluateToolInvocationGuard never runs, no externalToolGuardPrepare is sent, and the daemon-side createDaemonToolGuard never sees the call: cross-worktree git mutations from the hidden chain are unguarded. The design doc's 'hidden-agent tool calls traverse the same managed guard' promise is contradicted by the code. Could not be anchored to a diff line (the attach-site lines are outside this PR's hunks). — R13-10：隐藏的 workspace-memory（remember/dream）agent 运行时没有任何 tool-invocation guard：createHiddenWorkspaceMemoryConfig 代理的是无 guard 的 agent 级配置；Config.toolInvocationGuard 无 setter，唯一挂载点是 newSessionConfig；两个 planner 都授予 shell。默认 qwen serve 下，隐藏链的 run_shell_command 到达 CoreToolScheduler 时 getToolInvocationGuard() === undefined——守卫求值永不运行、不发 externalToolGuardPrepare、daemon 侧永远看不到该调用：来自隐藏链的跨 worktree git 变更不受守卫。设计文档'隐藏 agent 工具调用经过同一 managed guard'的承诺与代码矛盾。
— qwen3.8-max via Qwen Code /review (v0.21.11)
| const currentEntry = this.resolveEntry(sessionId); | ||
| if ( | ||
| !this.ownsSession(sessionId) || | ||
| currentEntry !== entry || |
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[Critical] R13-11: Prompt-less guard requests are not serialized against changeSessionCwd (probe-verified with a fix-and-flip): effectiveCwd — the containment basis forwarded at line 1344 — is mutated IN PLACE by changeSessionCwd (bridge.ts:7693) during the handler await; the post-call recheck is reference-identity only and prompt-less requests skip the prompt-state arm (changeSessionCwd throws CdWhilePromptActiveError only while promptActive). — Failure scenario: A context-less shell check (subagent/cron/background path — the exact flows this PR's prompt-less support creates) is in flight while a /cd completes on the same session: the decision validated against basis B0 is returned after the basis became B1, allowing e.g. git -C /workspace/sibling reset --hard that the narrowed effectiveCwd would deny. A naive reference recheck cannot see the in-place write; capturing the basis pre-await and comparing flips the probe to rejected.
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（见英文说明）
— qwen3.8-max via Qwen Code /review (v0.21.11)
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| // Programs whose own `-C` means something else entirely (`grep -C 5`, | ||
| // `tar -C dir`), so it must not read as a git relocation marker. | ||
| const PROGRAMS_WITH_OWN_C_FLAG = new Set([ |
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[Critical] R13-25: PROGRAMS_WITH_OWN_C_FLAG includes make, whose -C is a REAL chdir applied before recipes run: the own-C carve-out skips hasGitRelocationMarker and the -C-free text marker matches nothing (probe-verified ALLOWED for -C and --directory; tar gets PATH_EXTRACTING_PROGRAMS treatment, make has none). — Failure scenario: make -C <outside> git-release → allowed: GIT_WORD gate passes on the git-bearing target, ownsCFlag suppresses the -C marker scan, state is empty, and make chdirs and runs the recipe's git against the outside repository (make chdir verified live).
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（见英文说明）
— qwen3.8-max via Qwen Code /review (v0.21.11)
| const token = parsed[index]; | ||
| if (typeof token === 'string') { | ||
| const isRedirectOperand = redirectOperand; | ||
| redirectOperand = false; |
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[Critical] R9-25 still stands: redirectOperand is cleared only on string tokens; a >(pwn) body's first word gets redirect:true and is skipped by both replay gates (readProgramWord/runFromProgramWord) and the marker gate. — Failure scenario: f() { git -C /outside reset --hard; }; true >(f) — the run [f(redirect:true)] gets programToken undefined, shadow dispatch and definition readers skip it, evaluateUnrecognizedRun finds no git word → allowed while bash runs f in the procsub.
中文说明
R9-25 仍然成立：redirectOperand 只在字符串 token 上清除；>(…) 体的第一个词继承 redirect:true，被重放闸门（readProgramWord/runFromProgramWord）和 marker 闸门同时跳过。失败场景：f() { git -C /outside reset --hard; }; true >(f)——run [f(redirect:true)] 的 programToken 为 undefined，影子分发与定义读取器都跳过它，backstop 无 git 词 → 放行，而 bash 在进程替换中执行 f。
— qwen3.8-max via Qwen Code /review (v0.21.11)
| if (inner.op === '(') depth++; | ||
| else if (inner.op === ')') { |
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[Critical] R13-S1: The $(...) body consumption loop counts only bare (/) ops, but shell-quote emits <(/>( as their own ops closed by a bare ) — the first ) inside the substitution satisfies the counter and a leftover ) leaks into the main tokenizer. UPGRADED from Suggestion: the verifier found the allow-flip the finding as filed denied. — Failure scenario: (cd <outside>; echo $(cat <(echo hi)); git reset --hard) → allowed while bash executes git with cwd=outside (verified): the early break leaks a ) that pops the enclosing subshell scope early, discarding the subshell's tracked outside-cwd before the git segment is evaluated. The round-5 fix covered the main loop's identical failure mode; the substitution-body loop was missed.
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（见英文说明）
— qwen3.8-max via Qwen Code /review (v0.21.11)
| runs.at(-1)!.tokens.push({ text: pattern, dynamic: true }); | ||
| continue; | ||
| } | ||
| if (SUBSHELL_OPENING_OPERATORS.has(op)) { |
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[Critical] R9-2 still stands: process substitutions split runs — op ( opens a new run and never resumes; git > >(true) -C /outside reset --hard strands [-C /outside reset --hard] as an other run with no git word that evaluateUnrecognizedRun clears. — Failure scenario: git > >(true) -C /outside reset --hard — run1 [git] is unrelocated in-bounds, run3 [-C /outside reset --hard] has no git word and passes; bash executes the full relocated command.
中文说明
R9-2 仍然成立：进程替换会切断 run——op ( 开启新 run 且永不恢复；git > >(true) -C /outside reset --hard 把 [-C /outside reset --hard] 留作无 git 词的 other run，被 evaluateUnrecognizedRun 放行。失败场景：run1 [git] 未重定位界内，run3 无 git 词通过；bash 执行完整的重定位命令。
— qwen3.8-max via Qwen Code /review (v0.21.11)
| directory. The command-executing keys are `alias.*`, `core.askPass`, | ||
| `core.editor`, `core.fsmonitor`, `core.pager`, `core.sshCommand`, |
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[Suggestion] R12-17 still stands: the design doc's enumeration of command-executing -c/--config-env keys covers 13 of the 28 families enforced in GIT_COMMAND_CONFIG_KEY_PATTERNS (the 15 verified omissions include include.path, includeif.*.path, core.gitproxy, remote..proxy, credential.helper, browser..cmd, diff.external, gc.recentObjectsHook, and more). — Failure scenario: The committed spec undercounts the control's own deny surface by more than half; anyone porting or auditing the guard from the doc rebuilds a materially different policy.
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（见英文说明）
— qwen3.8-max via Qwen Code /review (v0.21.11)
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| The guard is a containment control against mis-targeted Git invocations | ||
| expressed in the literal forms above. It is not a sandbox against a | ||
| prompt-injected agent: script-file contents are not read, variable values are |
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[Suggestion] R13-S10: The doc twice states variable values are 'not tracked across commands' (Limitations + Non-goals), but the guard tracks shell-local values chain-wide in shellLocals and expands them via expandShellLocals — whose own JSDoc exists precisely because X=git; Y='-C <outside> reset --hard'; $X $Y is a relocation the literal scan cannot see; the doc's Policy section itself relies on chain-wide state. — Failure scenario: A maintainer reasoning from the doc treats the shellLocals/expansion machinery as out-of-scope accretion (removable or not-to-be-extended) or mis-models the control — e.g. concluding X=/outside; git -C $X reset --hard slips past, when the implemented guard resolves $X and denies. For a security control whose doc claims to enumerate its own boundary, the stated boundary is wrong.
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（见英文说明）
— qwen3.8-max via Qwen Code /review (v0.21.11)
| - No heredoc body analysis: `splitCommands` has no heredoc state, so a | ||
| heredoc body is scanned as ordinary command lines. Usually that only |
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[Suggestion] R13-S4: The heredoc Non-goal bullet is stale: it states heredoc bodies are 'scanned as ordinary command lines', but the implementation strips heredoc bodies BEFORE splitting (stripHeredocBodies applied at guard.ts:2117-2118) — probe-verified: the heredoc-wrapped relocation is allowed while the direct form denies. The user-facing qwen-serve.md heredoc sentence is stale the same way. — Failure scenario: A maintainer auditing or repairing the already-filed strip defects (R8-58/R12-6/R13-5/R13-18) reads the doc and concludes the stripping is out-of-spec dead code, or treats the documented over-denial behavior as the contract — risking a fix that restores the wrong semantics.
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（见英文说明）
— qwen3.8-max via Qwen Code /review (v0.21.11)
| }); | ||
| }); | ||
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| it('keeps the round-9 in-boundary equivalents alone', async () => { |
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[Suggestion] R12-18 still stands: an archive extraction can plant a .git file at the extraction root, but the extractor branch pushes trackedCwd only and never sets scope.relink.gitDir (contrast the ln/cp/mv branch which does); the actionable residue is the unqualified invariant comment at guard.ts:2474-2477 and design-doc silence — the TOCTOU itself is the deliberately documented tradeoff. — Failure scenario: tar -xf a.tar && git commit -m x is allowed with the comment promising relinked-.git redirects are tracked for every later command; the deterministic planted-symlink forms are caught downstream by discovery realpath, leaving the race window the comment overstates as closed.
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（见英文说明）
— qwen3.8-max via Qwen Code /review (v0.21.11)
| const guard = createDaemonToolGuard(); | ||
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| 'grep -C 5 git CHANGELOG.md', |
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[Suggestion] R12-19 still stands: the extractor branch fires on the mere presence of a PATH_EXTRACTING_PROGRAMS word with no mode inspection (probe-verified over-denial). — Failure scenario: tar -czf backup.tgz nested && git -C nested commit and tar -tzf … are denied as 'dynamic repository location' although create/list modes cannot plant a redirect — the branch's own justification is false for these modes; over-denial of benign commands.
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（见英文说明）
— qwen3.8-max via Qwen Code /review (v0.21.11)
The dangerous-config model already denies `git -c <key>=<command>` for the command-executing config families, but omitted three documented ones: `trailer.<token>.command`, `man.<tool>.cmd`, and `sendemail.(sendmailcmd|tocmd|cccmd)`. `git -c trailer.sign.command='…' interpret-trailers` (and the man/sendemail forms) ran the configured shell command while the guard allowed it. Adds the three patterns and regressions.
A note on the remaining
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Sandboxed verification: ✅ passed — merge-ready (agent verdict) - workflow run Ran the PR in an isolated, token-free container: A/B against the base build, mock-free harness assertions, targeted gates. Advisory evidence for human reviewers — not a review, an approval, or a CI check. Scripted assertions: 2545 passed · 0 failed · 2545 total 中文 — 判定：✅ 通过 · 可合入（agent 判定）沙箱验证在隔离、无凭证的容器中执行了该 PR 的代码（与 base 构建 A/B 对照、无 mock harness 断言、定向门禁）。仅作为评审证据，不构成评审、批准或 CI 检查。 脚本断言：2545 通过 · 0 失败 · 2545 总计 Verification reportPR #8687 deep verification — feat(daemon): guard cross-worktree Git mutationsVerdict: Scope chosen: (1) A/B load-bearing proof of the central claim — relocated mutating Git is denied, read-only and in-boundary commands are unaffected; (2) fail-closed sweep of novel hostile shapes against the documented promise; (3) vacuity proof of the new 373-test suite; (4) targeted gates on every touched workspace. The PR's design doc bounds its own promise: reliable for literal relocation forms, best-effort (not a boundary) against defeat-oriented shell text — sweep cells were classified against that boundary. 中文摘要
Central claim and A/BClaim: a model-issued Fixture: real
Witnesses: Notable head-arm cells that all behaved as documented: symlink-ancestor escape ( Base cell honesty note: on base there is no guard to drive, so the control proves policy absence structurally plus the consequence by executing the command exactly as the unguarded daemon would. The head↔base flip is: 0 policy decisions produced on base (mutation lands) → 232/232 correct deny decisions on head (92 matrix + 140 sweep deny cells), with all 19 legitimate cells (14 matrix + 5 sweep) still allowed. Corrections
Findings (none blocking)
Vacuity / mutation matrixSuite under test:
Witness: Targeted gates
CLI/TUI-unchanged claim verified by wiring trace, not just diff size: Not covered
MethodologyOne container ( Evidence images
Harness scripts and raw logs are in the workflow run artifacts (7-day retention). — Qwen Code · sandboxed verification |
fixed
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One traced bypass of the new removal logic at this head — a chained prefix (command builtin unset -f git with builtin shadowed, after a real command prefix) removes the masking shadow in bash but the guard never records the removal, so the final relocated git call is still replayed as the stale harmless body. One-condition fix and regression payloads in my Stage 2 comment. 🙏
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Reviewed at a0427ae (head unchanged during review). I verified every finding below on this checkout by driving createDaemonToolGuard() directly and, where the shell half mattered, by executing the same construct in real bash + real git against a two-repo lab (session repo + outside repo). The PR's own 373 guard tests pass here, so nothing below is a broken-build artifact.
Short version: I can't approve this. Not because the diff is careless — it is unusually careful — but because I reproduced 8 escapes in about an hour with plain one-liners, and measured that 7 of 30 ordinary in-bounds commands are denied, on a control that is now unconditionally on for every daemon session with no way to turn it off. I think the design doc's own "Why this cannot be made complete here" section is correct, and that it argues against merging this parser.
Critical — verified escapes at this head
Each row: guard verdict measured through createDaemonToolGuard(); "real effect" measured by running the identical construct in bash and checking whether the outside repository was actually written (payload git config --local probe.pwned <id> in the outside repo, so the proof is an artifact rather than an inference).
C1. A heredoc fed to bash is a complete one-line bypass
bash <<EOF
git -C <outside> reset --hard
EOF
Guard: ALLOWED. Real bash: executed — the outside repo was mutated (probe.pwned=HEREDOC_EXEC). Same for sh <<'EOF' … EOF and bash -s <<EOF … EOF.
Cause: stripHeredocBodies removes heredoc bodies before splitCommands, but when the heredoc is the script for bash/sh, the body is the command. This is also where both docs say the opposite of what the code does — design doc Non-goals: "a heredoc body is scanned as ordinary command lines"; user doc: "Git-shaped text inside a heredoc can be denied even though the shell never executes it". Measured behavior is the reverse in both directions: a heredoc-wrapped relocation is allowed, while echo "…git -C…" > f is denied (see M1).
C2 / C3. -- before a payload drops the payload from analysis
| command | guard | control without -- |
real effect |
|---|---|---|---|
eval -- "cd <outside>" && git reset --hard |
ALLOWED | DENIED | outside repo written |
bash -c -- "git -C <outside> reset --hard" |
ALLOWED | DENIED | outside repo written |
bash's eval/-c treat -- as end-of-options and run the rest; the re-parse classifies -- as an unrecognized program word and discards what follows.
C4. timeout eats a dynamic duration without failing closed
timeout $DUR -C <outside> reset --hard with DUR="5 git" → guard ALLOWED; bash runs timeout 5 git -C <outside> … and the outside repo was written. consumeTimeoutWrapper does a blind index++ without checking token.dynamic.
C5. The unrecognized-program backstop doesn't expand tracked locals
X='-C <outside>'; nice git $X reset --hard → ALLOWED (outside repo written)
X='-C <outside>'; git $X reset --hard → DENIED
Same variable, same relocation; adding a wrapper the guard doesn't model turns a denial into an allow. The asymmetry is the tell — evaluateUnrecognizedRun scans literal token text only.
C6. A function defined inside a compound is never recorded
if true; then f() { git reset --hard; }; fi; cd <outside>; f → guard ALLOWED; outside repo written. functionHeader is segment-start anchored, so the definition inside then … records nothing and the later bare f carries no git word.
C7. set -- +a is modeled as turning allexport off
set -a; set -- +a; GIT_WORK_TREE=<outside>; git reset --hard → guard ALLOWED. Verified with real git: git rev-parse --show-toplevel reports the outside path, i.e. the mutation lands there. set -- +a only assigns positional parameters; disablesAllExport scans past --.
C8. git config core.worktree moves the boundary for every later command
git config core.worktree <outside> → guard ALLOWED (no relocation flag in the argv, and the write itself is to the in-bounds repo). Verified afterwards, in-bounds with no flags at all:
git rev-parse --show-toplevel → <outside>
git status --short → sees the outside tree
So a following plain git reset --hard — which the guard allows, because there is nothing to see in it — mutates the outside working tree. This one persists past the command chain, which puts it in a different class from the parsing misses: it defeats the boundary for all subsequent calls in the session.
C9. sudo -i is treated as a neutral flag
sudo -i git reset --hard → guard ALLOWED, while sudo -D <outside> git reset --hard is DENIED. -i/--login starts the command in the target user's home — the same class of relocation as -D/-R, which the guard does model. (Guard verdict measured; I did not execute the sudo half locally.)
C10. Brace expansion in the wrapper option position
env {-C,<outside>} git reset --hard → guard ALLOWED. Verified bash -c 'echo {-C,<outside>}' expands to -C <outside>, so GNU env receives the chdir. The token doesn't start with -, so it misses both the flag branches and the fail-closed unrecognized-option branch, and falls through as the program word. (GNU coreutils only; env -C doesn't exist on BSD/macOS.)
C11. Prompt-less guard requests are bound only by channel-level ownership
promptId became optional, and for a prompt-less request the only binding is ownsSession(sessionId) — wired in bridge.ts as sessionIds.has(sessionId) over the whole multiplexed channel, defaulting to () => true in the constructor. The nominated session's entry.effectiveCwd then becomes the containment basis, and nothing ties the requester to the session it nominated. A worktree-pinned session can name a sibling session on the same channel and inherit its broader effectiveCwd. The paths this PR creates (subagent loops, cron turns, resumed background agents) are exactly the prompt-less ones.
Major — the false-positive cost, now unconditional
PRIVATE_EXTERNAL_TOOL_GUARD_ENV is now set to REQUIRED unconditionally, and createDaemonToolGuard(...) is wired at all three bridge sites. There is no flag, setting, or env var to disable it, so every qwen serve session pays this policy plus a child→daemon→child round trip per run_shell_command.
I ran 30 ordinary in-bounds developer commands through the guard with the session at a normal checkout. 7 were denied. The classes that worry me:
Text that merely mentions git -C is denied. All three denied with "may run a relocated Git command through an unrecognized program":
echo "use git -C dir status" > README.md
printf "%s\n" "git -C x commit" > note.txt
gh pr comment 1 --body "try git -C repo status"
while git commit -m "explain git -C usage" is allowed. Agents in this repo write notes, design docs, and gh pr comment bodies constantly; this makes documenting git behavior a denied action, inconsistently.
eval "$(…)" is always denied — "payload could not be resolved":
eval "$(direnv export bash)"
eval "$(ssh-agent -s)" && git push
eval "$(fnm env)" && npm test
That is the standard bootstrap for direnv / ssh-agent / fnm / nvm / pyenv.
An in-bounds subdirectory reached through a variable is denied, including read-only:
D=nested; git -C $D commit -m x → DENIED (dynamic repository location)
D=./nested; git -C $D status --short → DENIED
Documented as fail-closed, so not a doc mismatch — but the value is sitting in shellLocals and resolves in-bounds, so the denial is avoidable rather than necessary.
In-bounds git -C <subdir> after an archive/copy program is denied:
tar -czf backup.tgz nested && git -C nested commit -m wip → DENIED
cp -r nested copy && git -C copy commit -m x → DENIED
rsync -a nested/ copy/ && git -C nested status --short → DENIED
tar -czf is create mode — it cannot plant a .git redirect — so the branch's own justification doesn't hold for it (this is the already-filed R12-19, independently reproduced).
None of these classes are in docs/users/qwen-serve.md, so an operator hitting them has no way to recognize them as policy.
Major — hidden workspace-memory agents run with no guard at all
createHiddenWorkspaceMemoryConfig(this.config) proxies the agent-level config. toolInvocationGuard is only ever attached in newSessionConfig, and Config.toolInvocationGuard is a readonly constructor param with no setter, so on that path getToolInvocationGuard() is undefined and evaluateToolInvocationGuard never runs — no externalToolGuardPrepare is sent and the daemon never sees the call. The design doc states "hidden-agent tool calls traverse the same managed guard and are inspected by the same daemon-side policy"; the code contradicts it.
Partly mitigated: createMemoryScopedAgentConfig restricts shell to isShellCommandReadOnlyASTInDirectory. But that classifier's "read-only" is not this policy — it has no notion that a relocated status/grep refreshes the target index and runs its core.fsmonitor/textconv drivers, which is precisely why this PR excludes them from RELOCATED_READ_ONLY_GIT_SUBCOMMANDS. So the mitigation doesn't cover the case the guard was built for.
Suggestions — doc/code drift in a security document
- Design doc Non-goals and user doc both say heredoc bodies are unanalyzed / "scanned as ordinary command lines"; the code strips them (C1).
- Both docs say "variable values are not tracked across commands";
shellLocals+expandShellLocalstrack them chain-wide, and the Policy section depends on that. - The design doc enumerates ~13 of the 28 families actually enforced in
GIT_COMMAND_CONFIG_KEY_PATTERNS, so anyone re-deriving the policy from the spec builds a materially different one.
CI coverage
Test (ubuntu-latest) passes, but Test (macos-latest), Test (windows-latest), and Integration Tests (CLI, No Sandbox) are all skipping on this head. For a path-containment control this is the coverage that matters most — Windows case-insensitivity and separator handling are load-bearing for isWithinRoot and realpathNearestExistingAsync. The PR description already marks Windows/Linux
What I'd actually suggest
I want to be clear that I'm not disputing the problem. git -C <sibling-worktree> reset --hard from a daemon agent is real, and the trusted-effectiveCwd plumbing this PR adds is the right foundation.
My objection is to the parser, and the design doc already makes my argument better than I can:
The parser is now several times the size of the policy it protects […] Best-effort, not a boundary […] New ones will keep being found. […] Closing the gap properly means moving the decision off the text. The enforcement point, not the parser, is what would converge […] this one should not grow into it by accretion.
I agree with all of it. But the conclusion is that this parser shouldn't ship — 2910 production lines of partial bash semantics (tokenizer, heredoc stripping, subshell snapshot/restore, alias/function shadow replay, allexport modeling, nameref, env/sudo/timeout/shell wrapper argv models) against AGENTS.md's Simplicity First, which is the principle this project weighs most heavily. Thirteen review rounds, 295 unresolved Critical threads (273 of them not outdated), and the review tooling reporting that it "stopped at the 3-round huge-diff cap without converging" are the empirical form of the same conclusion. AGENTS.md also caps this: past ~5 rounds, land only Critical fixes — and here the Criticals are structural, not a punch list.
Concretely, I'd split this into what converges and what doesn't:
- Land now (small, useful, no guessing): the trusted context plumbing —
effectiveCwd/invocationCwdonExternalToolGuardPrepareRequest, thesessionId/cwdfields onToolInvocationGuardContextand their three call sites, andrealpathNearestExistingAsync. That's roughly 130 lines and stands on its own. Please keeppromptIdrequired, or bind the prompt-less path to the requesting session rather than to channel-level ownership (C11). - Replace the parser with a literal-form-only check (~150–250 lines):
-C,--git-dir[=],--work-tree[=], leadingGIT_DIR/GIT_WORK_TREE/GIT_COMMON_DIR/GIT_INDEX_FILE, andcdearlier in the same chain — resolve, compare, deny. Everything else allowed rather than guessed. That is exactly the case the doc calls the control's reason to exist ("a stale-C, acdthat outlived its purpose"), it drops nearly all of the FP surface above, and it makes no claim it can't keep. Addcore.worktreewrites to that list (C8) — it's a literal form and it's the one miss that survives the chain. - Do the enforcement-point change as its own design — decide where a command may write when it runs (restricted cwd, mount/namespace view, or interception at the git invocation), per the doc's own closing paragraph.
If the parser is kept in any form, it should at minimum be opt-in or disable-able (M2), so an operator hitting the eval "$(direnv …)" or echo "…git -C…" denials has a way out.
Happy to re-review a reduced version quickly. Reproduction harness for everything above is a single vitest file driving createDaemonToolGuard() plus a bash lab script — I can post it if useful.
中文摘要
在 a0427ae 上复核。所有结论均在本机独立验证：直接调用 createDaemonToolGuard() 测 guard 判定，并用真实 bash + 真实 git 在「会话仓库 / 外部仓库」双仓实验里跑同样的构造，确认外部仓库是否真的被写入。PR 自带的 373 个 guard 测试在我这里全部通过。
结论：暂不能 approve。 不是因为改动粗糙——恰恰相反它非常细致——而是我用一小时、全部是普通单行命令复现了 8 个逃逸，并测出 30 条常规「界内」命令里有 7 条被误拦；而这个控制现在对每个 daemon 会话无条件开启且无法关闭。
已验证的逃逸（guard 放行 + 真实 bash/git 确认外部仓库被改）
bash <<EOF … EOF一行完全绕过：heredoc 体在splitCommands前被剥掉，但喂给bash/sh时 heredoc 体就是脚本本身。sh <<'EOF'、bash -s <<EOF同样。两份文档在这里的描述与代码行为完全相反。eval -- "cd <外部>" && git reset --hard放行；去掉--则拒绝。bash -c -- "git -C <外部> …"放行；去掉--则拒绝。timeout $DUR -C <外部> reset --hard（DUR="5 git"）放行——consumeTimeoutWrapper未检查token.dynamic。X='-C <外部>'; nice git $X reset --hard放行，而不加nice的同一命令拒绝——backstop 只扫字面文本。if true; then f() { git reset --hard; }; fi; cd <外部>; f放行——函数定义识别锚定在段首。set -a; set -- +a; GIT_WORK_TREE=<外部>; git reset --hard放行——set -- +a只赋值位置参数，却被建模成关闭 allexport。git config core.worktree <外部>放行，之后不带任何标志的界内 git 命令即作用于外部工作树（已验证rev-parse --show-toplevel与status）。这一条会跨越整个命令链持续生效，性质比其他解析漏洞更严重。sudo -i git reset --hard放行，而sudo -D被拒——-i会切到目标用户 home，属同类重定位。env {-C,<外部>} git reset --hard放行——花括号展开后的 token 不以-开头，绕过了所有分支（仅 GNU env）。- 无 prompt 的 guard 请求只靠 channel 级
ownsSession校验，请求方与其声明的 sessionId 之间没有任何绑定，可借兄弟会话更宽的effectiveCwd作为边界。
误拦成本（现已对所有人无条件生效，且无关闭开关）：30 条常规界内命令拒绝 7 条。最麻烦的几类：字符串里只要出现 git -C 就被拒（echo … > README.md、printf、gh pr comment --body，而 git commit -m "…git -C…" 却放行）；eval "$(direnv export bash)" / ssh-agent / fnm 一律被拒；界内子目录经变量引用被拒（连只读 status 也拒）；tar -czf（创建模式本身无法植入重定向）、cp -r、rsync 之后的界内 git -C <子目录> 被拒。这些都没有写进用户文档。
隐藏 memory agent 完全没有 guard：createHiddenWorkspaceMemoryConfig 代理的是 agent 级 config，而 toolInvocationGuard 只在 newSessionConfig 挂载且无 setter，因此该路径上 getToolInvocationGuard() 为 undefined。设计文档的承诺与代码矛盾。memory-scoped 权限层的「只读 shell」限制并不等价于本策略（它不知道重定位的 status/grep 会跑目标仓库的 fsmonitor/textconv——而这正是本 PR 拒绝它们的原因）。
CI：Test (macos-latest)、Test (windows-latest)、Integration Tests (CLI, No Sandbox) 在此 head 上均为 skipping。对一个路径包含性控制来说，这恰是最关键的覆盖。
建议：设计文档自己的「Why this cannot be made complete here」已经把结论写清楚了——「parser 已是它所保护策略的数倍大小」「best-effort, not a boundary」「真正收敛的是执行点而不是 parser，本改动不应以累加方式长成那个东西」。我完全同意，而这个结论指向的是这个 parser 不应合入。对照 AGENTS.md 最看重的 Simplicity First，2910 行 production 代码的偏 bash 语义模拟、13 轮评审、295 条未解决 Critical、以及评审工具「三轮未收敛即停」的记录，都是同一结论的经验形态。
拆分建议：(1) 先合入可信上下文管道（effectiveCwd/invocationCwd、ToolInvocationGuardContext 的 sessionId/cwd、realpathNearestExistingAsync，约 130 行），但 promptId 保持必填或把无 prompt 路径绑定到请求方会话；(2) 用 150–250 行的纯字面形式检查替代 parser（-C、--git-dir、--work-tree、前置 GIT_*、同链 cd，外加 core.worktree 写入），其余一律放行而不猜测——这正好覆盖文档所说「本控制存在的理由」，且不做守不住的承诺；(3) 执行点方案（受限 cwd / mount-namespace 视图 / 在 git 调用处拦截）作为独立设计推进。若仍保留 parser，至少要做成可选或可关闭。
需要的话我可以把复现用的 vitest 文件和 bash 实验脚本贴出来。
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Released in v0.21.12. |
7 participants
What this PR does
Adds a built-in host-side guard for model-issued
run_shell_commandcalls inqwen serve. The guard recognizes Git repository relocation through-C,--work-tree, and--git-dir, then blocks mutating or unclassified commands when the resolved target escapes the session's current effective working directory. It uses daemon-owned session state, composes before an optional external guard, handles compound shell forms, dynamic targets, symlink ancestors, chained-C, and Git global options with values.Worktree sessions use their live
effectiveCwdas the boundary, so mutations inside the session's own worktree remain allowed while mutations targeting another checkout or worktree are denied. Read-only relocated Git commands remain allowed.The managed guard is installed only for daemon ACP children. CLI/TUI shell validation, permission classification, confirmation, YOLO behavior, and shared core tool execution are unchanged.
Why it's needed
A daemon model can start a shell inside its assigned workspace but relocate Git to another checkout with
git -C,--work-tree, or--git-dir. That bypasses the existing shell working-directory boundary and can mutate a sibling worktree or unrelated checkout. Enforcing the boundary in the daemon host prevents the ACP child from forging workspace context and avoids changing normal CLI behavior.Reviewer Test Plan
How to verify
git -C <other-worktree> reset --hardis denied before execution.--work-tree,--git-dir, a dynamic relocation target, a symlinked path, a compound command, and a value-taking Git global option such as--namespace; each mutating or unclassified external relocation should be denied.git -C <other-worktree> rev-parse HEADremains allowed, and thatstatus/grepdo not (they refresh the target index and run itscore.fsmonitor/textconv drivers), nor doescat-file --textconv.effectiveCwdremains subject only to the existing permission flow.Evidence (Before & After)
N/A — daemon policy change with unit and integration coverage; no UI changes.
Tested on
Environment (optional)
macOS, Node.js 22-compatible workspace. Passed: 25 daemon guard tests, 5 managed ACP guard tests, 97 ACP bridge tests, ACP bridge typecheck, targeted ESLint, Prettier, pre-commit hooks, normal CLI Git regression tests (36/36 in independent verification),
npm run dev -- --version, and daemon startup. The targetedrun-qwen-serve.test.tscould not be collected in this checkout because the workspace is missing@qwen-code/channel-github; the root build/typecheck is blocked by the same missing channel packages and existing unrelated type errors.Risk & Scope
Linked Issues
N/A
中文说明
本 PR 做了什么
为
qwen serve中模型发出的run_shell_command调用增加 Daemon host 侧内置 guard。该 guard 识别通过-C、--work-tree、--git-dir进行的 Git 仓库重定位；当解析后的目标逃出 session 当前有效工作目录时，阻止可变更或无法分类的命令。策略使用 Daemon 持有的可信 session 状态，在可选 external guard 之前执行，并覆盖 compound shell、动态目标、symlink ancestor、连续-C以及带值的 Git 全局选项。Worktree session 使用实时
effectiveCwd作为边界，因此 session 自己 worktree 内的 mutation 仍然允许，而指向其他 checkout 或 worktree 的 mutation 会被拒绝。重定位后的只读 Git 命令仍然允许。Managed guard 只安装到 Daemon ACP child。CLI/TUI 的 shell 校验、权限分类、确认、YOLO 行为以及共享 core tool 执行均保持不变。
为什么需要
Daemon 模型可以让 shell 从分配的 workspace 内启动，但通过
git -C、--work-tree或--git-dir将 Git 重定位到另一个 checkout。这会绕过现有 shell 工作目录边界，并可能修改 sibling worktree 或无关 checkout。把边界放在 Daemon host 强制执行，可以防止 ACP child 伪造 workspace context，同时避免改变普通 CLI 行为。Reviewer Test Plan
如何验证
git -C <other-worktree> reset --hard等 mutation 命令在执行前被拒绝。--work-tree、--git-dir、动态 relocation target、symlink path、compound command，以及--namespace这类带值的 Git 全局选项；所有指向外部的 mutation 或无法分类命令都应被拒绝。git -C <other-worktree> rev-parse HEAD仍然允许；而status/grep不再允许（它们会刷新目标 index 并运行其core.fsmonitor/textconv 驱动），cat-file --textconv同样不允许。effectiveCwd内目录的 Git mutation 仍只受现有 permission flow 约束。Evidence（Before & After）
N/A——这是带单元和集成覆盖的 Daemon 策略改动，没有 UI 变化。
Tested on
Environment（可选）
macOS，Node.js 22 兼容 workspace。已通过：25 个 Daemon guard 测试、5 个 managed ACP guard 测试、97 个 ACP bridge 测试、ACP bridge typecheck、定向 ESLint、Prettier、pre-commit hooks、普通 CLI Git 回归测试（独立验证 36/36）、
npm run dev -- --version和 Daemon 启动。当前 checkout 缺少@qwen-code/channel-github，因此定向run-qwen-serve.test.ts无法完成测试收集；root build/typecheck 也被相同的 channel package 缺失和已有无关类型错误阻塞。风险与范围
Linked Issues
N/A