docs: refresh repository directory map - #54
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…h-current-structure docs: refresh repository directory map
…resh chain Forward bump 84b1620 -> d41bd8e on PMOVES.AI-Edition-Hardened, landing the full anti-extractive token-structure refresh + policy-variable weave-in: #53 distributeByAttribution (Dirichlet distribution) #54 CommitmentModel (commitment-first attribution) #55 coordinator wire — Gaussian retired from the sim flow #56 policy variables (contributionMeasure, soulbound) #57 scenario-sweep harness (Gini/concentration/D12 per policy) #58 concentration cap (maxConcentration) #59 FoodUSD vendor-lock (toward $CRED) Each PR independently code-reviewed and TDD-green (390 tests). Implements the directions in pmoves/docs/architecture/TOKEN_STRUCTURE_REFRESH.md and the open decisions parameterized in pmoves/docs/CATACLYSM_CROSSLINKS.md. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…resh chain Forward bump 84b1620 -> d41bd8e on PMOVES.AI-Edition-Hardened, landing the full anti-extractive token-structure refresh + policy-variable weave-in: #53 distributeByAttribution (Dirichlet distribution) #54 CommitmentModel (commitment-first attribution) #55 coordinator wire — Gaussian retired from the sim flow #56 policy variables (contributionMeasure, soulbound) #57 scenario-sweep harness (Gini/concentration/D12 per policy) #58 concentration cap (maxConcentration) #59 FoodUSD vendor-lock (toward $CRED) Each PR independently code-reviewed and TDD-green (390 tests). Implements the directions in pmoves/docs/architecture/TOKEN_STRUCTURE_REFRESH.md and the open decisions parameterized in pmoves/docs/CATACLYSM_CROSSLINKS.md. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…ign a contested ballot (#2154) * docs(fordham): ballot prior art + A2UI reconciliation — HMAC cannot sign a contested ballot The pilot package plans to receipt resident votes with sign_cgp() -- symmetric HMAC (chit_security.py:91). Whoever holds the key can forge any ballot and any tally, and the operator holds the key. For a contested governance vote, where the operator's neutrality is itself the question, that is disqualifying. It also defeats the record-keeping purpose: an artifact its own custodian can forge carries little evidentiary weight. Integrity against outsiders and verifiability against the operator are different properties; this needs the second one. Fix: Ed25519 -- and we already wrote it. PMOVES-ClawZ/ui/src/ui/ device-identity.ts on @noble/ed25519 3.1.0 already does keypair + SHA-256-fingerprint-as-id + persistence. Port that pattern; don't hand-roll crypto. (My first draft recorded "no Ed25519 anywhere in the repo" -- a survey result I hadn't checked. Wrong. The doc flags the error, because "we already built this and forgot" is the failure mode it exists to stop.) Also lands what neither lane had: voting-systems prior art. Repo-wide greps returned Benaloh 0 files, ElectionGuard 0, "coercion resistance" 0, Ostrom 0. Every design decision now tracks to a citation (Helios, Delaune/Kremer/Ryan, Juels/Catalano/Jakobsson, BeleniosRF, Estonian revoting, NY BCL 602). Findings: - Two lanes built the same thing and contradict each other on voting basis -- the decision this package's own README calls most consequential. The pilot lane is the better work; A2UI pm-ballot was built without reading it. - Helios -- the reference system -- scopes itself to LOW-COERCION environments. A contested cooperative recall is not one. - Receipt-freeness: #2153's nonce gives the voter a durable proof of their own vote, which a coercer can simply demand. Estonia time-limits verification (~30min) precisely because a durable receipt IS the coercion instrument. - status:"superseded" defeats revoting -- the anti-coercion mechanism only works if the ballot count stays secret. That is the documented Estonian eID-log leak, reproduced by design. - Petition and secret ballot are opposite instruments and cannot be one component. US labor law already encodes the split (authorization cards vs NLRB election). A provable ballot is a validity risk: counsel argues procedure, not merits. - NY practice: the managing agent is often the inspector of election. An inspector drawn from the incumbent side is structurally conflicted, whatever the facts of a given building -- and no amount of cryptography fixes a conflicted tabulator. - Research integrity: the "~500 vs ~750 tokens" collusion finding in articles_long.md is fabricated -- no simulation exists. The QV formula and the DAO constitution's quorum numbers are unsourced. Counter-example and standard to copy: ECONOMIC_MODEL_VALIDATION_REPORT.md (real bibliography, 34 tests, honest about its limits). Corrects two lines in the existing package: "one signing key underwrites both trust surfaces" holds for agent trails, fails for ballots; and the "ballot is just another CGP payload" reduction is what carries the HMAC flaw. Adds 5 items to the Legal Review Register and 3 Open Operator Decisions. Buildable today with no election-law exposure: the bylaws corpus, on the real pdf-ingest -> extract-worker -> Qdrant/Meili -> hi-rag-gateway-v2 chain. Note on framing: this repo squash-merges using COMMIT_MESSAGES, so commit text lands on main. Threats are described structurally here; no party is named. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(pr): address all CodeRabbit + Codex review comments on #2154 Review fixes: - amd-voice.yml: reset inherited NVIDIA device reservation (Codex P2), use compose service DNS for Ultimate TTS URL instead of host.docker.internal (Codex P2) - ballot prior-art doc: distinguish Ed25519 authentication from ballot secrecy, add key enrollment/revocation requirements (CR Major); make repo-wide grep claim reproducible with exact commands + revision (CR Minor); align pipeline status wording with §8 MODELED (CR Minor) - mcp_inventory.json + test_mcp_config_generator.py: update cipher SSE path from /mcp/sse to /api/mcp/sse to match actual endpoint (CR) Infrastructure fixes (session convergence): - docker-compose.yml: cipher-api Ollama URL → host.docker.internal + extra_hosts for GPU passthrough - crush-env.sh: new env resolver script for tier file ${VAR} chain resolution - crush-pmoves: source crush-env.sh before/after bootstrap - pmoves-mini: use .venv-pmoves Python (typer/PyYAML available) All 17 MCP config generator tests pass. * fix(crush-env): use BASH_SOURCE[0] directly for sourced path resolution The ${1:-...} fallback incorrectly picked up the caller's first positional argument when sourced. BASH_SOURCE[0] always resolves to the script's own path, which is the correct behavior for source. * docs(fordham): voter-identity key-custody + token-structure refresh decision records Two decision records extending the Fordham decision-record lane (07): 08-voter-identity-key-custody.md — decides how a resident's identity/key works for a contested ballot. An adversarial review inverted the intuitive "resident signs their vote" design: signing a choice is a coercion receipt, WebAuthn-primary disenfranchises an elderly electorate, and operator-run enrollment recreates forgeability. Corrected architecture: residents authenticate eligibility (they do not sign their choice); an election committee threshold-signs the tally (no single party can forge); a paper ballot is a first-class equal path; the eligibility credential is decoupled from Archon minting and the token structure. Generalizes to a two-mode primitive (adversarial/secret vs consensual/attributable) with a mode-separation invariant. TOKEN_STRUCTURE_REFRESH.md — the incentive engine beneath the consensual mode. Current structure carries a plutocratic on-chain layer (stake-locked voting power, freely-transferable token) contradicting a fair-but-unwired off-chain attribution layer (Dirichlet, everyone non-zero). Refresh direction: standing from real, agreed, kept commitments — not capital held/locked/traded. Concrete diffs: sever governance power from stake, make credit soul-bound, and wire distributeWeekly() to the existing Dirichlet weights instead of a Gaussian draw. Anti-extractive, anti-rent-seeking, anti-money-changing, anti-speculative by construction. Both DRAFT, REQUIRES LEGAL REVIEW (securities question counsel-gated). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(cataclysm): crystallize token-cooperative spec into the crosslinks bridge Refreshes the stale (2026-03-11) vision↔implementation bridge via a 9-agent fan-out reconciling CATACLYSM_STUDIOS_INC/ (L1–L5) against built code. Headline finding: there is no single token trinity — there are two competing designs. The DOCUMENTED trinity ($CAT governance / $WORK reputation SBT / $CRED spend credit) has zero code; the BUILT design is a dual-token FoodUSD+GroToken core (the design the DAO docs claim to supersede) plus mechanics + off-chain Dirichlet/commitment layer. Decision (Path A): built FoodUSD+GroToken is canonical for the sim/utility layer now; $CAT/$WORK/$CRED is the target governance-layer redesign. Adds the built⇄ documented mapping, spec⇄code gap matrix, 9 contradictions, binding boundaries, and 10 open decisions. Records the coordinator Dirichlet wire as done (PR #55). DRAFT — every clause touching a binding vote or token-as-investment is counsel-gated. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore(submodule): bump PMOVES-ToKenism-Multi to pick up the token-refresh chain Forward bump 84b1620 -> d41bd8e on PMOVES.AI-Edition-Hardened, landing the full anti-extractive token-structure refresh + policy-variable weave-in: #53 distributeByAttribution (Dirichlet distribution) #54 CommitmentModel (commitment-first attribution) #55 coordinator wire — Gaussian retired from the sim flow #56 policy variables (contributionMeasure, soulbound) #57 scenario-sweep harness (Gini/concentration/D12 per policy) #58 concentration cap (maxConcentration) #59 FoodUSD vendor-lock (toward $CRED) Each PR independently code-reviewed and TDD-green (390 tests). Implements the directions in pmoves/docs/architecture/TOKEN_STRUCTURE_REFRESH.md and the open decisions parameterized in pmoves/docs/CATACLYSM_CROSSLINKS.md. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(cataclysm): mark parameterized open decisions + policy-knob library Round-2 weave-in landed (submodule #53–#59, gitlink bumped): the sweepable open decisions are now testable config knobs measured by the scenario-sweep harness, not pre-decided. Marks #4 (soulbound), #6 (concentration cap), #7 (FoodUSD vendor-lock) as PARAMETERIZED; adds a policy-variable table with measured Gini/ concentration effects; notes LoyaltyPoints/RewardsPool (#2) as the remaining dedicated increment. Distribution is now commitment-first + Dirichlet (Gaussian retired). DRAFT — counsel-gated where member-facing. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(spec): EqualWeightGovernor design (governance replacement, stage 1) Brainstormed design for the tractable first increment of the #5 governance replacement: an equal-weight (member/unit/share knob) governor with roll-% quorum and a modeled M-of-N committee finalize gate (crypto stubbed behind a pluggable TallySigner). Drop-in sim/bridge replacement for the plutocratic CoopGovernor, which stays intact as the sweep contrast. Stages 2–5 (real threshold crypto, voter-card credentials, secret-ballot integration, paper parity) are sequenced as later counsel-gated lanes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(plan): EqualWeightGovernor implementation plan (5 TDD tasks) Bite-sized, red-first plan for stage 1 of the #5 governance replacement: roll+proposal+member-basis tally → castVote validation → basis contrast → roll-% quorum+pass → k-of-n finalize gate + TallySigner. Full code per step, CoopGovernor untouched, ends with PR + review + admin-merge. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(ci): regenerate agents.yml overlay to clear compose drift * chore(submodule): bump PMOVES-ToKenism-Multi — EqualWeightGovernor (#60) Forward bump picking up PR #60: the equal-weight governor (member/unit/share knob, roll-% quorum, k-of-n committee finalize gate) — stage 1 of the #5 governance replacement. CoopGovernor left intact as the sweep contrast. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(spec): MemberRegistry design (governance replacement, stage 3) Committee-controlled eligibility roll: enrol/revoke each require k-of-n committee approval (closes the enrollment chokepoint 08 flags), decoupled from tokens, roll() feeds EqualWeightGovernor.setRoll(). Crypto stubbed behind the same M-of-N gate pattern as stage 1. Stage 3 of the #5 arc. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(plan): MemberRegistry implementation plan (3 TDD tasks) Enrol with k-of-n gate + config validation → revoke + active-only roll() → integration proof (roll drives the governor). Full code per step, imports EligibleMember from stage 1, no existing model modified. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore(submodule): bump — MemberRegistry (#61) + committee-genesis spec note Forward bump picking up PR #61: committee-controlled eligibility roll (M-of-N enrol/revoke) — stage 3 of the #5 governance replacement. Spec updated to state the committee-constitution trust assumption explicitly (review). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(gov): stage-2 Ed25519 multisig TallySigner design spec Real third-party-verifiable committee signature replacing MockThresholdSigner behind the same TallySigner interface. k-of-n Ed25519 multisig (not FROST — accountability is a feature at the tally layer); loose committee keyring; keys injected (custody documented, not coded); float-excluded netstring preimage shared by signer + verifier; verifyTallyAttestation is the third-party informing surface (public keys only). Honors fordham-hill/08 ('replaces single-operator HMAC') and the inform-not-decide north star. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Summary
folders.mdwith a current depth-2 tree of the repositoryTesting
https://chatgpt.com/codex/tasks/task_b_68ce4025b5188324a8c5aaece2b415b4