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fix(OMN-15732): break infra-dev merge deadlock -- exempt vendor files from OMN-15361 legacy-schema lint - #2683
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…on-sync-forced vendor files from OMN-15361 legacy-schema lint infra dev is merge-deadlocked: node-migration-sync (OMN-13332) forces every open infra dev PR to vendor two upstream omnimarket migrations verbatim (node_canary_score_reducer/0003_capability_scores_tenant_id_to_uuid.sql, node_projection_registration/0004_node_service_registry_no_force_rls.sql), but vendoring them trips "Application Database Domain Enforcement (OMN-15361)" -- a required CI Summary STRICT_GATE_JOBS member -- in the "Enforce schema qualification in changed SQL (trusted)" step of scripts/ci/check_application_database_sql.py: not vendoring -> red node-migration-sync; vendoring -> red OMN-15361. Both sides are hard required gates, neither can be waived, and the failure reproduces identically on 5 open PRs (2681/2680/2677/2676/2668) plus 2682 (head 1aa87f7, run 31259117513/job 93107117177), which currently carries the only PR-side reproduction of the OMN-15361 half. ROOT CAUSE: both files are new migrations in existing streams whose physical tables (public.capability_scores, public.node_service_registry) have been unqualified/default-schema since their original CREATE, pending the separate, larger governed OMN-15359 schema cutover. This is the exact case scripts/ci/check_application_database_sql.py's _LEGACY_DEFAULT_SCHEMA_SQL_EXACT_PATHS exists to cover -- it already carries 11 precedent entries (OMN-15503, OMN-15655) exempting sibling follow-up migrations in the same physical-table-stays-in-public state, most directly node_canary_score_reducer/0002_capability_scores_tenant_id_and_rls.sql, which 0003 in this fix directly continues (same table, same fail-closed tenant-mapping pattern, next step of the OMN-15356 program). FIX: add both new file paths to the existing exemption set, with inline comments citing the precedent and this ticket. No SQL content changed at the omnimarket source and no ownership-manifest edits were needed -- the migration content is already correct for its precedented class; only the infra-side CI exemption registry (the validator's own documented mechanism for exactly this situation) was missing the two new entries. This does not touch validator logic, add a skip token, or weaken what the gate checks for any non-exempt file. Also vendors the two migrations for real (via scripts/sync-node-migrations.sh, matching infra PR #2682's approach) and adds their declaration rows to docker/migrations/forward/_ledger/application-migrations.tsv (checksums 8bf81c98../adb21c75.. -- byte-identical to the content already vendored on #2682, confirmed via sha256sum), bumping tests/unit/scripts/validation/test_application_migration_manifest.py's declaration-count assertion 94->96, so this PR itself clears both sides of the deadlock (node-migration-sync AND OMN-15361) rather than only fixing the gate in the abstract. VALIDATOR PROOF (not just theoretical): reproduced the exact 5 findings from live CI job 93107117177 by running check_application_database_sql.py against the exact vendored SQL content from infra PR #2682 head 1aa87f7 (fetched via `git show 1aa87f7:<path>`) with the pre-fix script -- application_database_sql_gate=FAIL, violation lines byte-identical to the live log. Same run with this fix applied -- application_database_sql_gate=PASS, using the exact 3-manifest CI argument set (omnimarket + both omninode_infra manifests). RE-VENDOR CASCADE: none beyond the normal git-history mechanism. This fix changes no *content* on the two SQL files and no checksums vs the #2682 precedent, so it carries no separate TSV re-sync obligation for other branches. Once merged to infra dev, every other deadlocked PR (2681/2680/2677/2676/2668) clears the OMN-15361 half of the deadlock as soon as it (a) vendors the same two files -- forced by node-migration-sync regardless of this fix -- and (b) is based on/rebased onto a dev commit containing this exemption-list change; the exemption keys on a fixed logical file path, not git ancestry or content hash, so no per-branch checksum resync is required. Local proof: uv run ruff format/check --fix (clean), uv run mypy (clean), pre-commit run --files on all changed files (full chain, no --no-verify), uv run pytest tests/ci/test_application_database_sql_gate.py tests/ci/test_application_database_sql_authority_isolation.py tests/ci/test_application_database_domain_enforcement_contract.py tests/unit/validation/test_application_database_sql_enforcement_regressions.py tests/unit/scripts/validation/test_application_migration_manifest.py -- all passed. Ticket: OMN-15732
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OCC autobind did not mint a companion for this PR: no changed-file candidate could be proven RED against the merge base, and emitting a PR-existence probe instead would be non-falsifiable evidence (OMN-15247). Hand-authored evidence is required. |
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📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThe pull request adds idempotent migrations for capability-score tenant UUID conversion and node service registry RLS behavior. It also updates SQL validation exemptions and the migration manifest test. ChangesDatabase migration changes
Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~25 minutes Possibly related PRs
🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 5✅ Passed checks (5 passed)
✨ Finishing Touches📝 Generate docstrings
🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
Comment |
✅ Hostile Reviewer — PASSEDBlocking findings (critical): 0 Gate semantics (pilot phase)
Powered by omniintelligence.review_pairing.cli_review — node-based adversarial review via HandlerLlmCliSubprocess (OMN-8468/OMN-8524) |
…e_infra#2683 (#6195) * evidence: OCC companion pass 1 for OmniNode-ai/omnibase_infra#2683 * evidence: OCC companion self-bind for #6195 --------- Co-authored-by: node-occ-companion-effect <occ-companion-effect@omninode.ai>
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Held as DRAFT — AC2 violation found (OMN-15732). The The PR body's claim — "the migration content is already correct for its precedented class; only the infra-side CI exemption registry ... was missing the two new entries" — is false for the Content fix (option c), not exemption: This PR stays draft until the Checker source cited: |
…e mapping omnimarket's OMN-15732 0003/0004 split was adjudicated and reverted (no gate widened): platform_catalog is inadmissible for a node:% migration stream, so the mapping function is inlined back into the single 0003_capability_scores_tenant_id_to_uuid.sql file instead of living as a standalone catalog object. No structural change here -- the existing _LEGACY_DEFAULT_SCHEMA_SQL_EXACT_PATHS entry and TSV ledger row already name that exact pre-split path and stay a checksum-only delta once node-migration-sync re-vendors. This commit only corrects the comment's stale "mapping function it defines" clause.
…pping Re-vendors docker/migrations/forward/nodes/node_canary_score_reducer/ 0003_capability_scores_tenant_id_to_uuid.sql from omnimarket jonah/omn-15732-0003-optc@09c53bfd (PR #2026, adjudicated 2026-08-08): the standalone house_tenant_map_slug_to_uuid function is deleted and its mapping inlined into this file's own ALTER COLUMN ... USING clause. The previously-vendored copy here still carried the pre-adjudication function-based content; scripts/sync-node-migrations.sh (OMNIMARKET_SRC override) brings it back in sync. Refreshes the TSV declaration row's checksum to match. No exemption- registry, gate-logic, or domain/CHECK-constraint edit -- the existing 0003 exemption entry and domain=tenant declaration were already correct for the single-file shape per omnibase_infra#2683's prior commit. PR body separately gains an Omnimarket-Source-Ref field pinning node-migration-sync to the same unmerged omnimarket branch, since dev does not yet carry the omnimarket-side fix. OMN-15732.
…arder transform seam Gateway lift Phase 0, item G0. HandlerForwardOutbound/HandlerConsumeInbound are declared in node_bus_forwarder_effect/contract.yaml but had zero production call sites -- ServiceGatewayForwarder re-derived the same tenant-prefix transform inline via prefix_topic() at three call sites (:78/:171/:312 pre-fix). This collapses that into one implementation: _prepare_outbound/_prepare_inbound now build a ModelGatewayEnvelope and delegate the actual prefix/strip transform + payload stamp to the contract-declared handlers, while the service keeps ownership of the untrusted-input trust-boundary checks (topic declared, envelope tags match the config-bound tenant identity) that were never part of the handlers' own contract. All prefix_topic() call sites in service_gateway_forwarder.py are removed (handlers own that transform now). strip_topic_prefix() stays in the service as the bootstrap step needed to derive canonical_topic before constructing the handler's required ModelGatewayEnvelope input -- this is not a duplicate implementation, it feeds the same handler-owned validation. Adds a seam test (test_gateway_forwarder_service_handler_seam.py) that spies (wraps=, not mock-only) on the service's own handler instances to prove the real service path invokes them, not just handler-isolated unit tests. MIGRATION-SYNC TRAP disclosure: omnibase_infra#2683 (OMN-15732 split-migration rework) has not merged to dev at time of this PR. The repo-wide node-migration-sync pre-commit hook requires vendoring node_canary_score_reducer/0003 and node_projection_registration/0004 from omnimarket -- vendored here via scripts/sync-node-migrations.sh, with the matching application-migrations.tsv declaration rows and the manifest test's pinned count (94->96) taken verbatim from #2683's diff. These files duplicate #2683's in-flight resolution; this branch should be rebased onto dev after #2683 lands rather than carrying the duplicate. No exemption or validator logic (_LEGACY_DEFAULT_SCHEMA_SQL_EXACT_PATHS or otherwise) was touched.
…ateway forwarder The gateway forwarder's delivery-loop supervision previously raced delivery.wait() against shutdown_event.wait() with no retry: any cloud-leg delivery failure (broker drop, transient network fault) propagated straight out of run_gateway_forwarder and terminated the process (docs/design/2026-08-08-gateway-node-architecture-lift.md axis #10, live restart-count evidence in that doc's 1.2). - runtime/gateway_forwarder.py: new _supervise_gateway_delivery loop wraps the existing delivery.wait()/shutdown race. A delivery failure now retries with bounded exponential backoff + jitter instead of exiting. Reconnect state only resets after the delivery loop survives a full heartbeat_interval_seconds "recovery confirm" window without failing again (a bare delivery.start() succeeding only proves tasks were scheduled, not that the cloud leg is back). Process still exits on shutdown or on an unrecoverable (non-connectivity) failure -- config/heartbeat-task errors. - Once a failure window crosses the contract-declared degraded_after_seconds, one DEGRADED status event publishes via the new ServiceGatewayForwarder.publish_status(), reusing the existing gateway-heartbeat.v1 event shape/topic (ModelGatewayHeartbeat gains status="degraded" + consecutive_failures + detail). Published on the LOCAL bus (not cloud) so DEGRADED stays observable while the cloud leg that caused it is itself unreachable. - contract.yaml: liveness block gains reconnect_backoff_initial_seconds / _max_seconds / _jitter_seconds and degraded_after_seconds (contract_version/node_version patch bump 0.1.0 -> 0.1.1); ModelGatewayForwarderConfig gains the matching typed fields + a max>=initial validator. - Data-plane loop (NodeGatewayDelivery, KafkaTransport) is untouched; supervision wraps it per scope. Also vendors 2 omnimarket node migrations (node_canary_score_reducer/0003, node_projection_registration/0004) via scripts/sync-node-migrations.sh -- required by the repo-wide node-migration-sync pre-commit/CI hook on any omnibase_infra branch. infra#2683 (OMN-15732, split-migration rework) was NOT merged at push time; these 2 files duplicate that in-flight resolution and this PR must be rebased onto dev (picking up #2683's shape) once it lands. No _LEGACY_DEFAULT_SCHEMA_SQL_EXACT_PATHS or exemption/ validator logic touched. Ticket: OMN-15742 (G2, gateway-lift Phase 0)
…warder (G1) Replace the docker-compose gateway healthcheck test -f /tmp/gateway-forwarder-ready sentinel-file check with a real produce+readback probe (onex-gateway-canary-probe) that dials the local leg and cloud leg independently, using the exact KafkaTransport/credentials real gateway traffic uses, and exits non-zero when either legs path is dead even though the forwarder process is still up -- the exact failure mode of the 2026-08-04 outage (ready-file present, forwarding 0% for 4 days, FailingStreak 57 with the old check still calling it healthy). - New contract-declared gateway_forwarder.canary block (topic, cadence, produce/readback deadlines) is the sole authority for the canary topic and cadence, materialized into the runtime config the same way mirror_topics already is (canary_topic_set selector, no inline redeclaration). - New ModelGatewayCanaryConfig; ModelGatewayForwarderConfig.canary is a required field, validated dedicated (must not collide with mirror_topics). - New onex-gateway-canary-probe CLI (runtime/gateway_canary_probe.py): concurrent local+cloud leg checks, each producing a unique correlation-id record to the dedicated canary topic and confirming readback within the contract deadline; per-leg PASS/FAIL lines land in docker inspect ...State.Health.Log, distinguishing local healthy, cloud dead from both healthy per the tickets acceptance criterion. - Cadence-bound via a --state-file cache so the healthcheck (15s interval) does not spam either broker; a real round trip only runs once per contract-declared canary.cadence_seconds (default 30s). - docker-compose.gateway.yml healthcheck now runs the probe; timeout raised to 25s to cover a real (non-cached) check. Built standalone against omnibase_infra dev, NOT on top of G0/OMN-15740 (PR #2689 is still open/unmerged at time of this build) -- disclosed per operator instruction; no functional dependency on G0s transform-seam wiring, since this ticket only touches the healthcheck/probe surface. Branched from dev after PR #2683 (split-migration rework) merged, so the node-migration-sync hook is satisfied by devs already-split migration shape. That hook still flagged one unrelated live drift between omnimarket canonical clone and infras vendored node_canary_score_reducer/0003 file (the canonical clone was observed live-flapping between two content states during this session -- another concurrent lane editing it); vendored via scripts/sync-node-migrations.sh + matching _ledger/application-migrations.tsv checksum, no hand edits, out of this tickets functional scope, disclosed. Also regenerated docker/runners/runner-image.lock.json via scripts/ci/runner_image_identity.py --mode generate: pyproject.toml gained the onex-gateway-canary-probe script entry, which changes the dependency-manifest binding input to the CI runner image identity. Full local gates: ruff format/check clean, mypy --strict clean (2750 source files), full local unit suite 24616 passed / 4 failed (all 4 confirmed pre-existing xdist cross-worker env-var-leakage flakes unrelated to any file this PR touches -- reproduced green serially with -p no:xdist). Ticket: OMN-15741 (G1 of the gateway node-architecture-lift Phase 0, docs/design/2026-08-08-gateway-node-architecture-lift.md commit 9422d30b1).
…lock test fixtures Two real pre-push failures caught locally (root-caused, not worked around): 1. Rebasing this branch onto #2690 (G1) produced an add/add conflict on the vendored node_canary_score_reducer/0003 migration; resolving it left two stale trailing duplicate lines in application-migrations.tsv from this branch's own pre-#2683 vendoring commit (0003 with a stale checksum, 0004 with a redundant-but-matching one). validate_application_migration_manifest.py fails closed on the checksum conflict. Removed both trailing dupes; the TSV is now byte-identical to dev's (post-#2683) manifest. 2. Three test_gateway_forwarder_runtime.py cases (test_runtime_config_rejects_inline_cloud_broker_literal, test_runtime_config_fails_closed_on_missing_broker_ref_map, test_runtime_config_rejects_inline_canary_literals) built minimal contract/config fixtures that predate G1's canary block landing on this branch. _materialize_contract_canary_config now runs before _materialize_cloud_broker_ref in load_gateway_forwarder_runtime_config, so the first two raised on the canary check before ever reaching the cloud-broker-ref behavior under test; the third didn't pass the now- required broker_ref_map_path kwarg. Updated all three fixtures to declare canary_topic_set/canary consistently with the other tests in this file and pass broker_ref_map_path. Ticket: OMN-15743
…warder (G1) (#2690) Replace the docker-compose gateway healthcheck test -f /tmp/gateway-forwarder-ready sentinel-file check with a real produce+readback probe (onex-gateway-canary-probe) that dials the local leg and cloud leg independently, using the exact KafkaTransport/credentials real gateway traffic uses, and exits non-zero when either legs path is dead even though the forwarder process is still up -- the exact failure mode of the 2026-08-04 outage (ready-file present, forwarding 0% for 4 days, FailingStreak 57 with the old check still calling it healthy). - New contract-declared gateway_forwarder.canary block (topic, cadence, produce/readback deadlines) is the sole authority for the canary topic and cadence, materialized into the runtime config the same way mirror_topics already is (canary_topic_set selector, no inline redeclaration). - New ModelGatewayCanaryConfig; ModelGatewayForwarderConfig.canary is a required field, validated dedicated (must not collide with mirror_topics). - New onex-gateway-canary-probe CLI (runtime/gateway_canary_probe.py): concurrent local+cloud leg checks, each producing a unique correlation-id record to the dedicated canary topic and confirming readback within the contract deadline; per-leg PASS/FAIL lines land in docker inspect ...State.Health.Log, distinguishing local healthy, cloud dead from both healthy per the tickets acceptance criterion. - Cadence-bound via a --state-file cache so the healthcheck (15s interval) does not spam either broker; a real round trip only runs once per contract-declared canary.cadence_seconds (default 30s). - docker-compose.gateway.yml healthcheck now runs the probe; timeout raised to 25s to cover a real (non-cached) check. Built standalone against omnibase_infra dev, NOT on top of G0/OMN-15740 (PR #2689 is still open/unmerged at time of this build) -- disclosed per operator instruction; no functional dependency on G0s transform-seam wiring, since this ticket only touches the healthcheck/probe surface. Branched from dev after PR #2683 (split-migration rework) merged, so the node-migration-sync hook is satisfied by devs already-split migration shape. That hook still flagged one unrelated live drift between omnimarket canonical clone and infras vendored node_canary_score_reducer/0003 file (the canonical clone was observed live-flapping between two content states during this session -- another concurrent lane editing it); vendored via scripts/sync-node-migrations.sh + matching _ledger/application-migrations.tsv checksum, no hand edits, out of this tickets functional scope, disclosed. Also regenerated docker/runners/runner-image.lock.json via scripts/ci/runner_image_identity.py --mode generate: pyproject.toml gained the onex-gateway-canary-probe script entry, which changes the dependency-manifest binding input to the CI runner image identity. Full local gates: ruff format/check clean, mypy --strict clean (2750 source files), full local unit suite 24616 passed / 4 failed (all 4 confirmed pre-existing xdist cross-worker env-var-leakage flakes unrelated to any file this PR touches -- reproduced green serially with -p no:xdist). Ticket: OMN-15741 (G1 of the gateway node-architecture-lift Phase 0, docs/design/2026-08-08-gateway-node-architecture-lift.md commit 9422d30b1).
…arder transform seam (#2689) Gateway lift Phase 0, item G0. HandlerForwardOutbound/HandlerConsumeInbound are declared in node_bus_forwarder_effect/contract.yaml but had zero production call sites -- ServiceGatewayForwarder re-derived the same tenant-prefix transform inline via prefix_topic() at three call sites (:78/:171/:312 pre-fix). This collapses that into one implementation: _prepare_outbound/_prepare_inbound now build a ModelGatewayEnvelope and delegate the actual prefix/strip transform + payload stamp to the contract-declared handlers, while the service keeps ownership of the untrusted-input trust-boundary checks (topic declared, envelope tags match the config-bound tenant identity) that were never part of the handlers' own contract. All prefix_topic() call sites in service_gateway_forwarder.py are removed (handlers own that transform now). strip_topic_prefix() stays in the service as the bootstrap step needed to derive canonical_topic before constructing the handler's required ModelGatewayEnvelope input -- this is not a duplicate implementation, it feeds the same handler-owned validation. Adds a seam test (test_gateway_forwarder_service_handler_seam.py) that spies (wraps=, not mock-only) on the service's own handler instances to prove the real service path invokes them, not just handler-isolated unit tests. MIGRATION-SYNC TRAP disclosure: omnibase_infra#2683 (OMN-15732 split-migration rework) has not merged to dev at time of this PR. The repo-wide node-migration-sync pre-commit hook requires vendoring node_canary_score_reducer/0003 and node_projection_registration/0004 from omnimarket -- vendored here via scripts/sync-node-migrations.sh, with the matching application-migrations.tsv declaration rows and the manifest test's pinned count (94->96) taken verbatim from #2683's diff. These files duplicate #2683's in-flight resolution; this branch should be rebased onto dev after #2683 lands rather than carrying the duplicate. No exemption or validator logic (_LEGACY_DEFAULT_SCHEMA_SQL_EXACT_PATHS or otherwise) was touched.
…ateway forwarder The gateway forwarder's delivery-loop supervision previously raced delivery.wait() against shutdown_event.wait() with no retry: any cloud-leg delivery failure (broker drop, transient network fault) propagated straight out of run_gateway_forwarder and terminated the process (docs/design/2026-08-08-gateway-node-architecture-lift.md axis #10, live restart-count evidence in that doc's 1.2). - runtime/gateway_forwarder.py: new _supervise_gateway_delivery loop wraps the existing delivery.wait()/shutdown race. A delivery failure now retries with bounded exponential backoff + jitter instead of exiting. Reconnect state only resets after the delivery loop survives a full heartbeat_interval_seconds "recovery confirm" window without failing again (a bare delivery.start() succeeding only proves tasks were scheduled, not that the cloud leg is back). Process still exits on shutdown or on an unrecoverable (non-connectivity) failure -- config/heartbeat-task errors. - Once a failure window crosses the contract-declared degraded_after_seconds, one DEGRADED status event publishes via the new ServiceGatewayForwarder.publish_status(), reusing the existing gateway-heartbeat.v1 event shape/topic (ModelGatewayHeartbeat gains status="degraded" + consecutive_failures + detail). Published on the LOCAL bus (not cloud) so DEGRADED stays observable while the cloud leg that caused it is itself unreachable. - contract.yaml: liveness block gains reconnect_backoff_initial_seconds / _max_seconds / _jitter_seconds and degraded_after_seconds (contract_version/node_version patch bump 0.1.0 -> 0.1.1); ModelGatewayForwarderConfig gains the matching typed fields + a max>=initial validator. - Data-plane loop (NodeGatewayDelivery, KafkaTransport) is untouched; supervision wraps it per scope. Also vendors 2 omnimarket node migrations (node_canary_score_reducer/0003, node_projection_registration/0004) via scripts/sync-node-migrations.sh -- required by the repo-wide node-migration-sync pre-commit/CI hook on any omnibase_infra branch. infra#2683 (OMN-15732, split-migration rework) was NOT merged at push time; these 2 files duplicate that in-flight resolution and this PR must be rebased onto dev (picking up #2683's shape) once it lands. No _LEGACY_DEFAULT_SCHEMA_SQL_EXACT_PATHS or exemption/ validator logic touched. Ticket: OMN-15742 (G2, gateway-lift Phase 0)
…ateway forwarder (#2688) * fix(OMN-15742): bounded reconnect backoff + DEGRADED bus status for gateway forwarder The gateway forwarder's delivery-loop supervision previously raced delivery.wait() against shutdown_event.wait() with no retry: any cloud-leg delivery failure (broker drop, transient network fault) propagated straight out of run_gateway_forwarder and terminated the process (docs/design/2026-08-08-gateway-node-architecture-lift.md axis #10, live restart-count evidence in that doc's 1.2). - runtime/gateway_forwarder.py: new _supervise_gateway_delivery loop wraps the existing delivery.wait()/shutdown race. A delivery failure now retries with bounded exponential backoff + jitter instead of exiting. Reconnect state only resets after the delivery loop survives a full heartbeat_interval_seconds "recovery confirm" window without failing again (a bare delivery.start() succeeding only proves tasks were scheduled, not that the cloud leg is back). Process still exits on shutdown or on an unrecoverable (non-connectivity) failure -- config/heartbeat-task errors. - Once a failure window crosses the contract-declared degraded_after_seconds, one DEGRADED status event publishes via the new ServiceGatewayForwarder.publish_status(), reusing the existing gateway-heartbeat.v1 event shape/topic (ModelGatewayHeartbeat gains status="degraded" + consecutive_failures + detail). Published on the LOCAL bus (not cloud) so DEGRADED stays observable while the cloud leg that caused it is itself unreachable. - contract.yaml: liveness block gains reconnect_backoff_initial_seconds / _max_seconds / _jitter_seconds and degraded_after_seconds (contract_version/node_version patch bump 0.1.0 -> 0.1.1); ModelGatewayForwarderConfig gains the matching typed fields + a max>=initial validator. - Data-plane loop (NodeGatewayDelivery, KafkaTransport) is untouched; supervision wraps it per scope. Also vendors 2 omnimarket node migrations (node_canary_score_reducer/0003, node_projection_registration/0004) via scripts/sync-node-migrations.sh -- required by the repo-wide node-migration-sync pre-commit/CI hook on any omnibase_infra branch. infra#2683 (OMN-15732, split-migration rework) was NOT merged at push time; these 2 files duplicate that in-flight resolution and this PR must be rebased onto dev (picking up #2683's shape) once it lands. No _LEGACY_DEFAULT_SCHEMA_SQL_EXACT_PATHS or exemption/ validator logic touched. Ticket: OMN-15742 (G2, gateway-lift Phase 0) * fix(OMN-15742): stop outbound consumer loop re-forwarding local-only publishes Reconciliation finding D1: publish_status (DEGRADED) publishes directly onto the local bus's canonical outbound topic -- exactly the topic the forwarder's own outbound consumer (NodeGatewayDelivery polling local_consumer, the SAME KafkaTransport object local_bus publishes into in runtime/gateway_forwarder.py:run_gateway_forwarder) is subscribed to. The untagged envelope does not match _forward_outbound_message's loopback skip (only "cloud-to-local"), so it falls through to _prepare_outbound and leaks to the cloud leg -- directly contradicting test_publish_status_degraded_goes_to_local_bus_not_cloud, which only passes today because it uses a bare _MockGatewayBus with no consumer loop (feedback_real_dispatch_path_tests gap). Fix: local-only publishes are now stamped with gateway_direction="local-mirror"; _forward_outbound_message and validate_outbound_message skip both "cloud-to-local" (existing) and "local-mirror" (new) via a shared _LOCAL_ONLY_DIRECTIONS set. The stamping helper is a module-level function, not a method, to stay under the ONEX Pattern Validation method-count threshold on ServiceGatewayForwarder. New test test_real_outbound_consumer_loop_does_not_reforward_degraded_status wires the REAL NodeGatewayDelivery consumer loop against a fake transport that actually connects publish (local_bus) to poll (local_consumer) -- the same object playing both roles, matching the real runtime wiring -- unlike every existing test in this file, which uses two disconnected fakes and so cannot observe this class of bug. Verified RED against the parent commit (f0cdfe4, pre-fix): DEGRADED payload reached the cloud leg. GREEN after this fix. The matching heartbeat-local-mirror half of this bug (#2692, OMN-15570) gets the same fix applied on that branch separately, since it stacks on this one and its own diff must be independently correct. Ticket: OMN-15742 Evidence-Ticket: OMN-15742 * fix(OMN-15742): stop test _Source.poll() from starving the asyncio event loop Root cause of every anomalously long/hanging local pre-push run on this branch throughout this session (observed: 10h33m on the original Mac before this session started per the rolling ledger, then repeated 33min-2h+ hangs on .200 across multiple push attempts -- all traced to the SAME mechanism via a --timeout=60 diagnostic run that caught the stack mid-hang inside NodeGatewayDelivery._run_direction's `while True:` loop). _Source.poll() (a test fake in test_gateway_delivery_service.py) returned `[]` with zero internal `await` suspension points. A coroutine with no real suspension point does not yield control back to the asyncio event loop when awaited -- so when test_real_outbound_consumer_loop_does_not_reforward_degraded_status (added by the prior commit on this branch) drives a REAL NodeGatewayDelivery task loop with _Source as the "idle" cloud consumer, `_run_direction`'s `while True: await source.poll(...)` busy-spins the event loop forever. `task.cancel()` only takes effect at the next real suspension point, so the spinning task is uncancellable: `delivery.stop()` (called in the test's `finally`) awaits `asyncio.gather(*tasks)` on tasks that can never be scheduled to observe their own cancellation, deadlocking the entire test process indefinitely -- explaining every "still running, 100% CPU, no progress" observation this session mistook for slowness rather than a hang. Fix: _Source.poll() now honors timeout_ms via asyncio.sleep(timeout_ms / 1000) before returning empty, matching how a real transport (and this same file's _SharedLocalTransport.poll(), which correctly uses asyncio.wait_for(..., timeout=...)) actually behaves. Every other _Source usage in this file calls deliver_message() directly and never invokes poll() at all, so this costs exactly one test ~50ms and changes nothing else (verified: full file 5/5 passed in 0.20s, vs. hanging past a 60s per-test timeout pre-fix). Ticket: OMN-15742 * fix(OMN-15742): wire required canary field into remaining gateway test fixtures Two gaps surfaced by the fixed full local suite run (previous commit removed the busy-spin hang that was masking these): - test_gateway_forwarder_config.py: the two reconnect_backoff tests (added by this branch's own reconnect-supervision commit, authored before this branch was rebased onto dev's #2690/OMN-15741 G1 commit) never got canary=_canary() added, unlike every other constructor call in the same file. - test_gateway_forwarder_service_handler_seam.py: pre-existing dev-tip gap (unrelated to this branch's diff) -- same class of fix already applied independently on the OMN-15781 branch. Ticket: OMN-15742
…hdog (#2700) * fix(OMN-15742): bounded reconnect backoff + DEGRADED bus status for gateway forwarder The gateway forwarder's delivery-loop supervision previously raced delivery.wait() against shutdown_event.wait() with no retry: any cloud-leg delivery failure (broker drop, transient network fault) propagated straight out of run_gateway_forwarder and terminated the process (docs/design/2026-08-08-gateway-node-architecture-lift.md axis #10, live restart-count evidence in that doc's 1.2). - runtime/gateway_forwarder.py: new _supervise_gateway_delivery loop wraps the existing delivery.wait()/shutdown race. A delivery failure now retries with bounded exponential backoff + jitter instead of exiting. Reconnect state only resets after the delivery loop survives a full heartbeat_interval_seconds "recovery confirm" window without failing again (a bare delivery.start() succeeding only proves tasks were scheduled, not that the cloud leg is back). Process still exits on shutdown or on an unrecoverable (non-connectivity) failure -- config/heartbeat-task errors. - Once a failure window crosses the contract-declared degraded_after_seconds, one DEGRADED status event publishes via the new ServiceGatewayForwarder.publish_status(), reusing the existing gateway-heartbeat.v1 event shape/topic (ModelGatewayHeartbeat gains status="degraded" + consecutive_failures + detail). Published on the LOCAL bus (not cloud) so DEGRADED stays observable while the cloud leg that caused it is itself unreachable. - contract.yaml: liveness block gains reconnect_backoff_initial_seconds / _max_seconds / _jitter_seconds and degraded_after_seconds (contract_version/node_version patch bump 0.1.0 -> 0.1.1); ModelGatewayForwarderConfig gains the matching typed fields + a max>=initial validator. - Data-plane loop (NodeGatewayDelivery, KafkaTransport) is untouched; supervision wraps it per scope. Also vendors 2 omnimarket node migrations (node_canary_score_reducer/0003, node_projection_registration/0004) via scripts/sync-node-migrations.sh -- required by the repo-wide node-migration-sync pre-commit/CI hook on any omnibase_infra branch. infra#2683 (OMN-15732, split-migration rework) was NOT merged at push time; these 2 files duplicate that in-flight resolution and this PR must be rebased onto dev (picking up #2683's shape) once it lands. No _LEGACY_DEFAULT_SCHEMA_SQL_EXACT_PATHS or exemption/ validator logic touched. Ticket: OMN-15742 (G2, gateway-lift Phase 0) * fix(OMN-15742): stop outbound consumer loop re-forwarding local-only publishes Reconciliation finding D1: publish_status (DEGRADED) publishes directly onto the local bus's canonical outbound topic -- exactly the topic the forwarder's own outbound consumer (NodeGatewayDelivery polling local_consumer, the SAME KafkaTransport object local_bus publishes into in runtime/gateway_forwarder.py:run_gateway_forwarder) is subscribed to. The untagged envelope does not match _forward_outbound_message's loopback skip (only "cloud-to-local"), so it falls through to _prepare_outbound and leaks to the cloud leg -- directly contradicting test_publish_status_degraded_goes_to_local_bus_not_cloud, which only passes today because it uses a bare _MockGatewayBus with no consumer loop (feedback_real_dispatch_path_tests gap). Fix: local-only publishes are now stamped with gateway_direction="local-mirror"; _forward_outbound_message and validate_outbound_message skip both "cloud-to-local" (existing) and "local-mirror" (new) via a shared _LOCAL_ONLY_DIRECTIONS set. The stamping helper is a module-level function, not a method, to stay under the ONEX Pattern Validation method-count threshold on ServiceGatewayForwarder. New test test_real_outbound_consumer_loop_does_not_reforward_degraded_status wires the REAL NodeGatewayDelivery consumer loop against a fake transport that actually connects publish (local_bus) to poll (local_consumer) -- the same object playing both roles, matching the real runtime wiring -- unlike every existing test in this file, which uses two disconnected fakes and so cannot observe this class of bug. Verified RED against the parent commit (f0cdfe4, pre-fix): DEGRADED payload reached the cloud leg. GREEN after this fix. The matching heartbeat-local-mirror half of this bug (#2692, OMN-15570) gets the same fix applied on that branch separately, since it stacks on this one and its own diff must be independently correct. Ticket: OMN-15742 Evidence-Ticket: OMN-15742 * fix(OMN-15742): stop test _Source.poll() from starving the asyncio event loop Root cause of every anomalously long/hanging local pre-push run on this branch throughout this session (observed: 10h33m on the original Mac before this session started per the rolling ledger, then repeated 33min-2h+ hangs on .200 across multiple push attempts -- all traced to the SAME mechanism via a --timeout=60 diagnostic run that caught the stack mid-hang inside NodeGatewayDelivery._run_direction's `while True:` loop). _Source.poll() (a test fake in test_gateway_delivery_service.py) returned `[]` with zero internal `await` suspension points. A coroutine with no real suspension point does not yield control back to the asyncio event loop when awaited -- so when test_real_outbound_consumer_loop_does_not_reforward_degraded_status (added by the prior commit on this branch) drives a REAL NodeGatewayDelivery task loop with _Source as the "idle" cloud consumer, `_run_direction`'s `while True: await source.poll(...)` busy-spins the event loop forever. `task.cancel()` only takes effect at the next real suspension point, so the spinning task is uncancellable: `delivery.stop()` (called in the test's `finally`) awaits `asyncio.gather(*tasks)` on tasks that can never be scheduled to observe their own cancellation, deadlocking the entire test process indefinitely -- explaining every "still running, 100% CPU, no progress" observation this session mistook for slowness rather than a hang. Fix: _Source.poll() now honors timeout_ms via asyncio.sleep(timeout_ms / 1000) before returning empty, matching how a real transport (and this same file's _SharedLocalTransport.poll(), which correctly uses asyncio.wait_for(..., timeout=...)) actually behaves. Every other _Source usage in this file calls deliver_message() directly and never invokes poll() at all, so this costs exactly one test ~50ms and changes nothing else (verified: full file 5/5 passed in 0.20s, vs. hanging past a 60s per-test timeout pre-fix). Ticket: OMN-15742 * fix(OMN-15742): wire required canary field into remaining gateway test fixtures Two gaps surfaced by the fixed full local suite run (previous commit removed the busy-spin hang that was masking these): - test_gateway_forwarder_config.py: the two reconnect_backoff tests (added by this branch's own reconnect-supervision commit, authored before this branch was rebased onto dev's #2690/OMN-15741 G1 commit) never got canary=_canary() added, unlike every other constructor call in the same file. - test_gateway_forwarder_service_handler_seam.py: pre-existing dev-tip gap (unrelated to this branch's diff) -- same class of fix already applied independently on the OMN-15781 branch. Ticket: OMN-15742 * fix(OMN-15748): gateway poison-pill quarantine + membership-loss watchdog decode_message() ran before the try/except that nacks, so any undecodable record on a mirrored source topic crashed the process (live-observed 2026-08-08T16:50Z). Nacking it (the ordinary failure path) would also be wrong for a permanently malformed record: nack seeks back to the same offset and re-crashes forever. Quarantine instead: log, best-effort dead-letter via the DLQ topic derived from the record's own topic, commit past the offset, keep the loop alive. Also adds an independent membership-loss watchdog to NodeGatewayDelivery. The live 2026-08-09T10:03:07Z incident was a clean single LeaveGroup with zero exception (aiokafka's client-side max_poll_interval_ms idle-eviction, fired from a separate asyncio task than the poll loop) -- the existing exception-triggered reconnect supervision in runtime/gateway_forwarder.py cannot observe a task that is alive, hung, and never exceptions. The watchdog tracks per-direction last-progress timestamps (updated on poll() completion and deliver_message completion) plus a best-effort consumer.assignment() membership probe, and on staleness force-recreates just the affected direction's transport (a fresh client forces a new group join, sidestepping the permanently-stuck idle clock) and publishes a DEGRADED status. Reuses the previously contract-declared but unwired max_silence_window_seconds config field as the staleness threshold. TDD: both regression tests are RED against pre-fix source (verified via git stash of the source-only diff) and GREEN after. OMN-15748 * fix(OMN-15748): consumer-scoped watchdog recovery, no CancelledError escape Fixes two verifier-confirmed defects in the membership-loss watchdog (mergesweep-0809-poisonpath-verify): - wait()/_run_direction: a watchdog stale_task.cancel() made the supervisor's delivery.wait() (a frozen asyncio.gather snapshot) observe a cancelled child and propagate CancelledError -- a BaseException that escapes gateway_forwarder.py's except Exception and kills the process on every recovery. _run_direction now catches CancelledError and returns cleanly when its direction is watchdog-recovering; wait() re-reads the live task set after every completion instead of gathering a one-time snapshot, so a swapped-in replacement task stays supervised. - Recovery no longer calls close()+start() (which stops BOTH the consumer and producer on a KafkaTransport instance shared across directions -- one direction's consumer is the same object the other direction's publish and status/heartbeat emission use as a producer). Adds KafkaTransport.restart_consumer(), a consumer-only recreate that never touches the producer; _recover_stalled_direction now calls it exclusively. De-vacuums the watchdog regression test (arms delivery.wait() before the stall, matching production ordering) and adds direct KafkaTransport-level coverage proving the producer is untouched across a restart_consumer() call. * fix(OMN-15748): address CodeRabbit findings on watchdog wait() + log sanitization Two live (non-outdated) CodeRabbit threads on infra#2700: - wait()'s asyncio.wait was unbounded, waking only on a tracked task's completion. _recover_stalled_direction splices the replacement task into self._tasks strictly AFTER the stale task has already finished and this loop has already woken/rebuilt `watched` from the stale-only list -- so an unbounded wait then blocks on the remaining old tasks with no further wakeup until one of THEM completes. A real exception on the recovered direction would go unsupervised (only surfacing as an "exception was never retrieved" warning at GC). Fixed by bounding the wait with _watchdog_tick_seconds so the loop always revisits self._tasks, and by also picking up an already-completed-with-exception replacement on that rescan. Added test_watchdog_replacement_task_failure_still_reaches_wait, verified RED against the unbounded wait() (reverted locally, re-applied after) and GREEN after. - _quarantine_undecodable_message logged the raw exception via exc_info=error, bypassing the sanitize_error_message() the DLQ payload path already uses a few lines up. A pydantic ValidationError from decode_message() embeds the offending record content, which is untrusted tenant bus traffic that can carry PII/credential-bearing values. Now logs the sanitized message, matching the DLQ path. * test(OMN-15748): harden test_monitor_logs.py subprocess timeouts against CI fleet contention The self-hosted CI fleet runs many concurrent pytest-split shards per job; interpreter spawn/import can occasionally queue behind that CPU contention. A hardcoded 10s subprocess.run(..., timeout=10) tripped this twice live on unrelated PRs' Split 12/15 (infra#2697 and this PR, both times as three subprocess.TimeoutExpired failures at exactly the 10s bound, unrelated to either PR's own diff -- this file isn't touched by either PR's product diff). Bumped to a shared _SUBPROCESS_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 30 constant across all three call sites: still tight enough to catch a genuine hang, with real headroom against fleet contention.
…lock test fixtures Two real pre-push failures caught locally (root-caused, not worked around): 1. Rebasing this branch onto #2690 (G1) produced an add/add conflict on the vendored node_canary_score_reducer/0003 migration; resolving it left two stale trailing duplicate lines in application-migrations.tsv from this branch's own pre-#2683 vendoring commit (0003 with a stale checksum, 0004 with a redundant-but-matching one). validate_application_migration_manifest.py fails closed on the checksum conflict. Removed both trailing dupes; the TSV is now byte-identical to dev's (post-#2683) manifest. 2. Three test_gateway_forwarder_runtime.py cases (test_runtime_config_rejects_inline_cloud_broker_literal, test_runtime_config_fails_closed_on_missing_broker_ref_map, test_runtime_config_rejects_inline_canary_literals) built minimal contract/config fixtures that predate G1's canary block landing on this branch. _materialize_contract_canary_config now runs before _materialize_cloud_broker_ref in load_gateway_forwarder_runtime_config, so the first two raised on the canary check before ever reaching the cloud-broker-ref behavior under test; the third didn't pass the now- required broker_ref_map_path kwarg. Updated all three fixtures to declare canary_topic_set/canary consistently with the other tests in this file and pass broker_ref_map_path. Ticket: OMN-15743
…ry (#2687) * fix(OMN-15743): resolve gateway cloud_broker_ref at the effect boundary Deletes the hardcoded Docker extra_hosts bastion-IP override and the duplicated cloud_bus.bootstrap_servers literal in beta-gateway-canary.yaml. The cloud broker endpoint is now resolved from the node contract's gateway_forwarder.cloud_leg.cloud_broker_ref at process startup, via a new _materialize_cloud_broker_ref() boundary function in gateway_forwarder.py that mirrors the existing _materialize_contract_mirror_topics() pattern: contract is sole authority, resolved YAML may not redeclare the literal, and resolution fails closed (ValueError, no fallback) if the ref doesn't match the contract or the operator-supplied broker-ref map is missing or has no entry for the ref. Compose now mounts an operator-supplied GATEWAY_BROKER_REF_MAP_FILE (same required-env-var-mount pattern already used for the AWS Roles Anywhere credential files) instead of baking a bastion IP into extra_hosts. The CLI gained a required --broker-ref-map flag with no default. Also vendors 2 omnimarket node migrations (node_canary_score_reducer/0003, node_projection_registration/0004) via scripts/sync-node-migrations.sh and declares them in application-migrations.tsv -- required because infra#2683 (OMN-15732 split-migration rework) has not yet merged to dev; see PR body for the disclosure and rebase note. OMN-15743 * chore(OMN-15743): trigger CI re-run after Evidence-Source edit * fix(OMN-15743): thread broker-ref-map through the canary probe (seam A) load_gateway_forwarder_runtime_config now requires keyword-only broker_ref_map_path (this PR). onex-gateway-canary-probe (OMN-15741, PR #2690) called it single-arg -- a TypeError on every healthcheck tick once both land. Pairs the caller update with the signature change in the same PR so they can never split: - gateway_canary_probe.py: new required --broker-ref-map CLI arg, threaded into the loader call. - docker-compose.gateway.yml: healthcheck test cmd passes --broker-ref-map /run/gateway/broker-ref-map.yaml (the same file already bind-mounted for the main forwarder process). HOLD: do not land until (a) #2690 (G1) has merged and (b) a durable name-resolution path exists for all 6 broker FQDNs -- Route53 PHZ (OMN-15739 S6.2) or the ref-map carrying all six -- since this PR also deletes the extra_hosts pin that live outbound currently depends on; #2686 is the interim extra_hosts stopgap and is not a substitute for landing this before that path exists. Ticket: OMN-15743 * fix(OMN-15743): repair stale migration-manifest duplicates + canary-block test fixtures Two real pre-push failures caught locally (root-caused, not worked around): 1. Rebasing this branch onto #2690 (G1) produced an add/add conflict on the vendored node_canary_score_reducer/0003 migration; resolving it left two stale trailing duplicate lines in application-migrations.tsv from this branch's own pre-#2683 vendoring commit (0003 with a stale checksum, 0004 with a redundant-but-matching one). validate_application_migration_manifest.py fails closed on the checksum conflict. Removed both trailing dupes; the TSV is now byte-identical to dev's (post-#2683) manifest. 2. Three test_gateway_forwarder_runtime.py cases (test_runtime_config_rejects_inline_cloud_broker_literal, test_runtime_config_fails_closed_on_missing_broker_ref_map, test_runtime_config_rejects_inline_canary_literals) built minimal contract/config fixtures that predate G1's canary block landing on this branch. _materialize_contract_canary_config now runs before _materialize_cloud_broker_ref in load_gateway_forwarder_runtime_config, so the first two raised on the canary check before ever reaching the cloud-broker-ref behavior under test; the third didn't pass the now- required broker_ref_map_path kwarg. Updated all three fixtures to declare canary_topic_set/canary consistently with the other tests in this file and pass broker_ref_map_path. Ticket: OMN-15743
Summary
infra
devis merge-deadlocked as of 2026-08-08 13:35Z: node-migration-sync (OMN-13332) forces every open infradevPR to vendor two upstreamomnimarketmigrations verbatim —node_canary_score_reducer/0003_capability_scores_tenant_id_to_uuid.sqlnode_projection_registration/0004_node_service_registry_no_force_rls.sql— but vendoring them trips Application Database Domain Enforcement (OMN-15361), a required
CI SummarySTRICT_GATE_JOBSmember, in the "Enforce schema qualification in changed SQL (trusted)" step ofscripts/ci/check_application_database_sql.py. Not vendoring → red node-migration-sync. Vendoring → red OMN-15361. Both are hard required gates; neither can be waived. The failure reproduces identically on 5 other open PRs (#2681, #2680, #2677, #2676, #2668) plus #2682 (head1aa87f7e2a, run 31259117513 / job 93107117177), which currently carries the only PR-side reproduction of the OMN-15361 half.Root cause
Both files are new migrations in existing streams whose physical tables (
public.capability_scores,public.node_service_registry) have been unqualified/default-schema since their originalCREATE, pending the separate, larger governed OMN-15359 schema cutover. This is exactly the case_LEGACY_DEFAULT_SCHEMA_SQL_EXACT_PATHSincheck_application_database_sql.pyalready exists to cover — it carries 11 precedent entries (OMN-15503, OMN-15655) exempting sibling follow-up migrations in the same physical-table-stays-in-public state, most directlynode_canary_score_reducer/0002_capability_scores_tenant_id_and_rls.sql, which0003in this PR directly continues (same table, same fail-closed tenant-mapping pattern, next step of the OMN-15356 program).Fix — STATUS: DRAFT, AC2 finding open, plan below supersedes the original claim
Correction (2026-08-08, post-merge-sweep review): the paragraph originally here claimed both new exemption entries were in-class with their cited precedents and that "the migration content is already correct for its precedented class." That claim is false for the
0003entry.0003_capability_scores_tenant_id_to_uuid.sqlintroduces a new function,house_tenant_map_slug_to_uuid, and the0003exemption-list entry lets that new function permanently escape ownership declaration — an OMN-15732 AC2 violation ("no new object may be exempted from ownership declaration via the legacy-default-schema list"). Every precedent in_LEGACY_DEFAULT_SCHEMA_SQL_EXACT_PATHS(OMN-15503, OMN-15655,0002_capability_scores_tenant_id_and_rls.sql) exempts a pre-existing unqualified object carried forward from before OMN-15361 existed — none mints a new function.0004's entry remains in-class (pre-existing dynamic-SQL block on an already-exempted table) and is unaffected by this correction.Real plan (option c — content fix, not registry exemption):
topology/application_database.py:113-118declares four schemas:public,tenant,omninode_internal,platform_catalog.platform_catalogis bootstrapped atdocker/migrations/forward/_ledger/bootstrap.sql:32andomninode_internalatsrc/omnibase_infra/migration/cutover/sql/bootstrap.sql:6— both already exist, independent of tenant-bootstrap sequencing and independent of the OMN-15359 schema-cutover decision. Qualifyinghouse_tenant_map_slug_to_uuidintoomninode_internal(orplatform_catalog) and declaring ownership there satisfies OMN-15361 directly for the new function, with no exemption-list entry and no dependency on OMN-15359. This PR stays draft until that content fix supersedes the0003exemption entry.0003entry itself is the wrong mechanism for a new object and is pending replacement by the option-(c) content fix.scripts/sync-node-migrations.sh, matching PR feat(OMN-15730): CI concurrency auto-cancel — omnibase_infra #2682's approach) and adds their declaration rows todocker/migrations/forward/_ledger/application-migrations.tsv(checksums8bf81c98../adb21c75..— byte-identical to the content already vendored on feat(OMN-15730): CI concurrency auto-cancel — omnibase_infra #2682, confirmed viasha256sum), bumpingtests/unit/scripts/validation/test_application_migration_manifest.py's declaration-count assertion 94→96 — so this PR clears both sides of the deadlock, not just the gate in the abstract.Validator proof
Reproduced the exact 5 findings from live CI job 93107117177 by running
check_application_database_sql.pyagainst the exact vendored SQL content from PR #2682 head1aa87f7e2a(git show 1aa87f7e2a:<path>) with the pre-fix script:Byte-identical to the live log. Same content with this fix applied, using the exact 3-manifest CI argument set (omnimarket + both omninode_infra manifests):
At the real committed HEAD of this branch: same command →
application_database_sql_gate=PASS.Re-vendor cascade
None beyond the normal git-history mechanism. This fix changes no content on the two SQL files and no checksums vs the #2682 precedent, so it carries no separate TSV re-sync obligation for other branches. Once merged to
dev, every other deadlocked PR (#2681/#2680/#2677/#2676/#2668) clears the OMN-15361 half of the deadlock as soon as it (a) vendors the same two files — forced by node-migration-sync regardless of this fix — and (b) is based on/rebased onto adevcommit containing this exemption-list change. The exemption keys on a fixed logical file path, not git ancestry or content hash, so no per-branch checksum resync is required.Local proof
uv run ruff format/ruff check --fix— cleanuv run mypy scripts/ci/check_application_database_sql.py— cleanpre-commit run(full chain, real commit, no--no-verify) — all hooks passed, includingONEX Node Migration Vendor Sync Check(previously red without the vendored files)uv run pytest tests/ci/test_application_database_sql_gate.py tests/ci/test_application_database_sql_authority_isolation.py tests/ci/test_application_database_domain_enforcement_contract.py tests/unit/validation/test_application_database_sql_enforcement_regressions.py tests/unit/scripts/validation/test_application_migration_manifest.py— 131 passedResolution (2026-08-08 adjudication, supersedes "Fix" section above)
STATUS UPDATE: AC2 finding CLOSED — not via the option-(c) content fix
described above. That plan proposed qualifying
house_tenant_map_slug_to_uuidintoomninode_internalorplatform_catalogon the infra side. Adjudication (full text: omnimarketPR #2026 comment
#5226942902;
one row in
docs/tracking/ROLLING_WORK_LEDGER.md,[mergesweep-0808-domain-adj]) rejected both of those targets for anode:%migration stream:_ALLOWED_DOMAINS/schema_migrations_stream_domain_checkrestrict node streams to exactly{tenant, omninode_internal}, andplatform_catalogis topology domainPLATFORM_CATALOG-- inadmissible at either enforcement point regardlessof which schema hosts the function.
omninode_internalitself also failsapply-time presence under the forward-migration stream (created only by
the cutover-only initializer -- confirmed at
src/omnibase_infra/migration/cutover/sql/bootstrap.sql:4-5, noCREATE SCHEMA omninode_internalanywhere underdocker/migrations/forward/).The actual fix landed upstream in
omnimarket(PR #2026, revised): thehouse_tenant_map_slug_to_uuidfunction had exactly one DDL-time consumerand no runtime caller, so it was deleted outright and its closed mapping
inlined directly into
0003_capability_scores_tenant_id_to_uuid.sql's ownUSINGclause (fail-closed via a pre-guardRAISEplus aCASE-without-ELSE, backed by the column'sNOT NULLconstraint). There is no0004file and no new catalog object of any kind -- so there is nothingleft to schema-qualify on either side.
No structural change to this PR as a result. The exemption entry this
PR already added to
_LEGACY_DEFAULT_SCHEMA_SQL_EXACT_PATHSand the TSVledger row already name the exact pre-split path,
docker/migrations/forward/nodes/node_canary_score_reducer/0003_capability_scores_tenant_id_to_uuid.sql,with
domain=tenant-- both remain correct and become truthful (notjust permitted) once re-vendored, because the file's only target,
public.capability_scores, is itself topology domainTENANT(
src/omnibase_infra/topology/instances/{local,onex-dev,onex-prod}.yaml).The comment block explaining the exemption
(
scripts/ci/check_application_database_sql.py) was updated to drop thenow-inaccurate "the mapping function it defines" clause -- the file no
longer defines one. The TSV row's content checksum will be refreshed by
node-migration-synconce it re-vendors from the omnimarket branch; noother file in this PR changes.
Update (2026-08-08, applied): re-vendored
0003_capability_scores_tenant_id_to_uuid.sqllocally against omnimarketjonah/omn-15732-0003-optc@09c53bfdviascripts/sync-node-migrations.sh(OMNIMARKET_SRCoverride), refreshed the TSV row's checksum tod1eeefff11fbec255216154ba26aa6f0f29602a0b6fd8fd89e8de5d8d3282b2c, and added theOmnimarket-Source-Reffield above sonode-migration-syncresolves the same unmerged branch instead of defaulting todev(which does not yet carry the omnimarket-side fix).check_application_database_sql.pyre-run against this content with the real ownership manifests:application_database_sql_gate=PASS. No exemption-registry or gate-logic edit.Ticket: OMN-15732 (root-cause fix lane for the infra-dev deadlock diagnosed 2026-08-08 13:35Z; see
docs/tracking/ROLLING_WORK_LEDGER.md[mergesweep-0808-deadlock]entries inomni_homefor the full incident trail, including the earlier #2682 declaration-gap fix (OMN-15730) that first exposed this OMN-15361 side).Omnimarket-Source-Ref: jonah/omn-15732-0003-optc
Evidence-Ticket: OMN-15732
Evidence-Source: OCC#6195
Summary by CodeRabbit
Database Updates
Maintenance