fix(classifier): retry provider-injected parameter 400s instead of aborting the turn - #90261
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…orting The Codex OAuth backend (chatgpt.com/backend-api/codex) intermittently injects prompt_cache_retention into its own upstream call and then rejects it, returning HTTP 400 invalid_parameter. Hermes never sends that field on this route (see agent/transports/codex.py::_default_prompt_cache_retention_ for_request, which only sets it for api.meta.ai and bedrock-mantle hosts). Reproduced live: a minimal 1-message request carrying no cache parameters at all failed 4/20 (20%) with this error, so the rejection is not deterministic and retrying the identical request is the correct recovery. Previously the catch-all in _classify_400 returned format_error/ retryable=False, which tripped the is_client_error abort gate in conversation_loop and killed the turn on the first attempt - burning an entire large-context request (~550k tokens) per failure. Classify these as retryable server_error (should_compress=False - the request shape was never the problem). The same guard is applied to the sibling 5xx request-validation branch, where a fronting proxy can surface the identical rejection. Deliberately narrow: keyed on parameters we only send on specific routes, and skipped when the current provider is one that legitimately sends them, so a genuine client-side bad parameter (max_tokens on GPT-5) still fails fast as a format_error.
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Mapping for PR #90261 salvage (server-injected parameter 400 classifier).
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Merged via #91643. Your commits cherry-picked with authorship preserved. Your fix is exactly right — the classification of server-injected parameter 400s as retryable Thanks for the thorough reproduction and analysis — the ~20% failure rate measurement on a minimal request that provably carried no cache parameters was key to confirming this is a server-side injection, not a client-side request shape issue. |
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* chore: AUTHOR_MAP troy.rowe@re-source.au -> troyrowe-resource Mapping for PR NousResearch#90261 salvage (server-injected parameter 400 classifier). * fix(classifier): retry provider-injected parameter 400s instead of aborting The Codex OAuth backend (chatgpt.com/backend-api/codex) intermittently injects prompt_cache_retention into its own upstream call and then rejects it, returning HTTP 400 invalid_parameter. Hermes never sends that field on this route (see agent/transports/codex.py::_default_prompt_cache_retention_ for_request, which only sets it for api.meta.ai and bedrock-mantle hosts). Reproduced live: a minimal 1-message request carrying no cache parameters at all failed 4/20 (20%) with this error, so the rejection is not deterministic and retrying the identical request is the correct recovery. Previously the catch-all in _classify_400 returned format_error/ retryable=False, which tripped the is_client_error abort gate in conversation_loop and killed the turn on the first attempt - burning an entire large-context request (~550k tokens) per failure. Classify these as retryable server_error (should_compress=False - the request shape was never the problem). The same guard is applied to the sibling 5xx request-validation branch, where a fronting proxy can surface the identical rejection. Deliberately narrow: keyed on parameters we only send on specific routes, and skipped when the current provider is one that legitimately sends them, so a genuine client-side bad parameter (max_tokens on GPT-5) still fails fast as a format_error. * fix(agent): guard merged assistant compaction handoffs Treat a merged assistant-role summary carrier as the driving reference handoff when it immediately follows a completed assistant stop. Its preserved prose and stale tool_calls are assistant continuity, not a fresh live user request. Keep legitimate in-flight behavior unchanged when there is no completed stop, a real user turn follows, or a distinct later assistant tool-call row continues the loop. Extends the NousResearch#80622 active-turn guard for the merged-carrier shape reported under NousResearch#42768. * fix(agent): preserve live merged tool-call carriers Identify a completed merged assistant handoff from the carrier's own stop state instead of an unrelated adjacent history row. Keep carriers with pending tool calls actionable so compaction cannot abort a live tool chain. * fix(api): hide compaction scaffolding from clients Project client-visible session messages through the canonical compaction classifier. Hide standalone handoffs, unwrap merged carriers to their authentic prior-tail content, strip inherited internal fields, and keep model-facing recovery history unchanged. * fix(clients): hide compaction carriers across surfaces * refactor(api): reuse _COMPACTION_INTERNAL_FIELDS from compaction_display The 7-key internal-fields tuple was inlined twice (agent/compaction_display.py and _project_client_message); a drift between the copies would silently leak one internal field class through the API projection. Surfaced during review of PR NousResearch#85442. * fix(desktop): boot overlays stay opaque under window glass The full-screen boot surfaces (connecting, onboarding, boot failure, root crash fallback) paint their backdrop with --ui-chat-surface-background, which the glass field turns transparent so <body> can be the one painter (0483133). That was harmless while glass shipped off; once it shipped on by default (be31666) every boot overlay became a window onto the shell behind it. These overlays mask the whole app, so they declare data-glass-opaque — the existing contract for surfaces that paint over siblings — which pins the token back to opaque chrome under glass and changes nothing when glass is off. * feat(browser): add authenticated control broker * feat(browser): enable extension controller actions * fix(browser): harden extension controller routing Keep extension control opt-in and preserve existing browser backends unless an exact server-bound controller is available. Centralize protocol and capability admission across API and dashboard transports, make selected-controller results authoritative, bypass stale availability caches only inside bound requests, and serialize structured results for the existing tool contract. Add a real browser_snapshot route-table/WebSocket E2E, strict admission and ownership regressions, public configuration and protocol documentation, and tests proving feature-off/no-controller compatibility. * fix(browser): preserve controller work across reconnects Treat unexpected controller transport loss as recoverable until each command's original deadline. Same-identity reconnects refresh transport and capability state, flush deferred cancels before new dispatch, and can complete already-started work. Keep explicit detach and different controller/browser identity replacement terminal, owner-gate every inbound lifecycle frame, distinguish slow in-flight WebSocket writes from real send failures, and exclude browser-control session identity from shared shell snapshots. * fix(browser): keep bound controller routing authoritative Generic Hermes callers still use the existing browser backend when extension control is disabled or no server-bound controller identity exists. Once the gateway binds a controller identity, missing scope, disconnect, or capability loss now fail closed instead of silently switching a control-this-tab request to another local or cloud browser. Covers the schema-build to dispatch disconnect race. * feat(browser): add scoped artifact endpoints, broker permission gates, and companion journal * chore(config): declare browser.extension_control in DEFAULT_CONFIG The feature flag was only documented in cli-config.yaml.example; every other browser.* key is declared in DEFAULT_CONFIG so config tooling (dashboard editor, hermes config get) can see it. Defaults unchanged: enabled=False, developer_mode=False. Surfaced during review of PR NousResearch#85351. * fix(browser): bind the extension lane at controller registration, not transport auth The router treated any server-stamped principal as a bound lane, so with the flag ON every authenticated dashboard/API session lost the legacy browser backend even when no extension controller ever registered (scope_for_session returns None -> ControllerUnavailable, no fallback) — while check_fns still advertised the tools via the legacy OR-gate. New broker.lane_registered() distinguishes the two cases: - lane never registered -> generic callers keep the legacy backend - lane registered (controller offline/ambiguous) -> fail closed, unchanged — a control-this-tab session never silently jumps to another browser Also makes the four non-allowlisted wrapped tools (cdp/console/vision/ get_images) behave correctly for never-registered lanes (legacy backend) while staying fail-closed for registered lanes. Surfaced during review of PR NousResearch#85351. * fix(browser): offload broker lock acquisition off the event loop attach/disconnect/detach acquire a per-controller threading.Lock that a worker-thread dispatch can hold for up to 10s while blocking on the event loop to transmit its command frame (run_coroutine_threadsafe + result(timeout=10)). Acquiring that lock synchronously from loop context (controller WS finally, frame handler, gateway WS teardown) could park the ENTIRE gateway event loop behind the send bridge — a deterministic multi-second global stall whenever controller teardown raced an in-flight command. All loop-context broker calls now go through asyncio.to_thread, matching the existing offload pattern for _close_sessions_for_transport. Surfaced during review of PR NousResearch#85351. * refactor(browser): dedupe auth-flow names and sentinel identity - Rename the broker's TicketInvalid to ControllerTicketInvalid: the same exception name already exists in hermes_cli/dashboard_auth/ws_tickets.py and BOTH are caught in the same WS auth flow this feature touches — two unrelated same-named exception types in one blast radius invited a wrong except clause. - Import the 'server-internal' sentinel identity from its canonical definition (ws_tickets.INTERNAL_USER_ID/INTERNAL_PROVIDER) instead of re-declaring the strings; drift would have silently broken the internal-peer exclusion in _is_authenticated_identity. Surfaced during review of PR NousResearch#85351. * perf(browser): read the feature flags via load_config_readonly browser_control_enabled()/browser_control_developer_mode() run on every browser tool call and inside every check_fn evaluation (uncached for bound sessions). Both are pure reads of nested dicts; load_config()'s defensive deepcopy (~135us/call) is wasted there. Same pattern as the other read-only config probes. Surfaced during review of PR NousResearch#85351. * fix(browser): make the artifact boundary compose end-to-end and scope stores per profile Addresses both merge blockers from @andrexibiza's review of NousResearch#85351: 1. HTTP-uploaded artifacts could never be consumed by broker dispatch: artifact_scope_key hashed (principal, session, family), the HTTP routes store with an EMPTY session (API-key auth has no server session) while broker validation carries a session-bearing ControllerScope — every real upload->dispatch journey died with ArtifactScopeMismatch (reproduced before fixing). Canonical ownership is now principal/transport-family (documented in the scope-key docstring); ids stay unguessable server-minted 32-hex and downloads one-shot. New composition regression: HTTP-shape upload -> registered controller scope -> broker artifact dispatch, mutation-checked (re-adding session to the key makes it fail). 2. The 'profile-scoped' artifact store was first-profile-wins process state: one adapter-level singleton pinned profile B to profile A's physical root on multiplex listeners (same frozen-handle class as NousResearch#88734). Stores are now cached by resolved profile, and the broker selects the store from the controller scope's profile_id (default-slot fallback preserves single-profile/test behaviour). New A/B multiplex regression proves distinct physical roots regardless of touch order. Also documents the advertised ticket_expires_at as best-effort wall clock (broker enforces expiry monotonically) per review feedback. * fix(api): correct _handle_browser_control_frame return annotation The frame handler returns reply dicts (heartbeat/detach acks) that the WS reader loop sends back; the -> None annotation was the only new ty diagnostic vs origin/main. * fix(browser): honor live Developer Mode for privileged capability selection The global broker snapshotted browser.extension_control.developer_mode once at construction, so flipping it OFF in config did not revoke raw CDP/eval from already-attached controllers until process restart — a revocation failure at the highest-privilege browser surface (blocker 3 of andrexibiza's NousResearch#91535 review). select() now consults the live config on every privileged selection (explicit bool still pins for tests); off->on also unlocks without restart. Regression test drives both directions against an attached controller. Also drops the dead back-compat _artifact_store property (zero readers). * fix(browser): sweep orphan artifact files at store construction Artifact receipts live only in memory, so files left behind by a dead process were unreachable but persisted forever despite the advertised 300s TTL — a retention failure on the surface meant to be ephemeral (blocker 4 of andrexibiza's NousResearch#91535 review). A fresh ArtifactStore now removes every artifact-id-shaped file and stale *.tmp with no index entry (at construction the index is empty, so all such files are orphans). Non-artifact-shaped names are untouched. Regression: store -> recreate store over same root -> orphan+tmp gone, unrelated file kept. * perf(api): classify compaction rows once per message in run.completed transcript _turn_transcript_messages pre-classified every message with _is_compressed_summary_message (full content flatten + prefix scan), then _message_response re-ran the same classifier inside its projection -- 2x per non-summary row, 3x per summary row on every run.completed emit. The outer guard was redundant: _message_response already yields display_kind hidden for pure handoffs. One projection call per row now. Surfaced by the post-merge simplify re-review of NousResearch#91517/NousResearch#91535. * fix(desktop): stop tabs double-click-hiding the tab strip; body double-tap reveals it The synthesized double-tap that hides a zone's tab strip rode every tab's pointerdown (generic pane drag and each pane's tabDrag), so a routine double-click on a tab (select a title, retry a click) vanished the whole bar and stranded the zone with no tab, no close X, and no way back but a right-click. Keep the documented hide gesture on the strip background only, and add its inverse as recovery: double-tap a hidden zone's body restores the strip. Regression tests pin both sides of the grammar. * fix(desktop): scope the salvaged fix to the failure-path removal Narrows NousResearch#86278 to exactly the defect. Tabs pass no double-tap context on any press path (generic pane drag, multi-tab selection drag, chrome.tabDrag), so a double-click on a tab can no longer hide the strip; the strip background keeps its documented hide gesture unchanged. The body double-tap reveal from NousResearch#86278 is dropped: the zone body deliberately carries no double-click gesture (virtualized content recreates its nodes between clicks, per the standing ruling in tree-group.tsx), and recovery surfaces for a deliberately hidden header are being decided separately across NousResearch#84458 / NousResearch#81638 / NousResearch#89225. The DOUBLE_TAP_MS export is reverted since no consumer remains outside drag-session. Test file trimmed to the two assertions that pin the grammar: a tab double-tap must not hide the strip (red on main), the strip background double-tap still hides. Taps release on window between presses so the drag-session synthesized double-tap path is the one exercised. * refactor(desktop): make a zone's tab strip a stated mode, not a flag five paths wrote `headerHidden` carried two meanings at once. `true` was either "the user hid this" or "a double-tap nobody meant hid this"; `false` was either "the user wants a strip" or "insert / tab-cycling / dock-enforce / adoption pinned one to escape a dead end". Because the layout wrote the same field the user did, a repair silently overwrote a preference and neither could be read back — and since hiding also unmounted the tab, the ✕ and the menu offering "Show header", a zone that got hidden by accident stayed that way across restarts. Replaces it with `tabStrip?: 'always' | 'never'`, where absent is auto and only the user ever writes it, and moves the decision into one resolver that TreeGroup and the store both call, so the strip on screen and the toggle command cannot disagree. Reachability moves into that resolver as an invariant that outranks an explicit `never`: a closeable tile keeps its ✕ and a lone tool panel keeps its chip, because "hide the chrome" is never a request to make a surface unreachable. With that guarantee held centrally, the four repair writes are gone. Persisted `headerHidden` is dropped rather than translated — nothing on disk distinguishes a deliberate hide from an accidental one, and carrying the accidents forward would re-strand exactly the people who reported being stuck. The double-tap hide goes with it, along with the synthesized double-tap detector it was the only consumer of. It fired from ordinary double-clicks on a tab, nothing announced it, and its undo lived behind the chrome it had just removed. `data-zone-no-header` goes too: it marked full-page views for a body double-click toggle that no longer exists, and nothing has read it since. Supersedes the tab-side half of the fix from abundantbeing and yoniebans, whose commits this builds on. * feat(desktop): give hiding the tab strip a command, and a way back The strip could only be hidden by an undiscoverable double-tap, and once hidden the zone had no chrome left to click — no tab, no ✕, no menu holding "Show". This puts it on the same footing as the status bar, whose hide has never stranded anyone: ⌥⌘T, a ⌘K row, the shell context menu, and the zone menu, which now prints the keystroke on the row that takes the strip away so the way back is stated at the moment it matters. All four resolve their target zone the same way the other tab verbs do (hovered, else focused, else the workspace) and describe themselves from what is on screen rather than from a stored value, so "toggle" always means the opposite of what the user is looking at. Adds an app-wide default alongside it, in Appearance next to Session List Density — auto, always, or never, matching VS Code's `workbench.editor.showTabs` and Zed's `tab_bar.show` for people who want one answer everywhere instead of a per-zone choice they repeat. A zone that has stated its own preference still wins, and neither value can strand a pane. * feat(nix): wait for the backend bind target before it starts The backend binds to `backend.host` immediately. The bind fails when the target is not ready, because uvicorn cannot bind a name that does not resolve, or an address that no interface holds. A unit that starts at boot loses this race against the daemon that supplies the target, such as tailscaled. A bind to a Tailscale MagicDNS name shows the problem. The name is the correct bind target, because the dashboard refuses each request with a Host header that is different from the address that the server bound to, and a shared machine has a different address in each tailnet. But the name does not resolve until tailscaled is up, so the unit fails at each boot until `Restart=on-failure` finds the moment when the name works. A systemd user unit cannot order itself after a system unit. `After=` and `Requires=` are silent no-ops across that boundary. Thus the wait is a poll, and not a dependency. This change adds three options to `services.hermes-agent.backend` on both the NixOS module and the Home Manager module: - `waitFor` — `null` (the default, unchanged behavior), `"hostname"`, or `"interface"` - `interfaceName` — the interface to take the address from - `waitTimeout` — the time in seconds before the unit stops With `waitFor`, ExecStart becomes a launcher that polls for the target and then execs hermes. `exec` keeps hermes as the MainPID, so the restart logic of systemd sees the real process. A timeout stops the unit with an error. It does not bind a fallback address, because a fallback can expose the backend more widely than the user intends. The default is not changed. Without `waitFor`, ExecStart is the same command line as before. * docs: Add Nix/NixOS to installation link description * add mike@vorburger.ch to contributors * feat(cron): bot-chat delivery target — cron output lands in a bot's canonical Bot Chat and the bot responds deliver='bot-chat[:<profile>]' is a machine-local pseudo-platform: the scheduler delivers job output as a real inbound turn in the target profile's canonical Bot Chat via the chat CLI lane (--in ~ -c "Bot Chat" --create-if-missing -Q --query-file), the same lane Bot Mode agent-to-agent messages use. The bot reads the output, acts on it, and responds in its chat — instead of the output only landing in Run history. - cron/scheduler.py: token parsing, target resolution (own profile / named local profile / unknown -> skipped with warning), subprocess delivery lane with cron.bot_chat_delivery_timeout_seconds (default 600s), preflight exemption, and bot-chat entries in cron_delivery_targets() for UI pickers. Excluded from 'all' by design. - tools/cronjob_tools.py: create/update-time validation — named profiles must exist on this machine (fail at create, not at 3am); deliver schema documents the new token. - tui_gateway/methods_tools.py: cron.manage add forwards deliver. - hermes_cli/profiles.py: list_profile_names() cheap name-only scan. - hermes-bots plugin: Create Cronjob dialog gains a 'Send results to' picker (Run history only / <bot>'s chat); bot-chat jobs send the BARE token on the profile-scoped create so Desktop-side aliases can never name a profile the backend doesn't have. - Docs: user cron guide, automate-with-cron, cron-internals. Machine-local by construction: names resolve only against the executing machine's ~/.hermes/profiles/, so overlapping profile names across multiple connected gateways are unambiguous. * test(cron): delivery-targets test scopes platform assertions past bot-chat entries cron_delivery_targets() now also lists machine-local bot-chat:<profile> entries; the sibling test's exact set-equality assertion predates them. Scope the platform assertions to gateway entries and pin that bot-chat entries are always home_target_set. * kanban: resume-on-retry session continuity for re-review rounds A task that bounces review-requested-changes -> ready and gets reclaimed by the SAME implementer profile previously got a fully cold 'hermes chat -q' session every round: full system prompt, tool schemas, and task history re-fetched from scratch. _default_spawn now accepts an optional conn and, when the dispatcher passes one, calls _resolve_worker_resume_session_id() to look up the implementer's own worker_session_id stamped on the last ENDED run under that profile (kanban_complete/kanban_request_review already stamp this via _stamp_worker_session_metadata). If that session still resolves in the profile's own state.db, the child is launched with --resume <id> --no-restore-cwd instead of a cold start. Any resolution failure (no prior run, wrong profile, session gone) falls back to today's cold-start behaviour -- dispatch is never blocked. Both dispatch_once() spawn call sites (ready lane, review lane) now pass conn through to spawn_fn via signature introspection, matching the existing board= pattern so older test stubs are unaffected. Card: t_e1ba67d5 --------- Co-authored-by: kshitijk4poor <82637225+kshitijk4poor@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Troy Rowe <troy.rowe@re-source.au> Co-authored-by: abundantbeing <beingsabundant@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: emozilla <emozilla@nousresearch.com> Co-authored-by: yoniebans <jonny@nousresearch.com> Co-authored-by: Brooklyn Nicholson <brooklyn.bb.nicholson@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: ethernet <arilotter@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Michael Vorburger <mike@vorburger.ch> Co-authored-by: Teknium <127238744+teknium1@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Saylent Swarm <swarm@saylent.dev>
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What does this PR do?
Stops a turn being aborted when the provider rejects a request parameter that Hermes never sent.
The Codex OAuth backend (
chatgpt.com/backend-api/codex) intermittently injectsprompt_cache_retentioninto its own upstream call and then rejects it with HTTP 400invalid_parameter. Hermes only sets that field forapi.meta.aiandbedrock-mantle.*.api.awshosts (agent/transports/codex.py::_default_prompt_cache_retention_for_request) — never for the Codex route. The failing request body confirms it: noprompt_cache_retentionkey present._classify_400fell through to its catch-all and returnedformat_error/retryable=False, which trips theis_client_errorabort gate inagent/conversation_loop.py(~line 6142) and kills the turn on the first attempt.format_erroris right for a deterministic bad parameter, but this rejection is random: a byte-identical retry succeeds ~80% of the time. The cost of getting it wrong is high because the discarded requests are large-context ones.This classifies the case as a retryable
server_errorso the existing retry loop absorbs it, and keeps genuine client-side bad-parameter 400s failing fast exactly as before.Deliberately narrow, to avoid turning a useful fast-fail into a retry flood:
_SERVER_INJECTED_PARAM_SENDERS);should_compress=False— the request shape was never the problem, so this must not enter the compression loop.Related Issue
Fixes #90257
Type of Change
Changes Made
agent/error_classifier.py_SERVER_INJECTED_PARAM_SENDERS+_is_server_injected_param_rejection()helper_classify_400: new branch before the request-validation branch returning retryableserver_error_classify_by_status(500/502 branch): guard added so a proxy surfacing the same injected-parameter rejection as 5xx keeps the generic retryable-5xx handling, instead of being fast-failed asformat_errortests/agent/test_error_classifier.pyTestServerInjectedParameterRejection(10 tests, incl. 4 boundary/regression guards)How to Test
Reproduction (what made this diagnosable) — a minimal request to the Codex endpoint carrying no cache parameters at all:
n=20 sequential: 4 failed (20%) with
prompt_cache_retention is not supported on this model. n=12 concurrent: 0 failed. Random, and on a request that cannot contain the parameter.Verifying the fix:
pytest tests/agent/test_error_classifier.py -q→ 107 passedif False and _is_...), the 4 positive tests fail withformat_error != server_error; re-enabled, all 10 pass. The 4 boundary tests pass either way, so they can't mask a regression.is_client_errorexpression fromconversation_loop.pyagainst the real classification yieldsFalse, i.e. the loop retries rather than aborting.BadRequestErroron attempt 1, let the real retry policy handle it, recovered on attempt 2, model returned the expectedRETRY_OK.Boundary cases held (all asserted in tests):
detailbody)server_error, retryableserver_error, retryableserver_error, retryablemeta-ai/bedrock-mantle(we do send it there)format_error, fast-failmax_tokensunsupported-parameter 400format_error, fast-failunknown_parameter502 (the codex.nekos.me case)format_error, fast-failcontext_overflow, compressChecklist
Code
fix(classifier): ...)Test note: verified in a clean worktree checked out from
origin/main(9162ea6db) with the change cherry-picked, so no local config or plugins are in play.tests/agent/test_error_classifier.py→ 107 passedtests/agent/ tests/run_agent/→ 231 failed, 6296 passed, 31 skippedThose 231 failures are pre-existing on
mainand unrelated to this change. I ran the identical suite against a pristineorigin/mainworktree with the change absent and diffed the failure sets:The delta is exactly
+10 passed, which is the 10 tests added here. The pre-existing failures cluster intest_models_dev.py(41),test_codex_app_server_integration.py(17),test_title_generator.py(15) and ~40 other files, and appear environmental (mock-call assertions in a sandbox without provider credentials) — happy to share the log if useful.Documentation & Housekeeping
cli-config.yaml.exampleif I added/changed config keys — N/A (no config keys)CONTRIBUTING.md/AGENTS.md— N/A (no architecture or workflow change)Screenshots / Logs
Before (turn dies on first attempt):
Two sessions hit this 25 seconds apart, each carrying ~410-550k tokens of context — a full large-context input discarded per abort, for a fault that clears on retry.
After (same error injected, retry loop recovers):