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fix(classifier): retry provider-injected parameter 400s instead of aborting the turn - #90261

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fix(classifier): retry provider-injected parameter 400s instead of aborting the turn#90261
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What does this PR do?

Stops a turn being aborted when the provider rejects a request parameter that Hermes never sent.

The Codex OAuth backend (chatgpt.com/backend-api/codex) intermittently injects prompt_cache_retention into its own upstream call and then rejects it with HTTP 400 invalid_parameter. Hermes only sets that field for api.meta.ai and bedrock-mantle.*.api.aws hosts (agent/transports/codex.py::_default_prompt_cache_retention_for_request) — never for the Codex route. The failing request body confirms it: no prompt_cache_retention key present.

_classify_400 fell through to its catch-all and returned format_error / retryable=False, which trips the is_client_error abort gate in agent/conversation_loop.py (~line 6142) and kills the turn on the first attempt. format_error is right for a deterministic bad parameter, but this rejection is random: a byte-identical retry succeeds ~80% of the time. The cost of getting it wrong is high because the discarded requests are large-context ones.

This classifies the case as a retryable server_error so the existing retry loop absorbs it, and keeps genuine client-side bad-parameter 400s failing fast exactly as before.

Deliberately narrow, to avoid turning a useful fast-fail into a retry flood:

  • keyed on a small map of parameters Hermes only sends on specific routes (_SERVER_INJECTED_PARAM_SENDERS);
  • requires the message to actually be a rejection of that parameter, not an incidental mention;
  • skipped when the current provider is one that legitimately sends the field, so a real request error there still fails fast;
  • should_compress=False — the request shape was never the problem, so this must not enter the compression loop.

Related Issue

Fixes #90257

Type of Change

  • 🐛 Bug fix (non-breaking change that fixes an issue)

Changes Made

  • agent/error_classifier.py
    • added _SERVER_INJECTED_PARAM_SENDERS + _is_server_injected_param_rejection() helper
    • _classify_400: new branch before the request-validation branch returning retryable server_error
    • _classify_by_status (500/502 branch): guard added so a proxy surfacing the same injected-parameter rejection as 5xx keeps the generic retryable-5xx handling, instead of being fast-failed as format_error
  • tests/agent/test_error_classifier.py
    • added TestServerInjectedParameterRejection (10 tests, incl. 4 boundary/regression guards)

How to Test

Reproduction (what made this diagnosable) — a minimal request to the Codex endpoint carrying no cache parameters at all:

body = {"model": "gpt-5.6-sol", "instructions": "t",
        "input": [{"role": "user", "content": "OK"}],
        "store": False, "stream": True}

n=20 sequential: 4 failed (20%) with prompt_cache_retention is not supported on this model. n=12 concurrent: 0 failed. Random, and on a request that cannot contain the parameter.

Verifying the fix:

  1. pytest tests/agent/test_error_classifier.py -q → 107 passed
  2. Red-green verified: with the new branch disabled (if False and _is_...), the 4 positive tests fail with format_error != server_error; re-enabled, all 10 pass. The 4 boundary tests pass either way, so they can't mask a regression.
  3. Abort-gate check — replicating the is_client_error expression from conversation_loop.py against the real classification yields False, i.e. the loop retries rather than aborting.
  4. Live end-to-end against the real Codex API: injected the exact BadRequestError on attempt 1, let the real retry policy handle it, recovered on attempt 2, model returned the expected RETRY_OK.

Boundary cases held (all asserted in tests):

Case Verdict
Codex retention 400 (envelope + bare detail body) server_error, retryable
Same on a small 1-message request server_error, retryable
Same surfaced as 500/502 by a proxy server_error, retryable
Retention 400 from meta-ai / bedrock-mantle (we do send it there) format_error, fast-fail
max_tokens unsupported-parameter 400 format_error, fast-fail
unknown_parameter 502 (the codex.nekos.me case) format_error, fast-fail
Genuine context-overflow 400 context_overflow, compress

Checklist

Code

  • I've read the Contributing Guide
  • My commit messages follow Conventional Commits (fix(classifier): ...)
  • I searched for existing PRs to make sure this isn't a duplicate
  • My PR contains only changes related to this fix (2 files)
  • I've run the test suite and all tests pass — see note below
  • I've added tests for my changes
  • I've tested on my platform: Ubuntu 24.04, Python 3.11.15

Test note: verified in a clean worktree checked out from origin/main (9162ea6db) with the change cherry-picked, so no local config or plugins are in play.

  • tests/agent/test_error_classifier.py107 passed
  • Full tests/agent/ tests/run_agent/231 failed, 6296 passed, 31 skipped

Those 231 failures are pre-existing on main and unrelated to this change. I ran the identical suite against a pristine origin/main worktree with the change absent and diffed the failure sets:

baseline (pristine origin/main) failures : 231
with my change                  failures : 231
NEW failures introduced by my change     : 0
failures my change FIXED                 : 0
-> identical failure sets

The delta is exactly +10 passed, which is the 10 tests added here. The pre-existing failures cluster in test_models_dev.py (41), test_codex_app_server_integration.py (17), test_title_generator.py (15) and ~40 other files, and appear environmental (mock-call assertions in a sandbox without provider credentials) — happy to share the log if useful.

Documentation & Housekeeping

  • I've updated relevant documentation — N/A (internal classification behaviour; the reasoning is captured in code comments at both branch sites)
  • I've updated cli-config.yaml.example if I added/changed config keys — N/A (no config keys)
  • I've updated CONTRIBUTING.md / AGENTS.md — N/A (no architecture or workflow change)
  • I've considered cross-platform impact — N/A (pure string/dict logic, no platform-specific behaviour)
  • I've updated tool descriptions/schemas — N/A (no tool behaviour change)

Screenshots / Logs

Before (turn dies on first attempt):

WARNING agent.conversation_loop: API call failed (attempt 1/3) error_type=BadRequestError
  provider=openai-codex base_url=https://chatgpt.com/backend-api/codex model=gpt-5.6-sol
  summary=HTTP 400: prompt_cache_retention is not supported on this model
ERROR   agent.conversation_loop: Non-retryable client error: Error code: 400 - {'error':
  {'message': 'prompt_cache_retention is not supported on this model', 'type':
  'invalid_request_error', 'param': 'prompt_cache_retention', 'code': 'invalid_parameter'}}

Two sessions hit this 25 seconds apart, each carrying ~410-550k tokens of context — a full large-context input discarded per abort, for a fault that clears on retry.

After (same error injected, retry loop recovers):

[1] classification: server_error retryable=True OK
[2] abort gate: not triggered -> loop retries OK
    attempt 1: InjectedBadRequest -> server_error retryable=True
[3] recovered on attempt 2; live model said: 'RETRY_OK'

…orting

The Codex OAuth backend (chatgpt.com/backend-api/codex) intermittently
injects prompt_cache_retention into its own upstream call and then rejects
it, returning HTTP 400 invalid_parameter. Hermes never sends that field on
this route (see agent/transports/codex.py::_default_prompt_cache_retention_
for_request, which only sets it for api.meta.ai and bedrock-mantle hosts).

Reproduced live: a minimal 1-message request carrying no cache parameters
at all failed 4/20 (20%) with this error, so the rejection is not
deterministic and retrying the identical request is the correct recovery.

Previously the catch-all in _classify_400 returned format_error/
retryable=False, which tripped the is_client_error abort gate in
conversation_loop and killed the turn on the first attempt - burning an
entire large-context request (~550k tokens) per failure.

Classify these as retryable server_error (should_compress=False - the
request shape was never the problem). The same guard is applied to the
sibling 5xx request-validation branch, where a fronting proxy can surface
the identical rejection.

Deliberately narrow: keyed on parameters we only send on specific routes,
and skipped when the current provider is one that legitimately sends them,
so a genuine client-side bad parameter (max_tokens on GPT-5) still fails
fast as a format_error.
@alt-glitch alt-glitch added type/bug Something isn't working P2 Medium — degraded but workaround exists comp/agent Core agent runtime: loop, agent_init, prompt builder, context-compression, responses endpoint provider/openai OpenAI / Codex Responses API labels Aug 19, 2026
kshitijk4poor added a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 21, 2026
Mapping for PR #90261 salvage (server-injected parameter 400 classifier).
@kshitijk4poor

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Merged via #91643. Your commits cherry-picked with authorship preserved.

Your fix is exactly right — the classification of server-injected parameter 400s as retryable server_error instead of non-retryable format_error is the correct approach, and the boundary tests (meta-ai sender stays non-retryable, max_tokens stays non-retryable, codex.nekos.me 502 stays non-retryable) are excellent.

Thanks for the thorough reproduction and analysis — the ~20% failure rate measurement on a minimal request that provably carried no cache parameters was key to confirming this is a server-side injection, not a client-side request shape issue.

swarm-agents-soxzz5 Bot added a commit to SoxZz5/hermes-agent that referenced this pull request Aug 22, 2026
* chore: AUTHOR_MAP troy.rowe@re-source.au -> troyrowe-resource

Mapping for PR NousResearch#90261 salvage (server-injected parameter 400 classifier).

* fix(classifier): retry provider-injected parameter 400s instead of aborting

The Codex OAuth backend (chatgpt.com/backend-api/codex) intermittently
injects prompt_cache_retention into its own upstream call and then rejects
it, returning HTTP 400 invalid_parameter. Hermes never sends that field on
this route (see agent/transports/codex.py::_default_prompt_cache_retention_
for_request, which only sets it for api.meta.ai and bedrock-mantle hosts).

Reproduced live: a minimal 1-message request carrying no cache parameters
at all failed 4/20 (20%) with this error, so the rejection is not
deterministic and retrying the identical request is the correct recovery.

Previously the catch-all in _classify_400 returned format_error/
retryable=False, which tripped the is_client_error abort gate in
conversation_loop and killed the turn on the first attempt - burning an
entire large-context request (~550k tokens) per failure.

Classify these as retryable server_error (should_compress=False - the
request shape was never the problem). The same guard is applied to the
sibling 5xx request-validation branch, where a fronting proxy can surface
the identical rejection.

Deliberately narrow: keyed on parameters we only send on specific routes,
and skipped when the current provider is one that legitimately sends them,
so a genuine client-side bad parameter (max_tokens on GPT-5) still fails
fast as a format_error.

* fix(agent): guard merged assistant compaction handoffs

Treat a merged assistant-role summary carrier as the driving reference handoff when it immediately follows a completed assistant stop. Its preserved prose and stale tool_calls are assistant continuity, not a fresh live user request.

Keep legitimate in-flight behavior unchanged when there is no completed stop, a real user turn follows, or a distinct later assistant tool-call row continues the loop.

Extends the NousResearch#80622 active-turn guard for the merged-carrier shape reported under NousResearch#42768.

* fix(agent): preserve live merged tool-call carriers

Identify a completed merged assistant handoff from the carrier's own stop state instead of an unrelated adjacent history row. Keep carriers with pending tool calls actionable so compaction cannot abort a live tool chain.

* fix(api): hide compaction scaffolding from clients

Project client-visible session messages through the canonical compaction classifier. Hide standalone handoffs, unwrap merged carriers to their authentic prior-tail content, strip inherited internal fields, and keep model-facing recovery history unchanged.

* fix(clients): hide compaction carriers across surfaces

* refactor(api): reuse _COMPACTION_INTERNAL_FIELDS from compaction_display

The 7-key internal-fields tuple was inlined twice (agent/compaction_display.py
and _project_client_message); a drift between the copies would silently leak
one internal field class through the API projection. Surfaced during review
of PR NousResearch#85442.

* fix(desktop): boot overlays stay opaque under window glass

The full-screen boot surfaces (connecting, onboarding, boot failure, root
crash fallback) paint their backdrop with --ui-chat-surface-background,
which the glass field turns transparent so <body> can be the one painter
(0483133). That was harmless while glass shipped off; once it shipped
on by default (be31666) every boot overlay became a window onto the
shell behind it.

These overlays mask the whole app, so they declare data-glass-opaque —
the existing contract for surfaces that paint over siblings — which pins
the token back to opaque chrome under glass and changes nothing when
glass is off.

* feat(browser): add authenticated control broker

* feat(browser): enable extension controller actions

* fix(browser): harden extension controller routing

Keep extension control opt-in and preserve existing browser backends unless an exact server-bound controller is available. Centralize protocol and capability admission across API and dashboard transports, make selected-controller results authoritative, bypass stale availability caches only inside bound requests, and serialize structured results for the existing tool contract.

Add a real browser_snapshot route-table/WebSocket E2E, strict admission and ownership regressions, public configuration and protocol documentation, and tests proving feature-off/no-controller compatibility.

* fix(browser): preserve controller work across reconnects

Treat unexpected controller transport loss as recoverable until each command's original deadline. Same-identity reconnects refresh transport and capability state, flush deferred cancels before new dispatch, and can complete already-started work.

Keep explicit detach and different controller/browser identity replacement terminal, owner-gate every inbound lifecycle frame, distinguish slow in-flight WebSocket writes from real send failures, and exclude browser-control session identity from shared shell snapshots.

* fix(browser): keep bound controller routing authoritative

Generic Hermes callers still use the existing browser backend when extension control is disabled or no server-bound controller identity exists.

Once the gateway binds a controller identity, missing scope, disconnect, or capability loss now fail closed instead of silently switching a control-this-tab request to another local or cloud browser. Covers the schema-build to dispatch disconnect race.

* feat(browser): add scoped artifact endpoints, broker permission gates, and companion journal

* chore(config): declare browser.extension_control in DEFAULT_CONFIG

The feature flag was only documented in cli-config.yaml.example; every other
browser.* key is declared in DEFAULT_CONFIG so config tooling (dashboard
editor, hermes config get) can see it. Defaults unchanged: enabled=False,
developer_mode=False. Surfaced during review of PR NousResearch#85351.

* fix(browser): bind the extension lane at controller registration, not transport auth

The router treated any server-stamped principal as a bound lane, so with the
flag ON every authenticated dashboard/API session lost the legacy browser
backend even when no extension controller ever registered (scope_for_session
returns None -> ControllerUnavailable, no fallback) — while check_fns still
advertised the tools via the legacy OR-gate.

New broker.lane_registered() distinguishes the two cases:
- lane never registered -> generic callers keep the legacy backend
- lane registered (controller offline/ambiguous) -> fail closed, unchanged —
  a control-this-tab session never silently jumps to another browser

Also makes the four non-allowlisted wrapped tools (cdp/console/vision/
get_images) behave correctly for never-registered lanes (legacy backend)
while staying fail-closed for registered lanes.

Surfaced during review of PR NousResearch#85351.

* fix(browser): offload broker lock acquisition off the event loop

attach/disconnect/detach acquire a per-controller threading.Lock that a
worker-thread dispatch can hold for up to 10s while blocking on the event
loop to transmit its command frame (run_coroutine_threadsafe +
result(timeout=10)). Acquiring that lock synchronously from loop context
(controller WS finally, frame handler, gateway WS teardown) could park the
ENTIRE gateway event loop behind the send bridge — a deterministic
multi-second global stall whenever controller teardown raced an in-flight
command. All loop-context broker calls now go through asyncio.to_thread,
matching the existing offload pattern for _close_sessions_for_transport.

Surfaced during review of PR NousResearch#85351.

* refactor(browser): dedupe auth-flow names and sentinel identity

- Rename the broker's TicketInvalid to ControllerTicketInvalid: the same
  exception name already exists in hermes_cli/dashboard_auth/ws_tickets.py
  and BOTH are caught in the same WS auth flow this feature touches — two
  unrelated same-named exception types in one blast radius invited a wrong
  except clause.
- Import the 'server-internal' sentinel identity from its canonical
  definition (ws_tickets.INTERNAL_USER_ID/INTERNAL_PROVIDER) instead of
  re-declaring the strings; drift would have silently broken the
  internal-peer exclusion in _is_authenticated_identity.

Surfaced during review of PR NousResearch#85351.

* perf(browser): read the feature flags via load_config_readonly

browser_control_enabled()/browser_control_developer_mode() run on every
browser tool call and inside every check_fn evaluation (uncached for bound
sessions). Both are pure reads of nested dicts; load_config()'s defensive
deepcopy (~135us/call) is wasted there. Same pattern as the other read-only
config probes.

Surfaced during review of PR NousResearch#85351.

* fix(browser): make the artifact boundary compose end-to-end and scope stores per profile

Addresses both merge blockers from @andrexibiza's review of NousResearch#85351:

1. HTTP-uploaded artifacts could never be consumed by broker dispatch:
   artifact_scope_key hashed (principal, session, family), the HTTP routes
   store with an EMPTY session (API-key auth has no server session) while
   broker validation carries a session-bearing ControllerScope — every
   real upload->dispatch journey died with ArtifactScopeMismatch
   (reproduced before fixing). Canonical ownership is now
   principal/transport-family (documented in the scope-key docstring);
   ids stay unguessable server-minted 32-hex and downloads one-shot.
   New composition regression: HTTP-shape upload -> registered controller
   scope -> broker artifact dispatch, mutation-checked (re-adding session
   to the key makes it fail).

2. The 'profile-scoped' artifact store was first-profile-wins process
   state: one adapter-level singleton pinned profile B to profile A's
   physical root on multiplex listeners (same frozen-handle class as
   NousResearch#88734). Stores are now cached by resolved profile, and the broker
   selects the store from the controller scope's profile_id (default-slot
   fallback preserves single-profile/test behaviour). New A/B multiplex
   regression proves distinct physical roots regardless of touch order.

Also documents the advertised ticket_expires_at as best-effort wall clock
(broker enforces expiry monotonically) per review feedback.

* fix(api): correct _handle_browser_control_frame return annotation

The frame handler returns reply dicts (heartbeat/detach acks) that the WS
reader loop sends back; the -> None annotation was the only new ty
diagnostic vs origin/main.

* fix(browser): honor live Developer Mode for privileged capability selection

The global broker snapshotted browser.extension_control.developer_mode once
at construction, so flipping it OFF in config did not revoke raw CDP/eval
from already-attached controllers until process restart — a revocation
failure at the highest-privilege browser surface (blocker 3 of
andrexibiza's NousResearch#91535 review). select() now consults the live config on
every privileged selection (explicit bool still pins for tests); off->on
also unlocks without restart. Regression test drives both directions
against an attached controller. Also drops the dead back-compat
_artifact_store property (zero readers).

* fix(browser): sweep orphan artifact files at store construction

Artifact receipts live only in memory, so files left behind by a dead
process were unreachable but persisted forever despite the advertised
300s TTL — a retention failure on the surface meant to be ephemeral
(blocker 4 of andrexibiza's NousResearch#91535 review). A fresh ArtifactStore now
removes every artifact-id-shaped file and stale *.tmp with no index entry
(at construction the index is empty, so all such files are orphans).
Non-artifact-shaped names are untouched. Regression: store -> recreate
store over same root -> orphan+tmp gone, unrelated file kept.

* perf(api): classify compaction rows once per message in run.completed transcript

_turn_transcript_messages pre-classified every message with
_is_compressed_summary_message (full content flatten + prefix scan), then
_message_response re-ran the same classifier inside its projection --
2x per non-summary row, 3x per summary row on every run.completed emit.
The outer guard was redundant: _message_response already yields
display_kind hidden for pure handoffs. One projection call per row now.
Surfaced by the post-merge simplify re-review of NousResearch#91517/NousResearch#91535.

* fix(desktop): stop tabs double-click-hiding the tab strip; body double-tap reveals it

The synthesized double-tap that hides a zone's tab strip rode every tab's
pointerdown (generic pane drag and each pane's tabDrag), so a routine
double-click on a tab (select a title, retry a click) vanished the whole
bar and stranded the zone with no tab, no close X, and no way back but a
right-click. Keep the documented hide gesture on the strip background
only, and add its inverse as recovery: double-tap a hidden zone's body
restores the strip. Regression tests pin both sides of the grammar.

* fix(desktop): scope the salvaged fix to the failure-path removal

Narrows NousResearch#86278 to exactly the defect. Tabs pass no double-tap context on any press path (generic pane drag, multi-tab selection drag, chrome.tabDrag), so a double-click on a tab can no longer hide the strip; the strip background keeps its documented hide gesture unchanged.

The body double-tap reveal from NousResearch#86278 is dropped: the zone body deliberately carries no double-click gesture (virtualized content recreates its nodes between clicks, per the standing ruling in tree-group.tsx), and recovery surfaces for a deliberately hidden header are being decided separately across NousResearch#84458 / NousResearch#81638 / NousResearch#89225. The DOUBLE_TAP_MS export is reverted since no consumer remains outside drag-session.

Test file trimmed to the two assertions that pin the grammar: a tab double-tap must not hide the strip (red on main), the strip background double-tap still hides. Taps release on window between presses so the drag-session synthesized double-tap path is the one exercised.

* refactor(desktop): make a zone's tab strip a stated mode, not a flag five paths wrote

`headerHidden` carried two meanings at once. `true` was either "the user hid
this" or "a double-tap nobody meant hid this"; `false` was either "the user
wants a strip" or "insert / tab-cycling / dock-enforce / adoption pinned one to
escape a dead end". Because the layout wrote the same field the user did, a
repair silently overwrote a preference and neither could be read back — and
since hiding also unmounted the tab, the ✕ and the menu offering "Show header",
a zone that got hidden by accident stayed that way across restarts.

Replaces it with `tabStrip?: 'always' | 'never'`, where absent is auto and only
the user ever writes it, and moves the decision into one resolver that TreeGroup
and the store both call, so the strip on screen and the toggle command cannot
disagree. Reachability moves into that resolver as an invariant that outranks an
explicit `never`: a closeable tile keeps its ✕ and a lone tool panel keeps its
chip, because "hide the chrome" is never a request to make a surface
unreachable. With that guarantee held centrally, the four repair writes are
gone. Persisted `headerHidden` is dropped rather than translated — nothing on
disk distinguishes a deliberate hide from an accidental one, and carrying the
accidents forward would re-strand exactly the people who reported being stuck.

The double-tap hide goes with it, along with the synthesized double-tap detector
it was the only consumer of. It fired from ordinary double-clicks on a tab,
nothing announced it, and its undo lived behind the chrome it had just removed.
`data-zone-no-header` goes too: it marked full-page views for a body
double-click toggle that no longer exists, and nothing has read it since.

Supersedes the tab-side half of the fix from abundantbeing and yoniebans, whose
commits this builds on.

* feat(desktop): give hiding the tab strip a command, and a way back

The strip could only be hidden by an undiscoverable double-tap, and once hidden
the zone had no chrome left to click — no tab, no ✕, no menu holding "Show".
This puts it on the same footing as the status bar, whose hide has never
stranded anyone: ⌥⌘T, a ⌘K row, the shell context menu, and the zone menu, which
now prints the keystroke on the row that takes the strip away so the way back is
stated at the moment it matters. All four resolve their target zone the same way
the other tab verbs do (hovered, else focused, else the workspace) and describe
themselves from what is on screen rather than from a stored value, so "toggle"
always means the opposite of what the user is looking at.

Adds an app-wide default alongside it, in Appearance next to Session List
Density — auto, always, or never, matching VS Code's `workbench.editor.showTabs`
and Zed's `tab_bar.show` for people who want one answer everywhere instead of a
per-zone choice they repeat. A zone that has stated its own preference still
wins, and neither value can strand a pane.

* feat(nix): wait for the backend bind target before it starts

The backend binds to `backend.host` immediately. The bind fails when the
target is not ready, because uvicorn cannot bind a name that does not
resolve, or an address that no interface holds. A unit that starts at boot
loses this race against the daemon that supplies the target, such as
tailscaled.

A bind to a Tailscale MagicDNS name shows the problem. The name is the
correct bind target, because the dashboard refuses each request with a Host
header that is different from the address that the server bound to, and a
shared machine has a different address in each tailnet. But the name does
not resolve until tailscaled is up, so the unit fails at each boot until
`Restart=on-failure` finds the moment when the name works.

A systemd user unit cannot order itself after a system unit. `After=` and
`Requires=` are silent no-ops across that boundary. Thus the wait is a poll,
and not a dependency.

This change adds three options to `services.hermes-agent.backend` on both
the NixOS module and the Home Manager module:

- `waitFor` — `null` (the default, unchanged behavior), `"hostname"`, or
  `"interface"`
- `interfaceName` — the interface to take the address from
- `waitTimeout` — the time in seconds before the unit stops

With `waitFor`, ExecStart becomes a launcher that polls for the target and
then execs hermes. `exec` keeps hermes as the MainPID, so the restart logic
of systemd sees the real process. A timeout stops the unit with an error. It
does not bind a fallback address, because a fallback can expose the backend
more widely than the user intends.

The default is not changed. Without `waitFor`, ExecStart is the same
command line as before.

* docs: Add Nix/NixOS to installation link description

* add mike@vorburger.ch to contributors

* feat(cron): bot-chat delivery target — cron output lands in a bot's canonical Bot Chat and the bot responds

deliver='bot-chat[:<profile>]' is a machine-local pseudo-platform: the
scheduler delivers job output as a real inbound turn in the target
profile's canonical Bot Chat via the chat CLI lane (--in ~ -c "Bot Chat"
--create-if-missing -Q --query-file), the same lane Bot Mode
agent-to-agent messages use. The bot reads the output, acts on it, and
responds in its chat — instead of the output only landing in Run history.

- cron/scheduler.py: token parsing, target resolution (own profile /
  named local profile / unknown -> skipped with warning), subprocess
  delivery lane with cron.bot_chat_delivery_timeout_seconds (default
  600s), preflight exemption, and bot-chat entries in
  cron_delivery_targets() for UI pickers. Excluded from 'all' by design.
- tools/cronjob_tools.py: create/update-time validation — named profiles
  must exist on this machine (fail at create, not at 3am); deliver schema
  documents the new token.
- tui_gateway/methods_tools.py: cron.manage add forwards deliver.
- hermes_cli/profiles.py: list_profile_names() cheap name-only scan.
- hermes-bots plugin: Create Cronjob dialog gains a 'Send results to'
  picker (Run history only / <bot>'s chat); bot-chat jobs send the BARE
  token on the profile-scoped create so Desktop-side aliases can never
  name a profile the backend doesn't have.
- Docs: user cron guide, automate-with-cron, cron-internals.

Machine-local by construction: names resolve only against the executing
machine's ~/.hermes/profiles/, so overlapping profile names across
multiple connected gateways are unambiguous.

* test(cron): delivery-targets test scopes platform assertions past bot-chat entries

cron_delivery_targets() now also lists machine-local bot-chat:<profile>
entries; the sibling test's exact set-equality assertion predates them.
Scope the platform assertions to gateway entries and pin that bot-chat
entries are always home_target_set.

* kanban: resume-on-retry session continuity for re-review rounds

A task that bounces review-requested-changes -> ready and gets
reclaimed by the SAME implementer profile previously got a fully cold
'hermes chat -q' session every round: full system prompt, tool
schemas, and task history re-fetched from scratch.

_default_spawn now accepts an optional conn and, when the dispatcher
passes one, calls _resolve_worker_resume_session_id() to look up the
implementer's own worker_session_id stamped on the last ENDED run
under that profile (kanban_complete/kanban_request_review already
stamp this via _stamp_worker_session_metadata). If that session still
resolves in the profile's own state.db, the child is launched with
--resume <id> --no-restore-cwd instead of a cold start. Any resolution
failure (no prior run, wrong profile, session gone) falls back to
today's cold-start behaviour -- dispatch is never blocked.

Both dispatch_once() spawn call sites (ready lane, review lane) now
pass conn through to spawn_fn via signature introspection, matching
the existing board= pattern so older test stubs are unaffected.

Card: t_e1ba67d5

---------

Co-authored-by: kshitijk4poor <82637225+kshitijk4poor@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Troy Rowe <troy.rowe@re-source.au>
Co-authored-by: abundantbeing <beingsabundant@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: emozilla <emozilla@nousresearch.com>
Co-authored-by: yoniebans <jonny@nousresearch.com>
Co-authored-by: Brooklyn Nicholson <brooklyn.bb.nicholson@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: ethernet <arilotter@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Michael Vorburger <mike@vorburger.ch>
Co-authored-by: Teknium <127238744+teknium1@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Saylent Swarm <swarm@saylent.dev>
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comp/agent Core agent runtime: loop, agent_init, prompt builder, context-compression, responses endpoint P2 Medium — degraded but workaround exists provider/openai OpenAI / Codex Responses API type/bug Something isn't working

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Codex OAuth: provider-injected prompt_cache_retention 400 aborts the turn instead of retrying

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