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fix(photon): auth & setup cluster — stale tokens, secret rotation, diagnostics, atomic auth.json (salvage x6) - #73562

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teknium1 merged 12 commits into
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Jul 29, 2026
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fix(photon): auth & setup cluster — stale tokens, secret rotation, diagnostics, atomic auth.json (salvage x6)#73562
teknium1 merged 12 commits into
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photon/auth-cluster

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Summary

Consolidated Photon auth/setup salvage: setup no longer 401s on stale device tokens and actually enables the channel in config.yaml, project secrets stop being needlessly rotated out from under a running sidecar, check_requirements() failures are diagnosable, auth.json writes are atomic + locked, and system proxies can no longer break sidecar localhost calls.

Salvages six contributor PRs onto current main with authorship preserved, in composition order: #60427 (@solyanviktor-star), #64902 (@pierrenode), #72803 photon-only (@webtecnica), #50761 (@liuhao1024), #50983 (@JoaoMarcos44), #47933 (@DI404N, widened to all 5 httpx sites).

Changes

Validation

Result
Photon suite 13 files, 142 tests passed, 0 failed (re-run green after mid-build rebase)
Stale-base gate 0 behind; diff = photon plugin + tests + mappings only

Fixes #72763. Fixes #50755. Fixes #50981.

Infographic

photon auth overhaul

@alt-glitch alt-glitch added type/bug Something isn't working comp/plugins Plugin system and bundled plugins area/auth Authentication, OAuth, credential pools P2 Medium — degraded but workaround exists sweeper:risk-security-boundary Sweeper risk: may affect sandboxing, auth, credentials, or sensitive data labels Jul 28, 2026
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૮ >ﻌ< ა ci review

ran on af1d812

ℹ️ Info

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Failed to upload diff-665a0833239e-onboarding-overlay-diff.png with gh image (exit code 1): Error uploading /home/runner/work/_temp/e2e-evidence/diff-665a0833239e-onboarding-overlay-diff.png: step 0 (get upload token): uploadToken not found on repo page — do you have write access to NousResearch/hermes-agent? (or, if NousResearch enforces SAML SSO, authorize at https://github.com/orgs/NousResearch/sso)

@teknium1
teknium1 force-pushed the photon/auth-cluster branch from 35c463f to 3068278 Compare July 28, 2026 19:31
solyanviktor-star and others added 12 commits July 28, 2026 13:33
_save_auth() wrote the bearer token with tmp.open('w') — created at
process umask (typically 0o644) — and only chmod'ed to 0o600 after the
write, leaving a window where the token sat world-readable. The temp
name was also fixed and predictable (auth.json.tmp), so it could be
pre-planted (symlink attack).

Create the temp file with os.open(O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, 0o600) and a
per-process random suffix, fsync before the atomic replace, and clean
the temp file up on failure. Mirrors hermes_cli/auth.py:_save_auth_store
(#19673, #21148), which hardened the same pattern in the core writer.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Review follow-up: if os.fdopen() raised before taking ownership of the
descriptor returned by os.open(), the cleanup handler unlinked the temp
file but leaked the fd. Close it explicitly on that path, mirroring the
credential-writer cleanup from #62837.

Strengthen the tests so the old writer could not pass them: an os.open
spy asserts O_CREAT | O_EXCL and an explicit 0o600 mode (the final-mode
check alone was also satisfied by the post-write chmod), and a forced
fdopen-failure test asserts the raw fd is closed and no temp file is
left behind.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
… lock

store_photon_token/store_project_credentials/store_user_numbers read-modify-
wrote auth.json without hermes_cli/auth.py's _auth_store_lock(), the
cross-process flock every other writer of that file (credential_pool
refresh, model_switch, fallback_cmd, nous_portal adapter, etc.) already
holds. A concurrent write from either side during the unlocked
load-mutate-save window silently drops the other side's update.
…tup (#72763)

Two related bugs in hermes photon setup / gateway_setup:

Bug 1 -- stale token reused (401)
----------------------------------
_cmd_setup reused an existing dashboard token without validation.
The device token has a short TTL (~3-4 days observed); reusing a
stale token caused every management API call (find_project_by_name,
regenerate_project_secret, etc.) to fail with 401.  The operator
saw confusing "spectrum provisioning failed: 401" errors.

Fix: check GET /api/auth/get-session before using the stored token.
On 401/403, clear the stale token with clear_photon_token() and
fall back to a fresh device-login flow automatically.

Bug 2 -- channel left disabled after successful setup
-----------------------------------------------------
After all five provisioning steps completed, config.yaml still had
photon.enabled: false, so the gateway never loaded the Photon
adapter.  Every inbound iMessage hit Photon's offline auto-responder
without the operator being notified.

Fix: call write_platform_config_field('photon', 'enabled', True,
raw=True) as a final setup step so the gateway picks up the freshly
configured channel on its next start.

New public API in auth.py:
  - clear_photon_token()   -- discard stored token from auth.json
  - check_photon_token_valid(token) -- lightweight session-check test

References: #72763
Maintainer follow-up to the #72763 salvage: check_photon_token_valid()
now delegates to the existing validate_photon_token() (session lookup +
/api/projects/) instead of a bespoke get-session-only probe, since the
device flow can mint tokens that pass the session check but fail the
project APIs that setup actually uses. Semantics preserved: definitive
auth rejection = stale, transient errors = probably-valid.
…alid

hermes photon setup unconditionally called regenerate_project_secret()
on every re-run, invalidating the credential held by a running sidecar
and causing all outbound sends to fail with AuthenticationError.

Now validates existing credentials via a lightweight list_users call
before deciding to regenerate. Only rotates when no credentials exist
or the existing ones are invalid, and warns the user to restart the
gateway when rotation occurs.

Fixes #50755
…gnostic chain

Problema
--------
Quando o npm install do sidecar Photon falhava, o Hermes descartava toda
evidencia e continuava normalmente - deixando o adapter de iMessage
silenciosamente ausente, sem nenhuma mensagem de erro acionavel.

Tres falhas independentes formavam o caminho de falha silenciosa:

1. check_requirements() sem logging
   Cada branch de return False retornava sem emitir nenhum log. O core em
   platform_registry.py so consome o bool de check_fn() e loga uma mensagem
   generica com o install_hint - sem acesso ao motivo real da falha.

     if not HTTPX_AVAILABLE:     return False  # sem log
     if not shutil.which(node):  return False  # sem log
     if not node_modules.exists: return False  # sem log

2. node_modules/ parcialmente criado passava o guard (Risk 2)
   npm cria node_modules/ antes de abortar em ENOSPC, timeout de rede ou
   EACCES. O diretorio existia, check_requirements() retornava True (falso
   positivo), o adapter era registrado, e o crash acontecia em runtime com
   um erro de modulo ausente aparentemente nao relacionado ao setup.

3. stderr do npm descartado (Risk 3)
   subprocess.run sem stderr=PIPE. O output de erro aparecia no terminal
   durante o setup e sumia depois - diagnostico impossivel em CI/CD, Docker,
   VPS headless, e qualquer reinstalacao posterior.

Correcoes
---------
adapter.py - check_requirements() agora loga por branch:
  - httpx ausente       -> logger.warning com nome do pacote
  - node nao no PATH    -> logger.warning com nome do binario e env var
  - spectrum-ts ausente -> logger.debug com path do sidecar + ultimo erro npm
    (DEBUG nao WARNING: estado normal pre-setup; check_fn() e chamado de
    5 hot paths do core incluindo polling do /api/status)

adapter.py - content check em vez de existence check (Risk 2):
  antes:  if not (_SIDECAR_DIR / node_modules).exists()
  depois: if not (_SIDECAR_DIR / node_modules / spectrum-ts).exists()
  spectrum-ts e a unica dependencia do package.json. Checar sua presenca
  garante que instalacao parcial/abortada e detectada no boot do gateway,
  nao na primeira mensagem recebida via gRPC.

cli.py - stderr capturado e persistido (Risk 3):
  subprocess.run passa agora stderr=subprocess.PIPE, text=True em ambas as
  chamadas (npm ci e npm install fallback). O stderr capturado e:
    - impresso em sys.stderr imediatamente (output visivel no terminal)
    - persistido em _NPM_ERROR_LOG = sidecar/.photon-npm-error.log se
      returncode != 0, limitado a 300 chars
    - apagado de _NPM_ERROR_LOG se returncode == 0 (evita erro stale)
  check_requirements() le _NPM_ERROR_LOG quando spectrum-ts esta ausente e
  inclui o conteudo no DEBUG log - o erro do npm sobrevive ao terminal, ao
  restart do gateway e a reinicializacao da maquina.

sidecar/.gitignore - adicionado node_modules/ e .photon-npm-error.log.

Isolamento - sem impacto no core:
  - check_fn() continua retornando apenas bool; core nao e modificado
  - Logging usa namespace plugins.platforms.photon.adapter, isolado de
    gateway.* e hermes_cli.*
  - Cada plugin tem seu proprio check_requirements() independente
  - OSError no write/read de _NPM_ERROR_LOG e silenciado - nunca propaga

Testes - 24/24 passando:
  test_check_requirements_risks.py (7 testes):
    WARNING emitido quando httpx ausente
    WARNING emitido quando node nao no PATH
    DEBUG emitido (nao WARNING) quando spectrum-ts ausente, com path
    node_modules/ vazio agora retorna False (Risk 2 resolvido)
    _NPM_ERROR_LOG escrito no stderr do npm em falha
    _NPM_ERROR_LOG apagado apos npm bem-sucedido
    erro npm aparece no DEBUG log quando node_modules ausente

  test_npm_error_log_regression.py (9 testes - vetores de falha da solucao):
    return code contrato intacto (0 em sucesso, nao-zero em falha)
    OSError no write do log silenciado, exit code ainda propagado
    OSError no read do log silenciado, check_requirements() retorna False
    stderr vazio nao cria arquivo de log
    proc.stderr=None nao lanca AttributeError
    log stale apagado apos reinstall bem-sucedido
    DEBUG emitido mesmo sem log de erro (setup pela primeira vez)

Closes #50981

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Addresses teknium1 review on #50983:

- cli.py's `hermes photon status` and adapter.py's _start_sidecar() still
  used the old node_modules/-existence check while check_requirements()
  had moved to a spectrum-ts content check. Extracted the check into a
  shared sidecar_deps_installed(), used by all three, so an
  empty/partial node_modules/ (aborted npm install) is rejected
  consistently instead of only in check_requirements().
- _install_sidecar()'s success-path _NPM_ERROR_LOG.unlink() only caught
  FileNotFoundError, so a PermissionError/OSError on a locked file would
  propagate. Broadened to OSError.
- npm stderr was truncated only when read back in check_requirements();
  an unbounded stderr was written to disk on every failed install. Now
  truncated to _NPM_ERROR_LOG_MAX_CHARS before write_text().

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
All Photon sidecar HTTP requests target 127.0.0.1 — they should
never be routed through a system HTTP proxy. When trust_env=True
(the default), httpx picks up macOS system proxy settings and
routes localhost requests through the proxy. If the proxy returns
a spurious response (e.g. 502), _reap_stale_sidecar() interprets
it as 'port in use by a non-sidecar process' and refuses to start,
yielding: 'pids: unknown, not a Photon sidecar'.

Set trust_env=False on all five httpx.AsyncClient call sites in
the Photon adapter so localhost sidecar communication bypasses
the system proxy entirely.
Maintainer follow-up: #60427's leak tests predate #64902's cross-process
lock, whose auth.lock sentinel legitimately persists next to auth.json.
Maintainer follow-up: _cmd_setup now validates existing tokens (#72763
salvage); the pre-existing setup tests monkeypatch a stored token, so
without stubbing check_photon_token_valid they'd hit the real dashboard
API and hang.
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