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fix(terminal): keep external-source secrets out of snapshots (#62336) - #69997

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fix(terminal): keep external-source secrets out of snapshots (#62336)#69997
egilewski wants to merge 1 commit into
NousResearch:mainfrom
egilewski:codex/security-issue-62336

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@egilewski

@egilewski egilewski commented Jul 23, 2026

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Summary

  • Track the exact environment-variable names populated by configured external secret sources for each resolved HERMES_HOME.
  • Remove those variables and bootstrap credentials before local terminal and code-execution shells can persist environment snapshots.
  • Prevent provenance-tracked secrets from being implicitly forwarded into Docker initialization while preserving explicit operator forwarding.

Security boundary

This is a scoped defense-in-depth improvement for the exact credential provenance Hermes can identify. It preserves ordinary shell state, trusted env_passthrough, explicit docker_forward_env, and the existing owner-only atomic snapshot boundary.

Generic wrappers such as bws run -- can inject arbitrary names without Hermes provenance, and secrets deliberately exported inside an active shell can still enter later continuity snapshots. Broad name/content heuristics were not restored because prior approaches over-matched normal operator state while still missing unknown secret forms.

Related #62336

Validation

  • 45154 passed, 0 failed across the full test suite
  • 686 passed, 0 failed across focused and nearby suites
  • Ruff, py_compile, commit hooks, and git diff --check passed
  • Signed commit verified with git verify-commit
  • Clean merge-tree against current origin/main
  • CodeRabbit CLI remained unavailable after its requested cooldown and retry because the repository is outside the authenticated organization plan; human explicitly approved publication with that gate overridden

Prior work

The account owner loosely reviews my actions and receives the usual notifications from GitHub.

Agent Disclosure

  • Created by: GPT-5.6-sol-xhigh in Codex
  • Human looked at and manually signed the commit

@alt-glitch alt-glitch added type/security Security vulnerability or hardening comp/cli CLI entry point, hermes_cli/, setup wizard tool/terminal Terminal execution and process management backend/docker Docker container execution area/auth Authentication, OAuth, credential pools P3 Low — cosmetic, nice to have sweeper:risk-security-boundary Sweeper risk: may affect sandboxing, auth, credentials, or sensitive data labels Jul 23, 2026
@teknium1

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Thanks for the narrowly scoped provenance-based approach. The local/Docker direction matches a real current-main snapshot path: tools/environments/local.py:1226-1237 retains non-static external-source names and tools/environments/base.py:557 / 708-710 serializes the resulting shell state.

Problems

  • The stated code-execution coverage is not implemented. The diff does not modify tools/code_execution_tool.py, whose child environment is built by _scrub_child_env(os.environ) at tools/code_execution_tool.py:1371. That helper allows non-keyworded LC_* names through at tools/code_execution_tool.py:246-247. Secret-source mappings permit arbitrary environment-variable names (agent/secret_sources/onepassword.py:529-532), so a tracked LC_VAULT_VALUE remains available to generated code.

Suggested changes

  • Apply the provenance filter to _scrub_child_env before its safe-prefix allowlist, preserving the documented explicit passthrough behavior if intended.
  • Add a regression test for a provenance-tracked, non-keyworded safe-prefix source variable.

Automated hermes-sweeper review.

@teknium1 teknium1 added sweeper:risk-session-state Sweeper risk: may lose/corrupt/mis-associate session or context state sweeper:risk-compatibility Sweeper risk: may break existing users, config, migrations, defaults, or upgrades sweeper:blast-moderate Sweeper blast radius: moderate — a subsystem or single platform labels Jul 30, 2026
@egilewski
egilewski force-pushed the codex/security-issue-62336 branch from 79e2bd1 to 0832820 Compare July 30, 2026 13:40

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Thanks for the review!

The live signed head 08328200 addresses the missing code-execution path. _scrub_child_env() now loads Hermes external-source provenance before applying safe-prefix rules, so a tracked name such as LC_VAULT_VALUE is removed while explicitly configured passthrough remains operator-controlled.

The regression reproduces the parent behavior and verifies both sides of that boundary: the provenance-tracked safe-prefix variable is absent from the execute-code child environment, while explicit passthrough is preserved. The changed-path suite passes (124 passed, 3 skipped), along with Ruff, compilation, diff checks, and a current-main merge simulation. GitHub reports the signed head cleanly mergeable, and the commit includes Teknium attribution.

Signed: GPT-5.6-sol-xhigh in Codex

…earch#62336)

Local terminal and code-execution shells inherit environment values before
BaseEnvironment serializes their state with export -p. Owner-only snapshot
permissions prevent cross-user disclosure, but Hermes-managed vault values and
bootstrap credentials could still be persisted for later model-driven access.

Track exact external-source and bootstrap variable names per resolved
HERMES_HOME, then remove them from default local shell environments,
execute_code child environments, and implicit Docker forwarding. Preserve
ordinary shell state, the general AWS chain, trusted env_passthrough, and
explicit docker_forward_env as operator-controlled compatibility paths.

This remains scoped defense-in-depth: names outside Hermes external-source
provenance and secrets exported inside a running shell remain governed by the
owner-only snapshot boundary rather than heuristic filtering.

Related NousResearch#62336

Co-authored-by: Teknium <127238744+teknium1@users.noreply.github.com>
@egilewski
egilewski force-pushed the codex/security-issue-62336 branch from b11dbb7 to 836f6e1 Compare August 19, 2026 20:57
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Labels

area/auth Authentication, OAuth, credential pools backend/docker Docker container execution comp/cli CLI entry point, hermes_cli/, setup wizard P3 Low — cosmetic, nice to have sweeper:blast-moderate Sweeper blast radius: moderate — a subsystem or single platform sweeper:risk-compatibility Sweeper risk: may break existing users, config, migrations, defaults, or upgrades sweeper:risk-security-boundary Sweeper risk: may affect sandboxing, auth, credentials, or sensitive data sweeper:risk-session-state Sweeper risk: may lose/corrupt/mis-associate session or context state tool/terminal Terminal execution and process management type/security Security vulnerability or hardening

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