fix(security): pipe sudo password via stdin instead of shell cmdline - #698
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johnh4098 wants to merge 1 commit into
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fix(security): pipe sudo password via stdin instead of shell cmdline#698johnh4098 wants to merge 1 commit into
johnh4098 wants to merge 1 commit into
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Important security fix — clean separation of password from command line across all 6 backends. All 2857 tests pass. Merged to main. Thanks @johnh4098! 🔒🎉 |
teknium1
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Mar 10, 2026
… shell cmdline Authored by johnh4098. Fixes CWE-214: SUDO_PASSWORD was visible in /proc/PID/cmdline via echo pipe. Now passed through subprocess stdin. All 6 backends updated: local, ssh, docker, singularity pipe via stdin; modal and daytona use printf fallback (remote sandbox, documented).
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…n instead of shell cmdline Authored by johnh4098. Fixes CWE-214: SUDO_PASSWORD was visible in /proc/PID/cmdline via echo pipe. Now passed through subprocess stdin. All 6 backends updated: local, ssh, docker, singularity pipe via stdin; modal and daytona use printf fallback (remote sandbox, documented).
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…n instead of shell cmdline Authored by johnh4098. Fixes CWE-214: SUDO_PASSWORD was visible in /proc/PID/cmdline via echo pipe. Now passed through subprocess stdin. All 6 backends updated: local, ssh, docker, singularity pipe via stdin; modal and daytona use printf fallback (remote sandbox, documented).
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Jul 2, 2026
…n instead of shell cmdline Authored by johnh4098. Fixes CWE-214: SUDO_PASSWORD was visible in /proc/PID/cmdline via echo pipe. Now passed through subprocess stdin. All 6 backends updated: local, ssh, docker, singularity pipe via stdin; modal and daytona use printf fallback (remote sandbox, documented).
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SUDO_PASSWORD was being passed as part of the shell command string:
This makes the password visible in /proc//cmdline and ps aux for
the entire duration of the command — readable by any unprivileged
process on the same machine (CWE-214).
The fix passes the password through subprocess stdin instead. The
transformed command now contains bare
sudo -S -p ''with nocredential in the argument list. The password travels as bytes in
memory only.
local, ssh, docker, singularity — full fix via stdin pipe
modal, daytona — fallback with printf (remote sandbox, different
threat model), noted in comments
Fixes the credential exposure on any system where SUDO_PASSWORD is set.